AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 12ND EDITIONA NI N T RO D U CT I O NTOT H ECONSTITUTIONALLA W O F A F G H A N I S TA N1
3A N I N T RO D U CT I O N TOT H E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L LA W O F A F G H A N I S TA NS E C O N D E D I T I O N · P U B L I S H E D 2015A F G H A N I S TA N L E G A L E D U C AT I O N P R O J E C T ( A L E P ) AT S TA N F O R D LA W S C H O O Lalep.stanford.edualep@law.stanford.eduCrown Quadrangle559 Nathan Abbott WayStanford, CA 94305-8610law.stanford.eduProtected by Creative Commons License (No Derivative Works)
4A L E P – S TA NF O R D L AW S CHO O LAMER ICAN UNIVER S ITY O F AFGHANISTANAUTHORSCONTRIBUTINGF A C U LT Y E D I T O R SRose Leda Ehler (Student Co-Director, 2011-12)Daniel Lewis (Student Co-Director, 2011-12)Elizabeth EspinosaJane FarringtonGabe LedeenGhizaal HaressJenn RoundMohammad IsaqzadehNafay ChoudhuryEDITORSCHAIR OF THED E PA RT M E N T O F LA WStephanie Ahmad (Rule of Law Fellow, 2011-12)Ingrid Price (Student Co-Director, 2012-13)Sam Jacobson (Student Co-Director, 2013-14)Catherine BaylinJane FarringtonJay MingaJason FischbeinF A C U LT Y D I R E C T O RErik JensenR U L E O F LA WEXECUTIVE DIRECTORMegan KarshADVISORSRolando Garcia MironRohullah AziziVISUAL DESIGNERSDaniel McLaughlinPaula AirthTaylor Strickling, 2012-13Hadley Rose, 2013-14Mehdi Hakimi, 2014-
Table of ContentsPREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSStanford Law School’s Afghanistan Legal Education Project (ALEP) began in the fall of 2007 as a studentinitiated program dedicated to helping Afghan universities train the next generation of Afghan lawyers.ALEP’s mandate is to research, write, and publish high-quality legal textbooks, and to develop a degreegranting law program at the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). The AUAF Law Department faculty and Stanford Law School students develop curriculum under the guidance of ALEP’s Faculty Directorand Executive Director with significant input from Afghan scholars and practitioners.In addition to An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition), ALEP has published introductory textbooks about: The Law of Afghanistan (3rd Edition); Commercial Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition);Criminal Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition); International Law for Afghanistan (1st Edition); Law of Obligations ofAfghanistan (1st Edition), Property Law of Afghanistan (1st Edition), Legal Ethics in Afghanistan (1st Edition). Textbooks addressing Legal Methods: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Legal Methods: Legal Practice, and a new versionof Public International Law are forthcoming. Many of the ALEP textbooks have been translated into the native Dari and Pashto languages and are available for free at alep.stanford.edu. Additionally, ALEP has published professional translations of the Afghan Civil Code and Afghan Commercial Code, and business guidesauthored by Afghan students in the business law clinic. All are available on ALEP’s website.ALEP would like to acknowledge the individuals and institutions that have made the entire project possible. ALEP benefits from generous and dynamic support from the Bureau of International Narcotics andLaw Enforcement (INL) at the U.S. Department of State. Current Stanford Law School Dean Elizabeth Magill,former Dean Larry Kramer, and Deborah Zumwalt, General Counsel of Stanford University and member ofAUAF’s Board of Trustees, have provided important continuing support to ALEP. ALEP’s partnership hasdeepened over the last six years with AUAF’s leadership: Dr. Sharif Fayez (Founder), Dr. Mark A. English(Acting President), Dr. Michael Smith (former President), and Dr. Timor Saffary (Chief Academic Office).This second edition of the Constitutional Law textbook represents a new step in ALEP curriculum development. We enhanced the visual aspects of the textbook to create a more professional and effective teaching tool. We thank design consultants, Daniel McLaughlin and Paula Airth for their superb work and Megan Karsh (Rule of Law Program Executive Director), Rolando Garcia Miron (ALEP Program Advisor), ChrisJones, Mansi Kothari, and Adeeb Sahar for their directive and facilitative roles.As with all ALEP textbooks, the content of An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition)is the product of extensive collaboration. In terms of content, we thank AUAF Professors Ghizaal Haressand Mohammad Isaqzadeh, who provided extensive chapter-by-chapter comments the first edition, andProfessor Naqib Ahmad Khpulwak, Mr. Fahim Barmaki, and Mr. Yama Keshawerz, former visiting scholarsat Stanford Law School, who reviewed the final draft. I would like to thank the many student authors, andparticularly Jane Farrington, who worked tirelessly to finalize the book for publication. ALEP CurriculumAdvisor Rohullah Azizi, Jason Fischbein (SLS, ’16), and Daniel McLaughlin deserve mention for making substantive revisions to the second edition. Finally, we thank Professor Ghizaal Haress for bringing the material to life in the classroom.ALEP looks forward to continuing the collaboration that made this book possible. Please share your feedback with us on our website, alep.stanford.edu.Erik Jensen, Faculty Advisor, ALEPPalo Alto, California, December 20155
