The Israeli Experience In Operation Peace For Galilee
AD-A254 133And Operational Art:S PeacemakingThe Israeli Experience In Operation"Peace For Galilee"AMonographbyMajor Walter E. KretchikInfantryDTICSk[51CLAI SAIl1USchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasSecond Term AY mie92-23461
""-formREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEIOtilliP U q OW0.sehIl0OME.AhlWl ' U.n.qqSWSeOr"V9 WW'10oWIVtqfU SbWOApprovedNo, 7044188.M.JO.Wd 441"Mo. 5r toy9ors rJ.sb.orroarqn" od oq s.liem . OC "S03.P0 0W4 9U l .aSI.w tIM O"5S rgu. 41* f. 0"Z 1 0aN0504"00"D*O- so"12410,53.J. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED"I.AGENCY USE ONLY (Leavo blink) 2. REPOr DATE"MONOGRAPH15 MAY 1992'.c-- AND OPERATIONAL ART: THE ISRAELI ntýW I, t A4,Tl.4. "o cVfV.q *s5u nme*S. FUNDING NUMBERS"EXPERIENCE IN OPERATION "PEACE FOR GALILEE."6. AUTHORtSJMAJOR WALTER E. KRETCHIK, USAs.7. PERFORMIN4G ORGANIZAJION NAME(S) AND AOORESSiES)PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBERSCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESATTN: ATZL-SWVFT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900COMM: (913) 684-3437 AV: 552-32379. SPONSORING/ MONITORING AGENCY11. SUPPLEMENTARY10. SPONSORING/MONITORINGNAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)AGENCY REPORT NUMBERNOTES12a. DISTRIEUtION/AVAILABILITYI2b. OISTRIBUTIONSTATEMENTCOOEAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)IS.14. SUIBLECITERMSPEACEMAKINGOPERATIONAL ARTTHEATER DESIGNI1.SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF REPORTUNCLASSIFIEDNStI II40-00S O-12600NUMBER OF PAGES62CAMPAIGN PLANNING16. PRICE COOEARAB ISRAELI-RELATIONSIE. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION'Of THIS PAGEUNCLASSIFIEDto.SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOf ABSTRACTUNCLASSIFIED20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACTUNLIMITEDStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-69)IIit-tI mpIl
Pe11vacemaking And Operational Art:The Israeli Experience In Operation"Peace For Galilee"AMonographbyMajor Walter E. KretchikInfantryVICTO---M ;'AfsJSTCLAVISSchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasSecond Term AY ed
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPHMatior Walter E.Titleof Monograph:APPROVALKretchikPeacemaking and Operational Art:Experience in OperationThe Israeli"'Peace For Galilee.-Approved by: Robert H.1 4(\MonographDirector LBerlin,Ph.D.Director, School ofams R.Advanced MilitaryMcDono6h, MSStudiesDirector, GraduatePhBrookes,Degree ProgramPh.D.Aocession ForNTISDTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2GRA&IDTIC TABUnaunowncedJust itflatIon00ByDisribution/ivallabillty CodesSvaiiadorAccepted this jqQMday ofSpecilsj JDiu%1992j
ABSTRACTPeacemaking and Operational Art:In Operation "Peace For GalileeKretchik, USA.The IsraeliExperienceby RAJ Walter E.This monograph analyzes the 1982 Israelipeacemaking operation againstthe PalestinianLiberation Organization in regards to current militaryIt uses operation -Peace For Galilee" as atheory.case study to examine the possibility of using currentoperational art concepts to explain and design apeacemaking operation.The monograph firstdefines the terms peacemaking,operational art,and campaigns.Next it reviews thehistorical and strategic setting that prompted theIsraelioperation.It then examines how politicalandmilitary interaction drove the peacemaking campaigndesign, and how operational art concepts of strategicaim, endstates, centers of gravity, decisive points,lines of operation, and battle were used by Israelimilitary planners.It also includes an analysis of thepolitical,strategic, operational and tacticalinteraction as the campaign unfolded.The monograph concludes that operational artcanbe used to design and explain a peacemaking operation.The IsraeliDefense Forces used operational artconcepts in the design and execution of the peacemakingoperation.Operational artalso explains peacemakingoperations.Operational art alone cannot guarantee asuccessful peacemaking operation.Peacemaking requiresinternational and national will as prerequisites foroperational success.The military needs clearlydefined politicalobjectivestoensure thattheoperation accomplishes the desired politicalendatate.Peacemaking can be affected by personal politicalagendas that might not be in the best interestof thenation.Additionally, peacemaking is an extremelydangerous and complex operation--one that requires askilled military planner who is educated in politicalaffairsas well as military operations and tactics.The indications are that any nation undergoing apeacemaking operation must ensure that allelements ofa nation--government, people, and military--agree to acommon objective before the operation commences or riskpoliticaland military failure.
