United States Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCEAIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONBOARD REPORTF-16CM, T/N 92-388313TH FIGHTER SQUADRON35TH FIGHTER WINGMISAWA AIR BASE, JAPANLOCATION: MISAWA AIR BASE, JAPANDATE OF ACCIDENT: 20 FEBRUARY 2018BOARD PRESIDENT: COLONEL SERGIO J. VEGAConducted IAW Air Force Instruction 51-503

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYAIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONF-16CM, T/N 92-3883MISAWA AIR BASE, JAPAN20 FEBRUARY 2018On 20 February 2018, at 0838L, an F-16CM, tail number (T/N) 92-3883, during departure atMisawa Air Base (AB), Japan, experienced an engine fire on takeoff during a routine trainingsortie, necessitating an immediate landing back at Misawa AB. The mishap aircraft (MA) wasbased at Misawa AB, Japan, and assigned to the 13th Fighter Squadron, of the 35th Fighter Wing.The MA sustained engine damage and loss of external fuel tanks with an estimated governmentalloss of 987,545.57.The mishap flight (MF) consisted of two F-16CM aircraft. The mishap flight’s pre-flight, start,and taxi were uneventful until the departure phase of flight. The mishap pilot (MP) departedrunway (RWY) 28, fifteen seconds after the mishap lead pilot (MLP). Shortly after the afterburnertakeoff, Misawa air traffic controllers informed the MP and the mishap lead pilot (MLP) that theMP had a large flame coming from the aft section of the MP’s aircraft. The MLP also contactedthe MP regarding the fire. During the MP’s ascent, he noticed an unexpected decay in his airspeedand climb rate. The MP took a right turn back towards RWY 28, and when unable to maintainairspeed or altitude, the MP jettisoned his stores (external fuel tanks) in accordance with F-16CMcritical actions procedures. Following the jettison, the MA regained some airspeed and achieveda better climb rate to get into a position to land. The MP landed on RWY 28, and accomplishedthe emergency engine shutdown and emergency ground egress critical action procedures. Therewere no injuries resulting from the mishap. The MP’s actions during the mishap sequence werefocused, precise, and appropriate; his actions did not contribute to the mishap. A review ofmaintenance procedures revealed several past actions that were causal to the accident.The AIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the accident was anobsolete part that fractured, causing the engine to overheat. In 2012, maintenance personnelordered and installed an obsolete part, a turbine frame forward fairing, years after it was replacedby a forward fairing made of stronger material and design. The logistics system then delivered theobsolete forward fairing. Maintenance personnel installed the obsolete forward fairing on themishap engine (ME) using the updated version of the bracket hardware. The obsolete forwardfairing’s weaker material, along with wear from the mismatched hardware, ultimately caused theforward fairing to fracture during takeoff. Once fractured, a piece of the forward fairing lifted andblocked the cooling flow of air around the engine, causing the area near the blockage to overheatand catch fire. The AIB President further found by a preponderance of the evidence thatmaintenance practices during the 2012-2015 timeframe substantially contributed to the mishap.Under 10 U.S.C. § 2254(d) the opinion of the accident investigator as to the cause of, or the factorscontributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report, if any, may not beconsidered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from the accident, nor may suchinformation be considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referredto in those conclusions or statements.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND STATEMENT OF OPINIONF-16CM, T/N 92-388320 FEBRUARY 2018TABLE OF CONTENTSACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . iiiSUMMARY OF FACTS . 11. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE .1a. Authority .1b. Purpose.12. ACCIDENT SUMMARY .13. BACKGROUND .1a. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) .2b. Fifth Air Force (5 AF).2c. 35th Fighter Wing (35 FW).2d. 35th Operations Group (35 OG) .2e. 13th Fighter Squadron (13 FS) .3f. The F-16 Fighting Falcon .34. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS .3a. Mission .3b. Planning .3c. Preflight .3d. Summary of Accident .4e. Impact .13f. Egress and Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) .13g. Search and Rescue (SAR) .13h. Recovery of Remains .135. MAINTENANCE .13a. Forms Documentation .13b. Inspections .13c. Maintenance Procedures .14d. Maintenance Personnel and Supervision .16e. Fuel, Hydraulic, Oil, and Oxygen Inspection Analysis .16f. Unscheduled Maintenance .17g. Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTO) .176. LOGISTICS .187. AIRFRAME, MISSILE, OR SPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS .19a. Flight Controls .19b. Avionics/Communications .19c. Hydraulic System .19d. Fuel System .19e. Electrical System .19f. Life Support and Egress .19g. Oil System .19h. Engine .19F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 2018i

