Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9
Integrated Dell RemoteAccess Controller 9Security TargetEvaluation Assurance Level (EAL): EAL2 Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.322 October 2019Dell Technologies1 Dell WayRound Rock, Texas, USA78682Prepared by:EWA-Canada, An Intertek Company1223 Michael Street North, Suite 200Ottawa, Ontario, CanadaK1J 7T2
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security TargetCONTENTS1SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION . 11.1DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION. 11.2SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE . 11.3TOE REFERENCE . 21.4TOE OVERVIEW . 21.4.11.5TOE Environment . 2TOE DESCRIPTION . 31.5.1Physical Scope . 31.5.2Logical Scope. 51.5.3Functionality Excluded from the Evaluated Configuration . 62CONFORMANCE CLAIMS . 72.1COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM . 72.2PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM . 72.3PACKAGE CLAIM . 72.4CONFORMANCE RATIONALE . 73SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION . 83.1THREATS . 83.2ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES . 83.3ASSUMPTIONS . 94SECURITY OBJECTIVES . 104.1SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE. 104.2SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT . 114.3SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE . 114.3.1Security Objectives Rationale Related to Threats . 124.3.2Security Objectives Rationale Related to OSPs . 144.3.3Security Objectives Rationale Related to Assumptions . 155EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION . 175.1SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS . 175.1.15.2FTA SAC EXT Service Access . 17SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS . 18Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page i of iii
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target6SECURITY REQUIREMENTS . 196.1CONVENTIONS . 196.2SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS . 196.2.1Security Audit (FAU) . 206.2.2Cryptographic Support (FCS) . 216.2.3User Data Protection (FDP) . 236.2.4Identification and Authentication (FIA) . 236.2.5Security Management (FMT) . 246.2.6Protection of the TSF (FPT) . 256.2.7TOE Access (FTA) . 256.2.8Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) . 266.3SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS . 276.4SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE . 286.4.1Security Functional Requirements Rationale. 286.4.2SFR Rationale Related to Security Objectives . 296.4.3Dependency Rationale . 326.4.4Security Assurance Requirements Rationale. 337TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION . 347.1SECURITY AUDIT . 347.2CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT . 347.3USER DATA PROTECTION . 347.4IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION . 367.5SECURITY MANAGEMENT . 367.6PROTECTION OF THE TSF . 377.7TOE ACCESS . 377.8TRUSTED PATH / CHANNELS . 388TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS . 398.1TERMINOLOGY . 398.2ACRONYMS . 39LIST OF TABLESTable 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software . 3Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page ii of iii
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security TargetTable 2 – Logical Scope of the TOE . 6Table 3 – Threats . 8Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies . 9Table 5 – Assumptions . 9Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE . 10Table 7 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment . 11Table 8 – Mapping Between Objectives, Threats, OSPs, and Assumptions . 12Table 9 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements . 20Table 10 – Cryptographic Key Generation . 21Table 11 – Cryptographic Operations . 23Table 12 – Security Assurance Requirements . 28Table 13 – Mapping of SFRs to Security Objectives . 29Table 14 – Functional Requirement Dependencies . 33Table 15 – Roles and Privileges . 35Table 16 –Privilege Descriptions . 36Table 17 – Terminology . 39Table 18 – Acronyms . 41LIST OF FIGURESFigure 1 – Deployment Configuration . 2Figure 2 – TOE Boundary . 4Figure 3 – FTA SAC EXT: Service Access Component Levelling . 17Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page iii of iii
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTIONThis Security Target (ST) defines the scope of the evaluation in terms of theassumptions made, the intended environment for the Target of Evaluation(TOE), the Information Technology (IT) security functional and assurancerequirements to be met, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level)to which it is asserted that the TOE satisfies its IT security requirements. Thisdocument forms the baseline for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.1.1DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONSection 1, ST Introduction, provides the Security Target reference, the Targetof Evaluation reference, the TOE overview and the TOE description.Section 2, Conformance Claims, describes how the ST conforms to theCommon Criteria and Packages. This ST does not conform to a ProtectionProfile.Section 3, Security Problem Definition, describes the expected environmentin which the TOE is to be used. This