RIVER CROSSING OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE Captain Russell A. Eno
,, .IRIVER CROSSING OFFENSIVE DOCTRINECaptain Russell A. EnoRoster Number 059, Faculty Adviser Group 4, ADV 6-7123 August 1971
00Ihe United States Army Infantry SchoolFort Benning, Georgia 3190523 August 1971IOAC 6-71SUBJECT:River Crossing Offensive Doctrine1. PROBLEM. To determine whether river crossing offensive doctrinewould be valid under circumstance which preclude the employment ofboth the deep-fording medium tank and the amphibious MS51 reconnaissance vehicle.2.FACTS BEARIR; ON THE PROBLEM.a. Present river crossing offensive doctrine will not undergomajor revision in the immediate future. (11)b. Preseut river crossing offensive doctrine is not dependentupon the deep-fording capabilities of the medium tank, nor does itdepend upon the amphibious capabilities of the M551 reconnaissancevehicle. (Annex B)c. Both the medium tank and the MS51 reconnaissance vehicleare subject to such restrictions regarding stream velocity, banksteepness, and bank height as to preclude their employment undercertain conditions. (Annex D, Annex E)d. the assault force is not doctrinally bound to cross on orbelow the surface of the river, but can be transported by helicopteror parachute landed. (10: 15-16)e. Airborne, iafantry, and mechanized infantry battalions havesufficient organic antitank resources to provide themselves with alimited antitank capability after crossing the river obstacle. (8: 1-2)f. The infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored divisions havean organic capability of conducting bridaing operations across waterobstacles. (Annex F)3.DISCUSSION.a. The deep-fording capability of the medium tank and the swi ming capability of the M551 reconnaissance vehicle, while consideredas an adjunct to present river crossing doctrine, are not the basisfor the development of such doctrine. (Annex B) Both hasty anddeliberate river crossings have been conducted entirely without accompanying armor, using many of the principles found in present doctrine.(Annex C)b. In my opinion, factors which would preclude the fording oftanks or the swimming of amphibious vehicles would enhance the valueof a particular crossing site, in that the enemy would in all probability regard that part of his sector as an unlikely avenue of approachand leave it lightly defended. Such a situation would lend itself toa hasty crossing, the establishment of a bridgehead, and subsequentcrossings of men and equipment.
0c. With the increased mobility offered by rotary wing aircraft,it is now possible to land an assault force beyond the river obstacle,neutralize enemy forces along the shore, and establish a bridgehead.To assist in this method of crossing, the M551 reconnaissance vehiclecan be airlifted or airdropped with the assaulting force. (15: 46)d. One of the reasons for the early movement of tanks across ariver obstacle is the requirement that the assaulting force have anantitank capability, as well as sufficient firepower to neutralizeenemy strongpoints. Infantry battalions presently have this capability. (8: 12) This organic capability of the infantry battalionsreduces the requirement for armor in the initial assault.e. The bridging equipment organic to the engineer bridging companyof infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored divisions is capable oftransporting all armored vehicles currently in use across water obstaclesup to 325 meters in width, with as little as three hours of constructiontime required. Necessary bank and access road preparation can be conducted concurrently with the bridge construction. (Annex F)f. Once the river obstacle has been breached, it is essentialthat the momentum of the attack be maintained. While the inabilityto swim or ford armor may cause some delay in the employment of tanksin the attack, I feel that the attacking force could rely upon supporting artillery and aircraft-delivered fires to facilitate the establishment of a bridgehead. Once this has been accomplished, the efforts ofsupporting engineers can expedite the crossing of the armor. The responsibility for spearheading the offensive operation will then evolve tothe armor.4.COR:LUSIONS.a. The inability to swim or ford armor to accompany an