EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT - Federation Of American Scientists
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT1999«««««««««« ««2004Session documentFINALA5-0264/2001PAR111 July 2001REPORTon the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercialcommunications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))Part 1: Motion for a resolutionExplanatory statementTemporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception SystemRapporteur: Gerhard SchmidRR\445698EN.docENPE 305.391EN
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CONTENTSPagePROCEDURAL PAGE . 9MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION . 10EXPLANATORY STATEMENT . 211.Introduction: .211.1.1.2.1.2.1.1.2.2.1.3.1.4.1.5.1.6.The reasons for setting up the committee .21The claims made in the two STOA studies on a global interception systemcodenamed ECHELON .21The first STOA report of 1997 .21The 1999 STOA reports.21The mandate of the committee .22Why not a committee of inquiry? .22Working method and schedule .23Characteristics ascribed to the ECHELON system .232.The operations of foreign intelligence services .252.1.2.2.2.3.2.4.2.4.1.2.4.2.2.5.Introduction .25What is espionage? .25Espionage targets .25Espionage methods .25Human intelligence.26Processing of electromagnetic signals .26The operations of certain intelligence services.273.Technical conditions governing the interception oftelecommunications.303.1.3.2.3.3.3.3.1.3.3.2.The interceptibility of various communication media.30The scope for interception on the spot .30The scope for a worldwide interception system .31Access to communication media .31Scope for the automatic analysis of intercepted communications:the use of filters .35The example of the German Federal Intelligence Service.353.3.3.PE 305.391EN4/194RR\445698EN.doc
4.Satellite communications technology .4.3.1.4.3.2.4.3.3.4.3.4.The significance of telecommunications satellites .37How a satellite link operates.38Geostationary satellites .38The route followed by signals sent via a satellite communication link.38The most important satellite communication systems.39The allocation of frequencies.43Satellite footprints.43The size of antennae required by an earth station.44Satellite communications for military purposes .45General.45Frequencies used for military purposes .45Size of the receiving stations .45Examples of military communications satellites .455.Clues to the existence of at least one global interception system. 5.7.1.5.7.2.5.7.3.Why is it necessary to work on the basis of clues? .47Evidence of interception activity on the part of foreign intelligence services .47Evidence for the existence of stations in the necessary geographical areas .47Evidence of a close intelligence association .48How can a satellite communications interception station be recognised? .48Criterion 1: accessibility of the installation .48Criterion 2: type of antenna .48Criterion 3: size of antenna .49Criterion 4: evidence from official sources .49Publicly accessible data about known interception stations .50Method.50Detailed analysis .50Summary of the findings .59The UKUSA Agreement.59The historical development of the UKUSA Agreement.59Evidence for the existence of the agreement .61Evaluation of declassified American documents.62Nature of documents.62Content of documents .63Summary.66Information from authors and journalists specialised in this field .67Nicky Hager's book .67Duncan Campbell .68Jeff Richelson .69James Bamford .69Bo Elkjaer and Kenan Seeberg .70Statements by former intelligence service employees.71Margaret Newsham (former NSA employee).71Wayne Madsen (former NSA employee) .71Mike Frost (former Canadian secret service employee).71RR\445698EN.doc5/194PE 305.391EN
5.10.5.10.1.5.10.2.5.10.3.Fred Stock (former Canadian secret service employee) .72Information from government sources .72USA .72UK.72Australia.73New Zealand .73The Netherlands.73Italy .74Questions to the Council and Commission.74Parliamentary reports.75Reports by the Comité Permanent R, Belgium's monitoring committee.75Report by the French National Assembly's Committee on National Defence.75Report of the Italian Parliament's Committee on Intelligence and Security Servicesand State Security .766.Might there be other global interception systems? . 776.1.6.1.1.6.1.2.6.2.6.3.6.4.Requirements of such a system.77Technical and geographical requirements .77Political and economic requirements.77France .77Russia.78The other G-8 States and China.797.Compatibility of an 'ECHELON' type communicationsinterception system with Union law. 807.1.7.2.7.2.1.7.2.2.7.3.Preliminary considerations .80Compatibility of an intelligence system with Union law .80Compatibility with EC law .80Compatibility with other EU law.81The question of compatibility in the event of misuse of the system forindustrial espionage .82Conclusion .827.4.8.The compatibility of communications surveillance by intelligenceservices with the fundamental right to privacy . 838.1.8.2.8.3.8.3.1.8.3.2.8.3.3.Communications surveillance as a violation of the fundamental right to privacy .83The protection of privacy under international agreements .83The rules laid down in the ECHR.84The importance of the ECHR in the EU.84The geographical and personal scope of the protection provided under the ECHR.85The admissibility of telecommunications surveillance pursuant to Article 8 of theECHR.85The significance of Article 8 of the ECHR for the activities of intelligenceservices) .868.3.4.PE 305.391EN6/194RR\445698EN.doc