i. Landing Gear .208. WEATHER .20a. Forecast Weather .20b. Observed Weather .20c. Space Environment .20d. Operations .20e. Conclusion.209. CREW QUALIFICATIONS .20a. Training .20b. Experience.2110. MEDICAL .21a. Qualifications .21b. Health .21c. Pathology.21d. Lifestyle .22e. Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time .2211. OPERATIONS AND SUPERVISION .22a. Operations .22b. Supervision .2212. HUMAN FACTORS analysis.22a. Introduction .22b. Human Factors .2313. GOVERNING DIRECTIVES AND PUBLICATIONS .25a. Publically Available Directives and Publications Relevant to the Mishap .25b. Other Directives and Publications Relevant to the Mishap .25c. Known or Suspected Deviations from Directives or Publications .2514. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF CONCERN .25a. Jettisoned F-16 Fuel Tank Response/Recovery Operations.26STATEMENT OF OPINION . 281. Opinion Summary .282. Cause .293. Substantially Contributing Factor: Maintenance practices .304. Conclusion .32INDEX OF TABS . 33F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 2018ii

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONSABACESACNAFAFBAFCECAFEAFECTAir BaseAdvanced Concept Ejection SeatAircraft Classification NumberAir ForceAir Force BaseAir Force Civil Engineer CenterAircrew Flight EquipmentAircrew Flight EquipmentContinuation TrainingAFIAir Force InstructionAFIPAir Force Institute of PathologyAFLCMCAir Force LifeManagement CenterAFMESAir Force MedicalExaminer SystemAFPAMAir Force PamphletAFSCAir Force Specialty CodeAFSECAir Force Safety CenterAFTOAir Force Technical OrderAGLAbove Ground LevelAIBAccident Investigation BoardAIMAir Intercept MissileAMUAircraft Maintenance UnitAMXSAircraft Maintenance SquadronAOAAngle of AttackAUXAuxiliaryBPBoard PresidentCAFCombat Air ommand DirectedInvestigationCECivil EngineerCEMSComprehensive EngineManagement SystemCERFCentral Engine Repair FacilityCES/CEIECivil Engineer Squadron,Environmental ElementCGCenter of GravityCIMChief of Installation ManagementCMSgtChief Master SergeantColColonelCOMPACAFCOSOPACAF CommanderCombat OrientedSupply OrganizationCPIContinuous Process ImprovementCRFCentralized Repair FacilityCSFDRCrash Survivable Flight DataRecorderCSMUCrash Survivable Memory UnitCTHConsolidated Track HistoryD&IDrill and InstructionDLADefense Logistics AgencyDMS Decentralized Maintenance SupportDoDDepartment of DefenseDODACDepartment of DefenseActivity CodeDRMODefense ReutilizationManagement OfficeDUDisplay UnitEDNAEnhanced Diagnostics AidEFHEngine Flight HoursDIFMDue In For MaintenanceEMBEngine Management BranchEOFEnd Of FlightEPSEmergency Power System or SupplyESSEnterprise Supply SystemETIDElectronic Turn In DocumentFCIFFlight Crew Information FileFERMSFlight Equipment RecordsManagement SystemFHRFlight HoursFLCSFlight Control SystemFOMFacilitation Other MaintenanceFPFlight ProfileFPMFeet Per MinuteFSFighter SquadronFSCFlight Service CenterFTITFan Turbine Inlet TemperatureFWFighter WingGEGeneral ElectricGPSGlobal Positioning SystemGSGeneral ScheduleHUDHeads-Up DisplayHzHertzF-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 2018iii

