Pathways To Cooperation - Nuclear Threat Initiative
February 2017Pathways to CooperationA Menu of Potential U.S.-RussianCooperative Projects in theNuclear Sphere
Photo CreditsRussian and American flags, iStockphoto, coverSam Nunn and Igor Ivanov, courtesy of NTI, page 2Artists Concept of an Atom, Adobe Stock, page 6Nuclear Power Plant, courtesy of Physics Frontline, page 10Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, courtesy of Cryptome, page 14IAEA Headquarters, courtesy of IAEA, page 17Savannah River Site Heavy Water Components Test Reactor,courtesy of U.S. Department of Energy, page 21Steel Framework, iStockphoto, page 25Copyright 2017 by the Nuclear Threat InitiativeAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the copyright holder. For permissions,send an e-mail request to contact@nti.org. The views expressed in this publication do notreflect those of the NTI Board of Directors or institutions with which they are associated.
ContentsForeword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Nuclear Science. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6NuclearEnergy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Nuclear Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Nuclear Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Nuclear Environmental Remediation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Potential Legal, International, and Intergovernmental Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . 25Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28About the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Sam NunnIgor IvanovPathways to CooperationForeword2The United States and Russia today face noshortage of disagreements. From Syria toUkraine, the differences are serious and stark,but they should not obscure another important truth—that the United States and Russiahave mutual, converging interests on some ofthe most consequential issues of today. Amongthem is the shared responsibility to manage thedestructive forces of the atom while directingthose same forces toward positive applications,such as combating climate change.Today’s world is one in which nation–statesno longer have a monopoly on the means formass destruction. Terrorist organizations, suchas Daesh (also known as ISIS or ISIL) and alQaeda, have openly declared their intention toacquire nuclear and radiological weapons. Theknow-how for developing such weapons is morethan 70 years old, and the materials needed toproduce them are still stored in too many placesand are accessible to too many people. Today,the danger of nuclear terrorism is real, serious,and growing.These dangers compel collaboration betweenthe United States and Russia, cooperation thatunfortunately has almost come to a standstill.Communication between scientists andtechnical experts in U.S. and Russian nuclearcomplexes—which dates back to the 1980s—has been frozen. Bilateral forums, such asthe U.S.-Russian Nuclear Energy and NuclearSecurity Working Group, have been suspended.Differences, including those over Ukraine andthe Middle East, have overshadowed nuclearcooperation, putting citizens of both of thesenations at greater risk.
The benefits of cooperation can be significantfor the United States and Russia and forthe world. Together, the United States andRussia could drive critical advancements: (a)developing the next generation of safe andSam NunnCo-Chairman and CEONuclear Threat InitiativeFormer U.S. Senatorreliable nuclear reactors, (b) investigatingnovel solutions to common nuclear wastechallenges, (c) creating proliferation-resistantnuclear fuels, (d) bolstering the capabilitiesof essential radiation detectors, (e) improvingthe safety of commercial nuclear power plants,and (f) interdicting illicit nuclear trafficking indangerous parts of the world.Moving forward with projects such as thoseproposed in this report would also allow theUnited States and Russia to begin to rebuild thetrust critical to putting bilateral relations backon track. If they do not change direction and theacrimony continues to build, these two nationswill continue down an increasingly dangerouspath and will have missed a crucial opportunityto cooperate on a wide range of urgent nuclearissues.Igor IvanovPresidentRussian International Affairs CouncilFormer Foreign Minister of theRussian FederationPathways to CooperationThis report—developed jointly by the U.S.-basedNuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Russiabased Center for Energy and Security Studies(CENESS)—offers an alternative to the acrimonythat has recently characterized these nations’bilateral relations. Building on the success ofbilateral cooperation to destroy Syria’s chemicalweapons stockpile and cooperation to negotiateand begin implementation of the Iran nuclearagreement, this report offers policymakers amenu of dozens of projects on nuclear securityand safety issues that could be implemented inthe near term and as political relations improve.3
