Country Information And Guidance Afghanistan: Security And .
Country Information and GuidanceAfghanistan: Security andhumanitarian situationVersion 3.0July 2016
PrefaceThis document provides country of origin information (COI) and guidance to HomeOffice decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rightsclaims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum,humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claimbeing refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of theNationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account thecase specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained withthis document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Officecasework guidance in relation to relevant policies.Country InformationThe COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of externalinformation sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given tothe relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency andtraceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made tocorroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy.All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched andpresented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines forProcessing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the EuropeanAsylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information reportmethodology, dated July 2012.FeedbackOur goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide.Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please email the CountryPolicy and Information Team.Independent Advisory Group on Country InformationThe Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up inMarch 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to makerecommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. TheIAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the functionof the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI maybe contacted at:Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration,5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN.Email: on about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which havebeen reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’swebsite at rmation-reviews/Page 2 of 28
ContentsGuidance . 41.Introduction . 41.1 Basis of Claim . 42.Consideration of Issues . 42.1 Credibility. 42.2 Exclusion . 42.3 Assessment of risk . 52.4 Internal relocation . 82.5 Certification . 93.Policy summary . 9Country Information . 104.Sources . 105.Actors in the conflict. 106.Nature and levels of violence . 116.1 Overview . 116.2 Casualties of the conflict. 136.3 Impact on women and children. 156.4 Health workers, humanitarian workers, and journalists . 166.5 Abductions. 177.Geographical distribution of violence . 197.1 Overview . 197.2 Taliban controlled areas . 197.3 Kunduz . 197.4 Government controlled areas . 207.5 Kabul . 218.Humanitarian situation . 238.1 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) . 239.Returns and reintegration . 25Version Control and Contacts . 28Page 3 of 28
GuidanceUpdated 21 July 20161.Introduction1.1Basis of Claim1.1.1That the general humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is so severe as tomake removal a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on HumanRights (ECHR); and/or:1.1.2That the security situation in Afghanistan presents a real risk which threatenslife or person such that removal would be in breach of Article 15(c) ofEuropean Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 (‘the QualificationDirective’).Back to Contents2.Consideration of Issues2.1Credibility2.1.1For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction onAssessing Credibility and Refugee Status.2.1.2Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application fora UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visasshould be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the AsylumInstruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).2.1.3Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct languageanalysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).Back to Contents2.2Exclusion2.2.1Anti-government elements (AGEs) and pro-Government armed groups havebeen responsible for serious human rights abuses (see Actors in the conflictand Nature and levels of violence).2.2.2If it is accepted that the person has been involved with these groups, thendecision makers must consider whether one of the exclusion clauses (fromasylum and/or humanitarian protection) is applicable.2.2.3For further guidance on the exclusion clauses, discretionary leave andrestricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection, theAsylum Instruction on Discretionary Leave and the Asylum Instruction onRestricted Leave.Back to ContentsPage 4 of 28
2.3Assessment of riski.General points2.3.1A state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down doesnot in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a RefugeeConvention reason.2.3.2However, even where a person comes from a place where there is a state ofcivil instability and/or where law and order has broken down, they may stillhave a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reasonand be entitled to asylum. This might include, but is not limited to, beingtargeted because they are perceived to support the government and/orinternational forces. See the country information and guidance onAfghanistan: persons supporting or perceived to support the governmentand/or international forces; Afghanistan: women fearing gender basedharm/violence; Afghanistan: sexual orientation and gender identity.2.3.3It is only if the person does not qualify under the Refugee Convention thatdecision makers need to make an assessment of the need for protectionfirstly under Article 3 of the ECHR and, if that is unsuccessful, under Article15(c) of the Qualification Directive.ii.Humanitarian situation2.3.4The armed conflict in Afghanistan has led to a significant number ofinternally displaced persons (IDPs), estimated to number 948,000 as of June2015. The worst affected areas overall are the west, central and southernregions. Increasing numbers of IDPs live in informal settlements inAfghanistan’s major urban centres. Displaced persons, compared to theirAfghan counterparts, were more likely to be illiterate; to have lower rates ofschool enrolment; to have lower household incomes, whilst living in largerhouseholds; to be unemployed; and to be food insecure (see Internallydisplaced persons (IDPs)).2.3.5Displaced women and