IAWIn Accordance WithIFRInstrument Flight RulesIFTIn Flight TimeIGInspector GeneralIMDS Integrated Maintenance Data SystemIOInvestigating OfficerIPInstructor PilotIPBIllustrated Parts BreakdownISBInterim Safety BoardJEIM Jet Engine Intermediate MaintenanceJMSDFJapanese MaritimeSelf-Defense ForceJOAPJoint Oil Analysis ProgramJP-8Jet Propellant 8KThousandKCASKnots Calibrated AirspeedKTASKnots True AirspeedKTLKey Task ListingktsKnotsLLocal TimeLALegal AdvisorLt ColLieutenant ColonelLPTLow Pressure TurbineLRSLogistics Readiness SquadronMAMishap AircraftMajMajorMAJCOMMajor CommandMEMishap EngineMDGMedical GroupMFMishap FlightMFLMishap Flight LeadMFLMaintenance Fault ListMICAPMission Impair CapabilityAwaiting PartsMLCMaster Labor ContractMLGMain Landing GearMLITTMinistry of Land, Infrastructure,Transport and TourismMLPMishap Lead PilotMMMishap MissionMODMinistry of DefenseMOFMaintenance Operations FlightMPMishap PilotMPCMission Planning CellMQTMission Qualification TrainingMSMishap SortieMSgtMSLMUNSMXSMXGMXMMXSNAFNCOICMaster SergeantMean Sea LevelMunitions SquadronMaintenance SquadronMaintenance GroupMaintenance MemberMaintenance SquadronNumbered Air ForceNoncommissioned OfficerIn ChargeNMNautical MilesNOTAMsNotices to AirmenNSNNational Stock NumberOGOperations GroupOGVOG Standardization/EvaluationOps TempoOperations TempoORMOperational Risk ManagementOSKWeapons and TacticsOSSOperation Support SquadronPAPublic AffairsPACAFPacific Air ForcesPEXPatriot ExcaliburPFLPilot Fault ListPMPilot MemberPPDPhysical Property DataPR/BPOCombined Preflight/BasicPost FlightPRPreflightQAQuality AssuranceQRLQuick Reference ListQVIQuality Verification InspectionRECRecorderRIERapid Improvement EventsROSReport of SurveyRTBReturn-To-BaseRWYRunwaySARM Squadron Aviator Resource ManagerSARSATSearch and Rescue SatelliteSBAFESIB Flight Equipment MemberSBAFSECSIB AFSEC MemberSBFSSIB Flight SurgeonSBMXSIB Maintenance MemberSBPSIB Pilot MemberSBRECSIB RecorderSEAD Suppression of Enemy Air DefenseSIBSafety Investigation BoardF-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 2018iv

SLEP Service Life Enhancement ProgramSMSgtSenior Master SergeantSOFSupervisor of FlyingSPSIB PresidentSPOSystem Program OfficeSrASenior AirmanTCTO Time Compliance Technical OrderTDBTohoku Defense BureauTMOTraffic Management OfficeT/NTail NumberTNBTail Number BinTOTechnical OrderTODA Technical Order Distribution AgentsTODO Technical Order Distribution hnical SergeantUnited States Forces JapanVisual Meteorological ConditionsVisual Flight RulesVariable Stator VaneWalk Around InspectionWork Center EventWar Reserve EquipmentFlight Visibility and WeatherExpendable ItemExpendable at Depot LevelExpendable At Intermediate LevelFirst LieutenantF-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 2018v

