Feature: US Maritime Strategy In The Pacific Pivot Point

feature: US maritime strategy in the PacificAssuming the approach is not primarilyabout striking Chinese and North Koreanassets, but to constrain adversary operationsin the Pacific and beyond, the tools neededare presence, partnership building and operations – and an ability to put in place distributed, forward-deployed capabilities that canbe rapidly augmented.Indeed, USN and USMC leaders are discussing presence in terms of the Single NavalBattle. Rather than a monolithic strategy, itis a mindset about how to shape templates formore effective integration of naval forces inthe epoch ahead.The USN and USMC might not use theterm ‘single naval battle’, because in today’smedia world, one would spend endless timedebating what the concept means. The pointis less about the concept and more about howto shape a mindset, which will lead to tighterintegration of the key elements of navalpower projection.Commanders’ perspectivesUSMC: 1484362During recent interviews conducted byIHS Jane’s with US commanders involved inPacific operations, a common thread wassimply the size of the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR), and the challenge of operatinglimited forces over such a large region.There is also concern with the limitations onavailable resources to operate throughout thedepth and scope of the Pacific. For example,the USGC is concerned about the absence ofmajor vessels and how many of the improvedMarine Forces Pacific activities for 2012.24 Jane’s Navy International April 2013 National Security Cutters will be procured.This concern was matched by worries aboutthe numbers of amphibious ships.In all discussions, the demand on resourceswas highlighted. For example, Marine ForcesPacific conducted more than 100 exercisesand events during 2012, spread across 48countries, both inside and outside the AOR.This included deploying the first marines tostart a more permanent presence in Australia.Through the training efforts, the USMCestablished an operational presence throughout the entire region. Training kept deployedmarines as the ready force to respond whencrises occurred, and through forward trainingin the region, the USN and USMC teams wereable to respond when a crises such as theflooding in Thailand and the Philippines withforces that were already in theatre.Furthermore, it was clear from the interviews that ongoing operational demandsmade it difficult to move forward on a newstrategy without additional investment inplatforms and systems. Implicitly, if theUS does not invest in new platforms andsystems, there will inevitably be a shortfall infuture US capabilities in the Pacific.For General Mike Hostage Commander,Air Combat Command, there is no alternativebut to build out air capability with LockheedMartin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighteraircraft. He is clearly concerned with numbersand the need to procure a serious fleet of F-35sto provide the kind of “combat cloud” crucialto cover an area as vast as the Pacific. The fleetimplications are also about innovative newways to work with allies. Gen Hostage said:“The F-35s are central to the transition. Weare operating in contested air space and needto shape a distributed air operations capability.“The F-22s aggregated in appropriatenumbers can do some amazing and essentialtasks, and with a significant number of F-35s,we can reshape the operational space.“The ability of the planes to work with eachother over a secure distributed battlespace isthe essential foundation from which the aircombat cloud can be built. And the advantageof the F-35 is the nature of the global fleet.“Allied and American F-35s, whether USAF,USN, or USMC, can talk with one another andset up the distributed operational system.Such a development can allow for significantinnovation in shaping the air combat cloudfor distributed operations in support of theJoint Force Commander.”In addition to diminishing platformnumbers, many leaders expressed concernsabout new challenges and emerging threats.For General Charles Jacoby, US NorthernCommand and North American AerospaceDefense Command chief the addition of theArctic as an operating environment meant newchallenges and new demands for resources:“We need to make advances over time that[will] allow us to stay ahead of evolving problems, with a solid strategic direction definedand in place. There is a school of thought thatsays we can have competitive commercial andeconomic interests in the Arctic, but not haveany associated security challenges. That issimply not the way the world works.“Economic opportunities and challengesshape or imply security interests. We needto not only be prepared to take advantage ofand exploit the economic opportunities inthe Arctic, but also to be prepared to addresssecurity challenges.”For Lieutenant General Jan-Marc Jouas,deputy commander of United NationsCommand Korea and US Forces Korea, theevolving North Korean missile capabilitiesramps up the challenges to providing for thekind of air superiority crucial to deterrence inthe future: “Air power is an essential elementin Korea. This is a ‘come as you are’ fight overhere. No one is going to let us reinforce forsix months; when people take on the UnitedStates, they know they don’t want to give usthe time to build up our forces.”By air power, Gen Jouas was discussing thefull range of integrated assets whether onland or at sea. He emphasised the central roleihs.com/janes

