Division Of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project Review

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Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewA Report from the Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC)Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR)Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Barbara Ellis, PhD, DFOApproved by Vote of the BSC: April 22, 2011Respectfully Submitted: March 19, 2012

Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Program ReviewOffice of Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR)Ad Hoc Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC) Workgroup ReportTable of Contents1.0Review Objectives and Process.32.0Scope of the Review .53.0Workgroup Findings and Observations3.13.24.0CDC Emergency Operations Center .8Barriers .10EOC Facilities and Work Environment 11EOC Procedures .15EOC Services 16Feedback Mechanisms .17Training 18Metrics .20Director’s Critical Information Requirements 21DCIR Strengths and Weaknesses .21Information Prioritization Framework .22AppendicesA.Workgroup Member Biographies.24B.Pre-Meeting Teleconference Agenda.31C.Pre-Meeting Teleconference Slide Presentations 33D.Workgroup Meeting Agenda, Atlanta, January 26-28, 2010 .64E.List of Briefing Materials Provided in Advance to the Workgroup .67F.Division of Emergency Operations Overview, May 2009 .70G.Acronyms .74Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 2 of 76

1.0REVIEW OBJECTIVES AND PROCESSBackgroundExternal peer review is a highly regarded mechanism for critically evaluating the scientific andtechnical merit of research and scientific programs. This rigorous process identifies strengths,gaps, redundancy, and research or program effectiveness in order to inform decisions regardingscientific direction, scope, prioritization, and financial stewardship. External peer review willaddress program quality, approach, direction, capability, and integrity and will also be used toevaluate the program’s public health impact and relevance to the missions of the Centers forDisease Control (CDC) and the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR;previously known as the Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and EmergencyResponse, or COTPER).OPHPR has established standardized methods for peer review of intramural research andscientific programs in order to ensure consistent and high quality reviews. A more detaileddescription of CDC’s and OPHPR’s peer review policy is available on request.CDC policy requires that all scientific programs 1 (including research and non-research) that areconducted or funded by CDC be subject to external peer review at least once every five years.The focus of the review should be on scientific and technical quality and may also includemission relevance and program impact. The OPHPR Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC)provides oversight functions for the research and scientific program reviews. The BSC primarilyutilizes ad hoc workgroups or expert panels to conduct the reviews. It is anticipated that the BSCwill be engaged in most of the reviews and they may elect to utilize workgroups, subcommitteesor workgroups under subcommittees to assist in the review. The BSC will evaluate findings andmake summary recommendations on all reviews, including those they engage in, as well asreviews performed by other external experts.1Scientific program is defined as the term “scientific program” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, intramural andextramural research and non-research (e.g., public health practice, core support services).Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 3 of 76

Review Objectives1. Evaluate CDC’s EOC and provide recommendations on any improvements that could bemade in CDC EOC facilities or services in order to maximize a CDC public healthresponse effort.2. Evaluate CDC’s use of the DCIR framework to prioritize upward information flow toCDC leadership.Review Process and Timeline:The peer review was conducted by a 7-member ad hoc workgroup with two members ofOPHPR’s Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC) serving as workgroup co-chairs and 5 invitedexpert reviewers external to the OPHPR BSC. Facilitation and logistical assistance was providedby the DEO Associate Director for Science (ADS) and the OPHPR Office of Science and PublicHealth Practice (OSPHP).1. Pre-meeting: OSPHP convened a pre-meeting web conference (webinar) with members of theworkgroup on Tuesday, January 19, 2010 from 1:00 to 3:30 pm (EST). The webinar agendaincluded overview presentations on the DEO and CDC’s response mission, CDC EOC utilizationand activation, and the DCIR concept. Reviewers were given the option of submitting writtenindividual comments in response to the review questions. These comments and questions wereintended to inform the co-chairs and assist OPHPR in providing the workgroup with thenecessary information in advance of the in-person meeting.2. Workgroup meeting: The workgroup met for two and one-half days from January 26-28, 2010in Atlanta, GA. On the first day and on the morning of the second day, there were presentationsfrom DEO staff as well as from external stakeholders, discussions, and question-and-answersessions. On the afternoon of the second day and the morning of the third day, the workgroupconvened privately to deliberate, formulate findings, and write a draft workgroup report.3. Post-meeting: The workgroup Chair(s) took the lead in completing the final report with inputfrom the workgroup. Workgroup members and OPHPR and DEO program leadership have hadDivision of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 4 of 76

