Review Of Domestic Sharing Of Counterterrorism Information
Review of DomesticSharing of CounterterrorismInformationPrepared by the Inspectors General of the:INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITYDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITYDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEMARCH 2017
REVIEW OF DOMESTIC SHARING OFCOUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATIONTABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY . iINTRODUCTION. 1BACKGROUND . 1FIELD-BASED COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING . 3FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 7INTEGRATION, COORDINATION, AND NATIONAL STRATEGY . 7EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION . 7SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES . 8INTERCONNECTED MISSIONS OF FEDERAL PARTNERS . 9STRATEGY AND COORDINATION IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING. 11DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE . 14Limited Cohesiveness and Coordination of Effort across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise . 14I&A Staffing Issues . 16Insufficient Reporting of Counterterrorism Information . 17Delays in I&A Intelligence Product Review and Approval . 18DHS Lacks Consistent Access to C-LAN and SCIFs in the Field. 20DOJ SUPPORT OF COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING . 21DOJ Strategy for Internal Counterterrorism Information Sharing . 22JTTF Executive Board Meeting Participation and Content . 23Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) . 27FBI Threat Review and Prioritization . 29ODNI FIELD BASED ELEMENTS SUPPORT TO COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING . 31The Domestic DNI Representative Program. 31The NCTC Domestic Representative Program . 38FUSION CENTERS . 42Federal Investment and Support to Fusion Centers . 42National Network Maturity Model . 47Need to Coordinate Granting of Security Clearances . 49National Mission Cell Initiative . 50CONCLUSION . 51APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE & METHODOLOGY . 52APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDATIONS . 54APPENDIX C: THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFTREPORT . 63APPENDIX D: THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT . 67APPENDIX E: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT . 77APPENDIX F: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT . 80
REVIEW OF DOMESTIC SHARING OFCOUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATIONEXECUTIVE SUMMARYFifteen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on theUnited States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad, asevidenced by recent attacks in Paris, France; San Bernardino, California;Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, Florida; and Nice, France. The U.S.’s nationalsecurity depends on the ability to share the right information with the rightpeople at the right time. This requires sustained and responsible collaborationamong federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector andinternational partners.In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental AffairsCommittee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of InspectorGeneral (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of thedomestic sharing of counterterrorism information.The OIGs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-relatedInformation Sharing Environment – components of the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners –are committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The partners’commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before,during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs andinitiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information.However, the OIGs also identified several areas in which improvements couldenhance information sharing.To share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entitiesactively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other’sroles, responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement ofmultiple agencies, such as the DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) andDHS’ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complexinvestigations. Updating or establishing new information sharing agreementsamong such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, andreaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the currentinformation sharing environment. Similarly, although there is a nationalinformation sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed to be uneven.The OIGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should review the interagencyinformation sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and take necessaryactions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processesamong the departments, which we believe would result in betterimplementation of the strategy.i
The OIGs also identified improvements in various practices andprocesses of the partners involved in counterterrorism. At DHS, a lack of unityin its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access toclassified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reportingprocesses, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective andvaluable to the IC than it could be. DOJ can improve its counterterrorisminformation sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidatedinternal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effectiveutilization for the United States Attorney’s Offices’ Anti-Terrorism AdvisoryCouncil (ATAC) meetings. Further, the FBI should spur participationassociated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and improve its efforts toobtain partners’ input in the process of identifying and prioritizingcounterterrorism threats. Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representativeprogram is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clearstrategic vision and guidance. In addition, the National CounterterrorismCenter (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in thefield, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions. At the state and locallevel, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused onsustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities. Further, varyingrequirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federalagencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharingof counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation’s ability toprevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings andRecommendations section of the report.ii
