Supreme Court Of North Carolina.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.Her husband, Tom Parsons, and TonyParsons had gone to bed earlier.STATE of North Carolinav.Bruce Franklin JERRETT.Before retiring Mrs. Parsons locked thefront door of the house, but she did notrecall locking the back door. She thenjoined her husband in their bedroom. Ataround 3:00 a.m., Mrs. Parsons waswakened by gunfire and the lights in thebedroom being turned on. She heard herhusband shout “Hey” and “Oh, God.” Shesaw defendant standing by the bedroomdoor holding a gun in his left hand. Hisright hand was on the light switch.Defendant had shot Dallas Parsons. Hethen turned his gun on Mrs. Parsons andordered her to come to him. Mrs. Parsonswas screaming, crying and pleading withdefendant not to shoot her. She repeatedlytold defendant that he had killed herhusband. Defendant again told her to cometo him and Mrs. Parsons complied.Defendant then grabbed her by the arm,but at some point allowed Mrs. Parsons todress.No. 228A82.Sept. 27, 1983.Defendant was convicted in the SuperiorCourt, Alleghany County, Julius A.Rousseau, J., of murder, felonious breakingand entering, kidnapping, and armedrobbery, and he appealed. The SupremeCourt, Branch, C.J., held that: (1)defendant’s motion for change of venue wasimproperly denied; (2) indictment wassufficient to allege first-degree kidnapping;(3) trial court should have instructed juryon defense of unconsciousness; and (4) trialcourt did not err in submitting aggravatingcircumstances to the jury.New trial.Mitchell, J., dissented in partconcurred in part, and filed opinion.Defendant picked up a box of .22 calibercartridges from a chest of drawers in thebedroom and said, “That is what I amlooking for.”andDefendant, Bruce Franklin Jerrett, wascharged with the first- degree murder ofDallas Parsons, felonious breaking andentering, kidnapping of Edith Parsons, andarmed robbery of Edith Parsons and TomParsons.Tom Parsons called from his room andasked what was going on. Defendantdragged Mrs. Parsons across the hall toTom’s room and pushed the door againstTom’s body. He then pushed his gunaround the door and demanded that Tomgive him his wallet and money. Mr. Parsonsgave defendant approximately three dollarsin change. In compliance with defendant’sorder, Tom remained in his room.Prior to trial, defendant moved for a changeof venue or, in the alternative, for a specialvenire from another county. These motionswere denied by Judge Davis. The motion fora change of venue was renewed both duringand after jury selection and denied byJudge Rousseau.Mrs. Parsons then pleaded with defendantto allow her to call the rescue squad. Herefused, but agreed to make the callhimself. Defendant went to a phone in thekitchen and dialed a number. He told theperson he was speaking with to come to theParsons’ residence. He then asked Mrs.Parsons, “What Parsons?” She replied,“Dallas”, and defendant relayed thisinformation. He also stated, “You will haveto find that out for yourself.”The evidence presented by the State tendedto show:On 24 July 1981, Dallas Parsons and hiswife, Edith Parsons, lived on a dairy farm inthe Piney Creek Community near Sparta,North Carolina. Mr. Parson’s brother, TomParsons, and nephew, Tony Parsons, alsolived at the residence. On that evening,Mrs. Parsons retired at around 11:30 p.m.Defendant then took Mrs. Parsons back to1
her bedroom to get her husband’s wallet.She gave defendant approximately eight ornine dollars from the wallet. Defendant andMrs. Parsons then went outside to theParsons’ automobile but Mrs. Parsons wasunable to find the keys. Defendant forcedMrs. Parsons back to the bedroom andobtained the car keys from Dallas Parsons’pants pocket. While in the bedroom, Mrs.Parsons saw that her husband’s leg washanging off the bed. Defendant told her notto touch him. Despite this warning, Mrs.Parsons put her husband’s leg back on thebed and put the sheet and blanket over hiswound.gas before the clerk would turn on thepump. He accused her of lying but sheassured him she was telling the truth.Defendant and Mrs. Parsons then left thecar and walked toward the store. Mrs.Parsons was walking in front of defendant.Defendant had put the pistol in his shirtright above his belt. As Mrs. Parsonswalked toward The Pantry, she saw OfficerCaudle standing in the store at the counter.Officer Caudle saw defendant and Mrs.Parsons walking toward the store entrance.Defendant was approximately two feetbehind Mrs. Parsons, walking with his headdown. Mrs. Parsons was holding her handsin front of her in a prayer-like position. Asshe neared the door and entered, she wasrepeating the words, “He’s got a gun” and“He’s going to kill me.”Mrs. Parsons and defendant again left thehouse. Before they entered the car,defendant pulled Mrs. Parsons over to theporch and picked up a blue jean jacket anda milk jug which was half full of a liquidsubstance. As they returned to the car,defendant told Mrs. Parsons that he wasgoing to drive but she convinced him toallow her to drive. Defendant sat in theright front passenger seat and held hispistol in his left hand pointed toward Mrs.Parsons. He told her that