Second Annual Staunton Hill Conference On China's People's Liberation .

PLA is called to act as political arbiter in asuccession crisis,less on popular support than professionalcompetence.2. PLA lessons from recent major events,Tiananmen. Participants generally agreed thatwithin the PLA there were three different attitudestoward the lessons of Tiananmen. One PLA groupbelieves that the army should not have been used.Another harbors support for the demonstrators andtheir aims, while a third believes that although forcewas necessary to resolve the crisis, the PLA waslight of the growing disparities between north andsouth. In the northern Shenyang MR. for example.the group armies remain oriented on the Sovietthreat (or new threat, however it may be defined bythe Chinese leadership) and rely principally onPeople's War concepts of the strategic defense. Asa result, these northern armies are more populist andconservative than most of the PLA.These differences are significant, especially inmishandled by the leadership.During conference discussions, it was noted thatDESERT STORM. While the PLA, in particularthose elements responsible for doctrinedevelopment, could not help but be impressed by theUS deployment of sophisticated weapons systems inDESERT STORM, it is difficult to assess how Chinacould react in an immediate, concrete fashion tomeet the perceived new challenges represented bythe US success. In particular, the transformation ofdefense industry and technology into operationalcapabilities is a long, arduous process for which theChinese to date have shown only limited success.On the other hand, a popular response, both inthe Shenyang MR units deployed for Tiananmencame from these northern group armies.Conservative attitudes among strong northern unitsprobably act as a source of support for the currentLeninist regime. In addition, such attitudes alsocounter arguments that the PLA, on the whole, is aunified institution in its move toward modernizationrepresented by developments in Local WarDoctrine. Finally, it was noted that Chinese militarydoctrine is evolving at a pace significantly behindthe pace of world political and technologicalchange.official PLA publications and held by many seniorcommanders, is that Iraq's defeat is irrelevant forChina. The Iraq army was not in a position to deploy4. Institutional Differences. The PLA isrecognized as a collection of significantly differentPeople's War, it did not fight on its own territory;communities. While this observation is true for allits solders were not adequately indoctrinated; andmilitary services (the US military, for instance, hasthe army relied on static defenses. The degree towhich DESERT STORM affects the PLA will bea staggering amount of different communities,ranging from the Navy submarine community to theseen in decisions regarding the defense budget andemphasis on research and development. Theprofessionally and technologically orientedelements of the PLA will push to enhance Local Warcapabilities, while the more traditional commandersand politically oriented officers will stress People'sWar values.Air Force space community and the Army specialforces community), what is significant for the PLAare the possible different responses by eachcommunity to a potential political crisis.Principal communities identified as havingdifferent orientations to key issues, such as thevision of Chinese nationalism and politicalsuccession, were the technical communities (which3. PLA Doctrine. People's War Under Modeminclude research and development and technicalConditions vs. Local War. Despite PLA publiccommitment to the doctrine of Local War andapparent trends in training and education, People'sWar concepts retain a strong hold on PLA mentality,Conferees accepted the distinctions between theeffects of the two doctrines: People's War requireslarge forces, draws upon popular support, andrequires significant and consistent politicalindoctrination, whereas Local War requires smaller,more mobile, technically oriented forces that relyproduction), some strategic think tanks, the GroupArmies in the field and the leadership of the GeneralStaff. Regional differences among the MR's alsowere considered. Within the technical communities,there are two significant approaches to militarymodernization. The COSTIND/Polytechnologiesgroup see the problem of military modernization asa simple matter of exerting a straight line effort tocatch up with the West. Outside this group, otherleaders such as former Air Force commander Wang3

