And The Liberation Of Walcheren 2 October - 7 November 1944
SECOND WORLD WAR60THANNIVERSARYThe Clearing of the Scheldt Estuaryand the Liberation of Walcheren2 October – 7 November 1944‘Operations designed to open up Antwerp’s port to Allied shipping’No.8
The clearing of the ScheldtEstuary and the liberationof WalcherenTHE SCHELDT ESTUARY AND WALCHEREN, NETHERLANDSNORTH SEALondon NETHERLANDSBerlin Paris BELGIUMGERMANYFRANCENETHERLANDSAmsterdam Rotterdam Ostend Antwerp BrusselsENGLISH CHANNEL BELGIUMFRANCE ParisKEY FACTSThe Scheldt Estuary is: The entrance to the largest harbourin Europe (Antwerp)Walcheren island is: In the province of Zeeland Situated at the mouth of theScheldt EstuaryCover image: A Churchill tank of 34th Armoured Brigade crosses an obstacle in RoosendaalIWM B 11490
SCHELDT AND WALCHEREN 1Foreword by theUnder Secretary of State for Defenceand Minister for Veterans, Don Touhig MPThis series of commemorative booklets is dedicated to those who foughtfor our freedom in the Second World War. The booklets provide adetailed account of key actions of the war for those familiar with theperiod, as well as serving as an educational tool for younger peopleless familiar with the heroic action of Allied Service Personnel.The successful Allied clearing of the Scheldt Estuary forms the subject ofthis eighth booklet. Following the D-Day landings of the previous spring,Allied supply lines were becoming ever more stretched as the armiesadvanced into the Netherlands, leaving their logistical base in Normandy.Comprising a succession of collaborative operations between British andCanadian Forces, the securing of the port of Antwerp and its ScheldtEstuary provided a crucial logistical platform from which further assaultson the Third Reich could be launched.Combining amphibious and ground operations, the Allied forcesmanaged to secure the Scheldt Estuary up from Antwerp, isolating theheavily defended island fortress of Walcheren. By 7 November 1944,a daring dual-pronged amphibious attack took Walcheren from the12,000 defending German soldiers and connected the crucial postto Beveland. This allowed for supplies to be delivered more effectivelyto Allied forces in North-West Europe, and was instrumental in the roadto victory.As we celebrate and commemorate these crucial events of the SecondWorld War, it is important to remember that those who gave their livesduring those dark days did so for the freedom we enjoy today. Sixtyyears on we must take this opportunity to salute the bravery and ingenuityof our Service personnel and we must continue to pass the baton ofremembrance to future generations, so that these heroes will continueto be honoured and the level of their sacrifice understood.
2 SCHELDT AND WALCHERENThe background to the clearing of the ScheldtEstuary and the liberation of WalcherenThe battle of the Scheldt, October – November 1944During late August and early September1944, after the collapse of the German frontin Normandy, Field Marshal Montgomery’s21st Army Group advanced rapidly northand north-east through Northern France andBelgium. On 4 September, British forces andlocal resistance fighters captured Antwerpin northern Belgium. This was a tremendousprize, since Antwerp’s docks were the largestin Europe. Once opened to Allied shipping,the harbour would revolutionise the deliveryof Allied supplies into mainland Europe. Atthat time, most Allied supplies still had tobe delivered over the Normandy beachesor via Cherbourg, necessitating lengthyoverland transportation. Then, as now,the transportation of bulk supplies by landwas many times less effective comparedwith transportation by water. This supplyproblem now increasingly influenced Alliedoperations as their forces advanced towardGermany. To maintain the momentum of theiradvance, the Allies had to open Antwerp’s portas quickly as possible. But to do this the Alliesalso had to clear the enemy from the 50 km(30 mile) Scheldt Estuary that lay downstreamof the port. The operations to clear theScheldt (correctly, West Scheldt) Estuarywere undertaken between 2 October and25 November 1944. During this period,the land forces, First Canadian Army, wereled temporarily by Lieutenant-General GuySimonds (the commander of II CanadianCorps) in place of the sick General HenryCrerar. These operations comprised six mainmissions determined primarily by theregion’s geography. In chronologicalorder, these were:
SCHELDT AND WALCHEREN 2–23 October, 2nd Canadian Divisioncleared the eastern approaches to the RiverScheldt as it ran north-east from Antwerp asfar as Woensdrecht. This advance isolatedthe German forces on South Beveland from theircolleagues deployed on the Dutch mainland.South Beveland was a long thin peninsula thatstretched west for 30 km (19 miles) to form thenorthern bank of the Scheldt Estuary. Between 6 October and 3 November,3rd Canadian Division mounted OperationSwitchback. This battle eliminated theGerman positions in the Breskens Pocket,located on the southern bank of the mouthof the Scheldt Estuary. Between 20 October and 7 November,4th Canadian Armoured Division, plus unitsof Ist (British) Corps, secured the north-easternflank of First Canadian Army. These forcesfought their way north from Antwerp towardsthe estuary of the River Maas. Between 24 and 31 October, Alliedforces mounted Operation Vitality, inwhich 2nd Canadian Division advancedwest along South Beveland. Meanwhile,the British 52nd (Lowland) Division initiatedan amphibious assault on the southern coastof the peninsula.IWM B 11746Field Marshal Montgomery (front centre) with Lt-GenSimonds (front left) and Maj-Gen Spry (rear, secondfrom right) 6 November 1944 3 Between 31 October and 7 November,Allied troops executed Operation Infatuate. Thisinvolved two British amphibious assaults on theheavily defended island fortress of Walcheren,located at the north-western corner of theestuary. Simultaneously, 52nd Division attackedWalcheren’s eastern coast. Some of its forcesexecuted an amphibious assault across the SloeChannel while others mounted a ground attackvia the connecting causeway from Beveland. Finally, between 3 and 25 November, RoyalNavy minesweepers undertook OperationCalendar. Once the threat of fire fromthe shore had been removed, these vesselswere able to clear the extensive Germanminefields, so that merchant ships could makea safe passage up the estuary to Antwerp.KEY FACTSList of commandersALLIED:First Canadian Army:Lt-Gen G.G. Simonds (acting commanderin place of the sick Gen H.D.G. Crerar)II Canadian Corps:Maj-Gen C. Foulkes (actingcommander in place of Simonds)I (British) Corps:Lt-Gen J.T. Crocker1st Polish Armoured Division:Maj-Gen S. Maczek2nd Canadian Division:Brig R.H. Keefler (acting commanderin place of Foulkes)3rd Canadian Division:Maj-Gen D.C. Spry4th Canadian Armoured Division:Maj-Gen H.W. Foster52nd (Lowland) Division:Maj-Gen E. Hakewell SmithForce T:Capt A.F. Pugsley RN4 Commando Brigade:Brig B.W. Leicester RMAXIS:Fifteenth German Army:Gen Gustav Adolf von Zangen
4 SCHELDT AND WALCHERENThe battle for the Scheldt EstuaryWalcheren island, October 1944By 26 September 1944, after a disorganisedretreat from France, the Germans had managedto re-establish a solid front in the Scheldtregion of Belgium. Their lines ran from nearAntwerp, west along South Beveland, andonto Walcheren island, and extended downonto the estuary’s southern bank aroundBreskens. In the previous three weeks, theGermans had extricated their FifteenthArmy from potential encirclement south ofthe estuary. This command used improvisedboats and rafts to evacuate 86,000 troopsnorth across the estuary to recreate acohesive front. At this time the Allies werestill optimistic after their previous successes,and many – including Montgomery –underestimated the difficulties involved inopening the Scheldt.