Table of IV.PeacemakingV.Conclusion andAppendix.and StrategicCampaignA.Appendix B.In.Environment.Planning.1.517.Lebanon .Implications .26.36.Lebanese Religious and Ethnic DiversityIsraeliForces ManeuverEndnotes .Bibliography .44Map .45.430.55
I.Introductionwhen our vitalThroughout our history,interests or those of our friends and allieshave been threatened, often with very littlewarning, the U.S. military has been calledupon to both demonstrate U.S. commitmentand, when necessary, to fight.Joint Chiefs of StaffNational Military Strategy 1The United States isentering an era of changingideas regarding world politics.Long suppressednationalistic movements and ethnic struggles challengethe old world order's inherent stability.Insomeareas "regional disputes could unleash local,destructiveforces.- thatdirectlyor indirectlythreaten the national interests of the U.S.and its2allies.The August 1991 edition of the National SecurityStrategy of the United States notes that,The United Statesseeks.todeteranyaggression that could threaten the securityof the United States and itsalliesand.[to]end conflicton termsfavorable to the United States,3interests, and itsallies.To protect U.S.U.S.interests and those of itsmight require itsallies,thearmed forces to enter a volatileregion to end a conflict,stability.itsAccordingly,make peace and reestablishmilitary planners will designand execute a campaign to accomplish that purpose.This paper,then,seekscurrent operational artto answer the question:Canbe applied to the understanding1
and design of peacemaking operations?question,thispaperpeacemaking,firstTo answer thatdefines the termsoperational art,and campaigns.Clarifyingthose terms should help the operationalplanner tocomprehend what comprises an operation tomake peace.Next,decide ifthispaper uses a historical case study tooperational artcan be applied to theunderstanding and design of peacemakingThe Israelioperationoperations.-Peace For Galilee" inJune 1982is an example of one nation projecting military powerinto an unstable region to accomplish an operationalpurpose--to restore order.4An examination ofoperation "'Peace For Galilee" inoperational artterms of U.S.provides insights into how anoperational planner might design a future peacemakingcampaign.Finally,thispaper concludes by answeringthe research question and addressing implications forpeacemaking operations now and into the future.The term "peacemaking"our current doctrine.interchangeably,5is not clearly defined inSeveral terms,add to the reader's confusion.Depending upon the source--peacemaking,restore order,an unstablemake peace.usedoperations toand contingency operations--allsituationwhere forcesenterThe crux of those terms is2adescriberegion tothat the
operation achieves the politicalend of haltingviolence and promoting or forcingpoliticaland diplomatic talks.the resumption of6Moreover,peacemaking operations are unilateral or multinational,and occur with or without the consent of the warringfactions.Since the belligerents might not approve ofoutside peacemakingassistance,itispossible that thepeacemaking force could immediately find itselfcombat.Thus,-aprepared to fight,The political[peacemaking)ifforce.in. must be7necessary.-nature of peacemaking operationsrequires that the available military force not only berobust enough to restore order,discretion.8but use itsRules of engagement(ROE)power withare likely tobe limiting due to the mission of restoring law andorder and realizing complex politicalgoals.Themilitary commander must use his forces prudently orrisk failing to attain the politicalgoal of makingpeace.Moreover,peacemaking operations are sub3ect tofriendly national will.least inand itsthe U.S.,The use of military force,atcompels the approval of the peoplegoverning body.An example of building"-national will- to use military force was the recentGulf War.President Bush spent considerable effortcreating consensus not only in3Congress,but among the
American public as well.9President Bush realized that high U.S.casualtiesand an extended military campaign could weaken U.S.resolve and hazard the military operation.Therefore,10President Bush continually stressed the needto keep U.S.casualties to a minimum and end theoperation as rapidly as possible.Thus,the militarycommander must be aware of the politicalneed for aquick and low cost operation.he mustreconcile politicalMoreover,want with sound military practice.He does so through the application of operationalArmy Field Manualart(FM)art.100-5 defines operationalas,the employment of military forces to attainstrategic goals in a theater of war ortheater of operations through the design,organization, and conduct of campaigns andmajor operations. 11That statement encompasses severalartrequires a broad vision,ideas.the abilityOperationalto foresee,understanding of the linkage of means to ends,strong joint and combined cooperation.12anandAnoperational commander creates operational artwhen heimagines the clear and complete picture of the endstatetowardwhich he directsallmilitaryaction(ends);thecalculation of what resources he must have to achievehissuitableends(moans);useofthewhat isa feasible,availablemeans4acceptable,(ways);andand what