Hai and Defense Minister Zhang Aiping acceptmounting a successful invasion on short notice.openness to the west as the price for modemization.5. Generational Differences. Conferees generallyagreed that within the PLA, there is an identifiableRequirements for military actions are such thatevidence of a build up would be detected early onand would invoke international responses,particularly from the United States, which is bounddifference between officers and commanders overand under 50. As a rule, younger officers emphasizeby the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act to providefor the defense of Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan is aprofessional competence over political unity. Thecritical factor in Deng Xiaoping's relationship withoutcome of political succession ultimately willthe United States which he cannot jeopardize. Onrevolve around opposing visions of Chinesenationalism. Although differences within the PLAwill contribute to this crisis, its resolution is an issueultimately beyond the PLA itself. Nevertheless, thelogic of the generational distinction follows closelythe thesis of north-south differences,As Chinese fc-eign policy increasingly is drawnthe other hand, if the regime on Taiwan succeeds ingaining political influence on the mainland or inbecoming independent, the current CCP regimeprobably could not survive. Discussion was leftopen on how the PLA would respond to orders tomove against Taiwan.from a vision of China with clearly identifiable7. PLA relations with the People's Armed Policeregional interests, rather than an ideologically(PAP). Ties between the PLA and PAP have beendetermined universalist view that prepares thepopulace for a general defense against all foreigninfluences, China's military requirements will bedefined by limited regional political objectiveswhich in turn require modern weapons andcommand, control, and communication (C3 )systems manned by professional soldiers. As a rule,younger officers accept this view, which isconsistent with the general political view nowevolving in the south. It was noted duringdiscussions that prior to Tiananmen, officer salonswithin various communities had begun to form forthe purpose of discussing issues of military doctrineand weapons development. These salons havedisappeared since Tiananmen in the wake ofpolitical control reimposed by the General PnliticalDepartment (GPD).critical since Tiananmen, when the PAP failed andthe PLA was called in to clear the square. The centralquestion is that of command and control relations atthe top, specifically within the CMC, where thereappears to be a blurring of staff control. The PAPhas been strengthened in the Beijing Capital regionsince Tiananmen, and its budget has been enhanced.It was noted, however, that the PAP budget may beset by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), not thePLA. While the formation of the PAP in 1985ostensibly freed the PLA to concentrate ondefending against external threats, Tiananmenforced the PLA to refocus on its internal securitymission. It was noted, however, that despite itsapparent failure in Tiananmen, no PAP unitcommanders were replaced, with the exception ofthe national level leadership group of Zhou Zushu(CDR). his Political Commissar, Wang Feng. and:heir principal deputies.Of specific concern to the analytical communitiescharged with predicting what the military will do ina crisis, the issue of PLA/PAP coordination and theirrelationship with the MSS in the Beijing Capitalregion are probably the most critical. Severalconferees cited the precedents of both the recentSoviet coup and the perhaps more relevant move in1976 by the Chinese 8341 security unit to seize theGang of Four and preserve Deng Xiaoping's powerposition within the CCP Politburo.6. PLA Response to Taiwan. In assessingpotential implications of the Soviet coup, severalconferees proposed that Taiwan now had significantnew opportunities to expand its foreign influence,principally through economic assistance to formerSoviet republics. The PRC might eventually beforced to respond, especially if the new Taiwaninfluence threatened either to undermine ChineseCommunist Party (CCP) legitimacy or lead toTaiwan independence.PLA capabilities remain limited, and while amilitary buildup in the Nanjing MR could createpanic in the Taiwan stock market and causeeconomic hardships. the PLA remains incapable of8. Command Relations. PLA/PAP relations areone element of the larger issue of overall PLA4