the opportunity to review and comment on the findings in the workgroup report before it wasfinalized. DEO will have the opportunity to provide program responses to any findings andindividual recommendations in the report at the next BSC meeting. The full BSC will deliberateon the final panel report during its next meeting and present final recommendations to OPHPRleadership. DEO will respond to the BSC recommendations in writing and present their responseand implementation plan at the next full BSC meeting.2.0SCOPE OF THE REVIEWBackgroundCDC EOCPrior to 2003, all of CDC’s public health event responses were managed by the program officewithin the Center, Institute, or Office (CIO) at CDC that housed the scientific and technicalsubject matter experts (SMEs) that were most knowledgeable in responding to the incident.Since 2003, the CDC EOC has provided a centralized, physical location to manage CDC’sresponse to large-scale domestic and international public health incidents.CDC leadership, in consultation with CDC’s SMEs and the Director of OPHPR’s Division ofEmergency Operations (DEO), determines how the CDC EOC will be used in response to apublic health incident. Usage may range from partial facility utilization in support of a programmanaged response to full activation of the Incident Management System (IMS) in support of anagency-wide response such as Hurricane Katrina or the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenzaresponse. Typically, when program resources are exceeded, CDC EOC may be utilized oractivated to support their response efforts. At that time, CDC transitions from a programmanaged response to a centralized, agency-wide response utilizing staffing from across CDC tosupport the IMS within the CDC EOC.CDC is primarily a scientific public health organization where the workplace is dominated by apublic health science culture and public health program specialist culture. In contrast,emergency response as mandated by the National Incident Management System (NIMS) has itsDivision of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 5 of 76

cultural roots in public safety operations (police, firefighting and the military). Each of thesethree cultures (i.e., public health science, public health practice, and emergency response) viewsthe EOC through its own unique workplace cultural filters. These differences in workplaceculture may result in potential cultural dilemmas such as miscommunication founded indifferences of perspectives, the potential for confusion regarding CDC’s roles andresponsibilities in emergency preparedness and response, differences in beliefs that result indifficulties in understanding and barriers which may inhibit effective public health emergencyresponse efforts and erode trust and confidence among different CDC groups.Successful integration of these three workplace cultures within the CDC EOC where theyconverge to form the unique attributes of a public health response culture is the key to improvingCDC EOC and thus improving CDC public health response as a whole. DEO requests that the adhoc BSC workgroup conducting this review make suggestions regarding initiatives that may beuseful in accelerating this integration (for example, training DEO staff to improvecommunication skills or cross-training SMEs and DEO staff).CDC Director’s Critical Information Requirements (DCIR) ConceptThe DCIR concept constitutes a framework of pre-identified categories of incident-specificinformation that the CDC Director considers vital to leadership’s decision making and situationalawareness. The DCIR framework is a dynamic and flexible framework that can be easilymodified to add new, or change existing, information requirements at the discretion of the CDCDirector. This framework defines: The information needed by the Director The urgency of reporting that information. (i.e., immediate phone call and e-mail anytime of day, or wait until normal business hours)DCIRs ensure that information transmitted to the CDC Director is meaningful and readilyrecognized as critical to the Director’s situation awareness. DCIRs allow the CDC Director todefine further information needs and, in turn, focus agency efforts to acquire, filter, process, andsynthesize information. DCIRs depend on the information requirements for each specific publichealth incident as outlined in the incident specific appendices of CDC’s Emergency OperationDivision of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 6 of 76

Plan (EOP) and should include the key decisions the Director is likely to make, and the type ofinformation required to support those key decisions. There are two tiers of DCIRs: Standing DCIRs which are broad information categories that are in effect at all times andare posted in the CDC Emergency Operations Center (CDC EOC) Incident-Specific DCIRs that usually cascade down from the standing DCIRs and providemore granularity or specificity to the information categories required by the Director.These are developed by SMEs in the applicable CIO(s).Peer Review Objectives and Focus Questions1. Evaluate CDC’s EOC and provide recommendations on any improvements that could bemade in CDC EOC facilities or services in order to maximize a CDC public healthresponse effort. The ad hoc workgroup will do this by hearing from internal CDCstakeholders during the review, as well as from review of an internal stakeholder surveyinput survey conducted by OPHPR. Barriers: What are the significant barriers to utilization or activation of the CDCEOC by internal stakeholders? What are your recommendations for mitigating oreliminating these barriers? EOC Facilities and Work Environment: What changes or modifications to CDCEOC facilities and work environment would be expected to increase thewillingness of internal stakeholders to utilize the CDC EOC or request itsactivation for response to a public health incident? EOC Procedures: What procedural changes from those outlined in CDC EOP,would increase internal stakeholder activation or utilization of the CDC EOC? EOC Services: What services could DEO provide to internal stakeholders thatwould be expected to increase the utilization or activation of the CDC EOC? Feedback Mechanisms: What improvements can be made in addition to the AARprocess to obtain feedback from CDC EOC internal stakeholders? Training: What additional the training from that outlined by OPHPR’s LearningOffice needs to be provided or improved to facilitate CDC EOC utilization oractivation?Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 7 of 76