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PrefaceTA B L E O F C O N T E N T SCHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 9CHAPTER 2: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 36CHAPTER 3: THE EXECUTIVE · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 91CHAPTER 4: GOVERNMENT & ADMINISTRATION · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 112CHAPTER 5: THE LEGISLATURE · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 135CHAPTER 6: THE JUDICIARY · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 151CHAPTER 7: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENSCIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,AND CULTURAL RIGHTS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 179CHAPTER 8: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENSRIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 243GLOSSARY· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 2657
8Introduction to the Constitutional Law of AfghanistanC H A P T E R 1: A N I N T R O D U C T I O N T O C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I S M1. CONSTITUTIONALISM· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 91.1. Defining Constitutionalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.1.1. Why Government?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.1.2. Why Constitutional Government?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112. CONSTITUTIONS· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 132.1. An Expression of Sovereignty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.2. Structure and Limits on Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.3. Principles and Aspirations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142.4. A Response to History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 173.1. The Early Constitutions: 1923 and 1931. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173.2. The Liberal Age: The Constitution of 1964. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193.3. Turmoil after 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234. THE CONSTITUTION OF 2004· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 274.1. Drafting Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275. METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 335.1. Textualism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345.2. Structuralism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345.3. Originalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355.4. Precedent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365.5. Pragmatism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376. AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 38CONCLUSION · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 40
CHAPTER 19A N I N T RO D U CT I O N TO CO N S T I T U T I O N A L I S M1. CO N S T I T U T I O N A L I S M“Over the past two centuries, we have movedfrom a situation where almost no country hada written constitution to one where almostevery country has one.”1Why does almost every country have a constitution? Is it because constitutions guaranteedemocracy, peace, and economic prosperity?Surely not. Many unsuccessful nations have constitutions. Indeed, the world is “full of writtenconstitutions, many of which do not mean whatthey say, while others do not accomplish whatthey mean.”2 It seems more accurate to say thatconstitutions have become a sort of credentialfor countries, both domestically and internationally, that may or may not have effect in practice.3 This gap between what a constitution saysand how a country actually operates illustratesthat there is a difference between having a constitution and constitutionalism.This chapter will explore that gap and more. InPart 1 we examine the historical origins of modern constitutional theory and its reflection inthe Constitution of Afghanistan. Part 2 looks atthe functions that constitutions serve, both generally and in Afghanistan specifically. In Parts3 and 4, we review Afghanistan’s constitutionalhistory, up through adoption of the 2004 Constitution. In Part 5, we present several methodsof constitutional interpretation, providing youwith analytical frameworks to use as you studythe Constitution. Finally, we review the processof how to amend the Constitution.1.1. D E F I N I N G CO N S T I T U T I O N A L I S MWe begin this chapter by defining what we meanby “constitutionalism.” At the most general level, constitutionalism can be defined as “limitedgovernment.”4 Put differently, constitutionalism