Integrated Survivability Assessment (ISA) In The Systems .

Integrated Survivability Assessment(ISA)in the Systems Engineering ProcessDavid H. HallSURVICE Engineering CompanyCarlsbad, CA(760) 382-1618Dave.Hall@SURVICE.comwww.survice.com

What is IntegratedSurvivability Assessment? ISA is a process for evaluating all aspects of systemsurvivability in a coordinated fashion– Using both M&S and T&E resources where appropriate Developed by SURVICE Engineering Company– For the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) with fundingfrom DOT&E SURVICE’s Experience in many related areas led to itsselection for this work– Survivability, Effectiveness and Mission Modeling and Analysis– Test and Evaluation Planning, Execution, and Analysis– Model and Simulation Verification, Validation and Accreditation– Systems Safety Engineering and Analysis

What does the IntegratedSurvivability AssessmentProcess Do? Measures system survivability in the context ofmissions and scenarios– Ensures that mission and scenario vignettes“cover the waterfront” to avoid a point design Ensures consistent treatment of survivability ifapplied throughout the system acquisitionlifecycle– Requirements development, AOA, speccompliance, LFT&E, OT&E, retrofits, SLEP,system mods, training applications Enables trades of Survivability, Effectiveness,and Mission Metrics in a Consistent andDocumented Process

1. DamageTolerance2. CrewProtection13. Tactics &Doctrine3. DamageResistance4. SignatureReduction5. y12. Policy& ROE6. SituationalAwarenessElements ofSurvivabilityOther11. MissionPlanningOffboardElements7. Performance10. Jamming9. SEAD &DEAD8. Precision &StandoffWeapons

Developing an IntegratedSurvivability Assessment Process Develop a checklist of important survivability factors Define the operational context and environment Select and evaluate the metrics identified as important tointegrated survivability assessment– Provide a modeling path to measure and quantify those metrics– Identify test range assets and processes to measure those metrics Identify assumptions, limitations, and deficiencies in both M&Sand Test resources– And mitigation actions for deficiencies Provide for a path to validation of the modeling processes withavailable test range data– Model - test - model

ThreatSuppressionThe Threat Kill Chain:A Checklist of Survivability FactorsOff PlatformFactorsOn -board EA, signatures,countermeasures, speed andaltitude, maneuverability,agility (last ditch maneuver),target acquisition(standoff), EngagementAvoidanceTactics, standoff weapons,anti-radiation missiles, selfdefense weapons, off-boardEA, night/all weathercapability, threat warning,situational awareness, C4ISRThreat or HitAvoidanceVulnerability:Fire/explosion protection, self-repairing flightcontrols, redundant and separated hydraulics,multiple engines, no fuel adjacent to air inlets,hydrodynamic ram protection, nonflammablehydraulic fluid, rugged structure, armor, Threat or HitTolerance

Survivability MetricsRecoverabilityPrimary Metric (MOE) – RedSub-Metric (MOP) - Black Threat Shot Opportunities Situational Awareness: Number ofthreat systems correctly detected,identified and located, with whatlocation range and accuracyEffectiveness Missions Accomplished: percentage ofvignettes that can be accomplishedconsidering survivability constraints Force Survivability Targets at risk Targets not engaged (leakers) (air to air) vivability Expected # casualtiesgiven a hit Probability of personnelsurvival given loss ofaircraft control due to hitMission LevelSurvivabilityVulnerability Threat System Pk Envelopes Hit locations on Aircraft Robustness Aircraft Pk/h (or damage given a hit or an intercept) Component Pk/h (or damage given a hit) Vulnerable area List of components vulnerable to various damage mechanismsEngagementLevelSusceptibility Threat Envelopes (with and w/o CM) F-Pole, A-Pole, E-Pole Detection Range Acquisition Range Tracking Range ECM/IRCM Effectiveness First Shot Opportunity (Air to Air)

Metrics and the ChecklistLinks in theThreat KillChainMissionSurvivabilityISA MetricsMissions Accomplished; robustnessThreatThreat Shot opportunities; situational awarenessSuppression (number, timeliness and accuracy of threatsPotential Survivability Enhancement FeaturesAlong the Kill ChainAll features combine to support mission levelsurvivabilityTactics, Precision Guided Munitions, mission planning, lowsignatures, fighter escort, ARM, self defense weaponsdetected)DetectionAvoidanceThreat Detection & Acquisition EnvelopesSOWs, Night Capability, on-board Electronic Attack (EA),stand-off EA, low signatures, good target acquisition, TerrainFollowing, Situational Awareness (SA), chaff, threat warning,tactics, mission planningEngagementAvoidanceThreat Tracking envelopes; F-Pole, A-Pole, EPole; ECM effectivenessSOWs, Onboard EA, Off-board EA, low signatures, goodtarget acquisition, SA, chaff and flares, threat warning, speedand altitude, mission planningThreat orHitavoidanceThreat Intercept Envelopes; ECM/IRCMeffectivenessOn-board EA, low signatures, chaff and flares, threatwarning, speed and altitude, maneuverability, agilityThreat or hit Threat system Pk envelopes; Aircraft Pk/h;toleranceComponent Pk/h; VA; Vulnerable Components;Casualties given a hit; hit locations on aircraftFire/explosion protection, self-repairing flight controls,redundant and separated hydraulics, multiple engines, no fueladjacent to air inlets, hydrodynamic ram protection,nonflammable hydraulic fluid, rugged structure, armor

