Combined License Application ReviewCombined License .

NRC000013Presentation to the CommissionCombined License Application ReviewVogtle Units 3 and 4SER Panel 4September 2727–28,28 2011

Presentation to the CommissionCombined License Application ReviewVogtle Units 3 and 4Chapter 13, Conduct of OperationsSeptember 27 – 28,28 2011

Purpose Summarize staff’s evaluation of FSARCh t 13 off thChapterthe VogtleV tl COL applicationli ti– Standard content of AP1000 designincorporated by reference– Emergency planning review at ESP stage Limited scope of review at COL stage– CyberC b securityit reviewi3

Overview of Vogtle COLFSAR Chapter 13FSAR SectionContent13 1 O13.1Organizationali tilStructure of ApplicantPlant-Specific13.2 TraininggTopics of InterestStandard13.3 Emergency PlanningStandard/Plant-Specific13.4 OperationalProgramsStandard/Plant SpecificStandard/Plant-Specific13.5 Plant ProceduresStandard13.6 Physical SecurityStandard/Plant-Specific13.7 Fitness for DutyStandard13.8 Cyber SecurityPlant-SpecificEmergency PlanningCyber Security4

Overview of Emergency Planning The COL application incorporates by reference the early sitepermit (ESP) and the AP1000 standard design The ESP application included the complete & integratedemergencygypplans, consistingg of:– Onsite emergency plan (including ETE and ITAAC)– Offsite (State & local) emergency plans NRC reviewedid ththe onsiteit planl & FEMA reviewedid ththe offsiteff itplans– ESP evaluation results documented in Section 13.3 ofNUREG-1923 10 CFR 52.83 – Limits the scope of EP review for COLapplication referencing ESP or DC5

Emergency Action Levels (EALs)ESP-004 Permit Conditions 2 through 7 Emergency Action Levels (EALs)– Reflect NEI 07-01– Reflect completed AP1000 design– Based on in-plant conditions, including State & local review Staff’s review– Applicant’s commitment regarding EALs satisfies applicableregulatory requirements– The staff proposes a license condition to capture thecommitment6

Technical Support Center (TSC) Permit Condition 8– Common Technical Support Center (TSC) for Units 1-414– AP1000 TSC location AP1000 Departure 18.8-1 ESP Variance 1.2-1 TSC Habitability––––Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and NUREG-0696Radiological and non-radiological analysesITAAC (Acceptance Criterion 5.1.8)Staff’s Review IndependentI dd t verificationifi ti off radiologicaldi l i l analysisl i7

Technical Support Center (TSC) AP1000 Departure 18.8-1– At the ESP stage, Staff found that the common TSC locationwas acceptable, subject to a demonstration of adequacyduring the full participation exercise (Unit 3 ITAAC 8.1)– AtA theh COL stage, PPermiti CConditiondi i 8 requiredi d theh applicantlitoresolve the difference between the AP1000 TSC location(Annex Bldg.) and the common TSC (Departure 18.8-1)– Units 3 & 4 TSC moved from the Annex Bldg. Control SupportArea (CSA) to a common TSC in the Communication SupportCenter (CSC)– The applicant also requested an ESP variance (Variance 1.21), which slightly moved the TSC location within the protectedarea8

ACRS Review ACRS Action Items– DemonstrateDt t theth capabilitybilit off TSC anddEEmergency OOperationstiFacility (EOF) equipment and data displays to clearly identifyand reflect the affected unit– Applicant added Unit 3 EP ITAAC Acceptance Criterion8.1.1.D.2.d Unit 3 exercise– Staff reviewed this ITAAC and found it acceptable because itis consistent with NUREG-08009

Post-COL Activities License conditions, implementation milestones, &ITAAC– Submit EALs & EIPs at least 180 days prior to fuel load– Submit EP program implementation schedule– Full participation exercise within 2 years of fuel load– Onsite exercise within 1 yyear of fuel load– EP ITAAC completion prior to fuel load10