SCHELDT AND WALCHEREN 5IWM BU 11716‘The Canadians foughtbrilliantly [at Hoogerheideon 7 October]. To the rankof brigadier, the officers stoodside by side with their men onthe front lines.’German Paratrooper Colonel Augustusvon der HeydteBefore focusing on clearing the Scheldt,Montgomery ordered First Canadian Army toconcentrate on clearing the Channel ports. Ittook the Army until 1 October 1944 to capturemost of these harbours. Meanwhile, Montgomeryhad allocated priority of supply to Second (British)Army for Operation Market Garden and theanticipated ensuing drive into Germany.That decision had restricted the combat powerthat First Canadian Army could deploy againstthe enemy. It was only on 16 October – afterbeing pressured by Supreme Allied CommanderGeneral Eisenhower and Allied NavalCommander-in-Chief Admiral Ramsay RN – thatMontgomery accorded the Scheldt operationsthe priority they deserved. It was only with theadditional resources, that Simonds’ forces couldbring significant combat power to bear againstthe German defences in the region.IWM BU 1273Colonel Reinhardt commanded a regiment in theGerman Fifteenth ArmyA key factor that hampered the advanceof Simonds’ forces was the difficult terrain.Much of the area was actually below sealevel, comprising ‘polder’ land that had beenreclaimed from the sea. It was only the largeraised embankments (dykes) that kept the watersfrom flooding the flat low-lying land. The Germandefenders skilfully exploited these conditions. Inaddition, the Germans constructed bunkers in thesteep rear slopes of these dykes, and locatedNebelwerfer rocket launchers immediately behindthem. Such positions proved hard to hit. As aresult, Allied infantry had to display extraordinarycourage and determination to wage war amidsuch miserable, wet and cold conditions.‘And here I must admit abad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficultiesof opening up the approachesto Antwerp so that we couldget free use of the port.’German coastal artillery gun on Walcheren islandMontgomery’s memoirs, p297
6 SCHELDT AND WALCHERENAdvance to Woensdrecht (2–23 October 1944)Woensdrecht, October – November 1944On 2 October 1944, 2nd Canadian Divisionbegan to advance north from Antwerp towardthe eastern base of the South Beveland peninsula.For the first four days, the division made goodprogress. It advanced 14 km (9 miles) to capturePutte, with its prize – the base of the peninsula –remaining just 5 miles away. 4th CanadianArmoured Division moved up to cover 2ndDivision’s eastern flank, freeing forces for arenewed drive toward the base of the peninsula.Indeed, during the next 10 days, the Canadianseventually managed to secure a tenuous footholdon the peninsula to the west of Woensdrecht.Simultaneously, the Canadians tried to extendtheir front by capturing the nearby villages ofWoensdrecht, Hoogerheide and Korteven.Here bitter fighting raged for many days.The Canadians now faced a newly reinforcedenemy that included elite paratroopers.The enemy forces skilfully exploited theirhold on the high ground and the widespreadflooding to prevent the Canadians wideningtheir tenuous positions around the base of thepeninsula. Despite suffering heavy casualties,the Canadians continued their attempt toadvance but faced repeated local counterattacks and night-time infiltration of theirpositions. One Canadian War Diary recalledthat ‘the slaughter was terrific’. By 16 October,a lull had descended over much of thisparticular battlefield after both sides’ troopsreached the point of utter exhaustion. Theonly exception to this was at Woensdrechtand Korteven, where fighting continued torage until the Canadians captured the villageon 23 October. This first phase of the Alliedclearance of the Scheldt had been largely,but not entirely, accomplished.
SCHELDT AND WALCHERENOperation Switchback(6 October – 3 November 1944)Between 6 October and 3 November 1944,Major-General Spry’s 3rd Canadian Divisionmounted Operation Switchback, to eliminatethe German-held Breskens pocket south of theScheldt. The German 64th Division held the 40km (25 mile) sector that ran along the LeopoldCanal, from the Braakman inlet in the east throughto Zeebrugge in the west. The defenders totalledapproximately 12,000 troops, backed by sixcoastal artillery guns that dominated the estuary.The Germans had deliberately breached theraised dykes that housed the canal andthe ensuing flooding channelled the Canadianadvance onto the area’s few raised dyke roadsand dry