risks he will accept when means and ways do not certifythe attainment of ends.The operational commander,ways,by balancing means,and risk to achieve a strategic end,operational artexpressesby designing and conducting campaigns.A campaign isa series of sequential or simultaneoustacticalengagements, battles,or majoroperations--air, ground and sea--arrangedtime, space, and dimension that link theand strategic levels of war. 1 3tacticalA campaign plan organizes tacticalbattles,inengagements,and major operations to achieve strategicends.Current military theory stresses several ideasthat are basic to campaign design and execution.ideas include the following:aim,Theseidentifying the strategicfinding the strategic and operational centers ofgravity,selecting a military endstate,lines of operation,engagements,battles,determiningand seeking decisive result inor major operations.allEach ofthose ideas will be examined as they apply to operation"Peace For Galilee."II.Historical and Strategic EnvironmentNodern Lebanon came into being on September 1,1920,when General Henri Joseph Gouraud,Commissioner inLebanon and Syria,French Highproclaimed Lebanonan independent republic under a French mandate.51 4
The new nation,ofreligiouscarved from Syria,groupsorganizedincluded a varietyby geographicSunni Muslims and Christiansequallyregion.dividedBeirut,while Shiite Muslims dominated the Bekaa Valley and theJabal Amel region.primarily Sunni's,Moreover,the coastalplainswerethe Shouf mountains mostly Druze,and the Mount Lebanon region Maronite Catholic.(Appendix A provides a map showing the ethnic andreligious variety inLebanon.)Some French officialssaw thisreligious diversityas a threat to regional stability.However,Frenchefforts to revise the Gouraud boundaries met withThe Maronites fearedstrong Maronite opposition.dividing Lebanon into Christian and Muslim regions.The Maronites thought that the Muslims might ally withSyria,resulting ina powerful Muslim bloc that woulddominate Christian Lebanon.Accordingly,sought and received internationalLebanese borders in1923.Inrecognition of the1926 Lebanon ratifiedconstitution and recognized the states'diversity.the Maronitesitsreligious15The Muslims viewed politicalpluralism as acolonialist agreement imposed upon them by the FrenchChristian mandate.politicalThe Maronites,however,saw thearrangement with France as a link toChristian Europe and a haven safe from domination by6
its Muslim neighbors.Thus,from itsrepublic suffered internal splitssectarian lines.In1943,gained fullorigins,the newalong politicaland16the French mandate ended and Lebanonautonomy.The Lebanese government soughtto ease internal politicaltensions by basing powerupon the 1932 population census.The census showedthat the Christians embodied a majority within thestateby a fiftymajority,one percent margin.Due to thisslimthe Maronites held the office of thepresidency,plus controlled the military and thesecurity forces.The prime minister was a Sunni,largest Muslim group,while the speaker of theparliament was a Shiite.not include the Druze.theThe power-sharing model did17Although the Lebanese government tried to easeinternal tension,Christian-Muslim distrustover religious difference.increasedAdditionally,a newlysovereign Syria refused to acknowledge independentLebanon,which the Syrians believed was part of Syria.Syria wanted to merge the two statesto compete withEgypt and Iraq for regional dominance.Furthermore,Syria refused to establish diplomatic relations withLebanon for fear that thisrecognize Lebanon'saction would officiallyindependence.The announcement that the British mandate in7
Palestinewould expire atmidnight on Mayfurther complicated Lebanese politics.14,1948The six monthsbefore the mandate expiration saw increased Arabattacks against Jewish villages with Jewish fightersresponding inkind.representativesOn May 14 Zionist movementassembled increation of a Jewish stateinTel Aviv and declared thePalestine,to be known asIsrael.18During the night of Hay 14/15,an Arab coalition,commanded by Prince Abdullah of Transeordan,the new Jewish state.Lebanon provided 3,500 Muslimvolunteers and attacked into Israel,village of Kadesh.results of that effort,remainedinThe Lebanese,on the night of May 28/29,securing thesatisfiedhalted theirplace for a week.area changed hands.attackedwith theoperations andIsrael counter-attackedand for several weeks theOn October 29,the Israelispushedthe Lebanese back into Lebanon and occupied tenLebanese villages.The Israeliforces leftwhenLebanon and Israel signed an armistice on March 22,1949.The declaration of the United Arab Republicin1958 further divided Lebanese politics.(UAR)The jointventure between Egypt and Syria inspired Muslims withinLebanon to seek membership inCamille Chamoun,that Arab federation.the Lebanese President and a staunch8
