A BRIEF HISTORY OF (CENTRAL EUROPEAN) TIME'
A BRIEF HISTORY OF (CENTRAL EUROPEAN) TIME'"A nCosmicW View of the Emerging Atlantic Security Environment and a Proposed "Face Lift" forUS/NATO Flexible Response StrategyLt Col Chet Herbst, USAFUS Def. Policy & Mil. Strategy9 April 1990[ With apologies to Stephen W. Hawking (author of A Brief History of Time: From the BigBanq to Black Holes), Einstein, and serious astrophysicists, cosmologists, and historianseverywhere.]
Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188Report Documentation PagePublic reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.1. REPORT DATE3. DATES COVERED2. REPORT TYPE09 APR 1990-4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE5a. CONTRACT NUMBERA BRIEF HISTORY OF (CENTRAL EUROPEAN) TIME. A "Cosmic"View of the Emerging Atlantic Security Environment and a Proposed5b. GRANT NUMBER5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER6. AUTHOR(S)5d. PROJECT NUMBER5e. TASK NUMBER5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBERNational War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J.McNair,Washington,DC,20319-60009. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORTNUMBER(S)12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for public release; distribution unlimited13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES14. ABSTRACTsee report15. SUBJECT TERMS16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:17. LIMITATION OFABSTRACTa. REPORTb. ABSTRACTc. THIS PAGEunclassifiedunclassifiedunclassified18. NUMBEROF PAGES19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON14Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT/HISTORICAL SETTING:The concept hit me like a thunaerbolt!I hadbeen mulling over a recent guest speaker's 'literary w characterization of world events basedon oceanographic analogies (i.e.,would-be strategists,mthe tides and currents m of political change),wondering iflike fishermen, should consult their solunar tables before wading intomurky political waters.Other conceptual models for visualizing international politics wereavailable for use in the upcoming strategy paper.For exampl(,, arxists and othermhistorical Darwinists subscribe to mnatural selection m and/or mscientific historical law m asthe ultimate determinant of international politics.These dogmatic approaches are no handierthan the solunar tables, since recent events in Europe do not fit neatly onto a steadyWevolutionary ladder nor do they reflect the meyer-oscillating but always-ascending pattern of dialectical materialism.Other conceptual devices to render internationalrelations more fathomable include Wbalance of power w (ballast management) approaches; chessanalogies/game theories; abnormal psychology and racial stereotyping;and (usuallyapocalyptic) religious allegories [after having been mmocked and scourged w by a previousFaculty Seminar Leader for dabbling with the moralistic m approach,I wasn't anxious to pressthat particular edge of the academic freedom envelope in my final written requirement].Thus, my predicament was that I had access to an exceptionally lucid,comprehensive,coherent, and practical framework for analyzing military strategy (pp. 7-9 of syllabus),there were few reliable,mintellectually gripping t modelsbut(telescopes or microscopes) throughwhich to make sense of the discontinuous fits and starts of current events in Europe, norplot their future trajectories,at least, not using Newtonian mechanics.That is when mthe apple m from the rafters of Arnold Auditorium hit me on the head, so tospeak.Instead of futilely attempting to describe the profound political forces which arereshaping Europe in the obfuscatory jargon of professional?professing political scientists,why not relate the process in simple terms more easily understood by laymen--i.e.,the basic concepts of nuclear physics and modern c o s m o l o g y ? T h e n ,by usinghaving established a f r a m eof reference for grappling with the changes which are sweeping Europe, it would be mucheasier to plug and chug w through the algorithm of the UFramework for Military Strategy