IntroductionBy Andrew Bieniawski, Vice President, NTIAnton Khlopkov, Director, CENESSIn February 2016, dozens of leading nuclearexperts from the United States and the RussianFederation gathered in Moscow for a conferenceon the potential for future nuclear cooperationbetween the world’s two largest nuclear powers.The dialogue—cosponsored by the NuclearThreat Initiative (NTI) and the Center for Energyand Security Studies (CENESS)—was the first ofits kind in many years, bringing together expertsfrom industry, think tanks, academia, and nongovernmental and governmental institutions.Pathways to CooperationThe conference was preceded and supported bypreparatory research efforts, including separateworking meetings of U.S. and Russian expertsto develop proposals that would reflect eachcountry’s interest to the fullest extent possible.A list of the experts, along with the conferenceparticipants, can be found can be found onpage 30.The result of the NTI-CENESS Dialogue onPotential U.S.-Russia Nuclear Cooperation isa menu of possible projects designed to usethe countries’ unique technical capabilities toadvance their mutual interests. Conferenceattendees discussed the potential forcooperation on nuclear issues across five areas:zz Nuclear sciencezz Nuclear energyThe following projects were proposed:On nuclear science, expanding researchon the effects of radiation, developingadvanced radiation detection equipment,and using the two countries’ state-of-the-artresearch facilities to develop new materials fornuclear applicationsOn nuclear energy, jointly developinginnovative reactor designs, collaboratingacross the fuel cycle, and promotingsafety and security in nuclear newcomercountries, including through education andtraining programsOn nuclear safety, collaborating tostandardize reactor designs, toharmonize reactor licensing approaches,to improve regulator-to-regulator cooperation,to strengthen international safety incidentzz Nuclear safety1zz Nuclear securityzz Nuclear environmental remediation4The experts reviewed a list of proposed projects1designed to advance key objectives for bothcountries across all five thematic areas. Thislist is not meant to be exhaustive but ratherillustrative of the universe of prospectivecollaboration between the United States andRussia in the nuclear sphere. Some criticalprojects could proceed now; others will requiremore time as political relations improve and astrust is restored.The projects offered in this report were compiled fromU.S. and Russian proposals by the co-chairs of the 2016NTI-CENESS Dialogue on Potential U.S.-Russia NuclearCooperation in Moscow: Andrew Bieniawski (NTI) andAnton Khlopkov (CENESS). This compilation of possibleprojects does not necessarily reflect the views ofindividual participants at the conference.
On nuclear security, developing jointprojects to secure potentially dangerousradioactive sources and nuclear materialsin Central Asia, to prevent illicit trafficking ofnuclear and radioactive materials, to improvenuclear security education and trainingresources, and to expand nuclear securitytechnical cooperation with other countriesOn nuclear environmental remediation,advancing cooperative approaches—such as decommissioning nuclearfacilities, including those in third countries—andinnovative research and development (R&D) ontechnologies and processes to remediatecontaminated soil and groundwaterIn addition to the proposals, four broad themesemerged from the project.First, nuclear cooperation should not be heldhostage to oscillations in U.S.-Russian politicalrelations. The United States and Russia sharecommon interests, opportunities, and challengeson nuclear and scientific issues that do notchange with political swings. If a terroristdetonates a nuclear bomb in any major city or anuclear accident occurs, the consequences willbe immediate and will remain for generations.Many U.S.-Russian nuclear challenges areglobal and enduring, and it is in neither nation’sinterest to impose political costs on the other bywithholding technical cooperation that benefitseach country and the world. In the event of aterrorist attack or nuclear accident, the UnitedStates and Russia will need to rely on eachother. That is among the reasons cooperationon nuclear issues is so important—even duringtimes of serious disagreements on othermatters.Second, scientific engagement can be theengine for innovation in nuclear cooperationand can provide a basis for rebuilding trustbetween these two countries. Scientificcollaboration between the United States andRussia dates back centuries and continuedthrough the Cold War, and there remainsbroad, unrealized potential for cooperationbetween each country’s respective scientificcommunities. Yet this potential today isconstrained by political barriers that preventcollaboration between technical expertsworking in the U.S. and Russian nuclearsectors. Despite these barriers, experts shouldengage with one another to advance technicalunderstanding and to expand the boundariesof science for the mutual benefit of the U.S. andRussian populations.Third, nuclear cooperation should be premisedon the principle of mutual benefit. Both theUnited States and