ihs.com/janes The guided-missile destroyers USSFitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS McCampbell (DDG 85) manoeuvre with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Type052B destroyer Guangzhou off the coastof North Sulawesi, Indonesia, in 2009.The rise of China represents the biggestchallenge to US influence in the Pacific.US Navy: 1482130of support from the sea to the evolving threatenvironment on the Korean peninsula.A common emphasis throughout wasthe need for what Lieutenant General TerryRobling, Commander, US Marine Corps ForcesPacific, called “persistent presence.” If you arenot there, you are not a player: “The UnitedStates has been a significant presence in theregion throughout the post-war period. Thatpresence has been significant glue in theregion facilitating both security and economicgrowth. Our allies and partners certainlyrecognise this and are a looking at new ways towork with us to get that persistent presence.“A key driver of demand is from partnernations, as well as the more obvious allies.South Korea, Japan, Australia and Thailandare certainly core allies, but we have growingdemand from and opportunities with Cambodia, Vietnam, India, Malaysia and Indonesiafor expanded working relationships.”Coupled with “persistent presence” wasa significant emphasis upon partnering andalliances and innovations in ways of workingwith other forces.As Vice Admiral Manson Brown, then headfeature: US maritime strategy in the Pacificof the USCG in the Pacific, emphasised: “It’spresence in a competitive sense, because ifwe are not there, someone else will be there,whether it’s the illegal fishers or whether it’sChinese influence in the region. We need tobe very concerned about the balance of powerin the neighbourhood.“If you take a look at some of the otherplayers that are operating in the neighbour-hood there is clearly an active power gamegoing on.”A key theme for the commanders wasshaping an effective logistic and sustainmentapproach to supporting a widely deployed fleetof aircraft and ships. The head of the Military Sealift Command, Rear Admiral Mark HBuzby, provided an important “reality” checkto the challenge of supporting deployed assetsApril 2013 Jane’s Navy International 25

feature: US maritime strategy in the PacificPacific DynamicsRLaird: 1482125NORTHKOREASOUTHKOREAJAPAN639 miCHINA4,09SINGAPORE2,33,686 mi2,809mi1,630mi9 mi533,895 miHAWAIIANISLANDS (US)GUAMPacific OceanmThe US Needs toOperate in two StrategicOperational Zones: atriangle In support ofJapan; and aQuadrangle to supportSouth Korea and coreAsian AlliesiAUSTRALIAover a wide swath of ocean, pointing out thatthe kind of distributed fleet operations centralto the future would place significant logisticaldemands on the fleet as well.Several of the commanders cited operational innovations they were making to tryto cope with the gap between demand andsupply for security and defence forces.For example, Major General ChristopherOwens, Commanding General, 1st MarineAircraft Wing, discussed how the BellBoeing MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraftwas being leveraged to allow USMC forcesto operate over a wider area and on a widervariety of platforms and locations to shapepresence capabilities. “When I was a younglieutenant and captain, I think we had somewhere in the neighbourhood of 65 amphibious warships in the navy inventory. Now, wehave 28 and they’re spread about as thin asthey possibly can be. We’re running throughtheir lifecycle faster than anticipated, andyet they’re never enough.“Going back to the whole challenge in this26 Jane’s Navy International April 2013 AOR is getting to where you need to be withsome capability. Being able to stretch the legsof the aircraft and operate from austere sitesis critical.”An important modernisation effort involvescommand and control (C2) and informationwarfare systems to be developed, deployed,and integrated with US and allied forces in thePacific. There are clear flashpoints or decisionpoints, which can be leveraged to highlightmodernisation opportunities.A final theme, which was discussed but nothighlighted in the interviews, was the A2/AD challenge posed by China, among others.Because these were commanders, they werenot treating the problem as fixed in concrete,but very much in terms of dealing with areactive opponent. A2/AD is an operationalproblem, not a final statement of an inabilityto deal with the challenge.One commander who spoke to IHS Jane’sabout the A2/AD challenge argued thatthinking among many strategists is toonarrowly focused: “The Chinese have anadvantage if they can use their resources onthe mainland to support operations fairlyclose to their territory, he said”. That is notthe strategic direction in which they areheaded. They are coming out into the Pacific.And if we build the appropriate distributedforce able to work closely with allies, thenthey have a different kind of anti-access, antidenial problem of their own.”Strategy will emerge in response to crisesand when leveraging new technologies andallied relationships in the decades ahead,leadership will be imperative. Between thetwo world wars, the United States facedsignificant challenges to redefine navalstrategy. As such, leadership emerged andguided the transformation of maritime forcesand capabilities that paid dividends duringthe Second World War.What was demonstrated by key leaders atthat time was a profound grasp of the harshreality that all military technology is evolving, and thus in a constant relative action/reaction cycle against a reactive enemy.ihs.com/janes

