Arrative Report ON SiNgapore - Tax Justice Network
Narrative Report on SingaporePART 1: NARRATIVE REPORTRank: 5 of 133BackgroundSingapore is ranked fifth in the 2020 Financial Secrecy Index. It has afairly high secrecy score of 65 and accounts for a huge and growingshare – over 5 per cent – of the global market for offshore financialservices.65How Secretive?Moderatelysecretive0 to 25This former British colony vies with Hong Kong to be Asia’s leadingoffshore financial centre. Singapore predominantly serves SoutheastAsia while Hong Kong predominantly serves China and North Asia. ManyChinese and North Asian financial investors, however, are deterred byChina’s increasing control over Hong Kong and prefer to park assets inmore independent-minded Singapore. Despite the heavily Asian focus, asignificant share of banking deposits come from the US and UK. As withso many secrecy jurisdictions, Britain’s influence has been important inthe construction of Singapore’s offshore financial centre.According to the Boston Consulting Group1 in 2015, Singapore heldaround one-eighth of the global stock of total offshore wealth2, anda 2019 report by the same group found that it hosted 900 billion ofoffshore assets – third-highest of any country. An IMF report3 in 2014estimated that over 95 percent of all commercial banks in Singaporeare affiliates of foreign banks, a testament to the country’s extremedependence on foreign and offshore money.25 to 5050 to 75Exceptionallysecretive75 to 100How big?5.17%The Singapore financial centre is also the region’s largest centre forcommodity trading, and in 2014 it overtook Tokyo to become Asia’slargest foreign exchange trading centre – and the world’s third largestafter London and New York. It hosts substantial activity in insurance,debt and equity capital markets, derivatives, and offshore companiesand trusts. The OECD in 2018 said there were more than 321,000companies in Singapore.4 It is a major wealth management centre, with 3.4 trillion5 in assets under management in 2018, 80 per cent of whichare sourced from outside Singapore.6Singapore has recently made some progress in curbing some of theworst excesses in money-laundering, and industry players say that ithas been somewhat more diligent than Hong Kong on enforcement andcompliance. In June 2017 Singapore signed the multilateral agreement7for the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard. Singapore, however,continues to offer a range of secrecy facilities that provide tax avoidanceand evasion opportunities,8 coupled with tax and regulatory incentives,as will be explained below.Singapore’s rise as an offshore financial centre stems from its historicalrole as a trading hub or gateway for Southeast Asia. In the modern age,Singapore’s global position as a financial centre has of course been verymuch driven by economic growth in the wider Asia region.But the more interesting story is about how Prime Minister Lee KuanYew brought the modern global offshore financial centre into being.Lee created three essential conditions to attract the world’s hot money.The first was political stability, which he created through authoritarianrule, a heavily statist development model and strong application ofhugelargesmallhuge: 5%large: 1% to 5%small: 0.1% to 1%tiny 0.1%Singapore accounts for 5.17 per cent of the globalmarket for offshore financial services. This makes it ahuge player compared to other secrecy jurisdictions.The ranking is based on a combination of itssecrecy score and scale weighting.Full data is available here: http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/database.To find out more about the Financial SecrecyIndex, please visithttp://www.financialsecrecyindex.com.The FSI project has received funding from theEuropean Union’s Horizon 2020 research andinnovation programme under grant agreementNo 727145. Tax Justice Network 20201If you have any feedback or comments on thisreport, contact us at info@taxjustice.net
Singaporethe rule of law. Second, while the overall economicdevelopment model was heavily statist, he made anexception for the financial sector, with an extremelypermissive approach in certain areas, particularlyfrom the late 1990s. These two ingredients combinein classic offshore style: The model involves fosteringstrong respect for the domestic rule of law, whiletolerating foreign law-breaking and illicit money thatflows from it, and a business model that says ‘wewon’t steal your money – but we will turn a blindeye if you want to steal someone else’s money.’A third ingredient emerged from Lee’sauthoritarianism, which meant messy democracyand associated press freedom were not going tobe allowed to rock the financial boat. This