polder land. As predicted, the Germanshad covered these routes with heavy weapons.The Canadians, as a result, had to combine theeffective tactical air support provided by 84Group RAF with accurate artillery fire and sheerdetermination to secure the Breskens pocket.Leopold Canal, October–November 1944On 6 October, 7th Canadian Infantry Brigadeattacked the canal along an unflooded sectornear Eede. Following an attack by Waspflame-throwing carriers, the assault infantry crossedthe 90 metre (100 yard) wide canal in dinghiesand attacked the German positions on the farbank. The Canadians successfully preventedthe now consolidated single bridgehead.However, the ensuing 48 hours saw repeatedfierce German counter-attacks which preventedthe bridgehead being extended.The Canadian infantry discovered thatthey could not dig their trenches more thana foot deep before they filled with water.Close air support, which had at first beenvery successful, was now hampered by poorweather. It was not until 13 October that asignificant bridgehead was established, bywhich time the Canadians had sufferedapproximately 600 casualties. 7
8 SCHELDT AND WALCHERENThe Scheldt EstuaryOn 9 October, the division launched asubsidiary attack, an amphibious assaultacross the 1.6 km (1mile) wide Braakmaninlet. Buffalo and Terrapin amphibious vehicles,manned by the British 5th and 6th AssaultRegiments (Royal Engineers) carried the troopsof 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade across theinlet. Meeting only light opposition from thesurprised Germans, the assault soon establisheda sizeable bridgehead.Maj-Gen Spry turned this into his main effort,and moved his remaining force – 8th Brigade –into the bridgehead. Attacking west, theCanadians took Biervliet and Hoofdplaat onthe coast. Having had the eastern flank of theirdefences unhinged, the Germans then withdrewto a second line of defence that ran fromBreskens down to, and along, the Sluis Canalto Zeebrugge in the west. Meanwhile, an RAFBomber Command braved intense anti-aircraftfire to mount heavy strikes against German gunbatteries at Breskens and Flushing. Improvedweather also led to the resumption of largescale close air support operations, and airattacks on German lines of communicationin northern Holland.The second phase of Switchback startedon 21 October, with a successful assault onBreskens. Bomber Command supported withstrikes on Flushing, and there were large-scaleground attack operations led by 84 Group.The nearby Fort Frederik Hendrik heldout for a further three days. On 27 OctoberCadzand was captured, and on 1 Novemberthe commander of German 64th Division,Lieutenant-General Kurt Eberding, was takenprisoner. 3rd Division completed Switchback on3 November by overwhelming the last Germanresistance in the Belgian coastal towns of Knockeand Zeebrugge, in the south-west of the pocket.The last 29 days cost the division 2077casualties. With the Breskens pocket cleared,the Allies could use the area as a vital stagingpost for the attack on Walcheren. Amphibiousvehicles could use the port of Breskens and thearea to the south would soon be filled to capacitywith artillery guns, all ranged on Walcheren.
SCHELDT AND WALCHEREN 9Operation Suitcase (20 October – 7 November 1944)On 20 October, the 4th Canadian ArmouredDivision initiated Operation Suitcase from itspositions, six miles north of Antwerp. Thedivision’s first objective was to capture theBelgian town of Essen, located 13 km (8 miles)east-south-east of Bergen-op-Zoom on the coast.It was accomplished on 27 October, but onlyafter sustaining significant losses, as the Germanshad sown mines under the cobbled main road.Unfortunately, the attached British Flail mineclearing tanks discovered that their thrashingchains could not detonate mines placed undercobblestones and consequently the tank itselfwould detonate the mine. Despite this setback,the Allies courageously fought their way into thetown, with further support from the Typhoons andSpitfires of 2nd Tactical Air Force.Then, the division struck west towards Bergen-opZoom and the area north of Woensdrecht. Thisunhinged the tenacious German defence of thelatter area, and helped 2nd Canadian Divisiondrive north to establish a more extensive frontat the base of the Beveland peninsula. Thesuccess enabled 2nd Division to divert moreof its forces to Operation Vitality, the advancewest along South Beveland toward Walcheren.The recently reinforced I (British) Corps, whichformed the remaining part