Metrics: How best can DEO measure the success of its efforts to support internalstakeholders? How best can DEO measure impact of its efforts to support internalstakeholders?2. Evaluate CDC’s use of the DCIR framework to prioritize upward information flow toCDC leadership. The ad hoc workgroup will do this by hearing from internal CDCstakeholders during the review, reviewing existing documentation as well as from reviewof an internal stakeholder survey input survey conducted by OPHPR. DCIR Strengths and Weakness: Review the current draft CDC policy on DCIRand determine what are the strengths and weaknesses of the DCIR framework asit is currently used to facilitate the upward flow of actionable information to CDCleadership? Information Prioritization Frameworks: Review incident specific H1N1 responseDCIRs from April - November 2009. What framework should be used for theprioritization and reporting of public health incident information up the chain ofcommand during a response in order to provide actionable information to CDCleadership?3.0WORKGROUP FINDINGS3.1CDC Emergency Operations Center (EOC)Overall, our review of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) suggests it has evolved tobecome a highly valued component of CDC that adds value to the agency and its overallcapacity, and is a core element to the effectiveness of CDC’s public health response. We haveidentified elements to enhance the value of the EOC and its function as a core element of CDC.A substantial amount of information was provided before and during the peer review of the EOCthat took place on January 26-28, 2010. In assessing all of this information, the followingoverall conclusions can be made.Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 8 of 76

Use of the EOC has become institutionalized at CDC and its role is widely acceptedamong the various components of CDC. Since it first opened in 2003, there has been continuous improvement in the operation andutilization of the EOC along with the professionalism of the staff in the Division ofEmergency Operations (DEO). Efforts have been made to adapt standard National Incident Management System (NIMS)practices and to provide flexibility in response in order to better manage the types ofemergencies (e.g., disease outbreaks) handled by CDC and to align the EOC with theculture of CDC science.Some of the evidence for these observations comes from the stakeholder survey done in the fallof 2009 and from the presentations and panel discussions held during the peer review. Thestakeholder survey results were largely positive with respect to the utility and value of the EOC.The presenters during the peer review came from across the spectrum of CDC, includingfrequent “customers” of the EOC and those less likely to use the EOC. Individuals with lessfavorable views of their experiences in the EOC were also included in the panel discussions.However, even these individuals understood the importance of the EOC and an organizedemergency response. Most of the examples cited as problematic related to responses thatoccurred several years ago. This suggests that CDC staff have adapted to the EOC environmentand that the support services provided by the EOC have improved, even as the activity is moreheavily utilized.Although it seems obvious that the EOC provides “added value” service to the agency and it ishard to imagine managing a complex, prolonged response outside the EOC structure, the valuemay not be as obvious to everyone. DEO needs to do a better job promoting use of the EOC anddocumenting the benefits that accrue from using the facility and infrastructure, both in terms ofefficiency and outcome. This is important to further solidify support among CDC staff, toadvertise how the EOC can help, and to assure adequate investments are made in the EOC forcontinued high quality operation.Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 9 of 76

The peer review team was asked to address a series of questions, each of which is discussedbelow, along with recommendations to further improve the function of the EOC.Barriers: What are the significant barriers to utilization or activation of the CDC EOC byinternal stakeholders? What are your recommendations for mitigating or eliminatingthese barriers?During the peer review, there seemed to be a perception among the staff of OPHPR, whichincludes DEO, that the EOC was being underutilized. However, there was little evidencepresented to support that perspective. In contrast, the EOC appears to be heavily utilized. It hasbeen in a continuous state of activation since April 2009, was used for a variety of emergencyresponses before April 2009, and has been used for concurrent responses on a number ofoccasions. The EOC does not have infinite absorptive capacity, and not every CDC responseneeds to be managed in, or through, the EOC.The problem seems to be more a matter of timing for when CDC components come to the EOCrather than actual use. There are legitimate concerns about delays in various CDC componentscoming to the EOC either to utilize EOC support services or for formal activation. Severalexamples were presented. EOC staff would like to see this happen sooner rather than later. Thismay be hard to accomplish because problems arise all the time and CDC staff may have concernsabout (1) not wanting to create “false alarms”, (2) an ingrained culture of self-sufficiency amongCDC scientists, (3) loss of control or concerns about misuse of information, (4) inconvenience(especially for staff not located on the Roybal campus), and (5) an ongoing perception that use ofthe EOC creates “more work” and may create more problems than it solves.Many CDC personnel seem to have the impression that coming to the EOC equals full activation,and may be unaware of the lesser levels of assistance that can be offered. In addition, earlier useof the EOC can be accomplished only when there is a stronger working relationship and trustbetween DEO and the programs, especially those most likely to use the EOC services. To buildthat relationship and trust requires significant outreach by DEO and significant input from theagency. Specific recommendations would include:Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 10 of 76