he wanted to go toTennessee, but Mrs. Parsons disregardedhis instruction and drove the car in theopposite direction toward Sparta.Defendant came through the door with hishand over his stomach and still lookingdown. When defendant looked up and sawOfficer Caudle, he looked away and went upto the counter. Mrs. Parsons walked towardOfficer Caudle and said in a low voice thatdefendant had a gun in his waistband area.Caudle stepped around her and went to theend of the counter. Mrs. Parsons continuedto walk to the back of the store where shelocked herself in a storage room.After a short time, Mrs. Parsons tolddefendant that the car did not have enoughgas and that the needle was on empty. Asthey passed a station defendant said,“Damn you, you passed the gas station.”Mrs. Parsons told him that the only placethat sold gas that late in Sparta was “ThePantry.” He accused her of lying butpermitted her to continue to drive toward“The Pantry.” In route, defendant told Mrs.Parsons to slow down because she mightattract attention. He also told her to dimthe dashboard lights. Before they reached“The Pantry”, they met a rescue vehicle withits emergency lights on heading toward theParsons’ residence. When they arrived at“The Pantry”, Mrs. Parsons turned theautomobile into the parking lot and pulledup to the gas tanks. The lot was well lightedand Mrs. Parsons saw a marked police carparked near the door. Defendant told Mrs.Parsons that she would pump the gas. Shetold him that they would have to pay for theOfficer Caudle then approached defendantwho was talking to the store clerk, Mrs.Mildred Pratt, about purchasing nddriver’slicense.Defendant twice asked Caudle “Why?”before producing his license. Caudle thenstarted to search defendant, who seemedsurprised. He asked Caudle two or threetimes why he was being searched and toldCaudle that he had no right to search him.Upon being asked if he had a gun,defendant replied affirmatively and turnedhis pistol over to the officer. Defendant wasthen arrested for carrying a concealedweapon and was taken to the patrol car.Mrs. Parsons told Mrs. Pratt that defendanthad shot and killed her husband, and Mrs.Pratt relayed this information to OfficerCaudle. Caudle thereupon put handcuffson defendant who asked why Caudle was2
doing this. Caudle told defendant that “thislady” [Mrs. Parsons] said that he[defendant] had “shot and killed herhusband.” Defendant replied, “You can’tpay any attention to her. She is half crazy.”Defendant’s mother testified that after hereturned home from the service, heexperienced numerous blackouts duringwhich he would “throw a fit or something.”Afterwards she would tell him about it andhe would say that he did not remember theincident.Defendant testified in his own behalf. Wesummarize his testimony as follows:On the night of 20 July 1981, he was atDelmer Bowens’ house and left with theintention of going to Bessie Royal’s house.On his way to the Royal house he fell in acreek. The next thing he remembered waswalking into The Pantry and seeing theofficer. Following his service in Vietnam heexperienced blackouts, one being while hewas still in the service and stationed inGermany. On that occasion he left hisbarracks and went downtown to talk to afriend. He stayed with the friend until threeo’clock a.m. and then started back to thebarracks. He recalled walking out the door,but the next thing he remembered wasbeing two miles from the barracks ataround 7:00 a.m. He had no recollection ofwhat had transpired during the four hoursbetween 3:00 and 7:00 a.m.Defendant’s father also testified that he hadobserved defendant on at least a half dozenoccasions during which defendant wasexperiencing blackouts.Two psychiatrists were called by defendantas witnesses. Dr. Groce, who examineddefendant pursuant to a court order atDorothea Dix Hospital, testified that heconducted a variety of tests on defendant;that he was familiar with a psychiatricdisorder typically found among Vietnamveterans referred to as post-traumaticsyndrome; that he did not diagnosedefendant as suffering from this malady;and that in his opinion defendant wouldhave been capable of forming the intent tocommit the acts with which he wascharged. His diagnosis was that defendantwas suffering from (1) an adjustmentdisorder with depressed moods, and (2)episodic alcohol abuse.Some two years after he left the service, hewas driving his car one night in Maryland.The next thing he remembered was wakingthe next morning in his bed in his parentshome. He looked out at his car and sawthat the whole right side was damaged. Hehad no idea what had happened.Dr. Goode, a psychiatrist at the BowmanGray Medical Center, testified on voir direthat he examined defendant at thecourthouse pursuant to a court order; thathe had reviewed Dr. Groce’s report but feltthat the tests conducted at Dix Hospitalwere inadequate to eliminate a complexpartial seizure as a diagnosis of ing a “CAT” scan would be necessaryto make a proper diagnosis. Following thevoir dire, the trial court refused to admitmost of Dr. Goode’s proffered testimony.He had another blackout while visiting hismother. He was talking with his family andsuddenly he