of First CanadianArmy, also joined the advance north. In thesector immediately east of the 4th CanadianArmoured Division, the British 49th Divisionthrust north to capture Roosendaal on29 October. Some days earlier, to theeast, the 1st Polish Armoured and US 104th‘Timberwolf’ Divisions had also joined in theAllied advance north toward the River Maas.From 28 October, the 4th Division closedon Steenbergen, and the 49th and 104thDivisions moved toward Standdaarbuiten.Whilst the Polish troops had advanced on thekey Maas bridges at Moerdijk. Consequently,by 7 November, the Germans had beenforced to withdraw north of the Maas,and the north-eastern flank of the Scheldtregion had been successfully secured.IWM B 11574KEY FACTSBritish armour advancing north towards RoosendaalAllied specialised landing craft and vehiclesLanding Craft, Gun: Landing craft armedto support the assault troopsLanding Craft, Flak: Landing craft armedwith anti-aircraft gunsLanding Craft, Rocket: Landing craft carryingup to 1,000 rockets to support troopsLanding Craft, Assault: A small landingcraft capable of carrying about 35 troopsto the shoreBuffalo: Amphibious armoured troop carrierDD (Duplex Drive): Amphibious variant ofSherman tankFlail: Mine-clearing variant of Sherman tankTerrapin: Amphibious lightly armouredtroop carrierWasp: Flame-throwing armoured troop carrier
10 SCHELDT AND WALCHERENOperation Vitality (24–31 October 1944)IWM CL 1656The Germans had flooded large parts of South Beveland peninsulaBetween 24 and 31 October 1944, Maj-GenFoulkes’ forces also advanced west alongSouth Beveland toward the eastern coast ofthe German-held fortress-island of Walcheren.Prior to this, on 23 October, Brigadier Keefler’s2nd Canadian Division finally captured thefiercely defended villages of Woensdrechtand Korteven, enabling the attack alongthe peninsula to begin.In the early hours of 24 October, after aheavy artillery bombardment, 4th CanadianInfantry Brigade began to fight its waywest. By dawn of the following day, it hadadvanced 5 km (3 miles) to capture Rilland.Throughout the remainder of that day, the4th Canadian Infantry Brigade had closedin on Krabbendijke, just 8 km (5 miles) shortof the Beveland ship canal, which bisectedthe peninsula. Then the Canadian InfantryBrigade took over as the division’s spearhead.On 26 October, the Allies launched OperationVitality II to outflank the German defence at thenarrow eastern end of the peninsula. A RoyalNavy landing craft, supplemented by Buffaloand Terrapin amphibious vehicles, carriedelements of the British 52nd (Lowland) Divisionacross the Scheldt. Sailing from Terneuzen,the amphibians of 1st Assault Brigade, RoyalEngineers travelled 13 km (8 miles) across theestuary to South Beveland, west of the shipcanal. Spearheaded by amphibious DDShermans from the Staffordshire Yeomanry,the force soon established a beachhead nearHoedekenskerke. 52nd Division had beenBritain’s only designated mountain division –yet its soldiers experienced the formation’sfirst combat in flooded polders below sealevel! Allied planners had also proposedthat Allied airborne forces, recently releasedfrom Operation Market Garden, be droppedon the western part of South Beveland. This
SCHELDT AND WALCHERENoperation was cancelled, in part, due to theunsuitability of the terrain.That same day, 26 October, 2nd CanadianDivision assaulted the German positions onthe ship canal, and established a bridgeheadthe next day. By 29 October, the Canadianshad captured Goes and linked up with theeastward advance of 52nd Division. InGoes, the joyful response of the inhabitantsto liberation compelled the soldiers of 5thCanadian Infantry Brigade to ‘kiss babies andsign autographs’.On 31 October, the last German action onSouth Beveland was mounted on the easternend of the causeway. The 1100 metre(1200 yard) by 37 metre (40 yard) structurebridged the Sloe channel and connected SouthBeveland to Walcheren island. The Germandefences on the western end had not beenflooded after Allied bombers had breachedWalcheren’s perimeter dyke. Across thiscauseway ran the road and railway thatheaded west to Flushing and Middelburg onWalcheren. By mid-morning, the Canadianshad driven the last German soldier fromSouth Beveland, and thus Vitality had beenaccomplished. One observer then describedthe state of the exhausted Canadian troops:IWM B11710British 49th Division troops near Klundert‘The men were indescribablydirty. They were bearded,cold. and wet from living inwaterfilled holes in the ground.’KEY FACTSClose air support for the Scheldt operations Tactical support by 84 Group RAF(1–31 October): 9782 sorties mounted. Bomber Command operations againstbatteries (18 September – 23 October):643 sorties mounted. Bomber Command operations againstWalcheren dykes (3–17 October):494 sorties mounted. Bomber Command operations againstcoastal defences (28–30 October):745 sorties mounted. Strategic and tactical ‘softening up’of Walcheren (3–27 October):1600 tons dropped. Strategic ‘softening up’ of Walcheren(28–30 October): 4092 tons dropped. Strategic bombing of Walcheren dykes(3–17 October): 2762 tons dropped. 11