createdthe conditions for a financially ‘captured’ state,where finance is ring-fenced from political or otherturbulence affecting the rest of the economy, andhas helped with the carve-out from the otherwisestatist economic model.History of Singapore as a financial centreEarly originsFounded as a British trading colony in 1819,Singapore is one of Asia’s two big city-states(alongside Hong Kong) with a major deep-waterport. This geographical advantage boosted its roleas a regional trading entrepôt, and the colonialauthorities bolstered this with a “light touch” traderegime that tolerated smuggling and illicit trade.But it was only in the 1960s, when Singapore tookits first steps as a modern offshore and internationalfinancial centre soon after independence from theFederation of Malaysia in 1965, that it began todiversify its reach beyond its traditional economichinterlands of Indonesia and Malaysia.The first big step was a strategic decision to developthe Asian Dollar Market9 by emulating the Londonbased ‘Eurodollar’10 markets, which are very muchan “offshore” phenomenon.11According to then-Prime Minister Lee, Singapore’sfinancial centre strategy first emerged from thework of Dr. Albert Winsemius, Lee’s Dutch economicadviser who came to Singapore with the UnitedNations Development Programme in 1960 and wasappointed chief economic adviser the following year.Winsemius advised Lee to crush the communistsand contacted J.D. Van Oenen, an official at theBank of America in London, for advice on setting upa financial centre. As Lee told it:“Dr Winsemius recalls his telephone call tohis friend, the vice president of the Bankof America branch in Singapore, who wasthen in London. ‘Look here, Mr. Van Oenen,we (Singapore) want, within ten years, tobe the financial centre in Southeast Asia.’Van Oenen replied, ‘All right, you come toLondon. In five years you can develop it.’Winsemius immediately went to London.”12Singapore was then inside the British sterling area,which required exchange controls on cross-borderspeculative transactions outside the zone. VanOenen advised Winsemius13 that Singapore’s keyoffering was its strategic location in a time zonebetween San Francisco and Zurich and wrote apaper on the subject for Lee, recommending thatforeign exchange controls be lifted on all currencytransactions between Singapore and territoriesoutside the sterling area. Though the Bank ofEngland declined to support Lee’s desire to set up a“Eurodollar” market in Asia, he went ahead anyway,giving commercial banks special regulatory and taxtreatment to set up separate Asian Currency Units(ACUs) in their banking organisations. The Bank ofEngland eventually acquiesced.Singapore began to establish its reputation forlight-touch regulation and the Asian Dollar businessmushroomed, focusing mainly on South Asia andinitially buoyed by large US dollar spending in theregion amid the Vietnam War. The establishmentof the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS),the country’s central bank and finance regulator,followed shortly in 1971, boosting Singapore’sregulatory capacity. When the US de-linked thedollar from gold in the same year, Singapore quicklyseized the opportunity to set up new foreignexchange trading operations.The 1970s and 1980s saw the establishment ofnew financial markets in equities, derivatives andcommodities, while fund management, corporatefinancing and insurance sectors became moreprominent from the 1990s onwards. Over the years,the GDP contribution of financial services has risenfrom 6 per cent in the 1970s to 13 per cent in 2019.14In the early days Singapore had a relatively smallshare of scandals by international standards. It wasimplicated in the Slater Walker scandal of the 1970sbut resisted attempts by the highly corrupt Bank ofCredit and Commerce International (BCCI)15 to openoffices there, including one approach that camewith a letter of support from British Prime MinisterHarold Wilson. Yet even in the early days a cultureof noncompliance with certain rules existed, as2