The SurvivabilityAssessment ProcessSusceptibility AssessmentEnvironmentalEffectsSignaturesSystem ensorsSAMGunsAAMLasersEngagement AssessmentMission-ThreatAnalysisVulnerability AssessmentVehicleGeometryDMEAFlight sionAssessmentMission and SystemMetrics

Data Sources for a Typical SurvivabilityAssessmentPK/E PA/E*PT/A*PL/T*PI/L*PF/I*PH/F*PK/HDT/OT&EM&SE EngagementA AcquisitionT TrackL LaunchI InterceptF FuzingH HitLFT&EK Kill

ConnectivityTargetingSystem Survivability ina Network EnvironmentConnectivityTargetingConnectivityand TargetingHow does loss of a UAS element affect the network?

Network Fault Tree ApproachExternal ConnectivityPrior toloss ofUAV #1UAV #1TargetingUAV #2UAV #2Ground PlatformGround PlatformExternal ConnectivityAfterloss ofUAV #1UAV #2Ground PlatformTargeting

Integrated Survivability Assessment Process:Model-Test-Model ConceptCharacteristics ofSystem Under TestCreate VignettesApplicable to SystemUnder TestProgram Documents(TEMP, ORD, etc.)TestresultsdictatemajorprogramchangeAssess M&SNeedsExisting Data(System Specific)Assess T&ENeedsSelect M&S SuiteSelect T&E Site(s)Best-Suited to System Best-Suited to SystemUnder TestUnder TestLibrary of M&S (incl.Credibility Info.)ModelExisting Fixed Data(Terrain, Threat, etc.)Execute M&S(Pre-Test Analyses)DevelopDetailed Test PlansConduct T&ETestCollect LFT&E data Collect OT&E dataConduct AnalysisTo YieldSurvivability MetricsExecute M&S(Post-Test, i.e., UsingLFT&E and OT&E Data) Model

“Case Study” Example Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS) withthe following characteristics:Role: CAS, battlefield interdiction, SEAD/DEAD, etc.Dimensions:Weight:Speed:Range: To be determined:RCS:IR signature:DECM/IRCM:Vulnerability:etc.

EXAMPLE: UCAS VIGNETTES3rd World Advanced ConventionalThreat,UrbanThreat,ForestedDesert3rd XXLXXC2All Weather,Night StrikeLXXXCSARXXXLDriving FactorsTargetAcquisitionDifficultIADS, Wx,TargetAcquisitionAdvancedThreatFlat Terrain,Clear WxHigh ThreatHigh Altitude,Rough TerrainConventionalThreatL MoststressingScenarioConventionalThreat

Example: SEAD/DEAD Vignette-50-100soj1 ucav3rd close sam-150-200harm1 ucav8 close sam cdrstrike1 ucavTimelinesoj2 ucavharm2 ucav-25031 med sam37th cmd post32 med sam33 med sam-300TOT -12TOT -5TOT -4TOT -3TOT -2TOT -1TOT -0TOT 15th close sam4 long samstrike2 ucav-3507th close samsoj3 intDecoys on @2 x HARMs2 x HARMs2 x HARMsWeapons awayWeapons impact2 x HARMs

Example Integrated Survivability Results :Impact of IRCM Improvements on UAS2042Fewest losses,highest unit cost630LIFE CYCLE COST MLOSSES406UNIT COST M60615600NONENOTE: EXAMPLE ONLYALQ-144Lowest LifeCycle CostADVANCEDCONVENTIONALJAMMERSDIRECTEDENERGYCM

Example Integrated Survivability Result:Impact of IR Signature Reduction on UAS60Fewest losses,highest unit cost620UNIT COST MLOSSES4042LIFE CYCLE COST M800700Lowest LifeCycle Cost60050 W/SrNOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY5 W/Sr1 W/Sr

