Lessons Learned From Practical Field Experience With High .
Lessons Learned from PracticalField Experience with HighPressure Gaseous FuelsDOE – DOTCNG – H2 WorkshopDecember 10, 2009Douglas Horne, PE – CVEF PresidentRob Adams, P.Eng. – Marathon Technical Services2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org1
The Facts NGVs have been used in North America for over30 yearsCodes and Standards (C&S) provide opportunityfor safe reliable operation of NGVsC&S evolve with new technology and fieldexperiencePeople make mistakes, continuous training iscritical for safe operationsCylinders have a limited life –track your cylinders!2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org2
Incidents in North America Since 1984 CVEF has recorded 97 incidentsof which 67 involved CNG vehicles– 37 incidents involve either a CNG leak (15) or arelease of CNG by the PRD activation (22)– There were 18 cylinder failures: 2/25/20104 Type 1 (all steel) -1 in fire where PRD failed, 1 by externalcorrosion and 2 by over pressurization by faulty fueling system4 Type 2 (hoop wrapped) - 1 by fire where PRD was isolatedfrom cylinder body, 3 from a combination of SCC and overpressurization8 Type 3 (full wrap and metal liner) – SCC from acid/chemicaldegradation of e glass wrap2 Type 4 (full composite with plastic liner) – 1 in localized fireand 1 by physical damagewww.cleanvehicle.org3
The Message — 9 Specific Categoriesof Incident Causes:30252015No Damage10Cyl. FailureLeak502/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org4
Type 1 Cylinder Incidents Type 1 cylinder faileddue to extensiveexternal corrosion, thecylinder was notvisually inspected forover 10 yearsType 1 cylinder faileddue to over pressure bydefective fuelingsystem, the 2400 psicylinder was subjectedto 6000 psi2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org5
Type 2 Cylinder Incident Lucas Type 2 cylinder failed during fuelingReport by CVEF indicates that there were two probablecauses for the failure– Stress corrosion cracking of the hoop wrap by chemical attack– Chronic over pressure of cylinder during multiple fueling cycles– the safety relief valve on the station was improperly set2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org6
Type 3 Cylinder Incident 1996 Dodge B250 Van - four3000 psi Comdyne Type 3cylinders one of which rupturedafter fillingStress corrosion cracking wasevident, and led to the failureThe van was used to haulbatteries and chemicals for ayacht maintenance companyThere were no injuries or firebut the vehicle was totaled andscrapped2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org7
Type 4 Cylinder IncidentPhysical Damage Two Type 4 Brunswick cylinders failed during fueling– The cylinders were 14 years old with one mountedhorizontally under the truck and the other mounted verticallyinside the truck body directly above the horizontal cylinder– The vertical cylinder had the valve end dome mounted on arubber padded steel ring with the valve and piping exposedunder the vehicle– It is believed that the horizontal cylinder failed first due tounknown road damage and when it failed the floor of thetruck was forced upward with the steel ring cutting into thedome of the vertical cylinder which then failed.– The initial report has been completed by CVEF andadditional evaluation of the cylinders will be made by NASA(White Sands)2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org8
Type 4 Cylinder IncidentPhysical DamageTypical installation in multiplevehicles of the same vintage No shielding of exposedcylinder under vehicle PRD on vertical cylinderisolated from cylinder exposure2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org9
Type 4 Cylinder IncidentPhysical Damage2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org10
Type 4 Cylinder IncidentLocalized Fire March 2007 an arsonist torched12 vehicles in a city governmentholding lot. The tank in a HondaGX failed from a fire movingfrom the back seat area onto thecenter of the cylinder, while thePRD was located on one end . Honda recalled the GX vehiclesand retrofitted the installation toprotect the cylinder from a localfire and insure that the PRDwould function correctly2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org11
PRD Release Physical Damage Bus impacted a steelbridge – with nocylinders failure The cylinder supportframe bent down andsevered the PRDs. Gas vented from the twoimpacted cylinders – nofire or other vehicledamage2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org12