Russia have unique andsophisticated facilities, technologies, expertise,and experience, and they complement eachother. Future projects should be designed toleverage the capabilities of both nations to theirmutual benefit.Fourth, the United States and Russia have aspecial imperative to work together to addressthe threat of nuclear terrorism. As leadingnuclear exporters with nearly 90 percent ofthe world’s nuclear materials, the United Statesand Russia bear a special responsibility toensure that dangerous nuclear materials andradioactive sources (the key ingredients for a“dirty bomb”) never end up in the wrong hands.Given the growing capabilities and declaredobjectives of terrorist organizations, morework needs to be done across multiple levels—political, technical, and intelligence—to preventthese groups from acquiring the means to carryout acts of nuclear or radiological terror.It is now incumbent on key stakeholders fromboth governments to determine how best toadvance these initiatives. As described earlier,the projects listed in the following pages arerecommendations for prospective cooperation,recognizing that they will not all be possible toimplement immediately. Over time, however, astrust is rebuilt and cooperation improves, thereis hope that the governments of the UnitedStates and Russia will be able to realize more ofthese initiatives for the benefit of their citizensand the world.Pathways to Cooperationresponse and management, and to ensure thesafety of next-generation nuclear technologies5
NUCLEARSCIENCEPathways to CooperationThe United States andRussia have a richhistory of collaborationin science.6In 1789, U.S. statesman and scientistBenjamin Franklin invited Ekaterina Dashkovato become the first woman member of theAmerican Philosophical Society. The sameyear, the Duchess Dashkova helped secureFranklin’s appointment to the St. PetersburgAcademy of Sciences, the forerunner of theRussian Academy of Sciences. Since then, theUnited States and Russia have pursued manygreat achievements together, including thedevelopment of the live polio vaccine and thefirst international space partnership, the ApolloSoyuz Test Project.Even during the Cold War, Moscow andWashington found common ground. Forexample, in the sphere of nuclear science,Russia and the United States collaboratedformally for several decades on such projectsas the Soviet-American Gallium Experiment ofthe 1980s. Cooperation advanced in 1991, owingto the mutual understanding of the benefitsof bilateral engagement between two of theworld’s leading scientific communities. Thiscooperation paved the way for the first U.S.Russian “lab-to-lab” exchanges, which allowedU.S. and Russian nuclear scientists to meet their
Going forward, it is essential that both governments “do no harm”to the foundation of scientific collaboration that exists between theUnited States and Russia.In recent years, however, U.S. and Russiancollaboration in nuclear science has stalledbecause of the downturn in bilateral politicalrelations. Many scientists now face restrictionson travel to each other’s countries to conductscientific research. This development endangersmore than three decades of collaboration innuclear science and threatens a generation ofcooperative research endeavors.Going forward, it is essential that bothgovernments “do no harm” to the foundationof scientific collaboration that exists betweenthe United States and Russia. Scientificendeavors—pursued for the common good—should not fall victim to the frequent oscillationsin bilateral relations.Prospective bilateral and multilateral projectsfor nuclear science could include the following:zz Establish a joint working group to identifyprojects for U.S.-Russian cooperation aspart of an international research venturebased at the Multipurpose Fast ResearchReactor (MFRR). The MFRR is a uniqueresearch facility being constructed at theResearch Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR)in Dimitrovgrad with the capability to exposematerials to high-intensity neutron flux.This facility could prove valuable for futurebilateral research in advanced fuels, materials,simulations, transmutation, and fundamentalsciences. Investigations in these sphereswill support research on (a) promotingefficient consumption of nuclear fuels, (b)resolving technical barriers associated withspent nuclear fuel and radioactive wasteprocessing, (c) validating safe operationof nuclear fuels and components, and (d)reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation.zz Pursue cooperative research on radiationdamage and nuclear materials for reactorapplications. The United States and Russiahave distinct facilities and capabilities thatcan complement each other’s researchefforts. Certain advanced reactor designs,such as lead-cooled fast reactors, requireextensive testing to design and validatematerials that can withstand the harshoperating conditions inside the reactor.Both countries have unique neutron sources,such as the Multipurpose Fast ResearchReactor in Russia and the Spallation NeutronSource in the United States. Together, theselaboratories can leverage their cooperationto develop better materials for nuclearapplications, such as radiation-resistantmetals and ceramics. In addition, academicinstitutions in both countries can cooperateto conduct joint experiments at thesefacilities.Nuclear Sciencecounterparts for the first time. The relationshipsdeveloped between these constituencies provedinvaluable, as scientists from technical institutesand laboratories partnered to address immensesafety, security, and scientific challenges.7
Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR),Dimitrovgrad, Ulyanovsk Oblast, RussiaOak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge,Tennessee, United StatesSOURCE: Rosatom State Corporation EnterpriseSOURCE: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S.Department of EnergyPathways to Cooperationzz Establish cooperation on actinide chemistryand metallurgy to support work onadvanced nuclear fuels and fuel cycles.Both the United States and Russia areactively designing advanced nuclear fuelsbut with very different research facilities andexperiences. In addition, both countries havepursued lead-cooled and transmuting fastreactor designs at some point, but researchin designing appropriate fuel meats is notyet mature enough for demonstration anddeployment. Both countries stand to benefitfrom a bilateral project that shares priorexperiences and unique approaches to fueland fuel cycle research.8zz Pursue more extensive collaboration onexperiments in underground science andultralow background measurements. TheUnited States and Russia have a history ofcooperation in this field because of theircollaboration on the joint Soviet-AmericanGallium Experiment. The next generation ofexperiments investigating solar neutrino fluxwill benefit from facilities and capabilitiesunique to both the United States and Russia.Russia has extensive capacity for enrichmentof stable isotopes used for internationalexperiments in nuclear science and providedthe liquid xenon used at the EnrichedXenon Observatory in New Mexico. The nextgeneration of experiments will require evenmore extensive U.S.-Russian cooperation,owing to the fact that increasingly sensitiveexperiments will require larger amounts ofisotopically pure xenon.zz Pursue parallel (and eventually joint)analytical chemistry and radiochemistryexercises to improve methodologies andto support nuclear forensics and nuclearnonproliferation safeguards. Before thedeterioration of U.S.-Russian relations,bilateral analyses of nuclear samples wereplanned between U.S. national laboratoriesand their Russian counterparts. Theseanalyses are generally conducted againstestablished standards. Different countriesand sometimes different laboratories withincountries use different standards. As aresult, the United States and Russia havecompiled distinct but complementary datasets. Exchanges of best practices and nuclearsamples would be valuable to global nuclearforensics and nonproliferation stakeholders,including the International Technical WorkingGroup on Nuclear Forensics, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and boththe United States and Russia. A researchorganization in a third country, such asthe Institute for Transuranium Elementsin Karlsruhe, Germany, could also provide
zz Conduct joint experiments to determinethe cross-sections of high-energy neutrons’interactions with various materials. Modelingprocesses that take place inside nuclearreactors requires detailed knowledge ofcross-sections of various reactions andfission yields and of half-lives of short-livedradionuclides, but some of these data arehighly uncertain because of the state ofthe art when nuclear-data campaigns wereundertaken decades ago. Both the UnitedStates and Russia will gain by collaboratingto improve the quality and sophistication ofdata inputs to their computer models. Suchcollaboration will enable accurate modelingof myriad processes, such as those takingplace inside fast neutron reactors in orderto develop novel nuclear fuels, or thosetaking place in improvised nuclear devices toadvance nuclear forensics capabilities.zz Reinvigorate cooperative research onnuclear data measurements. Fundamentalphysical characteristics of certain nucleardata—such as half-lives, neutron crosssections, and fission yields—are often highlyuncertain because of the state of the artwhen research campaigns were undertakendecades ago. These measurements arenot inherently sensitive from a securityperspective, and both the United Statesand Russia have incomplete data on certainspecies that may complement each other.zz Pursue joint development of technologyand hardware for monitoring shipmentsof nuclear and radioactive materials. TheUnited States and Russia have independentlydeveloped various technologies anddatabases to monitor the shipments ofnuclear and radioactive materials to ensurethe safety and security of shipments and tocounter nuclear smuggling, including duringlegal shipments. Collaboration in this fieldwill leverage both countries’ expertise inmonitoring transportation of nuclear