Basic Principles Of Nuclear Safety
International Atomic Energy AgencyBasic Principles of Nuclear SafetyL.W. DeitrichIAEA Consultant(deirichlw@earthlink.net)1
Contents Safety-related Characteristics of NuclearReactors Nuclear Safety Objectives Safety Fundamentals: The Safety ofNuclear Installations Defence-in-Depth2International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety-Related Characteristicsof Nuclear Reactors3International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety-related Characteristicsof Nuclear Reactors Unique Characteristics: A very large quantity ofradioactive material ispresent in the core of anuclear reactor after anysignificant period of poweroperation;Significant energy releasecontinues for a very longtime after shutdown;A reactor has no ‘natural’or ‘intrinsic’ power level,and rapid powerexcursions are possible.4Basic Safety Functions: Confinement of radioactivematerials, control ofoperational discharges,and limitation of accidentalreleases; Removal of residual heatfrom the core; Control of the reactivity.International Atomic Energy Agency
Radioactive Materials Inventory The radioactive inventory in a reactor comesfrom: Fission products; Activation products; and Transuranics. Fission products are the largest radioactivecomponent. Most fission products are retainedin the fuel. Decay of fission products is theprincipal source of radiation hazard for times ofseveral hundred years, and decay heat fromreactor fuel for times up to about 60 years.5International Atomic Energy Agency
Radioactive Materials Inventory Some fission products emit delayed neutrons, which are extremely important in reactorkinetics and control.Activation products arise from neutronabsorption in structural materials or in fissionproducts. Activation of stainless steel, Inconel and Zircaloy is a major contributor.Neutron absorption in fission products is importantin reactor operations due to large cross sections ofXe-135 (2E6 barns) and Sm-149 (6E4 barns).6International Atomic Energy Agency
Radioactive Materials Inventory Transuranics arise from non-fissile capture of neutrons in fuel and fertile materials, primarilyU-235 and U-238. Plutonium, Americium andCurium are the elements of principal interest.Most transuranics are alpha-emitters with longhalf-lives. They are a significant contributor tothe radioactive hazard at times longer than afew hundred years and to the decay heat attimes longer than about 60 years.7International Atomic Energy Agency
Radioactive Materials Inventory The radioactive material inventory depends on: Reactor power and operating history; Neutron flux and energy distribution; Fission product yields and decay schemes; Neutron cross-sections for important nuclides andreactions. The concentration of various fission productswill reach saturation in a few half-lives ofoperation.8International Atomic Energy Agency
Fission Product Decay Heat Radioactive fission products release energy in decay to a stable state.The decay heat depends on: The fuel and fertile materials; The time of irradiation and the power density; The time after shutdown; The reactor neutron spectrum. Since fission products are retained within thecladding, cooling must be sufficient to guardagainst cladding degradation or failure.9International Atomic Energy Agency
Fission Product Decay HeatLong Time Operation, LWR, Uranium Fuel Time after reactor Fraction of operatingshutdown:power:1 second1 minute1 hour1 day1 week1 month1 year10 years17%5%1.5 %0.5%0.3%0.15%0.03%0.003%10International Atomic Energy Agency
Fission Product Decay Heat A standard for calculation of decay heatis available: ANSI/ANS-5.1 – 2005, “Decay Heat Power inLight Water Reactors.” Supersedes ANSI/ANS-5.1 – 1994.11International Atomic Energy Agency
Fission Product Decay HeatFuel Cooling Considerations Adequate cooling must be maintained at all times to remove decay heat and preventcladding failure in the reactor or in spent fuelstorage.Decay heat is the thermal driving force in mostaccidents in LWRs.Water is an excellent heat sink. However, waterquality must be maintained to guard againstcorrosion.12International Atomic Energy Agency
Reactivity Control Requirements Control the reactor power level in operation and provide for shutdown under normal andoff-normal conditions.Compensate for reactivity changes due to coreconfiguration, experiments, burnup, ortemperature changes.Compensate for transient poisoning effects,primarily from Xe and Sm.Provide for rapid shutdown if necessary, andmaintain the reactor subcritical, including inaccident conditions.13International Atomic Energy Agency
Reactivity Control Some typical reactivity control mechanismsinclude: Moveable control rods or blades. Control drums at the edge of the core. Moveable fuel. Chemical means, such as boric acid in coolant. Burnable poisons, such as Gadolinium. Removable poison plates or curtains.14International Atomic Energy Agency
Reactivity Control Some typical reactivity feedback mechanismsinclude: Fuel temperature – a prompt effect, which must be negative;Doppler broadening of resonance absorption in U238 or other materials – a prompt effect;Moderator temperature – normally subject to heattransfer delay;Coolant void formation – can be positive or negative.15International Atomic Energy Agency
Fundamental Safety Principles16International Atomic Energy Agency