12 SCHELDT AND WALCHERENNational Archives WO 218/70Walcheren1 Nov 1944D-day for Operation INFATUATE. 10 Inter-Allied (IA) Commando (Cdo) Troopsdisposed in Landing Craft Tanks (LCTs) as follows:1. Cdo Headquarters (HQ), No.4 (Belge) Troop less one Section, and 1 Officer(Offr) and 14 Other Ranks (ORs) of No.5 (Norge) Troop.2. No.5 Troop, less 1 Offr and 14 ORs.3. 1 Sub-Section of No.4 Troop, Lieutenant (Lt.) Meny in charge (i/c), to act as tankprotection.4. 1 Sub-Section of No.4 Troop, as tank protection, with Captain (Capt.) Joy in thiscraft to act as Liaison Officer (LO) on landing. Zero hour for 10 IA Cdo landingwas H 25 (1010 hrs). Enemy fire became intense when approaching within about1 mile of shore.1010.Apart from other ships seen to be hit, LCT with Capt Joy aboard received 3 directhits, these knocking out all the tanks and wounding Capt Joy and two 4 Troop ORs.1015.Same LCT passed Cdo HQ ship, still under control but making for home. Thiswas not an aid to morale.1035.Having received several near misses, Cdo HQ ship touched down, but when rampwas lowered it was found to be up against some iron stakes.1035 –1045.The craft a sitting target, with LVTs unable to proceed ashore. One near misswounded Adjutant who was later evacuated to Ostend.1040.LCT containing bulk of 5 Troop passed inshore on our port beam, and giving arousing cheer, landed satisfactorily.1045.It was considered too dangerous to remain on board any longer and orders were givenfor Troops to get ashore as best they could. Landing very wet, strong current and deepwater, with mortar and shell fire to add to the confusion. Casualties however were slight.Extract from No.10 (Inter-Allied) Commando’s war diary, 1 November 1944
SCHELDT AND WALCHEREN 13Operation Infatuate(3 October – 7 November 1944)IWM C 4668The breach in the Walcheren sea-dyke at WestkapelleThe Allies had to capture one final pieceof German-held territory before Antwerp’sharbour could be opened to Allied shipping –Walcheren Island. Situated at the north-westernboundary of the Scheldt Estuary, just to thewest of South Beveland, the powerful Germancoastal artillery positions on the islanddominated the sea approaches to Antwerp.In addition to numerous battery personnel,the island was defended by the German70th Division.These powerful defences had been attacked byBomber Command and 2nd Tactical Air Forcein September, but poor weather and heavyanti-aircraft fire had reduced the effectivenessof the air strikes. It still seemed likely, however,that any Allied amphibious assault would bean extremely difficult – and costly – undertaking.Indeed, such an assault was only madepossible by an audacious Allied plan to floodWalcheren by bombing its massive perimeterdyke. The aim was to disorganise the Germans’communications, immobilise their reinforcements,flood some of their defences, and createconditions in which Allied ground forcescould exploit amphibious vehicles to outflankGerman forward positions.At Lt-Gen Simonds’ insistence, during3–17 October, Bomber Command mountedfive separate attacks involving some 494sorties against the perimeter dyke. The bombingbreached the dyke in four places, and thesea poured into the interior of the low-lyingisland, flooding four-fifths of its area. Accordingto a report by 4th Special Service Brigade,German morale was sapped ‘to an incredibleextent’. Between 28–30 October, prior tothe Allied landings on Walcheren, BomberCommand mounted a further 745 sortiesagainst the German defences there, droppingmore than 4000 tons of bombs. This was anextremely difficult task, as the German positionswere well camouflaged and protected,dispersed, and ringed by anti-aircraft guns.Nevertheless, 11 of the enemy’s 28 artillerybatteries were put out of action. The landingswere also preceded by bombing and strafingattacks by Mosquitoes from 2 Tactical Air Force.