section defines the set of threats that arerelevant to the secure operation of the TOE, organizational security policies withwhich the TOE must comply, and secure usage assumptions applicable to thisanalysis.Section 4, Security Objectives, defines the set of security objectives to besatisfied by the TOE and by the TOE operating environment in response to theproblem defined by the security problem definition.Section 5, Extended Components Definition, defines the extendedcomponents which are then detailed in Section 6.Section 6, Security Requirements, specifies the security functional andassurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the ITenvironment.Section 7, TOE Summary Specification, describes the security functions thatare included in the TOE to enable it to meet the IT security functionalrequirements.Section 8 Terminology and Acronyms, defines the acronyms andterminology used in this ST.1.2SECURITY TARGET REFERENCEST Title:Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9 SecurityTargetST Version:1.3ST Date:22 October 2019Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 1 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target1.3TOE REFERENCETOE Identification:Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 93.34.34.34TOE Developer:Dell TechnologiesTOE Type:Remote Management (Other Devices and Systems)1.4TOE OVERVIEWThe Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9 (iDRAC9) is a systemsmanagement solution that provides remote management capabilities, crashedsystem recovery, and power control functions for Dell PowerEdge systems.The iDRAC9 uses an integrated System-on-Chip microprocessor for the remotemonitor/control system. The iDRAC9 co-exists on the system board with themanaged PowerEdge server. The server operating system is concerned withexecuting applications; the iDRAC9 is concerned with monitoring and managingthe server’s environment and state outside of the operating system.The remote management functionality provided by the iDRAC9 TOE is accesscontrolled and all administrator actions are audited. Communications to accessthis functionality are protected using cryptography.The TOE is a combined firmware and hardware TOE.In this ST, the TOE may be referred to as the TOE, the Integrated Dell RemoteAccess Controller 9 or iDRAC9. It should be understood that all references to theTOE are for the version of the TOE referenced in Section 1.3.1.4.1TOE EnvironmentThe iDRAC9 Service Processor is implemented within a Dell server.Figure 1 shows the evaluated configuration. Although many more servers aresupported, the evaluated configuration consists of the platforms listed in Table1. One of these systems is required to operate the TOE. The evaluatedconfiguration also requires a Windows Server 2016 Domain Controller withActive Directory and an NTP service, and an administrator workstation.Figure 1 – Deployment ConfigurationDoc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 2 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security TargetComponentOperating SystemHardwareTower Series Servernot applicablePowerEdge T440PowerEdge T640Rack Series ServerPowerEdge R440not applicablePowerEdge R540PowerEdge R740PowerEdge R740xdPowerEdge R640PowerEdge R840PowerEdge R940PowerEdge R940xaAdministrator WorkstationWindows 10General PurposeComputer HardwareActive DirectoryWindows Server 2016General PurposeComputer HardwareNTP ServiceTable 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software1.51.5.1TOE DESCRIPTIONPhysical ScopeThe TOE consists of the iDRAC9 Advanced RISC1 Machine (ARM) hardware andiDRAC9 firmware. The TOE includes external interfaces used for management,and interfaces internal to the managed server to communicate with the Hostsystem.1Reduced Instruction Set ComputerDoc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 3 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security TargetHostOS BMCPassthroughSerialUSBEthernetLegendiDRAC9TOE BoundaryInterfacesEnvironmentRACADMFigure 2 – TOE BoundaryThe iDRAC9 hardware is implemented within one of the servers listed in Table 1.1.5.1.1TOE InterfacesIn the evaluated configuration, the following iDRAC9 interfaces are supported: Remote Access Controller Admin (RACADM) The RACADM interface isaccessed over HTTPS.Server Management USB Port An administrator may plug a laptopdirectly into the micro Universal Serial Bus (USB) port and configureiDRAC9 using the Web Graphical User Interface (GUI), RACADM, WSManor Redfish.Ethernet An administrator uses the Ethernet port to access iDRAC9 overHTTPS using the Web GUI, Remote RACADM, WSMan or Redfish.1.5.1.2TOE DeliveryThe TOE is delivered as an integral component of the server, which is deliveredby courier when ordered directly from Dell Technologies. The evaluated versionof the firmware may be downloaded from the Dell support site asiDRAC 3.34.34.34 A00.exe (Windows-based Dell Update Package (DUP)) oriDRAC-with-Lifecycle-Controller Firmware 3HT95 LN 3.34.34.34 A00.BIN(Contains both iDRAC and Lifecycle Controller firmware) update package for RedHat Linux.Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 4 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target1.5.1.3TOE GuidanceThe TOE includes the following guidance documentation: Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9 (iDRAC9) Version 3.30.30.30User's Guide, Rev. A00o iDRAC9 with Lifecycle Controller Version 3.30.30.30 RACADM CLI Guide,Rev. A00o idrac9-lifecycle-controller-v3303030 users-guide en-us.pdfidrac9-lifecycle-controller-v3303030 reference-guide en-us.pdfiDRAC9 with Lifecycle Controller Version 3.31.31.31 Redfish API Guide,Rev. A00o1.5.2idrac9-lifecycle-controller-v3313131 api-guide en-us.pdfLogical ScopeThe logical boundary of the TOE includes all interfaces and functions within thephysical boundary. The logical boundary of the TOE may be broken down by thesecurity function classes described in Section 6. Table 2 summarizes the logicalscope of the TOE.Functional ClassesDescriptionSecurity AuditAudit entries are generated for security related events.The audit logs can be reviewed by authorizedadministrators, and filtered to show only the desired logs.Cryptographic SupportCryptographic functionality is provided to allow thecommunications links between the TOE and its remoteadministrators to be protected.User Data ProtectionThe TOE provides a role-based access control capability toensure that only authorized administrators are able toadminister the TOE.Identification andAuthenticationUsers must identify and authenticate prior to TOE access.The password is not displayed when entered by the user.Security ManagementThe TOE provides management capabilities via a WebBased Graphical User Interface (GUI), accessed via HTTPS,or locally through the Remote Access Controller Admin(RACADM) Command Line Interface (CLI). Managementfunctions allow the administrators to view audit records,configure users and roles, and monitor server health andconfiguration.Protection of the TSFThe TOE provides reliable time stamps.Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 5 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security TargetFunctional ClassesDescriptionTOE AccessUsers are automatically logged out of the managementinterfaces after a configurable period of inactivity. Usersmay log out at any time.A TOE administrator may configure the permitted servicesand accessible ports.Trusted Path/ChannelThe communications links between the TOE and its remoteadministrators are protected using Hypertext TransferProtocol Secure (HTTPS).Table 2 – Logical Scope of the TOE1.5.3Functionality Excluded from the EvaluatedConfigurationThe following features are excluded from the evaluated configuration:Windows multifactor authenticationTelnet, Secure Shell (SSH) and Simple Network Management Protocol(SNMP) are not exercised in the evaluated configurationThe following features were not evaluated as part of the evaluation: Hardware Root of TrustSELinux Policy EnforcementDoc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 6 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS2.1COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIMThis Security Target claims to be conformant to Version 3.1 of Common Criteriafor Information Technology Security Evaluation according to: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1,Revision 5, April 2017 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:Security Functional Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1,Revision 5, April 2017 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:Security Assurance Components CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1,Revision 5, April 2017As follows: CC Part 2 extended CC Part 3 conformantThe Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 has been taken into account.2.2PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCECLAIMThis ST does not claim conformance of the TOE with any Protection Profile (PP).2.3PACKAGE CLAIMThis Security Target claims conformance to Evaluation Assurance Level 2augmented with ALC FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures.2.4CONFORMANCE RATIONALEThis ST does not claim conformance of the TOE with any PP, therefore aconformance rationale is not applicable.Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 7 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION3.1THREATSTable 3 lists the threats addressed by the TOE. Potential threat agents areauthorized TOE users, and unauthorized persons. The level of expertise of bothtypes of attacker is assumed to be unsophisticated. TOE users are assumed tohave access to the TOE, extensive knowledge of TOE operations, and to possessa high level of skill. They have moderate resources to alter TOE parameters, butare assumed not to be wilfully hostile. Unauthorized persons have littleknowledge of TOE operations, a low level of skill, limited resources to alter TOEparameters and no physical access to the TOE.Mitigation to the threats is through the objectives identified in Section 4.1,Security Objectives for the TOE.ThreatDescriptionT.ACCOUNTAn authorized user of the TOE could gain unauthorized access toTOE configuration information, or perform operations for which noaccess rights have been granted, via user error, system error, orother actions.T.UNDETECTAuthorized users may be able to access TOE data or modify TOEbehavior without a record of those actions in order to circumventTOE security functionality.T.PRIVILEGEAn unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploitsystem privileges to