SingaporeCanadian professor Tom Naylor notes in his bookHot Money:“Singapore bank-loan officers werenotorious for their greasy palms, andSingapore banks equally notorious forevading restrictions imposed by theregulatory authorities.”16In recent years, Singaporean-based financialinstitutions have been implicated in twoinvestigations led by the International Consortiumof Investigative Journalists (ICIJ): “Offshore Leaks”(2013)17 and the “Panama Papers” (2016).18 Inaddition, Singapore has been heavily implicatedin the scandal involving Malaysia’s embattledsovereign wealth fund, 1Malaysia DevelopmentBerhad (1MDB).The 1MDB case in particular has resulted in someinternational pressure19 being brought to bear onSingapore. In 2016, the Financial Action Task Forcehighlighted the country’s weakness in pursuingcases of large-scale, complex financial crime, citingthe 1MDB case.This has sparked regulatory action from Singaporeanauthorities. After conducting a two-year-longreview of financial institutions involved in the 1MDBscandal, the Monetary Authority of Singapore shutdown two Swiss merchant banks – BSI Bank andFalcon Bank – for control lapses and for breachinganti-money laundering requirements. Eight banks,including the two mentioned above, were fined20 atotal of 21 million for breaching AML requirements,and local and foreign bankers implicated in thescandal were sentenced to jail.Two models: Singapore versus Hong KongFrom the outset, Singapore had to adopt specialtactics to compete with Hong Kong.According to Lee, Singapore could not match HongKong’s links to the City of London or the explicitbacking of the Bank of England, so it based itsearly success on a two-pronged approach. First, itreassured investors that Singapore was a safe placeto do business. Second, it attracted Asian businessoutside Hong Kong’s sphere of influence. “In theearly years from 1968 to 1985,” Lee noted, “we hadthe field all to ourselves in the region.”21To begin with, as part of a policy to establish areputation for solidity, Singapore took a morecautious approach to financial regulation than HongKong:“In Hong Kong what is not expresslyforbidden is permitted; in Singapore, whatis not expressly permitted is forbidden,”Lee wrote, quoting his critics.22Yet this was far from the end of the story. Asmentioned, Singapore is a hybrid of a highly statistapproach and a laissez-faire attitude in certainareas. The Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Changsummarises:“If you only read things like The Economistor the Wall St. Journal, you would only hearabout Singapore’s free trade policy and itswelcoming attitudes to foreign investment.This may make you conclude thatSingapore’s economic success proves thatfree trade and the free market are the bestfor economic development – until you alsolearn that almost all the land in Singaporeis owned by the government, 85 percentof housing is supplied by the governmentowned housing agency, and 22 percent ofnational output is produced by state-ownedenterprises (the international average isaround 10 percent. There is no single typeof economic theory – Neoclassical, Marxist,Keynesian, you name it – that can explainthe success of this combination of freemarket and socialism.”23Joe Studwell, founder of the China EconomicQuarterly, summarises what is perhaps the corereason for the two leading Asian city-states’ success:“As relatively easily managed city states,Hong Kong and Singapore perform a simpleeconomic trick: they arbitrage the relativeeconomic inefficiency of their hinterlands Since colonial inception they have offeredtariff-free trade (with few or no questionsasked about where the money camefrom) the regional offshore roles of HongKong and Singapore have been absoluteconstants since their founding, and showno sign of change.”24Studwell makes a striking observation about the twocompeting financial centres:“Under Mr. Lee – who never much likedprivate businessmen – Singapore followed3
Singaporea statist model, with the governmenttaking public control of most significantcompanies. Hong Kong pursued anapparently opposite free market model(though in fact its services were alwaysheavily cartelised). At the end of the 20th Century, theresult of ostensibly diametrically oppositeapproaches to economic managementwas GDP per capita in the two cities thatvaried by less than 1,000. The lesson?That a city state with a strategic deep waterport in a region that has relatively higherlevels of mismanagement, corruptionand political uncertainty will prosper,with little reference to official economicphilosophy.”25Light touch regulation Following the 1985 economic recession and the1997 Asian financial crisis, a strategic decision wastaken to diversify the financial sector. From the1990s, regulatory attention in Singapore shifted toliberalising financial markets and banking sectorsto attract more international institutions andto growing new market segments such as fundmanagement, treasury operations, insurance,equity market, debt issuance, corporate financingand so on.26 With further advice from GeraldCorrigan, a former president of the Federal ReserveBank of New York, and Brian Quinn of the Bank ofEngland, Singapore began to adopt a more ‘lighttouch’ regulatory regime and a far more liberalisedfinancial market from 1998.These moves were combined with a reinforcementof financial secrecy in 2001. That year