andradioactive materials.zz Cooperate on lower-cost, more compact,and higher-resolution radiation detectorsystems for countering nuclear smuggling.U.S. and Russian researchers have exploreddifferent materials and approaches fordetection that may complement eachother in advanced detector technologies.Future research may focus on developing(a) improved detection capabilities; (b)alternative technologies to helium-3based detectors; and (c) active particleinterrogation techniques for detection ofshielded materials, a challenge common toradiation detectors in both countries.zz Strengthen engagement under the NuclearSafety Research working group of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operationand Development’s (OECD) Nuclear EnergyAgency (NEA) and increase cooperationon a prioritized nuclear safety researchagenda. Both Russia and the United Statesparticipate in the OECD NEA’s Nuclear SafetyResearch working group, which uses facilitiesaround the world. But existing work couldbe augmented by the world’s two largestnuclear powers by projects conducted in theUnited States and Russia. In particular, bothcountries have made specific contributionsin advanced modeling and simulationcapabilities in the field of nuclear safety thatcan complement each other’s independentefforts.zz Support cooperative research on radioactivewaste in underground tanks and on wasteforms. Owing to their nuclear legacies,both Russia and the United States havesubstantial radioactive waste caches storedin underground tanks. Managing the integrityand minimizing the environmental impactsof these tanks are a complex and expensiveendeavor. Russia and the United Stateshave taken different approaches in R&Dof advanced waste technologies, and theirshared environmental experiences wouldprovide substantial value to both nations’stewardship of radioactive waste.Nuclear Sciencereference materials. These initial datasharing efforts could serve as a foundationfor a broader array of joint or simultaneousanalyses of samples and could lay thegroundwork for the two countries to establisha nuclear forensics technical working groupto develop and routinely exercise proceduresfor addressing technical issues, includingsample and data exchange and analysis.9
NUCLEARENERGYPathways to CooperationAddressing climatechange will require thesafe and secure use ofnuclear energy.10Nuclear power plants affordably and reliablyprovide more than 11 percent of electricityglobally. Given projected 21st-century energyrequirements, expanding the supply of baseload power delivered by nuclear energy willbe essential to meeting surging demand. Inaddition, nuclear energy is a crucial part ofthe answer to the global challenge of climatechange, as it is one of the proven energysources already deployed on a large scale andone that produces negligible greenhouse gasemissions.The U.S. and Russian nuclear establishmentsare among the world’s largest. They are marketleaders for reactors, fuels, and materials, andthey are at the forefront of efforts to developthe next generation of nuclear technologies.Enhanced bilateral nuclear cooperation canproduce mutually beneficial outcomes by(a) expanding commercial nuclear energy,(b) reducing the cost of nuclear power, (c)increasing industry profits, and (d) generatinghigher standards of safety and security aroundthe world.
Enhanced bilateral nuclear cooperation can produce mutuallybeneficial outcomes by expanding commercial nuclear energy,reducing the cost of nuclear power, increasing industry profits, andgenerating higher standards of safety and security around the world.zz Establish a joint working group tostudy, develop, and demonstrate futuregenerations of nuclear reactors. Innovativetechnologies can reduce energy costs,reduce up-front investment costs, increasesafety, and increase proliferation resistance.Technical experts can collaborate on a hostof reactor concepts and designs, includingsmall modular reactors and fast reactors. Inparticular, several existing research groupsshould be formalized and coordinated tofocus on challenges for Generation IV leadcooled fast reactors, in particular materialsthat are resistant to corrosion, temperature,and radiation. Future cooperation can alsoinclude joint development of novel fuels,such as high-density and metallic fuels(with applications for both fast and researchreactors).zz Develop accident-tolerant fuels. The disasterat Fukushima in 2011 vividly illustratedthe urgency of developing fuels that willmaintain integrity longer and better thanstandard uranium dioxide–zirconium fuelsin the case of a loss-of-coolant accident.The United States and Russia should initiatetechnical collaboration on accident-tolerantfuels within the international frameworkof the IAEA Technical Working Group onNuclear Fuel Cycle Options and Spent FuelManagement.zz Collaborate on bilateral ventures acrossthe fuel cycle to promote safe, secure, andreliable nuclear power development. A hostof bilateral projects would be beneficial toboth U.S. and Russian nuclear industries,including reciprocal access to (a) supplychains (incorporating U.S. equipment—instrumentation, control systems, andgenerators—into Russian-designed reactors);(b) fuel fabrication research, development,and demonstration (RD&D); and (c) policiesand practices that will help increase thedepth of fabrication supply sources, fuelbundling, and cradle-to-grave fuel services(incorporating Russian fuel cycle capabilities),as well as coordination on procurement,quality assurance, and liability standards. Inthe management of used fuel and high-levelwaste, opportunities for collaboration includetechnical work on waste forms, research onthe economics of interim storage and finaldisposal, dry cask storage technology, andunderground research laboratory RD&D toaddress such challenges as repository designand deep borehole disposal.zz Cooperate in third countries across the fuelcycle to ensure the safe operation of nuclearpower plants, to advance nonproliferationobjectives, and to promote reliable, costeffective nuclear energy. Many topicsdiscussed above can also be pursuedcollaboratively in third-country markets,including fuel bundling, cradle-to-graveservices, procurement coordination, qualityassurance, common international liabilityNuclear EnergyProspective bilateral and multilateral projectsfor nuclear energy could include the following:11
standards, and management of used fueland high-level waste. The United States andRussia should also consider exploring lowcost financing options for—and the politicaland economic benefits of—taking back usedfuel and high-level waste from these markets.zz Cooperate on transportation of used fueland high-level waste. Transportation of usedfuel and high-level waste has an outstandingsafety record. However, there is always morework that U.S. and Russian experts can doto improve safety and security of used fueland high-level waste in transit. In particular,some technical challenges are ripe forcollaboration, including package design (i.e.,packages that can accommodate multiplefuel types) and safety analyses (e.g., packageperformance in long-duration fires).Pathways to Cooperationzz Establish joint exchange programs forstudents and young professionals. Giventhe long realization time of nuclear energyprojects and concerns over the aging ofthe nuclear workforce, connections madebetween younger generations now willhave positive results in the future. TheUnited States and Russia should promotetechnical discussions and exchanges betweenearly-career nuclear engineers to developthe next generation of technical experts.Organizations such as the World Associationof Nuclear Operators (WANO) and theInstitute of Nuclear Power Operationsrepresent a starting point, as both supportYoung Generation in Nuclear chapters inthe United States and internationally. Otherpromising forums include major conferences(e.g., Atomexpo and the American NuclearSociety Conference); research exchanges;and student activities, such as the summercamp Forsage in Russia.12zz Provide educational and training supportfor nuclear infrastructure development innuclear newcomer countries. Thirty countriesare currently actively considering launchingtheir own nuclear energy programs, andRussia and the United States have eachsecured supply agreements with manyof these newcomer countries. Variouseducational and training projects are alreadyunder way to assist newcomers, but bettercoordination between U.S. and RussianBN-800 Fast Breeder Reactor, Beloyarsk NuclearPower Station, Zarechny, Sverdlovsk Oblast,RussiaSOURCE: Rosatom State Corporation Enterpriseprograms will increase the efficiency ofrelated efforts. Focusing on and conductingexchanges with early-career engineers canhelp train and develop the next generationof technical experts. Programs that arejointly developed and taught and that targettechnical employees and mid- and top-levelmanagement can include classroom
safety of next-generation nuclear technologies On nuclear security, developing joint projects to secure potentially dangerous radioactive sources and nuclear materials in Central Asia, to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, to improve nuclear security education and training resources, and to expand nuclear security
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Nuclear Chemistry What we will learn: Nature of nuclear reactions Nuclear stability Nuclear radioactivity Nuclear transmutation Nuclear fission Nuclear fusion Uses of isotopes Biological effects of radiation. GCh23-2 Nuclear Reactions Reactions involving changes in nucleus Particle Symbol Mass Charge
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Guide for Nuclear Medicine NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATION OF NUCLEAR MEDICINE. Jeffry A. Siegel, PhD Society of Nuclear Medicine 1850 Samuel Morse Drive Reston, Virginia 20190 www.snm.org Diagnostic Nuclear Medicine Guide for NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATION OF NUCLEAR MEDICINE. Abstract This reference manual is designed to assist nuclear medicine professionals in .
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