YugoslaviaTransformed, 18 October 1990

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Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990(Continued.)WarningNationaIourcesIntelligeods InvolvedorNINTEL)oationurityUnauthori zed DiureSubject to Criminal SaAll material on this pageis Unclassified.-y'

Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990(Continued.)Director ofCentralIntelligenceNIE 15-90Yugoslavia TransformedInformation available as of 18 October 1990 was usedin the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.The following intelligence organizations participatedin the preparation of this Estimate:The Central Intelligence AgencyThe Defense Intelligence AgencyThe National Security AgencyThe Bureau of Intelligence and Research.Department of Statealso participating:The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the ArmyThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.Department of the Air ForceThis Estimate was approved for publication by theNational Foreign Intelligence Board.October 1990

Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990(Continued.)Yugoslavia TransformedeYugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year,and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will notstave off the breakup- Serbia will block Slovene and Croat attempts to form an all-Yugoslav confederation.- There will be a protracted armed uprising by Albanians in Kosovo.A full-scale, interrepublic war is unlikely, but serious intercom-munal conflict will accompany the breakup and will continueafterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter- There is little the United States and its European allies can do topreserve Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contra-dictory to advocacy of democracy and self-determination.iiiSeemLNIE 15-90October 1990

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Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990(Continued.)Key JudgmentsThe old Yugoslav federation is coming to an end because the reservoir ofpolitical will holding Yugoslavia together is gone. Within a year the federalsystem will no longer exist; within two years Yugoslavia will probably havedissolved as a state.Although elsewhere in Eastern Europe economic and political reform willbe interdependent, Yugoslavia's future will be decided by political andethnic factors. Even successful economic reforms will not hold the countrytogether.The strongest cohesive forces at work in Yugoslavia are those withinSerbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. They are a mix of national pride, localeconomic aspirations, and historically antagonistic religious and culturalidentifications. In Slovenia, and to a lesser extent Croatia, the newnationalism is westward looking, democratic, and entrepreneurial; inSerbia, it is rooted in statist economics, military tradition, and a preferencefor strong central government led by a dynamic personality.Neither the Communist Party nor the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) willbe able to hold the federation together. The party is in a shambles; thearmy has lost prestige because of its strong Communist Party identificationand because much of the country considers it a Serb-dominated institution.No all-Yugoslav political movement has emerged to fill the void left by thecollapse of the Titoist vision of a Yugoslav state, and none will.jAlternatives to dissolution now being discussed in various quarters areunlikely to succeed. A loose confederation will appeal to Croatia andSlovenia, but Serbs will block this in an effort to preserve Serb influence.Moreover, a Serb-dominated attempt to muddle through, using the oldfederal institutions and military brinksmanship to block independence, willnot be tolerated by the newly enfranchised, nationalistic electorates of thebreakaway republics. Serbs know this. [It is likely that Serbian repression in Kosovo will result in an armeduprising by the majority Albanian population, supported by large Albanianminorities in Macedonia and Montenegro. This, in turn, will create strongpressure on those republics to associate themselves closely with Serbia.v

Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990(Continued.)nne.tA slide from sporadic and spontaneous ethnic violence into organizedinterrepublic civil war is also a danger, but it is unlikely during the periodof this Estimate. Serbia's commitment of resources to pacification of theAlbanians in Kosovo will constrain its ability to use military means to bringSerbian minorities in the western part of the country under its directcontrol. The Serbs, however, will attempt to foment uprisings by Serbminorities elsewhere-particularly in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovinaand large-scale ethnic violence is likely.The United States will have little capacity to preserve Yugoslav unity,notwithstanding the influence it has had there in the past. But leaders fromvarious republics will make claims on US officials to advance their partisanobjectives. Federal and Serb leaders will emphasize statements in supportof territorial integrity. Slovenes, Croats, and Kosovars, however, will playup US pressure for improved performance on human rights and selfdetermination. Thus, Washington will continue to be drawn into the heatedarena of interethnic conflict and will be expected to respond in somemanner to the contrary claims of all parties.The Soviet Union will have only an indirect influence-for example,through multinational forums-on the outcome in Yugoslavia. The Europeans have some leverage, but they are not going to use it to hold the oldYugoslavia together. Most of them, including the Germans, will paylipservice to the idea of Yugoslav integrity, while quietly accepting thedissolution of the federal state. srvi

Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990(Continued.)ContentsPageKey JudgmentsDiscussionV1Centrifugal Forces DominantModerating Influences Are WeakThe FutureOutside Influences Limited and/or MenacingAnnex: The Peoples of YugoslaviaVii371013

Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990(Continued.)Sitfat,DiscussionHow's the weather, Jeeves?Exceptionally clement, sir.Anything in the papers?Some slight friction threatening in the Balkans, sir.Otherwise, nothing.P. G. WodehouseTheInimitable Jews. 1928Behind the crumbling facade of the old Yugoslavfederation new political realities are emerging:" A centralized Serbian state, ruled initially by Slobodan Milosevic's former Communist Party and probably joined with Montenegro in a new federation." A Macedonian state, probably dominated by Communist Party factions with differing views on thedesirability of democratization and market reformsbut subject to Serbian influence articulated in termsof control over their Albanian minority populations." Croatian and Slovenian states in the northwest,oriented toward Western Europe and probably associated in a confederal arrangement with or withoutthe participation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.[With the departure of Slovenia and Croatia over thenext year, the Yugoslav federal system will cease tofunction. Efforts to construct a confederal alternativeto the current system will probably fail within thetwo-year span of this Estimate, leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a state.Centrifugal Forces DominantStrong centrifugal forces are driving the 70-year-oldYugoslav state apart. Although such forces have beenpresent for years and the federation has somehowsurvived, this time is different. Tito, who embodiedthe concept of a federal Yugoslavia, has been dead for10 years. Absent a leader of his stature, the Yugoslavfederation has been held together by institutionalinertia, mainly in the Communist Party and themilitary. The party organization has been shatteredand its ideological appeal leached away by recentdevelopments elsewhere in Central Europe and theBalkans. [ The Yugoslav National Army (JNA), because of itsstrong party identification and because much of thecountry considers it a Serb-dominated institution, haslost much of its stature as custodian of the Yugoslavidea. Although the army might unilaterally attempt tohold the federation together, its leadership recognizesthat it could not do this alone and probably believesthat any attempt to do so would cause the JNA todissolve along its ethnic faultlines. Dissolution in thiscircumstance would prompt Slovenia and Croatia torapidly assert as much control as possible over armyassets on their territories, and the JNA's remainingresources would be transferred into Serbian, andpossibly other, state armed forces. National pride, economic aspirations, and an upwelling of ethnic-based religious and cultural identification will continue to push Slovenia and Croatiatoward independence. Secessionist sentiment has beenpowerfully stimulated by Serbian attempts to dominate the federal political process. Breakaway claimshave reached the point of explicit demands andpractical measures that are incompatible with the oldFederal Constitution. Secessionist steps include declarations of sovereignty, pursuit of independent foreignpolicy goals, the appearance of republic-based para-military formations, plans for republic-based and-controlled military forces, and claims to exclusivecontrol of natural resources. These measures have yetto be knitted together into explicit, internally consistent statements of national identity, but they will bewithin the span of this Estimate.