SUMMARY OF FACTS1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSEa. AuthorityOn 1 March 2018, Major General Russell L. Mack, Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces(PACAF), appointed Colonel Sergio J. Vega to conduct an aircraft accident investigation for amishap that occurred on 20 February 2018 involving an F-16CM aircraft, tail number (T/N) 923883, at Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan. (Tab Y-1) The investigation was conducted at MisawaAB, Japan, from 26 March 2018 through 20 April 2018. The following board members wereappointed: a Captain (Capt) Legal Advisor (LA), a First Lieutenant (1LT) Pilot Member (PM), AMaster Sergeant (MSgt) Maintenance Member (MXM), and a Technical Sergeant (TSgt) Recorder(REC). (Tab Y-1 to Y-2)b. PurposeIn accordance with AFI 51-503, Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations, this accidentinvestigation board conducted a legal investigation to inquire into all the facts and circumstancessurrounding this Air Force aerospace accident, prepare a publicly releasable report, and obtain andpreserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverseadministrative action.2. ACCIDENT SUMMARYThe mishap aircraft (MA), an F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, assigned to the 13th Fighter Squadronlocated at Misawa AB, Japan, flown by the mishap pilot (MP), departed and landed at Misawa ABon 20 February 2018. (Tab K-3, CC-71) The MP experienced an engine fire on takeoff during aroutine training sortie, necessitating an immediate landing. (Tab J-2) The MP jettisoned his fueltanks in accordance with the F-16 flight crew checklist. (Tab V-17.14) There were no injuries;the mishap engine (ME) was impounded. Damage to the MA totaled 987,545.57. (Tab P-3)3. BACKGROUNDThe MA was assigned to the 13th Fighter Squadron (13 FS) located at Misawa AB, Japan. The13 FS falls directly under the 35th Operations Group (35 OG), which falls under the 35th FighterWing (35 FW), and 5th Air Force (5 AF). (Tab CC-2 to CC-11) 5 AF is a Numbered Air Force(NAF) within Pacific Air Force (PACAF). (Tab CC-2 to CC-11)F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 20181

a. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)PACAF’s primary mission is to provide ready air and space power topromote U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region during peacetime,through crisis, and in war. (Tab CC-2) PACAF’s area of responsibilityis home to 60 percent of the world’s population in 36 nations spreadacross 52 percent of the Earth’s surface and 16 time zones, with morethan 1,000 languages spoken. (Tab CC-2) PACAF maintains a forwardpresence to help ensure stability in the region. (Tab CC-2)The command has approximately 320 fighter and attack aircraft and 46,000 military and civilianpersonnel serving in nine major locations and numerous smaller facilities, primarily in Hawaii,Alaska, Japan, Guam and the Republic of Korea. (Tab CC-2)b. Fifth Air Force (5 AF)5 AF's mission is three-fold. First, 5 AF plans, conducts, controls, andcoordinates air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by thePACAF Commander. Secondly, 5 AF maintains a level of readinessnecessary for successful completion of directed military operations. Thirdand finally, 5 AF assists in the mutual defense of Japan and enhancesregional stability by planning, exercising, and executing joint airoperations in partnership with Japan. To achieve this mission, 5 AF maintains its deterrent forceposture to protect both U.S. and Japanese interests, and conducts appropriate air operations shoulddeterrence fail. (Tab CC-3)c. 35th Fighter Wing (35 FW)The 35 FW, headquartered at Misawa AB, Japan, provides worldwidedeployable forces, protects U.S. interests in the Pacific, and defends Japanwith sustained forward presence and focused mission support. (Tab CC-4)The wing operates and maintains two squadrons of F-16CM (C and Dmodels) Block 50 Fighting Falcons. (Tab CC-4) The 35 FW is the AirForce’s premier Wild Weasel organization and specializes in the supressionand destruction of enemy air defenses including surface-to-air-missile systems. (Tab CC-4)d. 35th Operations Group (35 OG)The 35 OG is a component of the 35 FW, Misawa AB, Japan. It is acombat-ready fighter group of two deployable F-16CM “Wild Weasel”fighter squadrons, one operational support squadron, and one air controlflight capable of conducting and supporting air operations worldwide.The 35 OG is responsible for flight operations, airfield management,intelligence, tactical air control, combat plans, weapons and tactics, andweather support to the 35 FW. (Tab CC-7)F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 20182