girls were considered to be at disproportionate risk ofharm, living with fewer freedoms and opportunities than when living in theirown homes and villages. Displaced females face significant enhancedgendered constraints to accessing education, health and employmentopportunities. The overcrowded living situation increases the risks ofviolence for women. Many are subjected to domestic violence and forcedmarriages. Special displacement-related vulnerabilities refer not only toinadequate livelihood opportunities and standard of living but also to thesituation of children, the elderly, persons with disabilities and victims ofviolence, including domestic violence (see Impact on women and childrenand, for general information on the position of women in Afghanistan, thecountry information and guidance on Afghanistan: women fearing genderbased harm/violence).2.3.6The Upper Tribunal in the country guidance case AK (Article 15(c))Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 00163(IAC) (18 May 2012) held that there waslittle evidence of significant numbers of the urban poor and IDP population inKabul suffering destitution or inability to survive at subsistence levels(paragraph 225). It further noted that, whilst the importance of return andPage 5 of 28
reintegration packages for UK returnees to Kabul should not beexaggerated, they did, nevertheless, place returnees in a better position thanthat of other IDPs (paragraph 224).2.3.7Since the country guidance case of AK was promulgated in 2012, thehumanitarian situation in Afghanistan has not deteriorated to the extent thatit represents, in general, a real risk of harm contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR(see Humanitarian situation).2.3.8However, decision makers must consider on the facts of the case whether areturnee, by reason of his or her individual vulnerability, may face a real riskof harm contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR as a result of the humanitariansituation. Factors to be taken into account include age, gender, medicalconditions, ill-health, disability, the effect on children, other familycircumstances, housing opportunities, the ability to sustain themselves andavailable support structures.iii.2.3.9Security situationUnlike Article 3 ECHR, Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive applies onlyto civilians, who must be genuine non-combatants and not those who areparty to the conflict. This could include former combatants who havegenuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.2.3.10 In the country guidance case of AK, which considered evidence up to early2012, the Upper Tribunal (UT) held that, despite a rise in the number ofcivilian deaths and casualties and an expansion of the geographical scope ofthe armed conflict in Afghanistan, the level of indiscriminate violence in thecountry taken as a whole was not at such a high level as to mean that, withinthe meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, a civilian faces areal risk to his life or person solely by being present in the country(paragraph 249. B(ii))2.3.11 The Upper Tribunal in AK held that those parts of Kabul city where returneesare most likely to live are ‘the poorest areas of the city or its environs’ andhave been less affected by indiscriminate violence, stating that the ‘greatmajority [of attacks] have concentrated on areas where the government orinternational organisations have their offices or where their employeesfrequent’ (paragraph 226). (For more recent information on the securitysituation in Kabul, see Kabul).2.3.12 The Tribunal further held that, even in the provinces worst affected byviolence, (which may now be taken to include Ghazni but not to includeKabul), the level of indiscriminate violence did not reach the Article 15(c)threshold (paragraph 249Bii and iii). In regard to Kabul city, the UT foundthat, ‘ given the fact that this has a reported population of around 5 millionand that Kabul province does not feature in any list of the most violentprovinces, the argument for any engagement of the Article 15(c) threshold, ifbased primarily on civilian deaths, is even weaker [than Kandahar andHelmand, the provinces with the highest number of civilian deaths, andGhazni, a province with a significant rise in violent incidents]’ (paragraph219) (see also Geographical distribution of violence).Page 6 of 28
2.3.13 Since the promulgation of AK in May 2012 the number of civilian deaths andinjuries in Afghanistan has increased according to UNAMA figures (whichmay under–report numbers). In 2015 UNAMA documented 11,002 civiliancasualties (3,545 deaths and 7,457 injured); an increase of 4 per centcompared to 2014, and 21 per cent compared to 2013 (see Casualties of theconflict).2.3.14 The worst affected areas for security related incidents were southern,eastern and south-eastern regions, which experienced 70 per cent of allincidents, with Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar and Nangarhar being themost volatile provinces. In 2015, the Taliban captured 24 district centrescompared to three in 2014. Although most district centres were quicklyretaken by pro-government forces, several remained under Taliban controlfor weeks, including in Faryab, Helmand, Kunduz, Sari Pul and Takharprovinces. The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, major transitroutes, provincial capitals, and nearly all district centres. Although there havebeen a number of security incidents in Kabul since mid-2015 and into 2016,the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) are generallycapable and effective at protecting the major population centres, or notallowing the Taliban to maintain their hold for a prolonged period of time (seeGeographical distribution of violence and Kabul).2.3.15 Nevertheless, the proportion of civilians injured or killed by security-relatedincidents remains low. 0.03% of the population were injured or killed (whentaking the 2015 UNAMA numbers against a population estimate of around32 million).2.3.16 Under UNHCR’s assisted returns programme, 3,766 Afghan refugees,mostly from Pakistan and Iran, returned to Afghanistan during the first fourmonths of 2016. This was considerably lower than the 21,502 returneesduring the same period in 2015, and slightly less than during the sameperiod in 2014. The driving factor for 55 per cent of returnees from Pakistaninterviewed by UNHCR was cited as the improvement in the securitysituation. Returns occurred to 30 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces; over 50 percent returned to central and eastern