then-FinanceMinister (and now Prime Minister) Lee HsienLoong amended27 the Banking Act to revise secrecyprovisions to allow “only very few exceptions”relating to customer deposits and investment funds,stressing that, “tight banking secrecy is importantto maintaining the confidence of customers in ourbanking system,” and that, “a person who receivescustomer information will be required by law tokeep the information confidential.” Infringingbanking secrecy became28 punishable by up to threeyears in jail. In 2004, trust laws were amended tomake them more useful to Europeans in avoidingand evading inheritance taxes. is followed by more scandals and dirty moneyAs deregulation gathered pace, the first scandalsbegan to emerge — most notoriously the NickLeeson Barings Bank scandal in 1995, facilitatedby what the New York Times at the time called29the “see-no-evil regulators of Simex, Singapore’sswinging stock exchange.”In 2006 Morgan Stanley’s Chief Asia Economist AndyXie, in an internal email that subsequently becamepublic, questioned why Singapore had been chosento host the annual IMF and World Bank meetings.As he put it,“[delegates] were competing with eachother to praise Singapore as the successstory of globalization actually, Singapore’ssuccess came mostly from being the moneylaundering center for corrupt Indonesianbusinessmen and government officials tosustain its economy, Singapore is buildingcasinos to attract corruption money fromChina.”Though a somewhat exaggerated account, it doescapture an essential truth about the Singaporefinancial centre: its deliberate role as a dirty-moneycentre. Indonesia’s Deputy Attorney General in 2010described30 Singapore as “the most strategic countryfor corruptors to run away to the policy of theSingaporean government enables corruptors to livethere,” with Singapore declining to help Indonesiaextradite those it believes to have siphoned off largescale state funds during the Asian crisis of the late1990s. According to the Singapore Democratic Partyin 2008, corrupt Burmese ruling generals, amongmany others from the Asia Pacific region, werealso suspected of using Singapore as a destinationfor their laundered money. The US InternationalNarcotics Control Strategy Report (INSCR) in 2011added that:31“Stringent bank secrecy laws and thelack of routine currency reportingrequirements make Singapore a potentiallyattractive destination for drug traffickers,transnational criminals, foreign corruptofficials, terrorist organizations and theirsupporters seeking to launder money orfund terrorist activities.”In April 2013, the Washington-based InternationalConsortium of Investigative Journalists acquiredsecret records32 on more than 120,000 offshorecompanies and trusts and the offshore holdings ofpeople and companies in more than 170 countriesand territories. Central to this data leak wasinformation on Singapore-based Portcullis TrustNet,which set up offshore companies, trusts and hard-totrace bank accounts in Singapore and other offshore4
Singaporefinancial centres around the world. According toICIJ’s investigation,33 Deutsche Bank’s Singaporebranch, for instance, helped create or manage 309offshore companies and trusts in the British VirginIslands and other tax havens by registering themwith Portcullis TrustNet. Public records do not showany business activities for most of these offshoreentities. Portcullis TrustNet is also implicatedin various offshore accounts scandals of publicofficials and wealthy individuals and families basedin Indonesia,34 Thailand35 and the Philippines.36Portcullis TrustNet has since rebranded37 itselfas Portcullis Group and does not appear to havesuffered long-term adverse consequences from the2013 leak.Separately, an entertaining and important 2013undercover investigation38 by Global Witness intocorruption in Malaysia’s Sarawak state, provided arare inside view of the financial centre, with a taxlawyer noting39 that:“Singapore has a ‘Chinese wall’, that it’simpossible for the Malaysian authorities toget any information out of Singapore, andthat Singapore is for ‘people like us’.”Singapore’s practitioners have often stressed,quietly, that information-sharing agreementswith other countries come hedged with specialSingaporean “safeguards,” which are backed bya courts system favourable to the financial sector,which can make it hard for other jurisdictions toextract necessary information.Singapore’s offshore financial centre todaySingapore has, in line with evolving internationalstandards on transparency, made some significantmoves to reform. In addition, Singapore currentlychairs the Peer Review Group of the OECDGlobal Forum40 on Transparency and Exchange ofInformation for Tax Purposes. The