1. Regular (e.g., quarterly) meetings between DEO and divisions/branches that arefrequent users of the EOC to obtain feedback, promote services, develop strongerinterpersonal relationships, and build trust. EOC feedback at the Division Directors’meeting would also be a mechanism for this information sharing. Similar meetings maytake place between DEO and occasional users of the EOC as necessary. This type ofoutreach seems essential, and it is important for DEO to meet agency components ontheir turf rather than having them always come to the EOC.2. Establish an internal stakeholder working group to provide input to DEO. Such aworking group should consist of members of the CDC components that are heavy usersof EOC services, and should meet on a monthly or bimonthly basis. Such a group couldgo a long way to develop stakeholder support for the EOC. However, for this group to bemost effective there should be clear evidence that efforts are being made to implementthe recommendations made by the working group to DEO.3. Continue to demonstrate flexibility in using the EOC, and make sure stakeholdersunderstand the flexibility and the services that are available. This can take the formof a menu (or suite) of services that are available from DEO short of formalactivation. Placing such a list on the website would assist in this process. This willbring components of CDC to the table earlier, and hopefully allow early phases of aresponse to be more effective for DEO and for the program.4. For the CDC Director’s action and the DEO: there should be a clear understandingamong all CDC components that complex responses are managed through the EOCstructure. This message needs to come unambiguously from the overall leadership ofCDC and the leadership of the various organizational components.EOC Facilities and Work Environment: What changes or modifications to CDC EOCfacilities and work environment would be expected to increase the willingness of internalstakeholders to utilize the CDC EOC or request its activation for response to a publichealth incident?Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 11 of 76

In the stakeholder survey and in the feedback from panelists, “lifestyle” concerns werecommonly raised. Some of these lifestyle problems are beyond the direct control of DEO. Butaddressing them is very likely to reduce barriers to utilization, increase the comfort level ofpersons working in the EOC, and make them more willing to voluntarily participate inactivations. The lifestyle concerns include availability of food after hours, rest areas, better noisecontrol, more meeting space, and dedicated parking for those deployed to the EOC.In addition, there are also two substantive concerns that need to be closely examined. First,while the EOC is located on CDC’s headquarters Roybal campus, many CDC personnel arelocated elsewhere, both in Atlanta and outside Atlanta. This represents a major inconvenience,and thus a major impediment, to use of the EOC by non-Clifton Road groups or personnel.Because this includes groups like NCEH and the immunization activity (two components that areheavy users of the EOC), this is a substantial problem that needs to be solved. Second, there is awidespread perception that to be part of a response or activation, an individual or group needs tobe physically present in the EOC. This is clearly not the case, and results in situations wheresome groups only reluctantly utilize the EOC, while others want to be there but don’t really needto be physically present. Activation or utilization of the EOC does not de facto equal physicalpresence in the EOC. Alternatives need to be developed for non-Clifton Road components andDEO needs to better develop the concept of the “remote” or “virtual” EOC. Specificrecommendations include:5. The workgroup recommends that the CDC Director initiate efforts to address lifestyle concerns. While a “concierge” function seems anathema to an emergencyresponse, it should probably be a core component of the facility to support those workingthere. This would include assuring access to healthy meal options (either by having foodmade available directly by DEO, assuring after-hours access to the cafeteria, or obtainingfood from outside sources), and maintaining a designated stress reduction/rest area. TheDEO should work with facilities management to either block a number of parking spacesfor response personnel or have a shuttle service available for off-site parking. Easilyaccessible meeting rooms/work areas for teams away from the main EOC would bebeneficial (possible to include taking over rooms in the global communications center forDivision of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 12 of 76