regions. The International Organizationfor Migration (IOM) recorded 83,128 spontaneous returns from Pakistanbetween January and 30 November 2015. UNHCR cited the lower returntrend in 2016 as being largely due to ‘high levels of unemployment and lackof livelihood opportunities, limited access to land, shelter and basic services,particularly in areas of high return, and increased insecurity’ (see Returnsand reintegration).2.3.17 In the judicial review of HN & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary ofState for the Home Department (JR - scope - evidence (IJR) [2015] UKUT437 (IAC) (27 July 2015) the Upper Tribunal held that “Within the limitationsof a judicial review challenge and the hearing which has taken place we findno warrant for departing from the current country guidance promulgated inAK. In particular, we find that the evidence falls short of satisfying thestringent Article 15(c) test” (paragraph 98). That finding was upheld by theCourt of Appeal on 3 March 2016: HN & SA (Afghanistan) (Lead CasesAssociated Non-Lead Cases), R (on the application of) v The Secretary ofState for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 123.Page 7 of 28
2.3.18 Even though there is no general Article 15(c) risk, decision makers mustconsider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’sindividual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk.2.3.19 For guidance on humanitarian protection and Article 15(c), includingconsideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction onHumanitarian Protection.2.3.20 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction onAssessing Credibility and Refugee Status.Back to Contents2.4Internal relocationi.Kabul2.4.1In the country guidance case of AK, when assessing whether Kabul city wasa viable internal relocation alternative, the Upper Tribunal held that ‘it isnecessary to take into account (both in assessing “safety” and“reasonableness”) not only the level of violence in that city but also thedifficulties experienced by that city’s poor and also the many InternallyDisplaced Persons (IDPs) living there’. It noted, however, that ‘theseconsiderations will not in general make return to Kabul unsafe orunreasonable’ (Paragraph 249, B, (iv)).2.4.2The Upper Tribunal held that ‘Nevertheless, this position is qualified (both inrelation to Kabul and other potential places of internal relocation) for certaincategories of women. The purport of the current Home Office OGN[February 2012 OGN, 3.10.8] on Afghanistan is that whilst women with amale support network may be able to relocate internally, “ it would beunreasonable to expect lone women and female heads of household torelocate internally” and the Tribunal sees no basis for taking a different view’(Paragraph 249, B, (v)). That position remains unchanged (see alsoparagraph 2.3.16 above, and Impact on women and children).ii.Outside Kabul2.4.3In AK, the Upper Tribunal observed that ‘In relation to Ghazni we note thatit is accepted that there are significant numbers of districts in that provinceunder Taliban control (although not the city itself) and we do not excludethat, for most civilians in such districts that is a factor that may make itunreasonable for them to relocate there, although that is not to say that aperson with a history of family support for the Taliban, would have difficulties;much will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. OutsideTaliban controlled districts, however, we do not find that internal relocationwould in general be unreasonable’ (paragraph 244).2.4.4Although not making a finding, the Upper Tribunal made the followingobservation concerning internal travel: ‘ we are bound to say that nothingin the evidence before us indicates that the main routes of travel from Kabulto other major cities and towns experience violence at an intensity sufficientto engage Article 15(c) for the ordinary civilian. The position may be differentwhen it comes to travel from the main cities and towns to villages: we note inthis regard that Dr Giustozzi said that “[m]ost indiscriminate violenceoccurs
and, for general information on the position of women in Afghanistan, the country information and guidance on Afghanistan: women fearing gender-based harm/violence). 2.3.6 The Upper Tribunal in the country guidance case AK (Article 15(c)) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 00163(IAC) (18 May 2012) held that there was
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DFAT Country Information Report afghanistan 9 DEMOGRAPHY Afghanistan is an ethnically diverse and multilingual country with a population of approximately 36.6 million, growing at an estimated 2.37 per cent per annum. The country has one of the youngest populations worldwide: nearly two- thirds of Afghans are under 25 years of age.
COLOR KEY: RESOURCE CODE: FTT # COUNTRY PEOPLE GROUPS Population ROL LANGUAGE RELIGION WS OS J G R C B WN WC 1361 Afghanistan Arab 13,500 abh Arabic, Tajiki Islam - Sunni Y N 1 0 641 Afghanistan Deaf Afghan 119,000 und Undetermined Various N 2 0 5059 Afghanistan Jew, Judeo-Persian 12,500 jpr Dzhidi Judaism N 1 0 5060 Afghanistan Kowli Gypsy 10,500 rmt Domari Islam - Sunni NY 1 0
Country Manager in Afghanistan, offered advice and guidance in the country throughout the mission. The list of persons met may be found in Annex 1. This work was carried out with guidance and supervision from Gian Casartelli (OPCPR), who extensively reviewed the report and provided many recommendations, and Quamrul Hasan (SARPS).
This chapter will explore that gap and more. In Part 1 we examine the historical origins of mod-ern constitutional theory and its reflection in the Constitution of Afghanistan. Part 2 looks at the functions that constitutions serve, both gen - erally and in Afghanistan specifically. In Parts 3 and 4, we review Afghanistan’s constitutional
dynamics and future trajectory of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship and its impact on Afghan stability. After identifying key drivers of conflict and connection between the two sides, it analyzes how the bilateral relationship could affect future outcomes in Afghanistan. this research was supported by the united tates Institute of Peace.s
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) 1965 Agreement ATTA replaced by APTTA signed on Oct, 2010 and enforced on 12th June 2011. Facilitating Transit Trade for Afghanistan and gateway for Pakistan for the transit trade to Central Asia. Afghanistan gains access to Indian and Chinese markets via
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