feature: US maritime strategy in the PacificSo how might US forces be shaped andwork with allies to execute a 21st-centurymaritime strategy, one which draws on thediversity of air, ground and sea assets necessary for success?There are two ways to think of the strategic objectives of force structuring in theperiod ahead. The first can be called shapingan attack and defence enterprise. Thesecond can be labeled as the 21st centuryequivalent of the “big blue” blanket that theUSN crafted to succeed in the Pacific in theSecond World War.The evolution of 21st-century weapontechnology is breaking down barriersbetween offensive and defensive systems. Ismissile defence about providing defence or isit about enabling global reach, for offence ordefence? Likewise, the new fifth-generationaircraft have been largely misunderstoodbecause they are inherently multi-missionsystems, designed for both forward defenceand forward offensive operations.Indeed, an inherent characteristic of manynew weapons systems is that they are reallyabout presence, and laying a ‘grid’ over anihs.com/janes Lockheed Martin: 1460730 A2/AD challenges are spurring new programmes,such as DARPA’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missileprototype demonstration programme.operational area so as to enable both strikeand/or defence within an integrated context.In the 20th century, surge was built uponthe notion of signaling: one would put in aparticular combat capability – a carrier battlegroup, amphibious ready group, or air expeditionary wing – to put down a marker andto warn a potential adversary that you werethere and ready to be taken seriously. If oneneeded to, additional forces would be sent into escalate and build up the force.With today’s new multi-mission systems –fifth-generation aircraft and the Aegis battlemanagement system for example – the keyis presence and integration with those sameassets able to support strike or defence missions in a single operational presence capability. Now the adversary cannot be certain thatApril 2013 Jane’s Navy International 27