is the concept of limiting the arbitrarinessof political power,5 of having “a government oflaws and not men.”6 This notion of limited government has evolved over the centuries, and itis useful to consider how scholars have come totoday’s understanding.1.1.1. W H Y G O V E R N M E N T?One of the most influential thinkers about thelimits of state power and the purpose of government is John Locke, the 17th century English philosopher. Locke’s political theory is founded onthe idea that there is a “social contract” betweenindividuals and government. In his famous Second Treatise, Locke explains why he believes people unite in society and form governments:§4 To properly understand political power andtrace its origins, we must consider the statethat all people are in naturally.That is a state of perfect freedom of acting anddisposing of their own possessions and persons as they think fit within the bounds of thelaw of nature. People in this state do not haveto ask permission to act or depend on the willof others to arrange matters on their behalf.The natural state is also one of equality inwhich all power and jurisdiction is reciprocaland no one has more than another 7§123 If man in the state of nature is as freeas I have said he is—if he is absolute lord ofhis own person and possessions, equal to thegreatest and subject to nobody—why will hepart with his freedom? Why will he give upthis lordly status and subject himself to thecontrol of someone else’s power? The answeris obvious:
10Introduction to the Constitutional Law of AfghanistanThough in the state of nature he has an unrestricted right to his possessions, he is far fromassured that he will be able to get the use ofthem, because they are constantly exposed toinvasion by others This makes him willingto leave a state in which he is very free, butwhich is full of fears and continual dangers;and not unreasonably he looks for otherswith whom he can enter into a society for themutual preservation of their lives, liberties andestates 8§131 But though men who enter into societygive up the equality, liberty, and executivepower they had in the state of nature eachof them does this only with the intention ofbetter preserving himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be thoughtto change his condition intending to make itworse). So the power of the society or legislature that they create can never be supposed toextend further than the common good.9Individuals enter into this “social contract”through mutual consent, agreeing to give upsovereignty and abide by certain rules for thegood of themselves and others.Later thinkers, such as the 18th century philosopher Jean-Jaques Rousseau, built on Locke’swork to elaborate how government could bestprotect individuals’ rights and interests. AsRousseau wrote in The Social Contract, “[t]heproblem is to find a form of association whichwill defend and protect with the whole commonforce the person and goods of each associate,and in which each, while uniting himself withall, may still obey himself alone, and remain asfree as before.”10 Because people do not intendto surrender all freedom when they enter a social contract, the only legitimate form of government is one in which the legislative powerbelongs to the people alone (not to a monarch ordictator). Finally, while the concept of a socialcontract is distinct from that of a constitution,constitutions logically follow from the socialcontract. Constitutions are a means of anchoring the organization of government and protecting individuals’ rights and privileges.11T H E H I S TO R I CA L CO N T E XTYou may have heard of another English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, also famous for his ideas aboutthe “social contract.” Hobbes, who lived from 1588-1679, believed that life in the “state of nature” was“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” As a result, people would enter into a social contract and cedesome of their rights so as to be more secure. In contrast to Locke and Rousseau, however (and earlierin time than them), Hobbes argued that it was necessary to have a near-absolute ruler to preventdiscord and civil war. Importantly, Hobbes lived and wrote during the brutal English Civil War (16421651), a turbulent and particularly deadly period. The war certainly influenced Hobbes’s theories aboutthe role of central authority in securing peace. Is this analogous to how the unstable environment inAfghanistan influenced the form of government articulated in the 2004 Constitution?Locke’s views, in contrast, were formed after the civil war had ended but during the rule of King JamesII, whose efforts to secure absolute power as monarch became a source of new insecurities for thegeneral populace. It was within this context that Locke questioned the theory of absolute rule andinstead theorized a more limited form of government.The authors thank Professor Mohammad Isaqzadeh for his comments on this passage.
