Decade Of War, Volume I - DTIC
UNCLASSIFIED Decade of War,Volume IEnduring Lessons from thePast Decade of Operations15 June 2012Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA)A division of the Joint Staff J7iUNCLASSIFIED
Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining thedata needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducingthis burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 222024302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currentlyvalid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)15 Jun 20122. REPORT TYPE3. DATES COVERED (From - To)Research report4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE5a. CONTRACT NUMBERDecade of War, Volume 1. Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade ofOperations5b. GRANT NUMBER5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER6. AUTHOR(S)5d. PROJECT NUMBER5e. TASK NUMBER5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, Joint Staff, Suffolk,VA9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORTNUMBER10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORTNUMBER(S)12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTDistribution Statement A - The Decade of War, Volume I report is approved for release and disseminationwithout caveat.13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES14. ABSTRACTIn October 2011, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a task to "make sure we actually learnthe lessons from the last decade of war." In response, the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division reviewed 46lessons learned studies conducted from 2003 to the present, and synthesized the studies' 400 findings, observations, and bestpractices into the 11 strategic themes described in this report. More than a "decade of war," the 46 studies covered a wide varietyof military operations; from major combat operations in Iraq, to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the Philippines, tohumanitarian assistance in the United States, Pakistan, and Haiti, to studying emerging regional and global threats. JCOA's initialanalysis was further refined and discussed by subject matter experts from across the Department of Defense during a weeklongDecade of War conference in May 2012. This report represents the synthesis of those efforts, and while significant, is only theinitial step in turning these critical observations into "learned lessons." The work that follows, integrating findings into a continuousjoint force development cycle, will serve as an enabler to building a more responsive, versatile, and affordable force. This initialeffort is envisioned to be the first volume in a sustained, multi-phased effort to identify critical, high-level lessons for the joint force.15. SUBJECT TERMS16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:a. REPORTUb. ABSTRACTUc. THIS PAGEU17. LIMITATIONOF ABSTRACT18. NUMBEROF PAGESUU5019a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSONjcoa@js.mil19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include areacode)Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
UNCLASSIFIEDJoint and Coalition Operational AnalysisMission: In support of the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned Program, and as directed,the Joint Staff J7 JCOA Division collects, aggregates, analyzes, and disseminates joint lessons learnedand best practices across the range of military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities. AddressJoint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, Virginia 23435-2697Requests for InformationRequests for information can be sent to jcoa@js.mil (NIPRNET), jcoa@js.smil.mil (SIPRNET),or jcoa@usa.bices.org (NATO). We will respond to your request as soon as possible. Please indicatethe type of information you require and the context of how the information will be used. If there isan urgent time requirement, please include that information as aNATO SSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDDecade of War StudyThe Decade of War study is JCOA’s response to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s callfor learning the lessons of the past decade of US military operations.1 To conduct the study, theDecade of War study team reviewed 46 JCOA studies dating from the organization’s inceptionin 2003 through early 2012, examining over 400 findings, observations, and best practices inorder to identify enduring lessons that can inform future joint force development.2 This reportcaptures the major themes of the first phase of the study.3 The study findings were vettedthrough the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade of War working group in May 2012; input fromworking group members was consolidated into this report. Future phases of study are plannedto identify additional issues not captured in the initial body of work. 1 GEN Martin E. Dempsey, CJCS, to LtGen George Flynn, “Chairman Direction to J7,” official letter, 6 October 2011.The 46 studies are listed in Appendix A.3The Decade of War study, therefore, neither addresses every aspect of every operation over the past decade,nor is it a comprehensive analysis of lessons developed by other organizations.2iiiUNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIEDForewordIn October 2011, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a taskto “make sure we actually learn the lessons from the last decade of war.” In response, the Jointand Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division reviewed 46 lessons learned studies conductedfrom 2003 to the present, and synthesized the studies’ 400 findings, observations, and bestpractices into the 11 strategic themes described in this report. More than a “decade of war,”the 46 studies covered a wide variety of military operations; from major combat operationsin Iraq, to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the Philippines, to humanitarian assistancein the United States, Pakistan, and Haiti, to studying emerging regional and global threats.JCOA’s initial analysis was further refined and discussed by subject matter experts from acrossthe Department of Defense during a weeklong Decade of War conference in May. This reportrepresents the synthesis of those efforts, and while significant, is only the initial step in turningthese critical observations into “learned lessons.” The work that follows, integrating findings intoa continuous joint force development cycle, will serve as an enabler to building a moreresponsive, versatile, and affordable force.The Decade of