most notableregulatory changes include: Committing to the OECDs “on request”standard for information exchange andpassing a bill in November 2011 that allowedSingapore to exchange information under itsTax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). The passing in October 2009, of the Income Tax(Amendment) (Exchange of Information) Bill toallow for the exchange of some bank and trustinformation. Including tax offences as predicate offences41for money laundering, from July 2013 Criminalising asset managers and bankers42who wilfully conceal, possess or use proceedsof foreign tax offences “if they had reasonablegrounds to believe that they were assistingthe tax offender in retention or control of theproceeds of the foreign tax evasion”, effective1 September 2014. Signingthemultilateralagreementimplementing the Common Reporting Standardon automatic exchange of information in June2017. Increasing the availability of beneficialownership information, which caused the OECDin 2018 to upgrade Singapore to “compliant”with its exchange of information standards.43 Signing the OECD’s Multilateral Conventionto Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures toPrevent BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting)in late 2018.44Singapore continues, however, to provide a rangeof secrecy offerings, including the popular PrivateTrust Company (PTC), which acts as a trusteefor secretive trusts. A PTC allows “the family toretain more control than with appointing anindependent trustee,” as one practitioner describesit45 (“more control” can mean the trust is moredirectly controlled by the person who contributedthe assets and is therefore more of a ‘sham’).Another symbol of Singapore’s secrecy offerings isLe Freeport,46 run by a Swiss art dealer, where highnet worth individuals can store art, wine, gold andother valuables –exempt from duties and taxes47 —and required customs declarations can be relativelyvague.48Singapore offers other tax exemptions too. Thereis full tax exemption for foreign-sourced incomereceived in Singapore by any individual not residentin Singapore; an absence of capital gains, gift orestate taxes; and Singapore also boasts a quasiterritorial tax system that exempts from individualincome tax on all foreign-sourced income notremitted to Singapore. Various other tax incentivesand loopholes exist for corporations too. Inaddition, Singapore has a wide array of tax treatieswith other countries, and, partly as a result of this, ithas become a major turntable49 for so-called ‘roundtripping’ into and out of India and other countries,competing against other centres like Mauritius.Round-tripping occurs when an investor from Indiasends capital to Singapore, where it is hidden behindlegal secrecy and subsequently returned to Indiavia a Singaporean shell company disguised illegallyas foreign investment. That allows the investor to5
Singaporeobtain tax and other benefits from the tax treatythat would otherwise not have been available tothe Indian investor. Singapore also offers plenty ofopportunities for other kinds50 of tax arbitrage.In addition to this “conventional” dirty money,Singapore has sought to provide a regulatory havenfor financial sector players to escape regulationelsewhere. In common with London and many otheroffshore financial centres, Singapore’s attitudehas acquired a rather predatory character, as thisaccount in The Economist attests:“A widely repeated story in Singaporeis that the only people who have readall of America’s gargantuan Dodd-Frankfinancial-regulation act are Americanacademics, who find it a mess, and theSingapore Monetary Authority, which ismulling the opportunities it might create.”Those “opportunities” will likely at some pointinvolve US taxpayers forking out for new bankbailouts, while Singapore gets to keep its winningsfrom hosting the riskier activities of US banks.the financial sector and the ruling People’s ActionParty, which has been in power since 1959, six yearsbefore Singapore’s independence. This combinationof political stability, official tolerance for a degree offoreign dirty money and financial state capture willcontinue to attract money from around the world.On the other hand, Singapore’s regulators, cognisantof the reputational risks52 to its financial centrethat would result from such practices, are likely tocontinue treading a thin line between maintaininga competitive tax and regulatory regime in linewith the practices of other comparable financialcentres while cracking down on the most egregiousregulatory breaches by financial institutions in thecity-state.Looking forward, Singapore’s place as the premiereAsian offshore centre may be cemented by politicalinstability