command and control. Who can order the basicmaneuver unit, the Group Army, to move in theevent of a crisis, as they did in Tiananmen?Specifically, in the chain from the CMC through theMR commander to the Group Army Commander,what is the role of the MR commander, and what ishis strength relative to the center?Conferees were split on this issue. One groupagreed that the MR commander not only does nothave authority to move GA's, but functions only asa communications link between the CMC and GA's.Others argued that the MR commanders retainextensive control, and the GA's cannot movewithout their permission. Another variation was thatthe MR commander cannot order a GA to move butcan prevent it from moving. Discussion inevitablyrevolved around the May 1989 Wu Han incident inwhich Deng reportedly went to this central city todirectly enlist the support of MR commanders forthe crackdown at Tiananmen. While there is noagreement that the meeting ever took place, there isconsensus that the center did and must still consultthe regions. One argument for centralized contiol isthat there is no precedent when the PLA, whetherduring the Peng Dehuai days, the CulturalRevolution, or Tiananmen, has ever failed to obeythe center. The rejoinder to this argument, however,was that events in China today are unprecedented,and analysts in particular should not be bound byprecedent.Department of Defense officials who were able totalk frankly with PLA leaders to ensure that theyfully understood the thrust of US policy. Thisdimension is now missing in the relationship.ConclusionsIn the early 1980s, the long range view was that astrong, modem China was a force for stability. Thiswent beyond the immediate objective of playing the"China card" to balance the Soviet Union inrecognizing China's potential as a major worldactor. A strategic dialogue was begun to discovermutual interests.Since Tiananmen, US administration policy hasstresscd the importance of maintaining arelationship with China. Until Tiananmen, themilitary relationship had been part of the larger.Afterwards, DoD actions to limit the relationshiphave gone beyond measures reported in the press.With some exceptions, "munitions list" deliverieswere stopped; high-level visits were stopped(defined as Assistant Secretary and above, actuallya very few people in DoD); and all working-levelvisits were stopped. All contact with the PLA(except for minimal attachd contact), was cut off.Liberalization of dual-use technology export toChina was stopped as were all foreign military salescontracts and commercial military sales. It wassuggested that the psychological impact of theseactions on US-China relations may be as bad as thatof the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s.It appears that the PLA is willing to restore"friendly ties." Nevertheless, the form of any futuremilitary relationship will be different from that ofthe 1980s. Significantly, there were no majorobjections among conference participants to thebasic argument for some form of militaryrelationship. A representative from theCongressional Research Service did, however,elaborate the list of objections currently prevalenton the Hill: human rights, Chinese proliferationpolicies, and the appearance of US approval of thecurrent leadership and its policies.9. US Military Relations with China. Theconference provided the opportunity to discuss atsome length both the possibility and advisability ofrestoring, in some fashion, formal military relationswith the PLA. The argument for restoration wasbased on the essential fact that relations betweenmajor states inescapably include a militarydimension. Despite the obvious American politicalobjections to military relations with China sinceTiananmen, a certain level of military to militarydialogue would serve US interests in China. In thepast, the PLA leadership was receptive to policyinitiatives and advice from mid-to-high levelThe views contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted asnecessarily representing the official policy, either expressed or implied, of the Department of Defenseor the US Government.5

Remarks and DiscussionOpening Remarks and Introductionpaid lip service to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty(NPT). Relations between the US and China arebleak and getting bleaker.The CMC is the most important body in China. Weneed to know more about Chinese military factionsand what elements of the PLA may come to the fore.LTG Sam Wilson, USA (Ret). We often approachthe PLA from the false premise that they are notprofessional and often must be reminded, as we areat this conference, that in China, the concept ofprotracted war remains, and the Chinese emphasizemuch more heavily than do westerners politicalobjectives rather than the destruction of the enemy.The ideal of Sun Tzu remains: it is better to prevailwithout war;, war seldom serves the general good ofsociety, and the state must seek to serve the generalgood. At the same time, the PLA of the 1979invasion of Vietnam, despite terrible technicalinadequacies and serious manpower losses, didachieve the objective of destroying two provincialcapitols and reminding the Vietnamese, andindirectly the rest of the world, that it could andwould pay high military prices for politicalobjectives.The objectives of the conference are reallytwofold: to further an understanding of the ChinesePeople's Liberation Army as it develops