14 SCHELDT AND WALCHERENIWM BU 1250The first ground action of Operation Infatuateunfolded on 31 October. That afternoon,5th Canadian Infantry Brigade launched itsfirst attack across the causeway from SouthBeveland to Walcheren. This was a difficultmission to undertake. Armoured vehicles couldnot cross the partially flooded strip of land,and there was virtually no cover from thehail of German defensive fire that emerged.Inevitably, the attack was driven back withheavy casualties, as was another assaultthat night. A third assault on 1 Novemberestablished a small bridgehead on Walcheren,but a subsequent German riposte drove theCanadians back onto the causeway. In the faceof bitter resistance, a fourth Canadian attack on2 November established a tenuous bridgeheadon Walcheren. Later that day the 52nd Divisionrelieved the exhausted Canadian infantrymen.On 3 November, other Lowland units daringlycrossed the Sloe channel in boats to outflankthe German defences. Within 24 hours thedivision had established a sizeable bridgeheadacross the island’s unflooded eastern fringes.Shortly after midnight on 1 November, a forceof landing craft and amphibious vehicles, partof Force T under Captain A.F. Pugsley RN,departed Ostend and headed north-east. Carryingtroops from 4th Special Service Brigade underBrigadier B.W. Leicester, Royal Marines, theBritish troops fight their way through the streetsof Flushingforce was to launch an amphibious assault on thewesternmost point of Walcheren at Westkapelle.From 0445 hours onwards, 314 artillery gunspositioned around Breskens engaged enemytargets on Walcheren. Under cover from thisbombardment, additional landing craft andamphibious vehicles departed Breskens destinedfor Flushing, located on the southern coast ofWalcheren. This force comprised 4 Commandoand elements of 155th Infantry Brigade, and wassimilarly protected by escort ships. At 0540 hoursthe commandos assaulted the heart of Flushing’sharbour area, with troops of the 4th King’sOwn Scottish Borderers landing at 0730 hours.IWM BU 1244British troops land on Walcheren at FlushingWithin the town, Dutch resistance groups alsobegan to attack German positions; and with thesupport of accurate artillery and Typhoon fighterbomber strikes, British troops, with some Frenchcommandos, gradually fought their way throughthe Old Town. The next day, troops fought theirway to the northern fringes of Flushing, againaided by artillery and Typhoon strikes. That nightthe 7/9th Royal Scots attacked the Hotel Britannia,an isolated centre of German resistance locatedsouth-west of the town. This building was just180 metres (200 yards) from the breach inthe sea-dyke and it was badly flooded. Despitefinding themselves wading in darkness throughwaters 1.5 metres (5 feet) deep with strong
SCHELDT AND WALCHERENcurrents, the Royal Scots soldiers neverthelesspressed home the attack with vigour. When the600 surviving defenders surrendered around noonon 3 November, Flushing was finally completelycleared of enemy forces.The force destined for Westkapelle had movednorth-east during the early hours of 1 November.News then reached them that the weather backin the UK had prevented the planned air supportfor the amphibious attack. Despite this, CaptPugsley and Brig Leicester jointly decided tocontinue with the mission. At 0809 hours thefirst German coastal batteries engaged thearmada, with the battleship HMS Warspiteand the monitor HMS Roberts returning firefrom 0820 hours. At 0845 hours, Allied artilleryfrom Breskens engaged the defenders, as did12 Typhoons from 183 Squadron RAF. The firstassault troops landed at 0959 hours. Within30 minutes, the bulk of 41 (Royal Marine)Commando was ashore, as were elementsfrom 10 (Inter-Allied) and 48 (RM) Commandos.The forces landed at Red and White Beaches,respectively located to the north and south ofthe breach in the sea-dyke. In order to ensurethat the vital landing was a success, the 27armed landing craft of the Support SquadronEastern Flank deliberately engaged the Germangun batteries, seeking to divert their fire fromthe assault troops. They achieved this but at aheavy cost, with only seven of the craft
Fifteenth German Army: Gen Gustav Adolf von Zangen KEY FACTS. 4 . Allied infantry had to display extraordinary courage and determination to wage war amid . Colonel Reinhardt commanded a regiment in the German Fifteenth Army IWM BU 1273 German coastal artillery gun on Walcheren island.
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