didn’t know what happened.His mother later told him that he got upand “went at [his] sister and pushed herdown.” He recalled seeing his mother’s faceand when he regained consciousness hesaw his sister on the floor of the kitchen.He did not remember anything aboutpushing her down. He had not experiencedblackouts prior to his tour of duty inVietnam. While he was in Vietnam, he wasexposed to “Agent Orange”, a defoliant usedin that region. Defendant further statedthat he was examined in Newport News,Virginia for the effects of Agent Orange andwas diagnosed as exhibiting symptoms ofexposure to the defoliant.The jury returned verdicts of guilty of felonymurder, armed robbery of Tom Parsons,armed robbery of Edith Parsons, firstdegree kidnapping, and felonious breakingand entering.A sentencing hearing was held pursuant toG.S. 15A-2000 et seq., following the firstdegree murder conviction. The evidence3
presented by defendant tended to show thathe had never been convicted of a seriouscrime. He was once convicted of oyer, Mr. Kennedy, testified thatdefendant was a hardworking employee andthat he had a good reputation. Two friendsof defendant and his family from Marylandalso testified. The essence of theirtestimony was that defendant experienced adecided personality change after returninghome from Vietnam. He was depressed andtroublesome and began drinking. Prior tohis time in the service, defendant was alaw-abiding citizen. He was described as avery likeable boy with a good reputation. Hehad also attended church regularly.of law impaired?4. Did the defendant call the ambulance forassistance of Mr. Parsons while at theParson residence?5. Did the defendant submit to arrestwithout resistance when approached by thepolice at the Pantry?6. Did the defendant exhibit good conductand act as a model prisoner whileincarcerated in the county jail?7. Did the defendant have a low IQ, it being73?8. Did the defendant exhibit religiousbeliefsandpracticessincebeingincarcerated in the county jail?9. Was the defendant exposed to combat,chemicals, and stressful experiences whilein Viet Nam?10.Youmayconsideranyothercircumstance or circumstances arising fromthe evidence which you deem to havemitigating value.Johnny Coffin, who worked with defendant,testified that defendant lived with him foreight months. During this time defendantworked regularly, but drank intoxicants.Three jailers at the Alleghany County jailalso testified. Their testimony tended toshow that during his incarceration,defendant was a model prisoner; that whilehe was in jail awaiting trial, defendantspent a great deal of time praying, readingthe Bible and drawing religious pictures.The jury found beyond a reasonable doubtthatbothaggravatingcircumstancesexisted and that these were sufficientlysubstantial to call for the imposition of thedeath sentence. The jury also found thatseven of the ten mitigating circumstances,(numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) existed.The jury did not indicate answers tonumbers 2, 3, and 10. The jury also foundbeyond a reasonable doubt that theaggravating circumstances outweighed themitigatingcircumstancesandrecommended that defendant be sentencedto death.The State presented no evidence at thesentencing hearing.The trial court submitted two aggravatingcircumstances:1. Was the murder committed for pecuniarygain?2. Was this murder part of a course ofconduct in which the defendant engagedand did that course of conduct include thecommission by the defendant of othercrimes of violence against another person?The trial court sentenced defendant to diefor the felony murder of Dallas Parsons.Since the underlying felony was armedrobbery, the convictions of armed robberyof Tom Parsons and Edith Parsons werearrested.The trial court submitted the followingmitigating circumstances:1. Does the defendant at the age of 33 yearshave no significant history of prior criminalactivity?2. Was the murder committed while thedefendant was under the influence ofmental or emotional disturbance?3. Was the defendant’s capacity toappreciate the criminality of his conduct orto conform his conduct to the requirementsIn the first-degree kidnapping and thefeloniousbreakingandenteringconvictions, the trial court found as amitigating factor that defendant had norecord of criminal convictions or a recordconsistingsolelyofmisdemeanorspunishable by not more than 60 daysimprisonment.Thecourtfoundasaggravating circumstances that defendantwas armed with or used a deadly weapon at4