Integrated Survivability AssessmentApplicationsAOASusceptibility sDefinitionSpecificationComplianceEngagement AssessmentMission-ThreatAnalysisVulnerability AssessmentVehicleGeometrySystem SurvivabilityAssessmentDMEAFlight sionAssessmentOT&E/LFT&ETrainingMissionPlanning

Summary Integrated Survivability Assessmentincorporates survivability into the systemsengineering process for all phases of systemdevelopment– Supports both individual platform and networksystem assessment JASP has funded the development of abaseline ISA capability focused on air systems– ISA process is extensible to ground, shipboard andspace systems as well

ISA Demonstrations JASP is co-funding demonstrations of the ISAprocess for two acquisition programs Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)– Demo began in FY04 Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)– To begin in FY06

Supplemental Material

Example: SEAD/DEAD Vignette SEAD/DEAD mission SOJ HARM Part of Battlefield Interdiction (Strike) Command Post target Scenario: Unclassified scenario taken from Joint IntegratedMission Model (JIMM) dataset Threats: Surface-to-air RF and IR missiles only

Single Threat EngagementAssessmentSIGNATUREPREDICTION, MEASUREMENTALARMOpen Air Test Range Tracking,Acquisition DataMOSAIC(IR SAMS)Flight PathsRF Detection, AcquisitionRange ContoursESAMS(RF SAMS)DREAM(HPM)BLUEMAXLELAWS(LEL)Output Metrics:Detection, Acquisition RangeTracking Range ContoursThreat EnvelopesECM/IRCM EffectivenessECM/IRCM Effects(Test Data Open air, HWIL, CaptiveFlight)RADGUNS(ADA)

Example Susceptibility Results:Impact of RCS and Terrain onDetectionEffects of Terrain Maskingon Detection ContourDetection range vs. RCS50A/C Flight PathsRCS (dBsm)403020100-10-20-30-40-500200400600Detection Range (km)Radar ARadar BRadar C8001000

Example Results:Impact of ECM on Miss DistanceA/C Flight PathsA/C Flight 02015151050-5- 10- 15- 20- 25- -30- 35-35- 40-40- 45-45- 50-50- 55-55- 60-60- 65-65- 70-70- 75-75No ECMWith ECMThreat SystemMiss Distances in MetersLocations in 00200-300100-2000-100-100-0

Vulnerability AssessmentFMECA(FMEA/DMEA)Pd/hFunctionsOUTPUT METRICS:Fault ModelLFT&E DataPk/h (Aircraft andComponent)Vulnerable AreaOUTPUT METRIC:List of vulnerablecomponents by damagemechanism

Threat Missile Endgame (Pk)AssessmentTest LFT&E HAZAM, ionFragmentationPK

Example Engagement SurvivabilityResults: Effect of ECM on PKNo ECMHigh PKRegion757065 60A/C Flight Paths55504540 3530252015 1050With ECMA/C Flight PathsThreat System-5 -1 0 -1 5 -20 -25 -30 -35 -40 -45 -50 -55 -60 -65 -70 0151510105500-5-5-1 0-1 0-1 5-1 60-60-65-65-70-70-75-75757065 6055504540 3530252015 1050-5 -1 0 -1 5 -20 -25 -30 -35 -40 -45 -50 -55 -60 -65 -70 -75

Mission SurvivabilityAssessmentDREAM(HPM)ESAMS(RF SAMS)RADGUNS(ADA)MOSAIC(IR SAMS)LELAWS(LEL)ECM/IRCM Effects(Test Data)Engagement Level ResultsDetection, Tracking RangeContoursThreat Pk EnvelopesECM/IRCM EffectivenessMan-in-the-loop simulatorsDIADSMISSIONPLANNINGSYSTEMSFlight Paths(MultipleAircraft)OUTPUT METRICS: Mission Accomplishment: percent ofvignettes that can be accomplishedconsidering survivability constraints Force Survivability Targets at risk Robustness Threat Shot Opportunities Situational Awareness: Number of threatsystems correctly detected, identified andlocated, with what location range andaccuracyMISSION LEVEL MODELS(JIMM, SUPPRESSOR, EADSIM)Blue C4ISRThreat C3Limited Open-Air RangeTestingMultiple Threat SystemsMultiple Air VehiclesBlue WeaponsEffects(JMEM)

s o j2 uc a v s o j3 uc a v 3 3 me d _ s a m 3 1 me d _ s a m 3 2 me d _ s a m ha rm1 uc a v ha rm2 uc a v TOT - 12 TOT - 5 TOT - 4 TOT - 3 TOT - 2 TOT - 1 TOT - 0 TOT 1 Ch e c kp oin t De c o ys o n @ 2 x HARMs 2 x HARMs 2 x HARMs We a