Principal Reference Documents Draft Safety Fundamentals: Fundamental Safety Principles, Draft Safety Standard DS298(June 2006).Safety Fundamentals: The Safety of NuclearInstallations, IAEA Safety Series No. 110 (1993).Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety, INSAG-10(1996).Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear PowerPlants, 75-INSAG-3, Rev.1, INSAG-12 (1999).17International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Objective The fundamental safety objective is toprotect people and the environment fromharmful effects of ionizing radiation.18International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Objective (cont’d.) Measures must be taken to: Control the radiation exposure of people andthe release of radioactive material to theenvironment; Restrict the likelihood of events that mightlead to loss of control over a nuclear reactorcore, nuclear chain reaction, radioactivesource or any other source of radiation; Mitigate the consequences of such events ifthey were to occur.19International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 1:Responsibility for Safety The prime responsibility for safety mustrest with the person or organizationresponsible for facilities and activitiesthat give rise to radiation risks. This prime responsibility cannot bedelegated.20International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 1Responsibility for Safety The responsible party must: Establish and maintain the necessary competencies and provide adequate training and information;Establish procedures and arrangements to maintainsafety at all times;Verify design and quality of facilities, activities andequipment;Ensure control of radioactive material and waste.21International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 2Role of Government An effective legal and governmental frameworkfor safety, including an independent regulatorybody, must be established and maintained. Government authorities must prepare programs to reduce radiation risks, including in emergencies,monitor releases and for disposal of radioactivewaste.They must provide for control over sources forwhich no one else has responsibility.22International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 2Role of Government The regulatory body must: Have adequate legal authority, competence and resources to fulfill its responsibilities;Be effectively independent;Set up appropriate means of providing informationabout safety, health and environmental aspects offacilities and activities, and about regulatoryprocesses.Consult, as appropriate, in an open and inclusiveprocess.23International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 2Role of Government Comments: The regulatory body must have the statutoryauthority, competence and resources to: Set safety standards; License and inspect installations; Set, monitor and enforce license conditions; and Ensure that corrective actions are taken whenever unsafeor potentially unsafe conditions are detected. Although the operating organization may delegateauthority to carry out functions on its behalf, itcannot delegate the prime responsibility for safety.24International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 3Leadership and Management for Safety Effective leadership and management forsafety must be established and sustained inorganizations concerned with, and facilitiesand activities that give rise to, radiation risks. Leadership in safety must be demonstrated at the highest levels in an organization.Safety must be achieved and maintained by aneffective management system that integrates allrequirements so that safety is not compromised byother demands.The management system must promote a strongsafety culture.25International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 3Leadership and Management for Safety Comments: The principles of safety management apply broadly to all organizations having safety responsibilities.Management must create an atmosphere of rigorand thoroughness throughout the operatingorganization to ensure that all safety objectives aremet. There can be no complacency about safetymatters. There must be a learning attitude and anopen exchange of information both upwards anddownwards.Quality must be verified with a disciplined approach,but the basic responsibility for quality rests with theperformer, not the verifier.26International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 4Justification of Facilities and Activities Facilities and activities that give rise toradiation risks must yield an overall benefit. For facilities or activities to be justified, the benefitsthat they yield must outweigh the risks to which theygive rise.27International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 5Optimization of Protection Protection must be optimized to provide thehighest level of safety that can reasonably beachieved. Optimization: Achieving the highest reasonable level of safety without unduly limiting utilization.Risks must be periodically reassessed.Resources devoted to safety must be commensuratewith the magnitude of the risk and the possibility ofcontrol.28International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 6Limitation of Risks to Individuals Measures for controlling radiation risks mustensure that no individual bears anunacceptable risk of harm. Justification and optimization do not guarantee that no individual bears an unacceptable risk of harm.Doses and radiation risks must be controlled withinspecific limits.Optimization and limitation of individual doses andrisks are both necessary to achieve the desired levelof safety.29International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 7Protection of Present and Future Generations People and the environment, present andfuture, must be protected against radiationrisks. Safety standards apply to local and remote populations.Future generations must be protected without anyneed for them to take significant protectivemeasures.Radioactive waste must be managed to avoid anundue burden on future generations.30International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 8Prevention