INTRODUCTIONThe Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate HomelandSecurity and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate JudiciaryCommittee requested that the Inspectors General (IG) of the IntelligenceCommunity (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department ofJustice (DOJ) conduct a performance audit of federally supported entitiesengaged in field-based domestic counterterrorism, homeland security,intelligence, and information-sharing activities in conjunction with state andlocal law enforcement agencies. The oversight committees requested that thejoint audit examine these entities’ overall missions, specific functions,capabilities, funding, personnel costs to include full-time employees andcontractors, and facility costs.In response to this request, the Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) ofthe IC, DHS, and DOJ conducted a coordinated, joint review focusing ondomestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The objectives of this reviewwere to: (1) identify and examine the federally supported field-basedintelligence entities engaged in counterterrorism information sharing todetermine the overall missions, specific functions, capabilities, funding, andpersonnel and facility costs; (2) determine if counterterrorism information isbeing adequately and appropriately shared with all participating agencies; and(3) identify any gaps or duplication of effort among these entities.The review was conducted by three teams from the OIGs of the IC, DHS,and DOJ. The OIGs interviewed more than 450 individuals, including seniorOffice of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and state andlocal officials. In addition, the OIGs reviewed policies, procedures, and otherrelevant documentation, as well as prior studies. While the OIG teams sharedrelevant documents, attended briefings, and participated jointly in interviews ofofficials and subject matter experts, each OIG team was responsible forevaluating the actions of, and information available to, its respective agencies.BackgroundPost 9/11 investigations proposed sweeping change in the IC, resultingin congressional passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism PreventionAct of 2004 (IRTPA).1 As a result of the IRTPA, the ODNI was officiallyestablished to lead and integrate the 16 members of the IntelligenceCommunity, and the IRTPA codified the establishment of the National1 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, PL 108–458, December 17, 2004, 118 Stat3638.1
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as part of the ODNI.2 The IRTPA also directedthe establishment of an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) for the sharingof terrorism information.3 In addition, the IRTPA required the President to“designate an individual as the Program Manager (PM) for information sharingacross the Federal Government,” as well as an interagency Information SharingCouncil (ISC) to advise the President and PM.4EO 13388, Further Strengthening Terrorism-related Information Sharing,established the policy framework for the terrorism-related ISE. In particular,ISE Presidential Guideline 2 – Sharing Among and Between Federal, State,Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities and its Report expanded the scope ofthe terrorism-related ISE to crimes of national security concern and involved astep forward from initial interagency information sharing established earlier.Under the statute, both the PM-ISE and ISC would expire after 2 years.In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 CommissionAct permanently established the PM-ISE and ISC. The PM-ISE is responsiblefor facilitating the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriatefederal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector, throughthe use of policy guidelines and technologies. The office of the PM-ISEfacilitates the development of responsible information sharing by bringingtogether mission partners and aligning business processes, standards andarchitecture, security and access controls, privacy protections, and bestpractices. The IRTPA mandated the PM-ISE to annually report to Congress onthe ISE’s progress, status of efforts, and targeted next steps.In October 2007, the White House issued a national strategy forterrorism-related information sharing (2007 NSIS), which provided theAdministration’s vision for the information sharing environment.5 In 2009, theWhite House established the Information Sharing and Access Interagency2 IRTPA supra note 2 at § 1021, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3056(a). President Bush initially established theNCTC by Executive Order 13354, on August 27, 2004. In July 2008, Executive Order 13354 wasrescinded by Executive Order 13470 because the IRTPA codified the establishment of the NCTC.3 ISE broadly refers to the people, projects, systems, and agencies that enable responsible informationsharing for national security. This includes many different communities: law enforcement, public safety,homeland security, intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs. The people in these communities may workfor federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial governments.4 IRTPA § 1016 (f)(1), codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485(f); established the responsibilities for the ISE PM. IRTPA §1016(g)(1); codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485(g)(1) established the responsibilities for the ISC.5 National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-RelatedInformation Sharing (October 2007).2