along withthe country, and to determine what the PLA will doin the next crisis, should it come.Intelligence PerspectiveRon Montaperto. By its very nature, defenseintelligence focuses on those aspects of Chinesepolicy that bear on US interests, in particular, USmilitary interests. The relationship betweenintelligence and academia should not be too close,but it is possible and, as reflected by this conference,desirable to have more interaction, both formallyand informally.Internal and External FactorsChina's Perception of the World and Its Role inInternational RelationsEdward Friedman. The Chinese regime isLeninist; its number one concern is the maintenanceand consolidation of power. The priority PLAmission is to facilitate the consolidation of powerand patriotism and is the regime's most powerfulprop. While the emphasis on economic developmenthas not yet replaced the emphasis on politics.nevertheless, a fundamental shift in Chinese valuesis taking place in which economic values arereplacing political values as the basis for a new senseof Chinese nationalism. This shift has potentiallyprofound implications for the PLA.There is a growing perception in the PLA that thepeople in power do not serve China's real interests.The concept of Chinese nationalism is changing asillustrated by the difference in presentation ofconcepts of "north" and "south." Previously, "north"represented good, and "south" was bad. Today,things "southern" are good, while "northern" isisolated and discredited. The Foreign Policy SmallPolicy PerspectiveDoug Paal. The NSC and US policy communitytake the PLA seriously, even though militaryrelations between the US and PRC are suspended.Currently, US policy is hostage to the human rightssituation in China and the proliferation issues. Thecontracts to sell missiles which exceed the limits ofthe MTCR and Chinese involvement in the Algeriannuclear power program reflect risky behavior of theChinese leadership. People are looking closer atChina, but China is not about to relax its humanrights policies. People are questioning if Chinaaccepts international standards of behaviorregarding proliferation. There has been someprogress on proliferation issues, but China has only7

Group of the Party Central Committee assumes thatthe 21st century will be the "Asian Century." Inoutlining its 21st century policy, the group hasoutlined how China will take advantage of the 21stcentury and it has done so in a manner that servesdirectly to consolidate the position of the Li Penggroup.The 21st century policy defines two principalsecurity missions: enfolding Taiwan and creatingpolicies to exploit Japan's natural economic lead inEast Asia. The current regime simply does notunderstand Taiwan; its continual securitypreoccupation with Taiwan is in obvious conflictwith the necessity to exploit openness and trade withTaiwan. The younger PLA generation regards thispolicy's attitude towards Japan as fantasy andbelieves it is better for China to be more open inworking with and playing off its economiccompetition. The PLA increasingly perceives thefact that the 21st century policy serves the narrowinterest of Li Peng and not the country as a whole.The PLA will act to prevent chaos, but the oldguard does not deserve PLA loyalty. No one in thePLA at present will turn against tfa currentleadership, but once Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yunare gone, no one has the legitimacy of credibility toreplace them. In conclusion, Deng is the lastemperor, and unfortunately, the old guard has set thePLA off against its own tradition,production in military factories), social (disasterrelief, reforestation), and security (Asian Gamessecurity, alert during Soviet coup).Trends for destabilization in the PLA include: 1)discontent; 2) lack of discipline; 3) regionalism; 4)the succession to Deng; ind 5) reaction to the Sovietcoup. Even Deng Xiaoping has publicly noted thepotential factional split in the military forces. Twosources had reported 30 to 35 cases which arrest 300to 400 PLA personnel for "coup plotting."With regard to problems of corruption within thePLA and the issue of family and guanxi ties withinthe military, contacts among relatives of the firstgeneration of military leaders takes place abovedivision level. Beneath division, there are fewcontacts. In addition, regionalism remains a keyproblem, and there is a significant overlap ofeconomic and military regions. The impact ofregionalism is evident in passive defiance by localleaders, local protectionism (most often in the formof tariffs) and inter provincial cooperation (mostoften at the expense of the center).The behavior of the PLA is uncertain in the nextcrisis.CommentsJohn Frankenstein: As an economist, I disagreethat PLA involvement

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