PRD ReleaseProper Operation in Fire Fire originated in rearwheel due to overheated brakes The CNG cylinders ontop of the bus ventedproperly through thethermally activatedPRDs For the 24 vehicle firesin our records nonewere caused by theCNG fuel systems2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org13
Hydrogen PRD ReleaseInstallation Issue"The investigation into this eventshowed that the relief device was arupture disc that normally would havebeen built to relieve pressure to preventcatastrophic failure of the hydrogentanks," McCullough said. "Normally, thedevice has a fusible bismuth plug thatholds the coin-shaped disc in place untiltemperatures exceed 180 degrees. Thedevice had been replaced by thehydrogen vendor several months prior,when the vendor was on-site to makerepairs related to an apparent leak. Thereplacement relief device assembly didnot have a fusible plug to support thedisc.― ** http://www.powermag.com/o and m/Lessons-Learned-from-a-Hydrogen-Explosion 1857 p3.html2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org14
Installation Issues With NGV market growth and thesignificant saving in fuel cost,independent conversions of CNGvehicles by untrained mechanicshave presented safety concerns While states recognized that use ofconversion kits not certified by EPAor CARB was an issue, they failed torealize that EPA and CARB do notaddress safe installation practices The ASE (F1 test) certificationprogram for technicians has beenupdated to cover installation as wellas maintenance of CNG vehicles2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org15
Indoor Fueling Release Obsolete PRD designsusceptible to waterinfiltration and freezing
Indoor Release Detection system not failsafe. Detection system knownto be compromised Fueler ran past 3 ESDbuttons exiting the facility Approximately 10minutes after the gasrelease started, the gasinside the buildingignited. The rooftop open flamemake up air unit (right)may have been thesource of ignition
Indoor Fueling Release The Service Building wasnot equipped withdeflagration panels(required by NFPA 52)—the pressure of the blastblew over an inside blockwall.The blast lifted the roofand damaged every wallof the building.
Lessons Learned—Indoor Release1.2.3.Strong codes (NFPA 52, and the NEC) arealready in place—facility was not code compliant.DOT FTA recommendations for these facilitieswere published after installation – but no updatedversions have been developed.Better Maintenance and Emergency training bymanufacturers and owners might have preventedthis incident.
Refuse Hauler Fire1. Fire destroyed orheavily damaged 5CNG powered garbagetrucks. Approx. 1.5Min property damage.2. The fire was believedto have originated inone truck and spreadto others from there.3. There were no injuries.
Refuse Hauler Fire Vehicles were fueling. Staff heard a loud ―metallic bang—like a handgrenade.‖ Staff immediately investigated and found the fire.BeforeAfter
Refuse Hauler Fires4 of the 5trucksinvolvedwerewritten off.
Refuse Hauler FiresNone of the CNGcylinders rupturedand the damage tothe cylinders wassurprisingly light.After
Refuse Hauler Fires—CauseUndetermined1. HP Regulator on one truckfound to have failed at body.2. PRD release could haveinitiated fire.3. Ignition source could havebeen a static discharge fromthe rapidly venting gas(except fueling hose shouldhave grounded vehicle).
Refuse Hauler Fires—PRD VentRouting1. PRDs not vented up, away from vehicle—responsible forthe rapid inclusion of other trucks in the fire.2. The vehicle at the center of the fire still had full CNGtanks and hydraulic reservoir.
Lessons Learned—Refuse Hauler Fire1.2.3.4.Strong codes (NFPA 52) are already in place.Inexperienced vehicle builder/converter did notfollow current industry practice or common sense(―Reference Guide for Integration of Natural GasVehicle Fuel Systems‖ – Battelle, 2002) as theyoriented the PRDs horizontally).Installer personnel training might have preventedor minimized this event.Not an owner maintenance or training issue.
Station Overfilling1. OEM van 3000 psicylinder failure.2. Cylinder had seriousdegradation.3. Evidence of overfillingat stations.
Station Overfilling--Deficiencies No overpressure device asrequired by code and bestpractice—2 stations. Overpressure devices on 3000psig hoses tampered with at 3rdstation (see right) High pressure solenoid valvesdid not provide positive shutoff(ball valves much more effectiveand reliable). Station designed to fuel both3000 and 3600 psi vehicles—station is particularly susceptibleto overfilling 3000 psi vehicles.