the time of each crime; that a lessersentence would depreciate the seriousnessof each crime; that the sentence imposedfor each crime was necessary to deterothers from committing the same crime;and that defendant engaged in a pattern ofviolent conduct which indicated a seriousdanger to society. The court imposed asentence of 40 years imprisonment (themaximum allowed) for the first-degreekidnapping and a sentence of 10 yearsimprisonment (the maximum allowed) forthe felonious breaking and entering.in which the prosecution is pending sogreat a prejudice against the defendantthat he cannot obtain a fair and impartialtrial, the court must either:(1) Transfer the proceeding to anothercounty in the judicial district or toanother county in an adjoining judicialdistrict, or(2) Order a special venire under the termsof G.S. 15A-958.This Court has consistently held that theburden of proving that a fair and impartialtrial cannot be received due to pretrialpublicity falls on the defendant. State v.Dobbins, 306 N.C. 342, 293 S.E.2d 162(1982); State v. Oliver, supra. In Sheppard v.Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), the United StatesSupreme Court held that due processmandates that criminal defendants receivea trial by an impartial jury free from outsideinfluences. The Court also held that wherethere is a reasonable likelihood thatprejudicial pretrial publicity will prevent afair trial, the trial court should remove thecase to another county not so permeatedwith publicity. In State v. Boykin, 291 N.C.264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976), we adoptedthis test and held that it applied not only tocases involving pretrial publicity by themedia, but also to cases “where theprejudice alleged is attributable to word-ofmouth publicity.” Id. at 269- 70, 229 S.E.2dat 918.Defendant gave notice of appeal. Heappealed his death sentence to this Courtpursuant to G.S. 7A-27(a). We allowed hismotion to bypass the Court of Appealspursuant to G.S. 7A-31(a) on thekidnapping and felonious breaking andentering convictions on 23 July 1982.Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Joan H.Byers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for theState.Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James &Harkavy by Norman B. Smith, Martha E.Johnston, and Donnell Van Noppen, III,Greensboro, for defendant-appellant.BRANCH, Chief Justice.Defendant assigns as error the denial of hispretrial motion for change of venue byJudge Davis and the denial of his motionfor change of venue by the trial judge. Wefind merit in these assignments of error andhold that the denial of these motionsrequires a new trial.In support of his motion in instant case,defendant introduced eight newspaperarticles which he contends were highlyprejudicial and inflammatory. He alsopresented evidence from Mr. Nelson Harrill,sales manager of WCOK radio station, ofradio broadcasts about the murder. Thesebroadcasts were aired numerous timesduring the weekend following the murder.The contents of these broadcasts were notincluded in the record. We have reviewedthe articles in question and conclude thatthey were factual, informative, andnoninflammatory in nature. Accordingly,these articles do not provide a basis for ourholding that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in denying defendant’s motion.See State v. Oliver, supra.A motion for a change of venue, or for avenire from another county, is addressed tothe sound discretion of the trial court andits ruling thereon will not be disturbedabsent a showing of abuse of discretion.State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183(1981); State v. See, 301 N.C. 388, 271S.E.2d 282 (1980). G.S. 15A-957 provides,in pertinent part:Motion for change of venue.--If, uponmotion of the defendant, the courtdetermines that there exists in the county5
Had these articles been the extent ofdefendant’s evidence in support of hismotion, resolution of this assignment oferror would be short and simple. Therewas, however, additional evidence pertinentto decision of this assignment of errortending to show that Judge Davis erred indenying defendant’s pretrial motion.and do their duty as jurors. On redirectexamination, he stated that he did notthink a jury could be obtained in AlleghanyCounty which would be totally independentand not know anything about the case.Mr. Edmund Adams, an attorney who wassubsequently appointed to serve as cocounsel for defendant but who had noconnection with the case at the time of thehearing, testified that he had often heardthis case discussed and that people in thecommunity were intensely interested in thecase. In his opinion, it was not possible fordefendant to get a fair trial in AlleghanyCounty. He also stated that he believed itwould be very difficult to get an impartialjury and that the people in the communitywere made about the murder of Mr.Parsons. He recalled at least threeoccasions when people came into his officeand said, “I sure do hope they fry this man”(referring to defendant). Adams had alsotalked to people who purported to knowwhat the actual facts in the case were.Before he was excused, the trial courtasked Mr. Ada
Parsons, and nephew, Tony Parsons, also lived at the residence. On that evening, Mrs. Parsons retired at around 11:30 p.m. Her husband, Tom Parsons, and Tony Parsons had gone to bed earlier. Before retiring Mrs. Parsons locked the front door of the house, but she did not recall locking the back door. She then joined her husband in their bedroom. At
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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, _vs- AARON RIOS-SALAZAR . 770 E. Etna Road Ottawa, IL 61350 (815) 434-5531 3rddistrict.esérve@osad.state.il.us . Jurisdiction lies with this Court under Supreme Court Rules 315 and 612(b). This Court allow