e. 13th Fighter Squadron (13 FS)The mission of the 13 FS is to provide Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses(SEAD) combat airpower to the combatant commanders. (Tab CC-10)During its distinguished 76-year history, the 13 FS has flown 8 differenttypes of aircraft, received 21 unit citations, and accumulated 20 campaignstreamers. (Tab CC-10)f. The F-16 Fighting FalconThe F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, multi-role fighteraircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven itself in airto-air combat and air-to-surface attack. It provides a relativelylow-cost, high-performance weapon system for the UnitedStates and allied nations. (Tab CC-12) Since 11 September2001, the F-16 has been a major component of the combatforces flying thousands of sorties in support of OperationsNoble Eagle (Homeland Defense), Enduring Freedom inAfghanistan, and Iraqi Freedom. (Tab CC-12)4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTSa. MissionThe mishap mission (MM) was planned and briefed without incident and had a valid flightauthorization. (Tab K-2, Tab V-17.11). The MM involved two F-16CM aircraft. (Tab AA-2)b. PlanningFlight products for the MM were produced the day of the flight by the MP before the mass briefing.(Tab V-17.11) Prior to the MM, all flight members attended a mass briefing conducted by thesquadron operations supervisor. (Tab V-17.13) The mass briefing adequately covered forecastedweather conditions, notices to airmen (NOTAMs), and other routine items. (Tab V-17.13) Themishap lead pilot (MLP), the pilot in charge of the formation, also conducted a coordination briefand a tactical brief for the MM. (Tab V-2.1)c. PreflightAfter the flight briefings, the personnel involved in the MM assembled at the 13 FS operationsdesk and received an update from the operations supervisor prior to proceeding to their assignedaircraft. (Tab V-17.13) During this brief, the operations supervisor provided updated informationon items pertinent to flying that day and assigned them their aircraft. (Tab V-17.13) The MPnoted no discrepancies upon inspection of his aircrew flight equipment. (Tab V-17.13) The MP’spreflight inspection, engine start procedures, and ground operations were uneventful. (Tab V17.13, V-2.1)F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 20183

d. Summary of AccidentMishap Flight Summary:The MP reported no issues during taxi. (Tab V-17.20) The MP took off at 0838L in afterburner,fifteen seconds behind the MLP. (Tab J-2, Tab V-2.1) Shortly after the MP became airborne, thetower controllers and the supervisor of flying noticed a large twenty to thirty-foot flame comingfrom the engine at the back of the MP’s aircraft. (Tab V-4.1)Upon seeing the flames, the tower controllers informed the MP of the fire. (Tab V-4.1) The MPdid not hear this radio call, but the MLP did. (Tab V17.4, V-2.1) Upon hearing the radio call, theMLP made a right turn to rejoin with the MP and visually confirm the fire. (Tab N-2, V-2.1) TheMLP then informed the MP of the fire and told the MP to make a right turn to a position where theMP could reach the runway and land if the engine failed, known as a key position. (Tab V-2.2)At this point, the MP acknowledged the MLP’s statements and began to ascend to a key position.(Tab N-2, V-2.2) During the ascent, the MP was only able to gain a fraction of the airspeed thathe typically could have gained. Figure 1 (Tab U-5, U-6)Figure 1: Mishap Aircraft Mishap Timeline (Tab Z-31)In trying to reach a key position, the MP started a right turn back towards the runway, and wasable to achieve the minimum controlled ejection altitude of two-thousand feet above ground level.(Tab U-5) During this turn, the MP, unable to retain his airspeed or gain sufficient altitude, decidedhe needed to emergency jettison his external fuel tanks. (Tab V-17.8) Before jettisoning his fueltanks, the MP checked the area below to ensure it was uninhabited. (Tab V-17.8) After confirminghe was over an uninhabited area, the MP jettisoned his fuel tanks, which impacted Lake Ogawara.(Tab V-17.8) This jettison was in accordance with the F-16 fire-in-flight critical action proceduresand local area procedures. (Tab BB-21, V17.14) Jettisoning the external fuel tanks made the MAlighter, allowing the MP to gain airspeed and altitude, and require less distance for landing. (TabU-6, U-7, U-8) The MLP observed the fuel tank jettison and electronically marked the point wherethe fuel tanks fell. (Tab V-2.2)F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 20184