Conclusions Early Site Permit (ESP) Review– Completep& integratedgemergencygypplans were reviewed– NRC & FEMA concluded emergency plans are adequate, andthere is reasonable assurance they can be implemented(subject to the permit conditions and ITAAC) Combined License (COL) Review– Staff’s review was limited to matters not resolved during theESP review– Permit conditions & COL action items were adequatelyaddressed– ITAAC carried forward into the COL (10 CFR 52.80(a))– There is reasonable assurance that adequate protectivemeasures can andd willill bbe ttakenk iin ththe eventt off a radiologicaldi l i lemergency at Vogtle Units 3 & 4 (10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)(ii))11

Presentation to the CommissionCombined License Application ReviewVogtle Units 3 and 4Chapter 13.8, Cyber SecuritySeptember 2727–28,28 2011

Background:Cyber Security History Order EA-02-026, “Interim Safeguards and SecurityCompensatory Measures for Nuclear Power PlantsPlants” (2002) NUREG/CR-6847, “Cyber Security Self-AssessmentMethod for U.S.U S Nuclear Power Plants (2003)”(2003) NEI 04-04, “Cyber Security Program for Power Reactors(2005)(2005)” 10 CFR 73.1, Design Basis Threat Rule (2007) RegulatoryGuide 55.69,69 “GuidanceGuidance for the Implementation of theRadiological Sabotage Design-Basis Threat”13

Background:10 CFR 7373.5454 (March 2009) High assurance that digital computer and communicationsystems and networks associated with the following areadequately protected against cyber attacks, up to andincluding the design basis threat as described in § 73.1:– Safety-related and important-to-safety functions– Security functions– Emergency preparedness functions,functions including offsitecommunications– Support systems and equipment which, if compromised,would adversely impact safety,fsecurity, or emergencypreparedness functions14

Background:10 CFR 7373.5454 (March 2009) Achieve high assurance by implementing defense-in-depthprotective strategies:––––Defensive architectureApplypp y cyberysecurityy controlsImplement cyber incident response and mitigation programsMaintain the program and address new cyber securityvulnerabilities Submit a cyberysecurityy pplan that satisfies the cyberysecurity requirements15

Background:Regulatory Guide 5.715 71 Regulatory Guide 5.71, “Cyber Security Programsfor Nuclear Facilities,” published January 2010– Framework– Security Controls– Cyber Security Plan Template16

Background:Regulatory Guide 5.715 71 Regulatory Guide 5.71, “Cyber Security Programs forNuclear FacilitiesFacilities,” published January 2010– Insight gained since 2002– Insight and recommendations from cyber security expertsand industry– Well-established NIST standards NIST SP 800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for FederalInformation Systemsyand Organizations”g NIST SP 800-82, “Industrial Control System Security”17

Background:Regulatory Guide 5.715 71 Regulatory Guide 5.71 was vetted for more than a year by:– NuclearN lpower iindustryd t– Cyber security experts Referenced by DHS Considered acceptable by FERC and NERC to meet theircyber security requirements18

Vogtle CSP Review As part of the Vogtle COL application, SNC submitted acyber security plan based on RG 55.7171 Plan included some deviations from the template providedin RG 55.7171 Provided additional information and clarifications on sitespecific conditions affecting program implementation– Mostly minor– One non-minor deviation: cyberysecurityy defensivearchitecture19

Staff Determination Staff evaluated each deviation and determined itwas acceptable– Deviations maintained the intent of template sectionsand did not reduce protection for critical digital assets Obtained additional technical details and clarificationson applicant’slit’ cyberb securityit planl– Rule requirements were adequately addressed20

Presentation to the CommissionCombined License Application ReviewVogtle Units 3 and 4Chapter 9, Auxiliary SystemsSeptember 2727–28,28 2011

Purpose Provide a summaryy of the staff’s evaluation ofChapter 9 of the Vogtle COL application Provide background information regarding theAP1000 design and the ESP as it relates toChapter 9 of the application:– Content IBR from the design certification or the ESPwithout modification did not involve further technicalreview– Standard content for AP1000 design center reviewed forVogtle as “Reference” COL application– Content specific to the Vogtle application22