War, Volume I report is approved for release and dissemination without caveat.Additional themes and associated issues are expected to emerge as this study continues, and willbe provided for review, resolution, and incorporation across the joint force.vUNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIEDDecade of War, Volume IIntroductionThe year 2001 began with the inauguration of a United States (US) president deliberatelyaiming to shift the use of the military away from the numerous humanitarian and peacekeepinginterventions of the 1990s toward responding to and defeating conventional threats from nationstates. The mood was optimistic, with the new US national security strategy citing widespreadfinancial prosperity and no sense of an imminent threat to the homeland.4 But this situation provedto be fragile: the events of a single day, September 11, altered the trajectory of the US and theway it used its military over the next decade. A national strategy that had focused on counteringregional aggressors and sophisticated attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) wasnow confronted by an enemy that attacked the homeland with low technology in asymmetricand unexpected ways—individuals armed with box-cutters using hijacked civilian aircraft.In the decade following 9/11, it became evident that the Cold War model that had guidedforeign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fit the emerging global environment.Key changes included: A shift from US hegemony toward national pluralism The erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states The empowerment of small groups or individuals An increasing need to fight and win in the information domainIn the midst of these changes, the US employed its military in a wide range of operations toaddress perceived threats from both nation-state and terrorist groups; to strengthen partnernation militaries; to conduct humanitarian assistance operations; and to provide defense supportof civil authorities in catastrophic incidents such as Hurricane Katrina. This wide range ofoperations aimed to promote and protect national interests in the changing global environment.In general, operations during the first half of the decade were often marked by numerousmissteps and challenges as the US government and military applied a strategy and force suitedfor a different threat and environment. Operations in the second half of the decade oftenfeatured successful adaptation to overcome these challenges. From its study of these operations,JCOA identified overarching, enduring lessons for the joint force that present opportunities forthe US to learn and improve, best practices that the US can sustain, and emerging risk factorsthat the US should address. These lessons were derived from JCOA’s 46 studies during this pastdecade and vetted through the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade of War working group in May2012; input from working group members was consolidated into this report.5 This initial effort isenvisioned to be the first volume in a sustained, multi-phased effort to identify critical, high-levellessons for the joint force.45“A National Security Strategy for a Global Age,” White House, December 2000.A list of JCOA’s 46 studies is provided in Appendix A.1UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDThe Volume I report of the Decade of War study discusses the eleven strategic themes that arosefrom the study of the enduring lessons and challenges of the last decade: Understanding the Environment: A failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accuratelydefine the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities,missions, and goals. Conventional Warfare Paradigm: Conventional warfare approaches often wereineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leadersto realign the ways and means of achieving effects. Battle for the Narrative: The US was slow to recognize the importance of informationand the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffectivein applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states. Transitions: Failure to adequately plan and resource strategic and operational transitionsendangered accomplishment of the overall mission. Adaptation: Department of Defense (DOD) policies, doctrine, training and equipmentwere often poorly suited to operations other than major combat, forcing widespreadand costly adaptation. Special Operations Forces (SOF) – General Purpose Forces (GPF) Integration: Multiple,simultaneous, large-scale operations executed in dynamic environments required theintegration of general purpose and special operations forces, creating a force-multiplyingeffect for both. Interagency Coordination: Interagency coordination was uneven due to inconsistentparticipation in planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and differencesin organizational culture. Coalition Operations: Establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challengedue to competing national interests, cultures, resources, and policies. Host-Nation Partnering: Partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier, and aidedin host-nation capacity building. However, it was not always approached effectivelynor adequately prioritized and resourced. State Use of Surrogates and Proxies: States sponsored and exploited surrogates andproxies to generate asymmetric challenges. Super-Empowered Threats: Individuals and small groups exploited globalized technologyand information to expand influence and approach state-like disruptive capacity.In this report, we briefly summarize each of these strategic themes and provide recommendationsfor the joint force.2UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDLesson One: Understanding the EnvironmentIn operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a failure to recognize, acknowledge, andaccurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities,missions, and goals. The operational environment encompasses not only the threat but also thephysical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of the environment.6Each of these elements was important to understanding the root causes of conflicts, developingan appropriate approach, and anticipating second-order effects. Despite the importance of theoperational environment: The US government (USG) approach often did not reflect the actualoperational environment Different components of the USG had differing approaches, based, in part, on differentunderstandings of the environment A nuanced understanding