R Laird: 1484361feature: US maritime strategy in the PacificThe F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is seen as an allied lynchpin in the Pacific.one is simply putting down a marker. This iswhat then USAF Secretary Michael Wynnecalled the “attack and defence enterprise”.The strategic thrust of integrating modernsystems is to create a grid that can operate inan area as a seamless whole, able to strike ordefend simultaneously. This is enabled by theevolution of C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems,Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and it is why Wynne has underscoredfor more than a decade that fifth-generationaircraft are not merely replacements for existing tactical systems, but a whole new approachto integrating defence and offence.By shaping a C5ISR system inextricablyintertwined with platforms and assets thatcan ‘honeycomb’ an area of operation, anattack and defence enterprise can operate todeter aggressors and adversaries or to conductsuccessful military operations.Inherent in such an enterprise is scalabilityand reach-back. By deploying the C5ISR ‘honeycomb’, the shooters in the enterprise canreach back to each other to enable the entiregrid of operation, for either defence or offence.In effect, what could be established fromthe US perspective is a ‘plug-in’ approachrather than a ‘push’ approach to projectingpower. Allies are always forward deployed; theUS does not attempt to replicate what thosepartners need to do in their own defence.But what the US can offer is strategicdepth to those allies. At the same time ifinteroperability and interactive sustainabil28 Jane’s Navy International April 2013 ity are recognised as a strategic objective ofthe first order, then the US can shape a morerealistic approach than one which now restson trying to proliferate power projectionplatforms, when neither the money nor thenumbers are there.Geo-political realitiesAs things stand, the core for the US effortfrom Hawaii outward is to enable a centralstrategic triangle, one that reaches fromHawaii to Guam and to Japan. This triangleis at the heart of the US’ ability to projectpower into the Western Pacific. With a 20thcentury approach, one which is platformcentric and rooted in step by step augmentation of force, each point of the triangle needsto be garrisoned with significant numbers ofplatforms which can be pushed forward.To be clear, having capability in this triangle is a key element of what the United Statescan bring to the party for Pacific operations,and it remains fundamental. However, with anew approach to an attack and defence enterprise, one would use this capability differently from simply providing for push forwardand sequential escalation dominance.Rather than focusing simply on projectingpower forward, what is crucial to a successful Pacific strategy is enabling a strategicquadrangle in the Western Pacific, anchoredon Australia, Japan, Singapore, and SouthKorea. This will not be simple. Competition,even mutual suspicion, among US allies in theWestern Pacific is historically deep-rooted; asa former US 7th Air Force commander underscored, “history still matters in impeding alliedco-operation.” But in spite of these challengesand impediments, enabling the quadrangle todo a better job of defending itself and shapinginteroperability across separate nations has tobecome a central strategic US goal.This will require significant cultural changefor the United States. Rather than thinkingof allies after its own strategy, it will need toreverse its logic. Without enabled allies in theWestern Pacific, the United States will not beable to execute an effective Pacific strategy.It is not about to have a 600-ship navy; andputting Littoral Combat Ships into Singapore isa metaphor for the problem, not the solution.The quadrangle can be populated bysystems that form a C5ISR grid, in turn supporting a network of deployed forces. Thepopulation of the area with various sensors –aboard new tankers, fighter aircraft, air battlemanagers, unmanned aerial vehicles, ships,and submarines – creates the pre-conditionsfor shaping a powerful grid of intersectingcapabilities. Indeed, the US can shape anattack-and-defence enterprise in the WesternPacific that it can easily plug into, if indeedit prioritises interoperability and the mutualleveraging of capabilities.At the heart of re-crafting a 21st centuryUS maritime strategy will be the grasp of newtechnologies and partnerships that will allowa credible evolution of a war winning andscalable presence force for Pacific deterrence.Among the core principles for building sucha force is the recognition that not only is allweapon technology relative against a reactiveenemy, but it is also relative amongst alliedfighting forces.In Max Hastings’ book ‘Inferno: The Worldat War 1939-1945’, he characterises the USNas showing itself to be “ the most impressiveof its nation’s fighting services.”Hastings goes on to stress that it took therelief of some early commanders, who did notunderstand the lessons of Carrier Operations(provided by the visionary insight of AdmiralWilliam S Sims at the Naval War College in1924) that “carriers presented a 360-degreerange of firepower via their aircraft that faroutdistanced the radius of a battleships’guns.” The navy wanted a “big blue blanket”to cover the distances of Pacific combat thatrequired a lot of ships.Now, everything has evolved to the 21stcentury version of a “Big Blue ‘Tron’ Blanket”of US and allied forces. True, the number ofsubmarines, ships and aircraft still matterihs.com/janes

feature: US maritime strategy in the PacificR Laird: 1478531 Deploying the first-of-class Littoral Combat ShipUSS Freedom to work alongside regional partnersin southeast Asia is totemic of the new USengagement in the Pacific region.greatly. At the same time the technologysoon arriving in the F-35 will allow eachaircraft to network and direct engagementsin 360-degrees of 3-D space by handingoff tracks to other air/land/sea platforms,including UAVs and robots. F-35 pilots willnot only have situational awareness, they willhave situational decision-making that is trulyrevolutionary. They will all have the best realtime battle information database.It is not enough to have just “things.” Elemental accounting of quantitative differencescan often overlook qualitative differences suchas the intangibles of C2, training and tacticsand logistic support. The “modernisation” ofaircrew proficiency along with all other humancomponents in the military is essential.Again, if the past is prologue, UAV battlefield evolution in the stain of Afghanistan andIraq has an invaluable dimension. Recognisingthat UAVs are not the future of aviation but acomponent of the future of aviation has beendiscussed largely in technology terms.However, the real force multiplier is theactual battlefield skill-set learned by a cadre ofjunior officers who are RPA operators. A newgeneration is being born that understand howdatalinks work half a world away to fight andwin combat engagements. Marrying up thisnew fighting force with the F-35 situationaldecision-making pilot linked to all air/land/seacombat systems is a formula for 21st centurywarfighting that embraces the future.The United States’ and allies’ innovationin understanding the evolving 21st-century“information revolution” and making thattechnology combat effective is a path to outmaneuvering and out-fighting the People’sLiberation Army (PLA), should conflict evercome to pass. A battle-ready force of distributed weapons platforms and precisionweapons all networked vertically and horizontally from submarines to satellites empowering combat situational decision making at alllevels at the speed of light is something PLAforces hav

feature: US maritime strategy in the Pacific US Navy: 1482129 Pivot point: Re-shaping US maritime strategy to the Pacific The strategic pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region is intended to rebalance the projection and focus of US military power in the yea