of Accidents All practical efforts must be made to preventand mitigate nuclear or radiation accidents. Prevent occurrence of failures, abnormal conditions (including breach of security) that could lead to lossof control.Prevent escalation of any such failures or abnormalconditions that do occur.Prevent loss of control over any source of radiation.The primary means of preventing and mitigation theconsequences of accidents is defense-in-depth.31International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 9Emergency Preparedness and Response Arrangements must be made for emergencypreparedness and response in case of nuclearor radiation incidents. Ensure that arrangements are in place for an effective response at the scene, and as appropriate,at the local, regional, national and internationallevels.Ensure that radiation risks are minor for reasonablyforeseeable incidents.Prepare practical measures to mitigate anyconsequences to human life or health or theenvironment.32International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 9Emergency Preparedness and Response Emergency preparedness and response involves theoperating organization, regulatory body, andappropriate branches of government at the local,regional and national, and possibly international levels.Emergency plans must include criteria for differentprotective actions, and provide for the capability toprotect and inform people at the scene and the public.Emergency plans must be exercised periodically.33International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principle 10Protective Actions to Reduce Existing orUnregulated Radiation Risks Protective actions to reduce existing orunregulated radiation risks must be justifiedand optimized. Mitigation of radiation of essentially natural origin. Exposure arising from past human activities never subject to regulatory control, such as residue frommining operations.Remediation measures following an uncontrolledrelease of radionuclides to the environment.34International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Fundamentals:The Safety of Nuclear Installations35International Atomic Energy Agency
Definitions Nuclear safety: The achievement of properoperating conditions, prevention of accidentsor mitigation of accident consequences,resulting in protection of workers, the publicand the environment from undue radiationhazards. Safety is primarily concerned with maintaining control over sources of radiation.Protection is primarily concerned with controllingexposure to radiation and its effects.36International Atomic Energy Agency
Nuclear Safety ObjectivesGeneral Nuclear Safety Objective: To protect individuals, society and the environmentfrom harm by establishing and maintaining in nuclearinstallations effective defences against radiologicalhazards.Radiation Protection Objective: To ensure that in all operational states radiationexposure within the installation or due to any plannedrelease of radioactive material from the installation iskept below prescribed limits and as low as reasonablyachievable, and to ensure mitigation of the radiologicalconsequences of any accidents.37International Atomic Energy Agency
Nuclear Safety ObjectivesTechnical Safety Objective: To take all reasonably practicable measures to preventaccidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate theirconsequences should they occur;To ensure with a high level of confidence that, for allpossible accidents taken into account in the design ofthe installation, including those of very low probability,any radiological consequences would be minor andbelow prescribed limits; andTo ensure that the likelihood of accidents with seriousradiological consequences is extremely low.38International Atomic Energy Agency
Nuclear Safety ObjectivesComments: Nuclear installations must be designed and operated tokeep all sources of radiation under strict technical andadministrative control.Limited exposures of people and release of legallyauthorized quantities of radioactive materials are notprecluded, but must be strictly controlled and incompliance with operational limits and radiationprotection standards.Measures must be taken to control operationalexposures to ALARA levels and minimize the likelihoodof loss of normal control of the sources of radiation.39International Atomic Energy Agency
Nuclear Safety ObjectivesComments: Accidents can happen.Measures to mitigate accident consequences arerequired.Such measures may include on-site accidentmanagement procedures, and off-site interventionmeasures.The greater the potential hazard from an uncontrolledradioactive release, the lower its likelihood must be.40International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of Safety - Siting The site selection shall take into accountrelevant features that might affect the safety ofthe installation, or be affected by theinstallation, and the feasibility of carrying outemergency plans. All aspects shall beevaluated for the projected lifetime of theinstallation and re-evaluated as necessary toensure the continued acceptability for safety ofsite-related factors.41International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyDesign and Construction The design shall ensure that the nuclear installation issuited for reliable, stable and easily manageableoperation. The prime goal shall be the prevention ofaccidents.The design shall include the appropriate application ofthe defence-in-depth principle so that there are severallevels of protection and multiple barriers to preventreleases of radioactive materials, and to ensure thatfailures or combinations of failures that might lead tosignificant radiological consequences are of very lowprobability.42International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyDesign and Construction Technologies incorporated in a design shall be provenor qualified by experience or testing or both.The systematic consideration of the man-machineinterface and human factors shall be included in allstages of design and in the associated development ofoperational requirements.The exposure to radiation of site personnel andreleases of radioactive materials to the environmentshall be made by design as low as reasonablyachievable.43International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyDesign and Construction A comprehensive safety assessment and independentverification shall be carried out to confirm that thedesign of the installation will fulfil the safety objectivesand requirements, before the operating organizationcompletes its submission to the regulatory body.44International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyDesign and ConstructionComments: Design and operation must ensure: Limitation of radiation exposures, radioactivereleases and production of radioactive wastes; Prevention of accidents; Limitation and mitigation of the consequences ofaccidents if they do occur.45International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyDesign and ConstructionComments: The design must provide: SSCs with high reliability; Proven technology, meeting conservative criteriawith appropriate safety margins; Appropriate engineered and inherent safetyfeatures; Consideration of minimizing personnelexposures.46International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyDesign and ConstructionComments: Design principles: No single equipment failure or human actionshould disable a safety function; The possibility of common cause failure shouldbe minimized by diversity of equipment; Redundant systems should functionindependently; Fail-safe design concepts should be used.47International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyDesign and ConstructionComments: Minimize likelihood and impact of humanerror by including: Engineered systems; Automatic control, protection and alarm systems; Elimination of human actions that couldjeopardize safety; Clear presentation of data and reliablecommunications.48International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyCommissioning Specific approval by the regulatory body shall berequired before the start of normal operation on thebasis of an appropriate safety analysis and acommissioning program. The commissioning programshall provide evidence that the installation asconstructed is consistent with design and safetyrequirements. Operating procedures shall be validatedto the extent practicable as part of the commissioningprogram, with the participation of the future operatingstaff.49International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyOperation and Maintenance A set of operational limits and conditions derived fromthe safety analysis, tests and subsequent operationalexperience shall be defined to identify safe boundariesfor operation. The safety analysis, operating limits andprocedures shall be revised as necessary if theinstallation is modified.Operation, inspection, testing and maintenance andsupporting functions shall be conducted by sufficientnumbers of adequately trained and authorizedpersonnel in accordance with approved procedures.50International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyOperation and Maintenance Engineering and technical support, with competence inall disciplines important for safety, shall be availablethroughout the lifetime of the installation.The operating organization shall establish documentedand approved procedures as a basis for operatorresponse to anticipated operational occurrences andaccidents.The operating organization shall report incidentssignificant to safety to the regulatory body. The OOand the RB shall establish complementary programs toanalyse operating experience to ensure that lessonsare learned and acted upon. Such experience shall beshared with relevant national and international bodies.51International Atomic Energy Agency
Technical Aspects of SafetyRadioactive Waste Managementand Decommissioning The generation of radioactive waste, in terms of bothactivity and volume, shall be kept to the minimumpracticable by appropriate design measures andoperating procedures. Waste treatment and interimstorage shall be strictly controlled in a mannerconsistent with the requirements for safe final disposal.The design of an installation and the decommissioningprogram shall take into account the need to limitexposures during decommissioning to ALARA. Priorto initiation of decommissioning activities, thedecommissioning program shall be approved by theregulatory body.52International Atomic Energy Agency
Verification of Safety The operating organization shall verify by analysis,surveillance, testing and inspection that the physicalstate of the installation and its operation continue inaccordance with operational limits and conditions,safety requirements and the safety analysis.Systematic safety reassessments of the installation inaccordance with the regulatory requirements shall beperformed throughout its operational lifetime, withaccount taken of operating experience and significantnew safety information from all relevant sources.53International Atomic Energy Agency
Defence-in-Depth54International Atomic Energy Agency
Defense-in-Depth Several Levels of Protection Including successive barriers preventing therelease of radioactive material to theenvironment.Defense-in-depth is the key concept on whichall of nuclear safety is based. The independence of different levels of defenseis a key element. 55International Atomic Energy Agency