(Elaborated Version}. mThe introductory chapter of the new Principia Strateqica might readas follows:In many resf cts, the behavior of states and nations is similar to the behavior ofnuclear particles and the aggregations of these particles into successively larger and morecomplex structures,ranging from atoms to the universe as a whole.Often the mmildinteractions t during peacetime of large objects (i e., NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the US, theSoviet Union) belie the tremendous energies bound up in their constituent subatomic particles(e.g., various national/ethnic s u r o u p sboundaries.which lie within,across, or outsidenationalMany of the characteristics of mmodern Europe were forged very rapidly in amsingularityW event of intense heat and light--a Big Bang represented by World War II.Residual forces, for example, Soviet military power, have helped to hold the Europeanpolitical constellation in place during the ensuing 45 years.affected political events on a global scale.Like gravity, Soviet forceOpposing power from the US and its regionalalliances tended to nullify the tgravitational pull m of the WRed Giant. mHowever,as theSoviet Union has consumed its economic and ideological sustaining fuel, it has begun a periodof gravitational collapse and may ultimately collapse to a White Dwarf. mOver the longerterm, that collapse could stabilize; or, an international Wsupernovam could occur which wouldconsume nearby b i e sand engulf some nations lying beyond the orbits of its former EastEuropean satellites.Some observers have been so enraptured by this macro t cosmic event that important"micro" effects have been slighted during the rush to formulate a new" US military strategy.At the "atomic w level, there are other nuclear forces which are typically exerted only overshort (11ocal ) distances, but whose intensities can be many times those of the nglobal gravitational and electrostatic forces which affect the superpowers" peacetime interactions.For example, there are Uheavy elements among the Current international system which areinherently unstable Several of the tartificial Balkan nations are prone to natural decayand exhibit relatively short mhalf-livesW(until, in the tastrophysical alchemy m ofcataclysmic I s u r n o v a events such as world wars, the are rearranged into new unstable
compounds).The explosive breakup of these states can release lethal "fission t energy.US,Allied, and Soviet military influence has often acted as a "moderating" element to preventuncontrollable chain reactions in these situations.In essence, a US military presence actsas a tcadmium rod w to keep reactions in these regions from "going critical."In addition to European instabilities caused by centrifuqal "fission w tendencies,thereexists the possibility of uncontr ll d explosions due to centripetal mfusionm effects. binding forces between various Eurasian peoples (the Germans, Romanians,Albanians, Armenians,energy physics, tHungarians,and divers Muslim groups come to mind} can produce very exciting high[A nice feature of nucleonic terminology is that affectatious expressionssuch as Wrevanchismm and irredentism can be avoided.]in Central E u r o ,TheWith the attenuation of Soviet powerit will be increasingly important for the US/NATO to moderate the fusionprocess to prevent its rate from "going exponential, mAnd, as in the case of H-bombs,nearbyfission explosions can provide the impetus/trigger for catastrophic fusion events.Having identified "fission w and "fusion m tendencies as the two principal,threats to regional and/or global peace and US interests in Europe,analogy drawn from physics--namely,potentiallet's look at one finaltEC 92 m and the Second Law of Thermodynamics.states that systems naturally tend toward states of greater, uniform disorder.This lawFor example,a liter of helium atoms released in Arnold Auditorium would tend to disperse evenlythroughout the room rather than spontaneously gather in a tight cloud near the speaker'spodium.A millennium of European history suggests that, aside from local cohesive effectsalong ethnic/national lines, there is no strong, endogenous,attractive force which has beensufficient to draw this nebulous array of stars, dust, and gas together.Rather,outsidemilitary and/or economic pressures have been the exogenous forces which have caused Europeaninstitutions to congeal.political,Ultimately, centrifugal forces seem to prevail whenever outsidemilitary, and/or economic pressures have subsided.In short,necessarily the spectral threat to US interests as often portrayed.EC 92 is notDangerous instabilitiesat the "micro (national) level should be our main concerns as the steadying influence ofSoviet power attenuates.