gain access to TOE security functions anddata.Table 3 – Threats3.2ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIESOrganizational Security Policies (OSPs) are security rules, procedures, orguidelines imposed on the operational environment. Table 4 lists the OSPs thatare presumed to be imposed upon the TOE or its operational environment by anorganization that implements the TOE in the Common Criteria evaluatedconfiguration.OSPDescriptionP.CRYPTOThe TOE shall incorporate cryptographic mechanisms to protectagainst potential disclosure or modification of sensitiveinformation, which is transferred between the TOE andadministrators.Doc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 8 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security TargetOSPDescriptionP.MANAGEThe TOE shall provide a means of managing the health of theserver in which it is implemented.Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies3.3ASSUMPTIONSThe assumptions required to ensure the security of the TOE are listed in Table 5.AssumptionsDescriptionA.LOCATEThe TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, whichwill prevent unauthorized physical access.A.MANAGEThere are one or more competent individuals assigned tomanage the TOE.A.NETWORKAn internal management network is provided for the sole use ofmanagement of internal resources, and is logically separate fromother networks.A.NOEVILThe authorized administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent,or hostile, are appropriately trained and will follow theinstructions provided by the TOE documentation.Table 5 – AssumptionsDoc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 9 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target4 SECURITY OBJECTIVESThe purpose of the security objectives is to address the security concerns and toshow which security concerns are addressed by the TOE, and which areaddressed by the environment. Threats may be addressed by the TOE or thesecurity environment or both. Therefore, the CC identifies two categories ofsecurity objectives: Security objectives for the TOE Security objectives for the environment4.1SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOEThis section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to beaddressed by the TOE.SecurityObjectiveDescriptionO.ACCESSThe TOE must allow authorized users to access only appropriateTOE functions and data.O.ADMINThe TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary tosupport the administrators in their management of the securityof the TOE and the availability of the server in which it isimplemented, and restrict these functions and facilities fromunauthorized use.O.AUDITThe TOE must record audit records for use of the TOE functions.Audit records must be readable by authorized administrators andadministrators must be able to filter records for ease of viewing.O.CRYPTOThe TOE shall use validated cryptographic algorithms in supportof cryptographic operations.O.IDENTAUTHThe TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior toallowing access to the administrative functions and data of theTOE. The TOE must protect against the inadvertent exposure ofpasswords.O.PROTECTThe TOE must protect against inadvertent access to interactivemanagement sessions, and must provide a means of controllingand restricting access to TOE services and ports.O.SECUREThe TOE must ensure the confidentiality and integrity ofinteractive administrative sessions.O.TIMEThe TOE must provide reliable timestamps.Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOEDoc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 10 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target4.2SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THEOPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTThis section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to beaddressed by the IT environment or by non-technical or procedural means.SecurityObjectiveDescriptionOE.ADMINThere are an appropriate number of trusted, authorizedadministrators trained to administer the TOE. Authorizedadministrators are carefully selected and trained for properoperation of the TOE, follow all administrator guidance and arenot malicious.OE.NETWORKThe operational environment will provide an internalmanagement network separate from the primary network formanagement of network resources.OE.PHYSICALThose responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts ofthe TOE critical to security policy are protected from anyphysical attack.Table 7 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment4.3SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALEO.ACCESSXO.ADMINXDoc No: T.UNDETECTT.PRIVILEGET.ACCOUNTThe following table maps the security objectives to the assumptions, threats,and organizational policies identified for the TOE.XXXXVersion: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 11 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller P.CRYPTOT.UNDETECTT.PRIVILEGET.ACCOUNTSecurity le 8 – Mapping Between Objectives, Threats, OSPs, and Assumptions4.3.1Security Objectives Rationale Related toThreatsThe security objectives rationale related to threats traces the security objectivesfor the TOE back to the threats addressed by the TOE.Threat:T.ACCOUNTAn authorized user