Figure 2: Mishap Aircraft Mishap Timeline (Tab Z-32)After jettisoning his fuel tanks, the MP asked the MLP if there was still a fire. Figure 2 (Tab N-3,V-17.10) The MLP replied that he still saw smoke trailing the MA. (Tab N-3) The MP thentested the fire/overheat light in the MA, ensuring that it was functioning properly. (Tab V-17.8)The MP then scanned his engine instruments and noticed the engine nozzle reading was incorrectfor his power setting. (Tab N-3, V-17.10) The MP communicated his nozzle reading to the MLPand asked the MLP if there was still a fire. (Tab N-3, V-17.10) The MLP stated that there werepuffs of smoke still trailing the MA. (Tab N-3, Tab V-17.19) At this point, the MP assessed thathe was no longer on fire. (Tab V-17.10) The MP reached a key position and accomplished a safelanding. (Tab V-17.11) He then stopped on the runway and accomplished the critical actionprocedures for both emergency shutdown and emergency ground egress. Figure 3 (Tab V-17.11)Figure 3: Mishap Aircraft Mishap Timeline (Tab Z-33)F-16CM, T/N 92-3883, 20 February 20185

Mishap Engine Summary:The Mishap Engine (ME) is a General Electric (GE) F110129 with serial number GE0E538133(538133). Figure 4 shows a cross-sectional view of the F110129 engine, highlighting the majorassemblies. (Tab CC-71)Figure 4: F110-129 Engine Schematic (Tab CC-63)The cause of the mishap was an uncontained engine fire. (Tab CC-73) This fire was directlycaused by the installation of an obsolete turbine frame forward fairing that was known to besusceptible to failure. (Tab CC-73) Specifically, in August 2007, safety Time ComplianceTechnical Order 2J-F110129-682 (TCTO-682) dictated replacement across the fleet by August2010 of this susceptible fairing, along with its attaching hardware. (Tab CC-70, Tab CC-73) Thesusceptible fairing then became obsolete, as it was replaced with an updated fairing of improvedmaterial and design. (Tab CC-73) The fairing was made up of three titanium segments thatconnect, creating a ring that lines the forward outer section of the turbine frame. (Tab CC-79)While the redesign was still comprised of the three segments, wear brackets and sacrificial wearstrips were added onto the fairing. (Tab CC-78) The redesign also included the use of a moredurable material for the existing wear pads on the top and bottom of the fairing. (Tab CC-78)The ME had the updated fairing properly installed in accordance with TCTO-682 on 03 June 2010.(Tab CC-73) However, the updated fairing was later re-replaced with an obsolete fairing duringengine maintenance in 2012. (Tab CC-73) The updated wear brackets exacerbated wear into thefairing, ultimately leading the fairing to fracture during takeoff of the MA. (Tab CC-73) Portionsof the fractured fairing then lifted into the cooling airstream of the engine, blocking essentialcooling air to the exhaust nozzle liner and other downstream components. (Tab CC-73) Withoutthe exhaust liner to contain the hot gases from the exhaust, the heat burned through the exhaustduct to the exterior of the engine causing a fire. (Tab CC-73) This fire caused extensive damageto the engine’s rear components. (Tab CC-7

AFSC Air Force Specialty Code AFSEC Air Force Safety Center AFTO Air Force Technical Order AGL Above Ground Level AIB Accident Investigation Board AIM Air Intercept Missile AMU Aircraft Maintenance Unit AMXS Aircraft Maintenance Squadron AOA Angle of Attack AUX Auxiliary BP Board President .

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