Information Incorporated by Referencefrom AP1000 DCD New fuelfstorage and handlingSpent fuel storage and handlingWater systems (e.g., CCW, SW)Process auxiliaries (e(e.g.,g CVCSCVCS, floordrainage system) Ventilation systems Fire protection, communications, lighting23

Fuel Rack Structural Analysis Spentpfuel rack designg included in AP1000amendment scope to resolve COL information itemfrom initial certification Staff performed confirmatory structural dynamicand stress analyses based on the (auxiliarybuilding) seismic loads transmitted to the racks Concluded that the DCD Revision 19 fuel rackdesigns are acceptable24

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling SpentpFuel Pool ((190,500,gallonsgof water)) Active non-safety-related spent fuel pool coolingsystemt Passive safety-relatedsafety related sources maintain thestored fuel in a submerged and cooled condition25

Spent Fuel Criticality 889 Fuel Assemblyy Locations in 2 Regionsg– Both regions use MetamicTM to maintain margin tocriticality– Region 2 (of the SFP) also uses burnup credit tomaintain margin to criticality– Separate analysis with unborated water to verify fuel inpooll remainsi subcriticalb iti l26

Overview of Vogtle COLFSAR Chapter 9SectionContent9.1 Fuel Storage andHandlingIBR/StandardMetamic CouponMonitoring ProgramIBR/Plant-SpecificRaw Water System9.2 Water Systems9.3 Process AuxiliariesIBR/Standard9.4 Air-conditioning,Heating, Coolingand VentilationSystemsIBR/Standard9.5 Other AuxiliaryS tSystemsIBR/Standard/Pl t SPlant-SpecificifiTopics of Interest27

Metamic Coupon Monitoring Program COL Information Item 9.1-7– PProvideid a MetamicM t i coupon surveillanceillprogram ffor ththespent fuel pool neutron absorbing material SNC described in the FSAR:––––The methodology to be employed and the acceptance criteriaCorrective actionsAdministrative controlsA commitment to implement the program before initial fuelload The staff found SNC’s coupon monitoring programdescription to be acceptable and is proposing to include alicense condition associated with the program’simplementation28

Raw Water System RWS design is outside the scope of the AP1000 certifieddesign.design Vogtle provided a site-specific RWS design which is nonsafety-related and does not provide any safety-significantfunctions.functions RWS supplies water to:– Service Water Systemy((SWS)) coolingg towers– Fire protection– Circulating Water System (CWS) cooling towers andpump cooling– Dilution water for radwaste discharge– Other users29

Raw Water System (Cont’d) Staff reviewed the COL’sCOL s FSAR and issued RAIwith respect to:– General Design Criteria (GDC) 2, “Design Bases forProtection Against Natural Phenomena,” and GDC 4,“Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases” toensure: Failure of the RWS will not adversely affect the abilityof other systems to perform their intended safetysignificant functions30

Raw Water System (Cont’d) Staff reviewed the COL’sCOL s FSAR and issued RAIwith respect to:– 10 CFR 2020.1406,1406 “MinimizationMinimization of Contamination”Contamination Staff concluded that the RWS meets all applicableregulationsl ti31

Presentation to the CommissionCombined License Application ReviewVogtle Units 3 and 4Chapter 12, Radiation ProtectionSeptember 27–28, 2011

Overview of Vogtle COLFSAR Chapter 12Section12.1 Assuring thatOccupational RadiationExposures are ALARAContentTopics of interestStandard12.2 Radiation SourcesStandard/Plant-Specific12.3 Radiation ProtectionD i FDesignFeaturestStandard/Pl t SPlant-Specificifi Minimization ofC t i tiContamination12.4 Dose AssessmentStandard/Plant-Specific/ESP Radiation Exposure toVogtle Units 3 and 4Construction Workers12.5 Health Physics FacilityDesignStandard/Plant-Specific33