Lessons Learned—Vehicle Overfilling1.2.3.4.Strong codes (NFPA 52) are already in place.Experienced equipment suppliers-but significantcode deficiencies.Owner took over equipment operation with notraining.Maintenance personnel had very little subsequenttraining and a limited budget.
Recap
Lessons Learned1.2.3.4.5.6.The C&S development process benefits fromlessons learned and provides adequate safety butenforcement and training is lackingVehicle cylinders can be over pressurized andrupturePhysical or chemical abuse has led to cylinderfailureCylinders have a limited life and should be trackedfor ultimate destructionTimely cylinder and fuel systems inspections arecritical to safe operationsImproper installation of CNG fuel systems can leadto failures2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org31
1. The C&S development processprovides adequate safety butenforcement and training is lacking There are no mechanisms to enforce C&S for aftermarket installations of CNG fuel systems – few stateshave vehicle inspection programs and are limited intheir coverage Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJs) focus on thefueling infrastructure CNG vehicle technicians can be ASE certified toservice NGVs through a voluntary program wherethey receive basic C&S information TRAINING – TRAINING – TRAINING2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org32
2. Vehicle cylinders can be overpressurized and rupture In the US, Cylinder PRDs are only required to protectagainst pressure build up due to fire, not overpressure from stationsDispensers have two separate pressure relief valvesto protect the cylinder against over pressurizationOngoing training of fuel station maintenance andoperating personnel is critical to safetyTRAINING – TRAINING – TRAINING2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org33
3. Physical or chemical abuse canlead to cylinder failure Required chemical and physical abuse tests havestrengthened over the yearsOld cylinders (prior to 1996) are still in useCylinders known to be susceptible to stress corrosioncracking (E glass) should be proactively removedfrom service – most are nearing end of lifeTRACK YOUR CYLINDERS2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org34
4. Cylinders have a Limited Life Removecylinders at their end oflife date and replace if vehicle willcontinue to operate Cylinders removed at end of life orfrom scrapped vehicles should bedestroyed according to themanufacturers instructions At this time there is no mechanismto track cylinders by end of life date TRACK YOUR CYLINDERS e.org35
5. Cylinder and fuel system inspections arecritical to safe operations Visual inspection of CNG fuel systems is,at this time, the best method of monitoringthe overall safety of NGVsCVEF under contract to DOE developed a―CNG Fuel System Inspector Study Guide‖for the CSA administered CNG CylinderInspectors Certification TestCVEF under the same contract providedscholarship funding for training over 250inspectorsNFPA 52 was recently changed to requirenotices at each fueling dispenser aboutinspection of eanvehicle.org36
6. Improper installation of CNGfuel systems can lead to failures Many of the incidents can be attributed toCNG fuel system installations that do notmeet applicable codeASE F1 Test certification of installation andmaintenance technicians is a step to mitigateissuesConversion shop certification – industryinitiated new project/collaboration with otherorganizations– NTEA collaboration on certification e.org37
Best Practices and Training Materialsmust be Living Documents C. 2005 PRD ReleaseVehicle began leaking rapidlyafter fueling—not a full PRDrelease as per earlier MiradafailuresShook model CG-9, 999-1 rated22 CFM, activation temperatureis 217 degreesF, marked for 3600 PSIGNeed documented BestPractices to pass onLessons Learned
The Message—3 General Categories ofIncidents Causes:Codes and Standards1.–Periodically update C&S to reflect field experienceCompliance Related Issues2.–Tracking cylindersVehicle inspections and conversion issuesStation design and operations affect vehicle safety––Training on Industry Standards3.––Best practices developmentDesign documents to assist users to meet coderequirementsStandard operating procedures–Training of all stakeholders–2/25/2010www.cleanvehicle.org39
Questions Please contact CVEFpersonnel as noted below: Please contact Marathonpersonnel as noted below:– Douglas Horne– Rob Adams– President– Principal– 770-424-8575– 519-699-9250– dbhorne@cleanvehicle.org– radams@marathontech.ca– John Lapetz– Director of Technology– 248-924-3120– org40
Visual inspection of CNG fuel systems is, at this time, the best method of monitoring the overall safety of NGVs CVEF under contract to DOE developed a ―CNG Fuel System Inspector Study Guide‖ for the CSA administered CNG Cylinder Inspectors Certification Test CVEF under the same co
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