assaultingforce, though affecting the tactical situation, would not invalidateriver crossing offensive doctrine, since present doctrine takes intoaccount the limitations of armor in river crossing operations.b. Adequate engineer support during a deliberate crossing wouldlargely obviate the requirement for the deep-fording of the medium tank.c. The air transportability of the H55l reconnaissance vehiclewould permit its use in a hasty crossing, without the necessity ofswimming the river.d. The potential of air-landed forces to augment a river crossingcan be examined in greater detail than current doctrine affords.5. ACTIONS BECCHIENDED.a. No modifications be made to present river crossing offensivedoctrine as regards the employment of deep-fording or amphibious vehicles.b. Efforts be made to develop an amphibious vehicle which will beless restricted by factors of stream velocity, bank steepness, and bankheight than is the M55l.2
0c. More emphasis be placed upon the employment of heliborne orparachute landed forces to support a river crossing.- tel& ELLA ER Captain, Infantry687-6248ANNEXES:ABCDE-Definition and Illustration of TermsDiscussion of Present River Croasing Offensive DoctrineHistorical Examples of River CrossingsCharacteristics of M113Al and M551Characteristics of H48A3 and M60AlF - Engineer Bridging CapabilitiesG - BibliographyCONCURRENCES: (Omitted)NONCOI«:URRENCES: (Omitted)CONSIDERATION OF R NCONCURRENCES:ANNEXES ADDED: (Omitted)ACtiON BY APPROVIR; AU'DIORI'lY:(Omitted)DAlE:Approved (disapproved), including (excluding) exceptions.Signature3
ANNEX A -- Definition of Terms, With Illustration (10:3-4, 11:1-2)Bridaebead. A bridgehead is an area of terrain which is either heldor which must be occupied on the enemy side of the river. This areawill be used as the base for subsequent operations and should besufficiently large to permit the crossing force to maneuver. Inaddition, the terrain within the bridgehead should be suited to adefense of the crossing sites.Bridaehead Line. The bridgehead line is represented on a map as a.n --(l Y!Limaginary line which defines the limits of the bridgehead. lhe endsof the line are tied in with the river on either side of the crossingsite.Crossigg Areas. Crossing areas are used as control measures, and maycontain more than one crossing site. A crossing area must also belarge enough to permit adequate dispersion and maneuver for elementsof the crossing force.Crossing Site. The crossing site is the actual location at whichthe crossing will occur. The site may be a bridge, a ford, or a suitable location to launch assault boats or amphibious vehicles.Assault Force. The assault force is the force which executes theactual crossing of the river obstacle and seizes the far shore.Crossing Force. The crossing force is the entire force which participates in the crossing, to include supporting elements such as engineersand smoke generator support units. ,·.· ''I'Aaaault crostlnotAssoult Boot), Raft and 8rldgt Sift0)Crostlng(AMph V.tllctes) and Raft !IttCrossing 1tt(Asaault 8oota). "'t.,iCrosslno AreaFiguf'e 1. Sch.sm.atit sketch of G d ln a. M116f' Cf'oating.II!4
00ANNEX B -- Discussion of Present River Crossing Offensive Doctrine(8:7-6, 10:3-5, ll:II)1. A river crossing operation is conducted in order to overcome ariver obstacle as efficiently and as rapidly as possible, to eithercontinue an offensive mission or to resume the offensive after conducting a defense. An additional purpose of a crossing is the establishment of security to support the crossing of subsequent units.2. A part of his preparations, the crossing force commander musthave detailed information concerning the size, composition, andlocation of any enemy reserves which could oppose the crossing forcebefore the bridgehead has been secured. In addition, the commandermust ensure that a detailed reconnaissance of the rossing area iscon4ucted. Ideally, such a reconnaissance would include availablemaps, aerial photographs, the utilization of skin divers, and theassistance of supporting engineers.3. The capability of the enemy to oppose the crossing force, and thenature of the river obstacle determine the type crossing to be attempted.Present doctrine envisions two types of crossings. These are the hastycrossing, or crossing of