of the TOE could gain unauthorized access toTOE configuration information, or perform operations for which noaccess rights have been granted, via user error, system error, orother actions.Objectives:O.ACCESSThe TOE must allow authorized users toaccess only appropriate TOE functions anddata.O.ADMINThe TOE will provide all the functions andfacilities necessary to support theadministrators in their management of thesecurity of the TOE and the availability of theserver in which it is implemented, and restrictthese functions and facilities fromunauthorized use.O.IDENTAUTHThe TOE must be able to identify andauthenticate users prior to allowing access tothe administrative functions and data of theTOE. The TOE must protect against theinadvertent exposure of passwords.Rationale:O.ACCESS mitigates this threat by ensuring that users may onlyaccess the functions and data for which they are authorized.O.ADMIN provides the functions to administer the TOE, and to limitDoc No: 2098-000-D102Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 12 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Targetaccess to those functions.O.IDENTAUTH provides the identifying information that determinesa user’s authorized access.Threat:T.PRIVILEGEObjectives:Rationale:An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploitsystem privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and data.O.ADMINThe TOE will provide all the functions andfacilities necessary to support theadministrators in their management of thesecurity of the TOE and the availability of theserver in which it is implemented, and restrictthese functions and facilities fromunauthorized use.O.IDENTAUTHThe TOE must be able to identify andauthenticate users prior to allowing access tothe administrative functions and data of theTOE. The TOE must protect against theinadvertent exposure of passwords.O.PROTECTThe TOE must protect against inadvertentaccess to interactive management sessions,and must provide a means of controlling andrestricting access to TOE services and ports.O.SECUREThe TOE must ensure the confidentiality andintegrity of interactive administrative sessions.O.ADMIN mitigates this threat by ensuring that access to thesecurity functions of the TOE are restricted to authorized users.O.IDENTAUTH helps to mitigate the threat by ensuring that onlycredentialed users have access to the TOE.O.PROTECT mitigates this threat by ensuring that system and auditdata are not accessible, except to those with explicit accesspermissions.O.SECURE mitigates the threat by ensuring that systemmanagement data in transit is protected.Threat:T.UNDETECTAuthorized or unauthorized users may be able to access TOE dataor modify TOE behavior without a record of those actions in orderto circumvent TOE security functionality.Objectives:O.AUDITDoc No: 2098-000-D102The TOE must record audit records for use ofthe TOE functions. Audit records must bereadable by authorized administrators andadministrators must be able to filter recordsVersion: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 13 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Targetfor ease of viewing.Rationale:O.IDENTAUTHThe TOE must be able to identify andauthenticate users prior to allowing access tothe administrative functions and data of theTOE. The TOE must protect against theinadvertent exposure of passwords.O.TIMEThe TOE must provide reliable timestamps.O.AUDIT ensures that audit records are maintained for the use ofTOE functions.O.IDENTAUTH ensures that user identity is captured by the TOE forinclusion in the audit records.O.TIME provides reliable timestamps for audit records.4.3.2Security Objectives Rationale Related to OSPsThe security objectives rationale related to OSPs traces the security objectivesfor the TOE back to the OSPs applicable to the TOE.Policy:P.CRYPTOThe TOE shall incorporate cryptographic mechanisms to protectagainst potential disclosure or modification of sensitive information,which is transferred between the TOE and TO supports this policy by ensuring that validatedcryptographic algorithms are provided in support of cryptographicoperations.Policy:The TOE shall provide a means of managing the health of theserver in which it is implemented.P.MANAGEThe TOE shall use validated cryptographicalgorithms in support of e:O.ADMIN ensures that functionality is in place to manage theavailability of the server in which the TOE is implemented.Doc No: 2098-000-D102The TOE will provide all the functions andfacilities necessary to support theadministrators in their management of thesecurity of the TOE and the availability of theserver in which it is implemented, and restrictthese functions and facilities fromunauthorized use.Version: 1.3Date: 22 October 2019Page 14 of 41
Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9Security Target4.3.3Security Objectives Rationale Related toAssumptionsThe security objectives rationale related to assumptions traces the securityobjectives for the operation
The TOE is delivered as an integral component of the server, which is delivered by courier when ordered directly from Dell Technologies. The evaluated version of the firmware may be downloaded from the Dell support site as iDRAC_3.34.34.34_A00.exe (Win
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