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES:Due to the limitations of Space and Time, we must leave our mthoughtexperiment/politlcal visual aid m and turn to the matter of US political objectives in Europe.With respect to the Soviets" intentions and capabilities (and Western vulnerabilities),insufficient time has e l a p s latter two categories.to verify or take advantage of substantial changes in theThe basic equation for the balance of East-West power has not yetdramatically shifted in terms of current capabilities.The first derivative of the currentcapability equation yields the coefficient of chanqe i.e., the future trajectory of Sovietpower.The second derivative of the basic equation is the mrateW of change (in this case, andeceleratione is taking place).The danger of the current wave of tGorbapheliaW is thatsome US policy-makers will place undue emphasis on today's "instantaneous rate of change while ignoring the underlying power base which drives the process,and ignoring the Soviets'planne d "power curve m which will level off and turn upward over the mid- and long-term.It is too soon for the US to abandon the basic political tenets embodied in theWReport on the Future Tasks of the Alliance m (the Harmel Report).1967The Harmel Reportreasserted NATO's commitment to maintaining collective strength and consultation as the sinequa non for establishing improved relations with the Soviet Union and the countries ofEastern Europe.The mdual track approach which led to the elimination of US and Soviet INFmissile forces in Europe is a direct descendant of the Harmel philosophy,Response Strategy,and NATO's Flexibleadopted at the same time as the Harmel Report, is the military embodimentof the Alliance's continuing, fundamentalrather than radical change is appropriate.political objective.At this juncture,continuityThe best approach is to examine the mdeltasW,i.e., those tangible factors which have changed--and to make adjustments to US/NATO politicaland military objectives rather than build a new collective security architecture startingwith "brick one. mThe empyrean age has not yet dawned in Europe.The Soviet Union is still a power to be reckoned with and the explosive instabilities noted above have increased theoverall political challenge for the US and its allies.In an era of (contagious) economic and political turmoil in the Soviet Union and CentralEurope, and at a time when Germany and the Western European states are entering a period of4
flux, the US has a vital interest in dampening political oscillations and instabilities tomanageable levels.In this vital 'steadying" role, a US presence can help in the preventionof politic l brush fires.The best course of action for the US is to remain an integralplayer, rather than a bystander,economic,political,in the process.Furthermore,the best channels for USand military integration are "traditional" vehicles such as NATO,although it will also be essential for the US to be a 'player" in emerging fo a such as theCSCE and to maintain close ties with the EC.to encourage the ascendancy of alternative,Gorbachev has scaled-back/concealedIt is not in America's best long-term interests"independent European pillars' such as the WEU."the threat' and has temporarily relaxed externalpressures on Europe in an effort to reinvigorBte the atrophied economy of the Soviet Unionwith Western technology and managerial"know how."This will exacerbate US difficultiespursuing stabilizing international policies during a period of fiscal retrenchment.residual Soviet threat,though considerable,inThewill be an insufficient bogeyman to 'scare up"support from those segments of the European public which cried out for unilateral disarmamenteven when the threat was most palpable.The US will, therefore,be more reliant upon itsEuropean partners to take the lead in "selling" Allied policies to voters.This will callfor a much greater commitment to true consultation with European nations prior to embarkingon major policy initiatives.The US must be willing to comply with local 'bylaws' as aresponsible tenant in the "new European house."This will entail scrupulous US respect forGerman sovereignty rights as that nation transitions toward full unification.Ultimately,American policy-makers should seek the closest possible political and economic integration ofthe US and all European nations to increase the "transparency"Transparent borders and cross-border political/economicof European borders.equilibria are the best"immunization" against crises stemming from ethnic/national centrifugal and centripetalforces.Border transparency and transnational uniformity Of basic human rights wouldsignificantly reduce the pressures to redraw national boundariessparked many European wars in the past).5(pressures which have