in Hong Kong, which has seen violentongoing protests in 2019 against a loss of autonomyto mainland China. Some media reports havealready found evidence that capital is fleeing HongKong for other, stable offshore centres, particularlySingapore.53The captured stateIn one offshore secrecy jurisdiction after anotherwe have noted the phenomenon of “state capture”by the offshore financial services sector, whereoffshore law-making is carefully ring-fenced againstany potential interference in domestic politics.A journalistic account in 2012 describes theSingaporean variant of this:“It is impossible to find opinions opposedto the omnipresence of finance on theisland. The banks form part of our DNA,”says Pritam Singh, one of five oppositiondeputies among 99 parliamentarians.Former ministers or civil servants makeup the boards of the banks. Parliamentapproves and votes on the executive’sdecisions, without haggling. “The notion ofconflicts of interest does not exist, becauseeveryone is in some form a shareholder ofSingapore Inc.,” a diplomat says. The ruleof law, vaunted by the authorities, is bothinflexible and obedient. “The inspectionsand reprimands from the MonetaryAuthority of Singapore are everything,”a European banking veteran said. “Notrespecting the rules risks huge fines, andeven prison.”51This ‘capture’ is partly rooted in the links between6
SingaporeFurther reading: Why Complementarity Matters for Stability—Hong Kong SAR and Singapore as AsianFinancial Centers, IMF, July 2014.54 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchangeof Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews:Singapore 2011: Phase 1: Legal and RegulatoryFramework,55 Global Forum on Transparencyand Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes,OECD; x; 05.01.2020.2BCG has its own methodology for estimating offshore wealth: for a broader analysis of whatconstitutes offshore wealth, see TJN’s Price of Offshore, Revisited, July 2012.Global Forum on Transparency and Exchangeof Information for Tax Purposes 2016: PeerReview Report – Phase 2: Implementation ofThe Standard in Practice –Cameroon, atest; /2014/wp14119.pdf; 05.01.2020. Singapore’s future as a financial centre: PartI,56 Part II57 and Part III,58 Singapore DemocraticParty, November and December 2008. Singapore, a Rising Home for Quiet Money,Comes Under Pressure,59 New York Times, May12, wer-54-pace-to-34-trillion-last ;14.10.2019. 4/anti-racist-revelations-ibram-x-kendi/?arc404 true; 4056/http://www.mas.gov.sg/ %20Management/2015%20AM%20Survey%20Report.pdf; x-information/MCAA-Signatories.pdf;05.01.2020.8For a good appraisal of its tax offerings,see Singapore: Home for Billionaires and Superstars, tax Analysts, Aug 6, ; 1Singapore’s first-mover advantage in establishing the ADM sparked off an on-going rivalrywith Hong Kong to become the premier financialcentre in Asia. See Wong, K.A. (1977) ‘Structure andgrowth of the Asian Dollar Market in Singapore’,Academic Annual 新亚书院学术年册, pp. 225-239.For more on Eurodollars, see the Eurodollar chapter in Nicholas Shaxson’s Treasure Islands; or for ashorter summary, Ronen Palan’s 2012 article “Britain’s Second Empire,” or the UK narrative report for7
Singaporethe Financial Secrecy Index.12Lee Quan Yew, From Third World to First,the Singapore Story, Harper, e/imaginaries-jurong-industrial-estate-singapore infographics/-/media/Files/visualising 9.pdf; 2020.16R.T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt, debt--third-edition-products-9780773527430.php, McGill‘s Queens University Press, 9a58ac7a5?ftcamp published links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct; r-1mdb-related-transactions; 05.01.2020.21Lee Quan Yew, From Third World to First,the Singapore Story, Harper, p.91.22Lee Quan Yew, From Third World to First,the Singapore Story, Harper, p.97.23Ha-Joon Chang, A Pelican Introduction toEconomics: A User’s Guide, Pelican, p49.24Joe Studwell, Asian Godfathers: moneyand power in Hong Kong and South East Asia, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007, pp33-34.25Studwell, p36.26See Monetary Authority of Singapore(2012) Sustaining stability: serving Singapore, Singapore: Straits Times lee--16-may-2001; ore nion/essay-singapore-sling.html; News/Business/Story/A1Story20100428-212965.html; /nrcrpt/2011/vol1/156362.htm; -hundreds-offshore-entities/; ny-among-thai-names-secret-offshore-files/; ust-caribbean
companies in Singapore.4 It is a major wealth management centre, with 3.4 trillion5 in assets under management in 2018, 80 per cent of which are sourced from outside Singapore.6 Singapore has recently made some progress in curbing some of the worst exces
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