Defense-in-Depth(Cont’(Cont’d) Objectives of Defense-in-Depth To compensate for potential human and component failures,To maintain the effectiveness of the barriers byaverting damage to the facilities and to the barriersthemselves, andTo protect the public and the environment fromharm in the event that these barriers are not fullyeffective.56International Atomic Energy Agency
Defense-in-Depth(Cont’(Cont’d) Strategy of Defense-in-Depth To prevent accidents: Principal emphasis is placed on the primary means of achieving safety, which is theprevention of accidents, particularly any whichcould cause severe core damage.To mitigate the consequences of accidents: In-plant and off-site mitigation measures areavailable and are prepared that wouldsubstantially reduce the effects of an accidentalrelease of radioactive material.Defense-in-depth is generally structured in fivelevels.57International Atomic Energy Agency
Levels of Defense-in-DepthLevel 1ObjectiveMeansLevel 2ObjectiveMeansLevel 3ObjectiveConservative design and high quality in constructionand operationControl of abnormal operation and detection of failuresControl, limiting and protection system and othersurveillance featuresControl of accidents within the design basisMeansEngineered safety features and accident proceduresObjectiveControl of severe plant conditions, including prevention ofaccident progression and mitigation of the consequencesof severe accidentsMeansComplementary measures and accident managementLevel 4Level 5Prevention of abnormal operation and ionof severecoredamageMitigation of radiological consequences of significantreleases of radioactive materialsOff-site emergency response58International Atomic Energy Agency
Relation between Multiple Barriers andLevels in Defense-in-DepthLevel 5Level 4Fourth BarrierLevel 3Level 2Level 1Third BarrierSecond BarrierFirst BarrierProtection System, ESFs& Special Safety FeaturesGeneral Means of Protection, Conservative Design,Quality Assurance, Safety CultureNormal Operating SystemFuel MatrixFuel Rod CladdingPrimary Coolant BoundaryPrevention of Deviation from Normal OperationControl of Abnormal OperationControl of Accidents in Design BasisContainmentAccident Management Including Containment ProtectionOff-Site Emergency Response59International Atomic Energy Agency
Multiple Barriers against RadioactiveReleaseexclusive boundary(virtual barrier)shield buildingsteel containmentor linerpressure vesselfuel claddingexclusive zonefuel pellet60International Atomic Energy Agency
Application of Defense-in-Depthin Reactor Design Level 1 Application (Normal Operation) Conservative design and high quality SSCs: Minimize the need to take measures at Level 2and 3. Adequate operation and surveillance. Comprehensive preventive maintenance. Adequate consideration for human factors: Adequate time for operator actions, appropriateman-machine interface, comprehensive training,and stress reduction.61International Atomic Energy Agency
Application of Defense-in-Depthin Reactor Design(Cont’(Cont’d) Level 2 Application (Abnormal Operation) Reliable control, and protection system torestore normal operating conditions. Inherent design features; Core stability and system thermal inertia; Prevention and mitigation features. Adequate detection of failures. Ongoing surveillance of quality; In-service inspection and periodic testing ofSSCs important to safety.62International Atomic Energy Agency
Application of Defense-in-Depthin Reactor Design(Cont’(Cont’d) Level 3 Application (DBA) Engineered Safety Features (ESFs): Systems dedicated to safety for maintaining integrity of the barriers and preventing core damage;Designed on the basis of postulated accidents representingthe limiting loads resulting from sets of similar events,derived from conservative deterministic accident analyses. Principles for ESF Design: Redundancy, independence, and diversity; Environmental qualification; Automation to reduce vulnerability to human failure; and Testability to ensure system availability and performance.63International Atomic Energy Agency
Application of Defense-in-Depthin Reactor Design(Cont’(Cont’d) Level 4 Application (Beyond DBA) First Three Levels: Provide maintenance of the structural integrity of the coreand limit potential radiation hazard for the public andenvironment. Additional Efforts to Further Reduce the Risk: Considering multiple failures; Equipment and procedures or guidelines to cope withbeyond DBA. Accident management: To control the course of severe accidents and mitigate theirconsequences.64International Atomic Energy Agency
Application of Defense-in-Depthin Reactor Design(Cont’(Cont’d) Level 5 Application (Large Release) On-Site & Off-Site Emergency Plan: Collecting and assessing information about levelof exposures; Short and long term protective actions thatconstitute intervention; Prepared in consultation with the operatingorganization and the responsible authorities; Exercised periodically.65International Atomic Energy Agency
Basic Prerequisites ofEffective Defense-in-Depth Conservatism Broadly applied at the first three levels of defensewith appropriate conservative assumptions andsafety margin. Quality Assurance A major element making each level of defenseeffective. Safety Culture An impact at each level of defense throughcommitment to safety, accountability, a questioningattitude and lack of complacency.66International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Principles, Draft Safety Standard DS298 (June 2006). Safety Fundamentals: The Safety of Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Series No. 110 (1993). Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety, INSAG-10 (1996). Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants, 75-INSAG-3, Rev.1, INSAG-12 (1999).
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