the environment was often hindered by a focus on traditionaladversaries and a neglect of information concerning the host-nation population Over time, forces and leaders adapted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP),organizations, and materiel solutions in order to better understand the environmentThere were a number of examples where the approach taken by the US military and othergovernment agencies did not reflect the actual operating environment. Iraq in 2003 after majorcombat operations was one example of this: the US government moved to establish a newsovereign Iraqi government and focused on long-term, state-of-the-art national infrastructurewhile ignoring early signs of an insurgency. Another example of this occurred in Afghanistan,where the early focus on top-down governance approaches ignored tribal and cultural historicalpreferences as well as the practical advantages of a bottom-up approach.In some cases, separate elements of the US government had different approaches basedon their views of the nature of the conflict and operational environment. In Iraq in 2003,military plans included assumptions regarding the rapid reconstitution of Iraqi institutionsbased on the understanding that national capabilities had to be rapidly reconstituted to promotegovernance and stability. Yet, the first two orders issued by the civilian Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA) unexpectedly removed both host-nation security forces and mid-levelgovernment bureaucrats, crippling Iraqi governance capacity and providing fuel for thedeveloping resistance to the coalition.7 These actions created a “security gap” that lasted foryears and widened over time, reducing the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort, causingthe population to lose trust in the coalition and Iraqi government, and allowing terrorist andcriminal elements to thrive. Even two years later, civilian- and military-led reconstruction and6The operational environment is defined in detail in Joint Pub 2-01.3, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of theOperational Environment,” 16 June 2009.7CPA Order 1, issued 16 May 2003, removed all Iraqi government employees associated with the Ba’ath Party fromcurrent and future employment with the Iraqi government. CPA Order 2, issued 23 May 2003, dissolved the IraqiArmy and associated elements.3UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDdevelopment efforts had different missions and perceived end-states, which led to largeexpenditures with limited return, as well as missed opportunities for synergy.A complete understanding of the operating environment was often hindered by a focus ontraditional adversary information and actions in the US approach to intelligence gathering.This focus impacted the US effectiveness in countering asymmetric and irregular threats frominsurgencies and mitigating terrorist and criminal influences. Further, shortages of humanintelligence (HUMINT) personnel and interpreters needed to capture critical information fromthe population, and lack of fusion of this intelligence with other sources, exacerbated theproblem. Other intelligence capabilities and platforms proved to be valuable but in shortsupply, but their numbers surged in both Iraq and Afghanistan as their value was recognized.Similarly, recognizing an unmet requirement, manned expeditionary intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms were developed and fielded, including Task Force Odin andProject Liberty. 8, 9 Units also learned to employ different kinds of ISR capabilities accordingto their local environment.Because the traditional intelligence effort tended to focus on enemy groups and actions,it often neglected “white” information about the population that was necessary for success inpopulation-centric campaigns such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Local commandersneeded information about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, and economics.Intelligence products provided information about enemy actions but were insufficient for otherinformation needed at the local level. Furthermore, there were no pre-established priorityintelligence requirements (PIRs) or other checklists or templates that could serve as first-orderapproximations for what units needed to know for irregular warfare. As a result, processes forobtaining information on “white” population-centric issues tended to be based on discoverylearning, and were not consistently passed to follow-on units.Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations similarly relied on informationabout the environment for success. Timely initial assessments were critical to an effectiveresponse. These assessments were used to determine command and control requirements,damage estimates (including the status of critical infrastructure), the size and type of requiredmilitary response units, and their deployment priorities. In natural disasters, these assessmentswere often difficult to achieve due to limited availability of assets. While the US military hadsignificant capability for performing these assessments, the assets used for these assessments(usually air assets) were typically also in high demand for delivering aid and performing searchand rescue missions.In the latter part of the decade, forces learned to overcome the abovementioned challenges,gradually developing innovative, nontraditional means and organizations to develop a morenuanced understanding of the operational environment. These means included direct interactionwith the local population through patrols, shuras, and key leader engagements (KLEs); the89Task Force ODIN was established in 2006 as an expeditionary aviation battalion for providing ISR.Project Liberty featured modified C-12 aircraft with ISR capabilities. These aircraft were first fielded in 2009.4UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDcreation of fusion cells that coupled information from operations and intelligence; the expandeduse of liaison officers (LNOs) to facilitate communication and coordination; and the practiceof all-source network nodal analysis to guide actions and engagements. These efforts weresupported by leaders and organizations taking on risk to lower classification of information tobetter share
Decade of War, Volume 1. Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, Joint Staff, Suffolk, Distribution Statement A - The Decade of War, Volume I report is approved for release and dissemination caveat.
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