MILITARY OBJECTIVES:The direction and magnitude of recent changes in Europe (i.e., thetdeltas') do not warrant abandonment by the US of its fundamental,objective in Europe:peacetime militarynamely, to deter war in Europe through collective security in NATO.Nor should NATO's fundamental wartime military objective be altered,i.e.,the restoration ofAlliance borders and termination of hostilities at the lowest practicable level in the eventthat deterrence fails.Obviously,the Soviets are significantlyaltering their peacetimemilitary objectives by removing their principal coercive mechanism for controlling EasternEurope.The eventual withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet military muscle from the Northern,Western, Central,and Southern Groups of Forces, coupled with conventional force cuts,being undertaken as the price tag for domestic modernization/resuscltatlonstate.areof the SovietIt seems much less likely that the current Soviet leadership would strive to occupythe entirety of Europe or resort to the early use of nuclear weapons to achieve Wtotalvictory' as ultimate wartime goals.likely to be limited,vulnerableAlliance,Thus, Soviet objectives in a European war are moreand in some respects,more difficult for NATO to deal with.The"center of gravity" for NATO will continue to be the political cohesion of thewhose overall effectiveness is highly dependent on mutual consensus.The center ofgravity of a mleaner" and less acquisitive Soviet Union will continue to be its militaryforces and its coercive security apparatus through which it maintains internal and externalcontrol.The Warsaw Pact is now moribund,and whether or not NATO continues to flourish,there is an increased likelihood of bilateral and multilateral(short of NATO-wide orWTO-wide) participation in future crises as the Soviets (and reluctant US allies) attempt toisolate participants and limit the scope of conflicts.Allied unanimity would be especiallyunlikely in "spill over" conflicts originating in the democratizing nations of EasternEurope.Developing "backup" bilateral arrangements to hedge against the possibility thatNATO fails to act in local (not to mention, out-of-area)conflicts will be a seriouschallenge for US policy-makers.MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES:Strategic surprise may be more difficult for theSoviets to attain opposite NATO's Central Region, depending upon the scenario.Since Soviet
intervention could be triggere by instability in a neighboring East European state (perhapsby invitation of one faction in a civil war), it is arguable whether NATO could put increasecstrategic warning time to effective use.The northern and southern flanks of NATO willremain as vulnerable to tm nimum warning t scensrios as ever.The assumption that the SovietEmight go to war for limited objectives increases NATO's difficulties in reaching a timelyconsensus on mobilization.Many NATO members woul be extremely reticent to take provocativecountermeasures in response to a tgraduatedW Soviet intervention in a peripheral conflictnear or within its own borders.There is a growing potential for such crises in CentralEurope, in the Baltic, and near the Turkish frontier.Other key trends will be the continuing reduction of NATO and WTO forces within the CFEprocess and unilateral arms reductions (especially on the part of smaller NATO allies and thenew East European regimes).Since fewer ground forces will be positioned near thebattlefield during peacetime or during a politically murky Itransition to war j phase,tactical air power will play a more important role as a mobile 11inebacker w to counter enemyforce concentrations.Another change is that military operations at the lower end of thespectrum of conflict will be somewhat more likely in Europe--creating challenges for allplayers in the theater who have tended to focus on general conventional/nuclear warscenarios.Also, the demographic trend of a shrinking 'draft age" cohort in the US andWestern Europe (coupled with steadily declining reserve forces} runs opposite to the trend inthe Soviet Union where the military manpower pool will continue to grow for the next decade.This unfavorable mobilization factor will exacerbate the qeoqraphic asymmetries(in favor ofthe Soviets} which will persist after opposing combat forces are drawn down to roughnumerical parity below current NATO levels.With shrinking military industrial bases in the US and Western Europe,it will beincreasingly difficult for most NATO nations to field modern weapon systems capable ofperforming the full spectrum of modern combat missions. The ongoing trend of tde factomission specialization u in NATO will accelerate.littleFor example,the smaller Allies will haveelectronic combat, advanced surveillance/reconnaissance/targeting,7or night fighting
capabilities.While the US is developing space-based systems to support terrestrialoperations, many allied sir forces are devolving into clear-air,daytime-only forces.Ingeneral, European forces (in the West and East) will be less capable of projecting land,naval, or air power to decide theater or out-of-area conflicts.Finally, the US should tailor its theater nuclear force structure to more closely attuneits military capabilities to the new political environment in Central E rope.mDual capable"systems which can potentially reach Soviet territory (i.e., aircraft with air-to-surfacemissiles) may be the only nuclear-capable systems which are politically acceptable to Alliedgovernments.Short-range,land-based systems which can only be used on Mfriendlym territory(or on the territory of Eastern Europeans who could be considered mbystanderst or nresistersmagainst Sov
A BRIEF HISTORY OF (CENTRAL EUROPEAN) TIME'" A nCosmicW View of the Emerging Atlantic Security Environment and a Proposed "Face Lift" for US/NATO Flexible Response Strategy Lt Col Chet Herbst, USAF US Def. Policy & Mil. Strategy 9 April 1990 [ With apologies to Stephen W. Hawking (author of A Brief History of Time: From the Big .
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Collectively make tawbah to Allāh S so that you may acquire falāḥ [of this world and the Hereafter]. (24:31) The one who repents also becomes the beloved of Allāh S, Âَْ Èِﺑاﻮَّﺘﻟاَّﺐُّ ßُِ çﻪَّٰﻠﻟانَّاِ Verily, Allāh S loves those who are most repenting. (2:22
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