8.4.8.4.1.8.4.2.The requirement to monitor closely the activities of other countries' intelligenceservices .87Inadmissibility of moves to circumvent Article 8 of the ECHR through the useof other countries' intelligence services.87Implications of allowing non-European intelligence services to carry outoperations on the territory of Member States which are ECHR contracting parties 889.Are EU citizens adequately protected against the activities ofintelligence services? . 919.1.9.2.9.3.9.4.Protection against the activities of intelligence services: a task for the nationalparliaments.91The powers enjoyed by national authorities to carry out surveillance measures .91Monitoring of intelligence services .92Assessment of the situation for European citizens .9510.Protection against industrial espionage . .10.10.1.10.10.2.10.10.3.10.10.4.10.10.5.Firms as espionage targets .97Espionage targets in detail .97Competitive intelligence.98Damage caused by industrial espionage .98Who carries out espionage? .99Company employees (insider crime) .99Private espionage firms.100Hackers .100Intelligence services.100How is espionage carried out?.100Industrial espionage by states .101Strategic industrial espionage by the intelligence services.101Intelligence services as agents of competitive intelligence .101Is ECHELON suitable for industrial espionage?.102Published cases .102Protection against industrial espionage .107Legal protection .107Other obstacles to industrial espionage .107The USA and industrial espionage .108The challenge for the US Administration: industrial espionage against US firms.109The attitude of the US Administration towards active industrial espionage .110Legal situation with regard to the payment of bribes to public officials .111The role of the Advocacy Center in promoting US exports .112Security of computer networks .114The importance of this chapter .114The risks inherent in the use by firms of modern information technology .114Frequency of attacks on networks .116Perpetrators and methods.116Attacks from outside by hackers.117RR\445698EN.doc7/194PE 305.391EN
10.11.10.11.1.10.11.2.10.11.3.Under-estimation of the risks.117Risk-awareness in firms.117Risk-awareness among scientists.118Risk-awareness in the European institutions .11811.Cryptography as a means of self-protection. .5.2.11.5.3.11.6.Purpose and method of encryption .120Purpose of encryption .120How encryption works.120Security of encryption systems.121Meaning of 'security' in encryption: general observations .121Absolute security: the one-time pad .122Relative security at the present state of technology.122Standardisation and the deliberate restriction of security.123The problem of the secure distribution/handover of keys .124Asymmetric encryption: the public-key process .124Public-key encryption for private individuals .125Future processes.125Security of encryption products.125Encryption in conflict with state interests .126Attempts to restrict encryption .126The significance of secure encryption for e-commerce.126Problems for business travellers .126Practical issues in connection with encryption .12712.The EU's external relations and intelligence gathering. uction.128Scope for cooperation within the EU.128Existing cooperation .128Advantages of a joint European intelligence policy .129Concluding remarks.129Cooperation beyond EU level.129Final remarks .13113.Conclusions and recommendations . 13213.1.13.2.Conclusions.132Recommendations .135PE 305.391EN8/194RR\445698EN.doc
PROCEDURAL PAGEAt the sitting of 5 July 2000 the European Parliament decided, pursuant to Rule 150(2) of itsRules of Procedure, to set up a Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception Systemand laid down its mandate as outlined in Chapter 1, 1.3. With a view to fulfilling that mandate, atits constituent meeting of 9 July 2000 the Temporary Committee appointed Gerhard Schmidrapporteur.At its meetings of 29 May, 20 June and 3 July 2001 the committee considered the draft report.At the last meeting the committee adopted the motion for a resolution by 27 votes to 5, with 2abstentions.The following were present for the vote: Carlos Coelho, chairman; Elly Plooij-van Gorsel, NeilMacCormick and Giuseppe Di Lello Finuoli, vice-chairmen; Gerhard Schmid, rapporteur; MaryElizabeth Banotti, Bastiaan Belder, Maria Berger, Charlotte Cederschiöld, Gérard M.J. Deprez,Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Robert J.E. Evans, Colette Flesch, Pernille Frahm, Anna Karamanou,Eva Klamt, Alain Krivine, Torben Lund, Erika Mann, Jean-Charles Marchiani, Hugues Martin,Patricia McKenna, William Francis Newton Dunn (for Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar), ReinoPaasilinna, Bernd Posselt (for Hubert Pirker), Jacques Santer (for Catherine Lalumière), IlkaSchröder, Gary Titley (for Ozan Ceyhun), Maurizio Turco, Gianni Vattimo, W.G. van Velzen,Christian Ulrik von Boetticher, Jan Marinus Wiersma and Christos Zacharakis (for Enrico Ferri).The minority opinions and the annexes will be published separately (A5-0264/2001-Par2).The report was tabled on 11 July 2001.The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant partsession.RR\445698EN.doc9/194PE 305.391EN