Policy Committee (ISA IPC).6 The ISA IPC is co-chaired by the National SecurityStaff’s Senior Director for Information Sharing Policy and the PM-ISE.7 The ISAIPC’s mission is to implement the national information sharing strategy and tolead information sharing policy on national security issues across the federalgovernment.8 The President issued an updated national strategy in December2012 (2012 Strategy).9 The 2012 Strategy outlined 5 goals and 16 priorityobjectives for the national security information sharing environment.Field-Based Counterterrorism Information SharingVarious components of the ODNI, DHS, DOJ, and state and local lawenforcement are among the ISE partners that contribute to the nation’sfield-based homeland security and counterterrorism missions and informationsharing. Within the ODNI, the NCTC serves as the federal government’sprimary organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed oracquired pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism (except intelligencepertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism).In addition, the NCTC ensures that agencies have access to and receiveintelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans to performindependent, alternative analysis and serves as the “central and sharedknowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terrorgroups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contactsand support.”10 The NCTC is staffed by personnel from multiple departmentsand agencies from across the IC, including the CIA, FBI, DHS, Department ofState, Department of Defense, and other federal entities. In addition to theNCTC, the following ODNI programs and entities are involved in domestic fieldbased sharing of counterterrorism information.6 The Executive Office of the President, establishes Interagency Policy Committees (IPC) on a variety ofissues. These IPCs are the primary day-to-day forums for interagency coordination on particular issues.They provide policy analysis for consideration by senior committees and staff and ensure timely responsesto decisions made by the President. The ISA IPC subsumed the role of a predecessor body, theInformation Sharing Council, which was established by Executive Order 13356: Strengthening theSharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans in 2004.7 The ISA IPC consists of representatives from the ODNI; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of Management andBudget; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); National Security Agency;Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health andHuman Services, Homeland Security, Interior, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury.8 In a July 2009 memorandum, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security andCounterterrorism made clear that the Administration regarded information sharing as extending beyondterrorism-related issues to encompass the sharing of information more broadly to enhance the nationalsecurity of the United States and the safety of the American people.9 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (December 2012).10 IRTPA of 2004, § 1021(d); codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3056(d).3
Table 1: ODNI Programs and Entities Engaged in Field-BasedCounterterrorism Information SharingEntityMissionDomestic Director ofRepresent the DNI within the U.S. to senior fieldNational Intelligencerepresentatives of each IC element and lead the IC effort toRepresentativecreate a single IC enterprise that is coordinated, integrated,Programagile, and effective.NCTC DomesticProvide tailored counterterrorism-related information and serveRepresentativeas the liaison for the NCTC Director with IC agencies andProgramcounterterrorism officials at the federal, state, and local levels.Provide and facilitate the means for sharing terrorisminformation among all appropriate federal, state, local, andtribal entities, as well as the private sector through the use ofpolicy guidelines and technologies.Source: NCTC, ODNI Partner Engagement, and PM-ISE documentationProgram ManagerInformation SharingEnvironmentThe Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, created DHS andestablished its primary mission to prevent terrorist attacks in the United Statesand enhance security. While not all DHS components have specific programsor groups dedicated to domestic field-based counterterrorism informationsharing, they contribute to this mission thro
objectives for the national security information sharing environment. Field-Based Counterterrorism Information Sharing Various components of the ODNI, DHS, DOJ, and state and local law enforcement are among the ISE partners that contribute to the nation’s field-based homeland security and counterterrorism missions and information sharing.
sharing sectors, including peer-to-peer sharing, online staffing, car sharing, sharing the accommodation and music streaming will make more than half of the total worldwide income (PwC, 2015). The global revenue of sharing economy will grow to US 335 billion by the end
With simple file sharing, the act of enabling file sharing on a folder and specifying the type of access is simplified to the following choices: Whether to enable sharing for the folder The name of the share Whether to allow network users to change files in the folder The Sharing tab for simple file sharing is shown in the following figure.
We name the coordinated time- or space-sharing scheduling as time-space sharing scheduling. Although Hawk [10], Mercury [26], and Eagle [9] all employ a mixed scheduling policy of time-sharing and space-sharing, they do not consider to coordinate time- or space-sharing scheduling among differenthorizontallayers. Instead, they simply employ .
4.1 Domestic Violence Policy Development in England 1990-2004 4.2 Recent Domestic Violence Policy Development in England 2005-11 4.3 Recent Policy relating to the impact of domestic abuse on children 2000-11 5 5 Relevant legislation 5.1 Civil Law 5.2 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act (2004) 5.3 Criminal Law 7
1 EOC Review Unit EOC Review Unit Table of Contents LEFT RIGHT Table of Contents 1 REVIEW Intro 2 REVIEW Intro 3 REVIEW Success Starters 4 REVIEW Success Starters 5 REVIEW Success Starters 6 REVIEW Outline 7 REVIEW Outline 8 REVIEW Outline 9 Step 3: Vocab 10 Step 4: Branch Breakdown 11 Step 6 Choice 12 Step 5: Checks and Balances 13 Step 8: Vocab 14 Step 7: Constitution 15
in wild rabbits Most recent confirmation Alameda 0 yes June 2021 (wild) Fresno 1 no August 19, 2021 (domestic) Kern 6 yes June 29, 2021 (domestic) Los Angeles 17 yes June 25, 2021 (domestic) Orange 0 yes June 2020 (wild) Riverside 15 yes June 15, 2021 (domestic) San Bernardino 5 yes March 17, 2021 (domestic), May 2021 (wild)
formation as percent of GDP, proxies of economic growth and domestic investment respectively. Economic growth represents the increase in the amount of the goods and services produced by an economy over time. It is conventionally measured as percentage rate of increase in real gross domestic product. Domestic investment
Keywords --- algae, o pen ponds, CNG, renewable, methane, anaerobic digestion. I. INTRODUCTION Algae are a diverse group of autotrophic organisms that are naturally growing and renewable. Algae are a good source of energy from which bio -fuel can be profitably extracted [1].Owing to the energy crisis and the fuel prices, we are in an urge to find an alternative fuel that is environmentally .