Chapter 11.1.2. W H Y C O N S T I T U T I O N A L G O V E R N M E N T?With this understanding of why governmentlegitimacy is tied to popular consent and limited government, we can return to the task ofdefining constitutionalism. Expanding on thedefinition of constitutionalism as “limited government,” we can say that “under constitutionalism, two types of limitations impinge on government. [1] Power is proscribed and [2] proceduresare prescribed.”12Constitutionalism refers to structural and substantive limitations on government.13 In practice, a constitution that reflects constitutionalismforbids (proscribes) state action in certain areas(such as various individual freedoms), and setsforth (prescribes) rules for how policies will bemade, implemented, and challenged. By contrast, a dictator with unlimited power can actwithout restraint (no proscription of his unlimited power) and on a whim (no prescriptionfor how he must act); thus a dictatorship, nomatter how benevolent, is not a constitutionalgovernment.14As one scholar notes, constitutionalism “governstwo separate but related types of relationship.First, there is the relationship of government tocitizen. Second, there is the relationship of onegovernmental authority to another.”15 Anotherscholar notes:Government is a creation of the constitution.It is the constitution that creates the organsof government, clothes them with their powers, and in so doing delimits the scope withinwhich they are to operate. A governmentoperating under a [] constitution must act inaccordance therewith; any exercise of poweroutside the constitution or which is unauthorized by it is invalid.16Now, it would be a mistake to equate having aconstitution with constitutionalism. As mentioned earlier, almost every country in the worldhas a written constitution. But not all of thesecountries pass the critical test for constitutionalism: does the constitution limit the power of thegovernment? In some countries, constitutionsare nothing more than lofty declarations of goalsand descriptions of government in terms thatimpose no restrictions. Instead of restraininggovernment, they only facilitate or legitimizedictatorial powers.17“C O N S T I T U T I O N A L” D I C T A T O R S H I P ?Consider these articles from the Constitution of North Korea,18 a country with a government widelyrecognized as one of the world’s most repressive. None of the basic rights articulated in these articlesare practiced in reality.Article 67: Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, demonstration andassociation Article 75: Citizens have freedom of residence and travel.Articl
This chapter will explore that gap and more. In Part 1 we examine the historical origins of mod-ern constitutional theory and its reflection in the Constitution of Afghanistan. Part 2 looks at the functions that constitutions serve, both gen - erally and in Afghanistan specifically. In Parts 3 and 4, we review Afghanistan’s constitutional
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Silat is a combative art of self-defense and survival rooted from Matay archipelago. It was traced at thé early of Langkasuka Kingdom (2nd century CE) till thé reign of Melaka (Malaysia) Sultanate era (13th century). Silat has now evolved to become part of social culture and tradition with thé appearance of a fine physical and spiritual .
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Chính Văn.- Còn đức Thế tôn thì tuệ giác cực kỳ trong sạch 8: hiện hành bất nhị 9, đạt đến vô tướng 10, đứng vào chỗ đứng của các đức Thế tôn 11, thể hiện tính bình đẳng của các Ngài, đến chỗ không còn chướng ngại 12, giáo pháp không thể khuynh đảo, tâm thức không bị cản trở, cái được
Le genou de Lucy. Odile Jacob. 1999. Coppens Y. Pré-textes. L’homme préhistorique en morceaux. Eds Odile Jacob. 2011. Costentin J., Delaveau P. Café, thé, chocolat, les bons effets sur le cerveau et pour le corps. Editions Odile Jacob. 2010. Crawford M., Marsh D. The driving force : food in human evolution and the future.
Le genou de Lucy. Odile Jacob. 1999. Coppens Y. Pré-textes. L’homme préhistorique en morceaux. Eds Odile Jacob. 2011. Costentin J., Delaveau P. Café, thé, chocolat, les bons effets sur le cerveau et pour le corps. Editions Odile Jacob. 2010. 3 Crawford M., Marsh D. The driving force : food in human evolution and the future.