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTIONEuropean Parliament resolution on the existence of a global system for the interception ofprivate and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system)(2001/2098 (INI))The European Parliament,– having regard to its decision of 5 July 2000 to set up a Temporary Committee on theECHELON Interception System and the mandate issued to the Temporary Committee1,– having regard to the EC Treaty, one objective of which is the establishment of a commonmarket with a high level of competitiveness,– having regard to Articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty on European Union, which impose on theMember States a binding requirement to enhance and develop their mutual politicalsolidarity,– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 6(2) thereof, which laysdown the requirement that the EU must respect fundamental rights, and Title V thereof,which sets out provisions governing the common foreign and security policy,– having regard to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Article 7 of which lays downthe right to respect for private and family life and explicitly enshrines the right to respect forcommunications, and Article 8 of which protects personal data,– having regard to having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), inparticular Article 8 thereof, which governs the protection of private life and theconfidentiality of correspondence, and the many other international conventions whichprovide for the protection of privacy,– having regard to the work carried out by the Temporary Committee on the ECHELONInterception System, which held a large number of hearings and meetings with experts of allkinds, and in particular with senior representatives of the public and private sectors in thesphere of telecommunications and data protection, with employees of intelligence andinformation services, with journalists, with lawyers with expert knowledge of this area, withmembers of the national parliaments of the Member States, etc.,– having regard to Rule 150(2) of its Rules of Procedure,– having regard to the report of the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON InterceptionSystem (A5-0264/2001),1OJ C 121, 24.4.2001, p. 36PE 305.391EN10/194RR\445698EN.doc
The existence of a global system for intercepting private and commercial communications (theECHELON interception system)A.whereas the existence of a global system for intercepting communications, operating bymeans of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among the USA, the UK, Canada,Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement, is no longer in doubt; whereasit seems likely, in view of the evidence and the consistent pattern of statements from a verywide range of individuals and organisations, including American sources, that its name isin fact ECHELON, although this is a relatively minor detail,B.whereas there can now be no doubt that the purpose of the system is to intercept, at thevery least, private and commercial communications, and not military communications,although the analysis carried out in the report has revealed that the technical capabilities ofthe system are probably not nearly as extensive as some sections of the media hadassumed,C.whereas, therefore, it is surprising, not to say worrying, that many senior Communityfigures, including European Commissioners, who gave evidence to the TemporaryCommittee claimed to be unaware of this phenomenon,The limits of the interception systemD.whereas the surveillance system depends, in particular, upon worldwide interception ofsatellite communications, although in areas characterised by a high volume ofcommunications only a very small proportion of those communications are transmitted bysatellite; whereas this means that the majority of communications cannot be intercepted byearth stations, but only by tapping cables and intercepting radio signals, something which as the investigations carried out in connection with the report have shown - is possible onlyto a limited extent; whereas the numbers of personnel required for the final analysis ofintercepted communications imposes further restrictions; whereas, therefore, the UKUSAstates have access to only a very limited proportion of cable and radio communications andcan analyse an even more limited proportion of those communications, and whereas,further, however extensive the resources and capabilities for the interception ofcommunications may be, the extremely high volume of traffic makes exhaustive, detailedmonitoring of all communications impossible in practice,The possible existence of other interception systemsE.whereas the interception of communications is a method of spying commonly employed byintelligence services, so that other states might also operate similar systems, provided thatthey have the required funds and the right locations; whereas France is the only EUMember State which is – thanks to its overseas territories – geographically and technicallycapable of operating autonomously a global interception system and also possesses thetechnical and organisational infrastructure to do so; whereas there is also ample evidencethat Russia is likely to operate such a system,RR\445698EN.doc11/194PE 305.391EN
Compatibility with EU lawF.whereas, as regards the question of the compatibility of a system of the ECHELON typewith EU law, it is necessary to distinguish between two scenarios: if a system is usedpurely for intelligence purposes, there is no violation of EU law, since operations in theinterests of state security are not subject to the EC Treaty, but would fall under Title V ofthe Treaty on European Union (CFSP), although at present that title lays down noprovisions on the subject, so that no criteria are available; if, on the other hand, the systemis misused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence, such action is at oddswith the Member States’ duty of loyalty and with the concept of a common mar
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1999 2004 Session document FINAL A5-0264/2001 PAR1 11 July 2001 REPORT on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI)) Part 1: Motion for a resolution Explanatory statement Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System
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