opportunity, and the deliberate crossing.1he hasty crossing is favored when the enemy shore is lightly defendedor when the attacking force wishes to preserve the momentum of theattack and cross without delay. A hasty crossing is also feasiblewhen the enemy defenders can be overcome by conventional artillery,nuclear weapons, or by chemical or biological means. In addition,the assaulting force must be able to move quickly to the river withoutmassing. This is significant in that the massing of forces wouldpresent the enemy with a lucrative nuclear target. Hasty crossingsare characterized by detailed planning to ensure the availability ofcrossing means, swiftness of execution, and surprise. A deliberateriver crossing will be attempted when the friendly force has beendefending along the riverline and is resuming the offensive, whena hasty crossing has been attempted and has failed, or when the enemyis known to be strongly defending the portion of the river underconsideration. the deliberate crossing is characterized by extensive,detailed planning, a deliberate massing of personnel and equipment tosupport the crossing effort, a delay at the riverline, and a deceptionto draw enemy attention away from the crossing area Unlike the hastycrossing, a deliberate crossing requires that enemy forces be completelycleared from the near shore.5
0ANNEX C -- Historical Examples of the Two Types of River Crossings(16:45-50)1. The 7lst Infantry Division was advancing toward Austria in May1945, with the intention of crossing the Inn River and continuingthe attack. 1Wo dams offered the only readily available means ofcrossing the river, and both were in German hands. The decision wasmade to launch a rapid attack in order to seize the dams before theenemy could react. The dam at Obenberg was the target of the 1stwas foAMe--D l .Battalion, 66th Infantry. An attack forceAconsisting of one riflecompany, a heavy machine gun platoon, a tank destroyer unit, organicantitank weapons, and supporting mortars. Under the leadership ofthe battalion commander, the force moved rapidly to their objective,overcoming the sporadic resistance encountered on the way. Upontheir arrival at the dam, the force quickly overran the su prisedGerman guard detachment, established a bridgehead on the Austrianside of the dam, and secured a crossing site for the remainder ofthe battalion and thus for the 7lst Infantry Division. Two of theessential elements of a hasty crossing, speed and surprise, wereemployed to the fullest in the seizure of the dam at Obenberg.2. The 34th Infantry Division was assigned the mission of crossingthe Volturno River in October 1943. Extensive reconnaissance patrolling was conducted along the river, both by infantry units and bythe division engineers. It was learned that the Volturno was seldomover 100 yards in width, and generally fordable, but the banks wereboth steep and high. Heavy rains necessitated the use of bridgingequipment and caused the attack, originally planned for the nightof 9-10 October, to be postponed until 12 October. During the delayfurther reconnaissance was conducted and troops were trained in theuse of assault boats. The attack commenced on 12 October and waspreceded by an artillery preparation. Some confusion arose in theexecution of the attack; the assault boats were lost after the firstwave crossed the river, and the remaining troops had to wade across.The guides became misoriented and directed troops to cross at thewrong places; several men were swept away by the swift river anddrowned. In addition to these difficulties, supporting artillery firesfell among friendly forces and caused a number of casualties. Despitethe setbacks suffered by the attacking force, the crossing :of theVolturno was successful and the 34th Infantry Division was able tocontinue the attack northward to Rome. This operation illustratesthe extensive planning, the massing of men and equipment, the delaybefore the river ob cle, and the detailed reconnaissance whichcharacterize a deli erate river crossing. While these principles contributed to the success of the attack, others were violated withdisastrous results. The failure to provide capable guides to thefording sites caused needless drownings. A bri ing site was selectedin an exposed area rather t p in a defiladed location and a greatdeal of equipment was dama ged or destroyed by the enemy's direct fire.Lastly, the failure to coordinate artillery fires was responsible forthe casualties suffered by the assaulting force.6