large-scale activations). Noise mitigation efforts should also be assessed. This is furtheraddressed in recommendations 12, 13 and 14 below.6. While a backup EOC exists in Lawrenceville, this location is not especially convenientfor most Atlanta-based CDC components. Although expensive, the workgrouprecommends that the CDC Director consider a smaller, but full-service additionalEOC on the Chamblee campus. EOC satellite facilities should also be consideredfor the non-Atlanta locations, especially NIOSH and Fort Collins where it isimpractical, expensive, and bad for morale for staff to come to Atlanta for extendedperiods.7. To reduce the number of individuals physically present in the EOC when activated,alternative models should be developed for participation via a “virtual” EOC.Present activities to develop virtual EOC procedures and software address this issueand should be moved forward. This would also likely enhance the willingness ofpersonnel to participate in a response and would reduce stress. Such an approach wouldallow responders to participate from their usual work location, or when necessary fromhome or the field. It is especially helpful for those who may need to be engagedepisodically or briefly, or those located on other campuses or outside of Atlanta. This isfurther discussed in recommendations 10 and 11. The workgroup observed thatexpanding the physical size of the current EOC on the Roybal campus seemsunwarranted, especially if some of the approaches above can be implemented.8. EOC Working Space Availability:a. Review and make changes to the layout of the EOC to increase its flexibilityand utilization for essential functions. Consideration may be given tomodularized organization which may better enable flexible multiple eventEOC response.b. Move from the EOC physical space those functions that can be handledeffectively by virtual participation.c. Make site visits to well-regarded EOCs elsewhere in the nation that usealternative arrangements of organization to assess the feasibility of usingthese approaches at CDC (e.g., EOCs that do not use the mission-control style).For example, an alternative for the main floor would be a shift to laptopDivision of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 13 of 76

computers on moveable tables that can be separated or clustered as needed to suitthe requirements of effective response to a given incident. Greater flexibility inlayout of the EOC also would create the potential to separate groups respondingto different, concurrent incidents within the space of the EOC main floor. Apriority in space should be the application of space released for new uses torespond to now-inadequately met mission needs. Notable among these areexpansion of the confined area for the JIC and creation of additional quiet areasfor focused preparation of briefings and reports.d. The OPHR Director should address the issues of noise by examining thefeasibility of implementing the previously developed sound deadening planfor the EOC main room.9. CDC Buildings and Facilities operations should address the HVAC Environment:Identify and implement improvements to the heating, ventilation, and airconditioning throughout the EOC.10. Virtual Emergency Management: Develop a plan to maximize the use of virtualcoordination, collaboration, decision-making, and administration for the array ofCDC emergency management approaches from short-duration, limited-scaleincidents to extended, enterprise-level incidents. CDC’s management of emergenciesin many instances is an enterprise endeavor in which the EOC itself is but onecomponent. CDC’s capacity, agility, and effectiveness in emergency management wouldlikely be enhanced through application of existing, proven virtual systems. Mostsignificant is the potential to speed and improve the insight and quality of collaborativedecision making by virtual means that engage stakeholders across CDC as needed. Acollateral benefit should be reducing the need for SMEs to relocate physically to the EOCfor an incident. Achievement of effective virtual collaboration and decision makingshould increase the number of incidents that are addressed effectively by CDC short ofactivating the EOC. Commonly cited inhibiting factors in use of the EOC, such astracking of personnel and their relevant capabilities can be reduced by othercomplementary IT-based systems. These actions may also result in improved emergencymanagement outcomes, a higher level of CDC participant satisfaction, and lowerfinancial cost to CDC.Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) Project ReviewAd Hoc BSC Workgroup ReportApril 22, 2011Page 14 of 76

11. Explore the value/cost savings/issues of virtual capabilities (coordination,collaboration) for present EOC (Atlanta). Explore the value/cost savings/issues ofsatellite EOCs for places not on Clifton Road (e.g., Chamblee or Fort Collins). Thiswill be addressed via a cost benefit analysis.12. The CDC senior leadership needs to engage appropriate facilities managementcomponents of CDC to develop and implement plans to address:a. Parking: Consideration should be given to blocking a group of parkingspaces reserved for personnel deployed to the EOC during an activation orother emergency response, especially for those not usually located on theRoybal Campus.b. Food Service: Reliable solutions are needed for 24-hour food service duringan activation to include healthy and nutritious food optionsc. Hygiene and rest: Options should be developed and implemented to assureadequate access to shower, bathroom, and rest areas during an activation.EOC Procedures: What procedural changes from those outlined in CDC’s EmergencyOperations Plan would increase internal stakeholder a

1. Evaluate CDC's EOC and provide recommendations on any improvements that could be made in CDC EOC facilities or services in order to maximize a CDC public health response effort. The ad hoc workgroup will do this by hearing from internal CDC stakeholders during the review, as well as from review of an internal stakeholder survey

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