Maroniteobelieved that joining the UAR meant the endof Christian rule insplitLebanon.over the UAR issue,The Lebanese governmentwith the Muslim factionscalling for a general strike throughout the country.The strike led to unrest and violence,with Muslimpartisans attacking the presidential palace near Dairal-Qamar.Lebanon plunged into civilA coup inwar.Iraq that resulted in19the death ofChamoun's close ally,King Faisal,the Lebanese crisis.Chamoun asked for U.S.out of fear of a similar overthrow,1958 two thousand U.S.further compoundedassistanceand on 15 July,Marines landed inLebanon.TheMarine presence eventually grew to 15,000.20American Under-Secretary of State,negotiated a settlement inLebanon by convincingChamoun not to run for reelection.Shihab,Robert Murphy,General Fuadcommander of the Lebanese Army,became thepopular candidate for president and took office onSeptember 28.Shihab formed a now government,power for the firsttime to lesser Muslim factions.The new government caused politicalcivilwar ended ingivingOctober,reform,and the1958.21While Lebanon struggled with its own internalproblems,matters.Palestinian nationalism would soon complicate22Inthe late 1940s,many Palestinians fledIsrael into Jordan where they hoped Prince Abdullah9
would further their cause for reclaiming Palestine.However,Abdullah diedin1951,and the Hashemitekingdom went briefly to a mentally disturbed King Talaluntildeposed him.the Jordanian ParliamentInAugust 1952,a 17-year-old King Hussein assumedpower of the weakened Hashemite dynasty.Palestinians,young king,Theobserving a fragile Jordanian statebelieved that their interestslonger be served inJordan.In1964,and acould noseveralPalestinian groups within Jordan formed an anti-Israelgroup called the Palestinian Liberation Organization orPLO.23The PLO became an expression of Palestiniannationalism.For several years the relationshipbetween King Hussein and the PLO became polarized,Hussein having littlesay inPLO policies.an aftermath of the Six Day War,Inwith1967,asmore Palestinianrefugees poured into Jordan from the now Israelioccupied West Bank.The.PLO,established a de facto statenow led by Yasser Arafat,within Jordan.Arafatdirected armed raids against Israeliforces inBank,againstwith the Israeli'sretaliatingPalestinians and Jordanians alike.InSeptember 1970,monarchy threatened,Hussein,directedthe West24now believing hisa briefbut bloody fightagainst the PLO to remove them from his country.10The
incident,inknown as"Black September,"Arafat fled into Lebanon,Jordan.destroyedthe PLOadding 200,000 ofhis followers to the 300.000 Palestinians already inrefuge there.25The PLO established itsBeirut.new headquarters inThey quickly moved to take advantage of theinternal politicalgovernment.struggles within the LebaneseThe PLO allied itselfMuslim movements within Lebanon,Lebanese statewith leftistandseeking to destroy theand create a PLO base for continuedforays against Israel.26Aware of the growing PLO strength,government triedto impose stricterPalestinians inLebanon.attempts to restrictraid Israel.itscontrol on theThe PLO,activities,the Lebanesehowever,ignored alland continued toNegotiations between the Lebanesegovernment and the PLO reached an impasse in1969,Aprilwith clashes occurring between Lebanese policeand PLO forces until November of the same year.Lebanese officialsreceived increased pressure,particularly from Egypt.November1969,presence inthe Cairo AccordLebanonagainst Israel.to legitimize the PLO.establishedInthe PLOand condoned PLO armed operationsThe Lebanese government and the PLOagreed to non-interference with each other.27The Lebanese Christians found the Cairo Accord11
intolerable.itsThe Lebanese government could not upholdobligations to defend the state,order,or curb PLO actions.Christian militia,assure law andThe Phalangists,orresorted to force to restore theirnation's sovereignty and their dominant position insociety.Fighting erupted inattack inretaliationApril1975 over a Phalangistfor the assassination of one oftheir leaders against a bus carrying PLO guerrillas.The ensuing violence caused a civilwar betweenChristian militia and a Muslim coalition comprisingLebanese.Palestinians.volunteers.and non-LebaneseArabMuslim coalition pressure destroyed theLebanese state,fragmented the military,many Muslim soldiers to defect.and caused28The Christian situation became desperate by early1976.The Palestinian-Muslim coalition was on theverge of victory.The Christian leadership,believingthat Syria would not want a Palestinian-controlledLebanon,asked the Syrian government to intervene.The Syrians rapidly entered the fray anddrastically changed the situation.The Syrian armyoverwhelmed the Palestinian-Muslim coalition,the Christians to survive.politicalmove,However,Syria changed sides.inenablinga rapidSyria seizedcontrol of the Palestinian-Muslim coalition and turned12
against the Christians.The Syrians assumed a foreignmilitary occupation
Peacemaking and Operational Art: The Israeli Experience In Operation "Peace For Galilee- by RAJ Walter E. Kretchik, USA. This monograph analyzes the 1982 Israeli peacemaking operation against the Palestinian . Nodern Lebanon came into being on September 1, 1920, when General Henri Joseph Gouraud, French High .
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