0ANNEX D -- Comparison of M-113Al and M551 Characteristics (15:36, 13:3)M-113AlWater CrossingAmphibiousAmphibiousMaximum Trench Crossing66 inches100 inchesMaximum Grade60 percent60 percentMaximum Vertical Wall24 inches33 inchesSteeringLateral steeringPivot steeringGround Clearance16 1/8 inches19 inchesMaximum Allowable CurrentSpeed for Swimmingl.Sm/secl.Sm/sec'1rS-7
ANNEX E --Fording Capabilities of the Tanks M48A3 and M60Al (15:48-52)M48A3M60AlWater Fording48 inches48 inchesw/kit 96 inchesw/deep water kit162 inchesMaximum Trench Crossing102 inches102 inchesMaximum Grade60 percent60 percentMaximum Vertical Wall36 inches36 inchesMaximum Allowable CurrentSpeed for Deep Fording1.5m/sec:18
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cANNEX G -- Bibliography1.Armor in River Crossings (Fort Knox, Kentucky:March 1950) D812.68 .A2bU.The Armored School,2.Armor in the Deliberate River Crossing (Fort Knox, Kentucky:Armored School, April 1952) U418.4 #1952-7pR.3.Asam, LTC Rolf, "River Crossing Operation," Military Review, June1962, p. 2-9.4.Barnov, COL B., "River Crossing in Offensive Operations," MilitaryReview, January 1947, p. 73.5.Bergerhoff, Hans, ''Mobility in River Crossing Operations," MilitaryReview, January 1963, p. 63-70.6.Eddleman, LTG C.D., ''Men, Missiles, and Atomics on the Future ArmyBattlefield, 11 Army, December 1956, p. 29.7.FM 7-10, The Rifle Company, Platoons, and Squads (Washington, D.C.:Department of the Army, April 1970).8.FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalions (Washington, D.C.:the Army, December 1969).9.FM 17-1, Armor Operations (Washington, D.C.:Army, October 1966).TheDepartment ofDepartment of the10.FM 31-60, River Crossing Operations (Washington, D.C.:of the Army, November 1966).11.FM 31-60, River Crossing Operations (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:United States Army Combat Developments Command, Institute ofCombined Arms and Support, March 1971) Initial draft manuscript,does not reflect final approval of Department of the Army.12.Hefford, CPT Robert A., ''Underwater Fording," Armor, NovemberDecember 1964, p. 12-15.13.Robertson, CPT Jarrett J. , "The Genera 1 Sheridan Tank ArmoredReconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle (XM551)" (Staff Study inUnited States Army Infantry School Library, Fort Benning, Georgia).14.Slesarev, MAJ P., ''Forcing a Water Obstacle with Tanks," MilitaryAttache Report Number 6670.29, August 1943. Translated at theCommand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,April 1944 (in United States Army Infantry School Library, FortBenning, Georgia).15.Tactical Vehicles (Fort Benning, Georgia:Infantry School, June 1969).16.Thomas, LTC Evert S., Jr., "Two Types of River Crossings, 11 MilitaryReview, December 1947, p. 45.17.True, CPT Richard D., ''Fordability," Armor, March-April 1953,p. 52-57, and May-June 1953, p. 46-49.18.Williamson, MAJ Dan H., Jr., "Tanks Under Water," Military Review,January 1965, p. 93-98.10DepartmentUnited States Army
Ihe United States Army Infantry School Fort Benning, Georgia 31905 23 August 1971 . continue an offensive mission or to resume the offensive after con . ANNEX C --Historical Examples of the Two Types of River Crossings (16:45-50) 1. The 7lst Infan
covers the same essentials of the faith, giving you a firm grasp on seven key topics: The Doctrine of the Word of God, The Doctrine of God The Doctrine of Man, The Doctrine of Christ The Doctrine of the Application of Redemption, The Doctrine of the Church The Doctrine of the Future Like Systematic Theology, this book is marked by its clarity, its
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CHAPTER 4. PLANNING General The Planning Process Analyzing the Mission Developing COAs Analyzing COAs Comparing COAs Producing Orders CHAPTER 5. DIVISION DELIBERATE RIVER CROSSING General Phases of a Deliberate River Crossing The River Crossing Advance to the River (Phase I) Assault Across the River (Phase II) Advance From the Exit Bank (Phase III)
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