Proactively Countering North Korea's Advancing Nuclear Threats
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSProactively CounteringNorth Korea’s AdvancingNuclear Threatsby Markus GarlauskasIATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSAtlantic CouncilSCOWCROFT CENTERFOR STRATEGY AND SECURITYProactively CounteringNorth Korea’s AdvancingNuclear Threatsby Markus GarlauskasIIATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSACKNOWLEDGMENTSThis report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council policy on intellectualindependence. The authors are solely responsible for their analysis and recommendations. TheAtlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocatefor any of this report’s conclusions.ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-419-3Cover: North Korea’s only test launch of its Hwasong-15 mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. NorthKorea claimed the missile is capable of delivering a “super super-large heavy warhead” to anywherein the United States. Writing for 38 North, US missile expert Michael Elleman assessed that it “ coulddeliver a moderately-sized nuclear weapon to any city on the US mainland.” November 28, 2017.Source: Korea Central News Agency.December 2021 2021 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of thispublication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means withoutpermission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in newsarticles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to:Atlantic Council, 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005IIIATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSAtlantic CouncilSCOWCROFT CENTERFOR STRATEGY AND SECURITYThe Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisanstrategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States andits allies and partners. The Center honors the legacy of service of General Brent Scowcroftand embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for USleadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of thenext generation of leaders.Our namesake, General Scowcroft, was the chairman of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission thatestablished the bipartisan basis for US nuclear deterrence and arms control through the endof the Cold War. As the United States enters a new era of strategic challenges, the ScowcroftCenter is proud to play a central role in crafting an effective and nonpartisan strategic forcespolicy for the twenty-first century.The Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense (FD) practice shapes the debate around the greatest defense challenges facing the United States and its allies, and creates forward-lookingassessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare.Through the futures we forecast, the scenarios we wargame, and the analyses we produce, FD develops actionable strategies to help the United States navigate major powerconflict and defend forward, alongside allies and partners. As the character of war rapidlychanges, FD assesses the operational concepts and defense industrial tools necessary toeffectively deter and defend against emerging military challenges.IVATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSTable of ContentsExecutive Summary 1Introduction 1North Korea’s Growing Nuclear Capabilities 2Prospects and Implications for Further Growth 7Reorienting US Strategy and Policy 10Investing To Outpace North Korea 14Improving Operational Countermeasures 18Conclusion 20About the Author 20Acknowledgments 21VATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSExecutive SummaryIf North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities continueadvancing along the path laid out by North Korean leaderKim Jong Un, they will far outstrip those needed simply toensure regime survival by deterring external threats. As thisreport explains, despite the economic challenges North Koreafaces, it has continued to make quantitative and qualitativeprogress in its weapons programs toward ambitious goals. At amajor ruling party meeting in January 2021, Kim unveiled plansthat include fielding smaller tactical nuclear weapons suitablefor battlefield use, missiles with multiple warheads, and morecapable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can hittargets throughout the United States with nuclear warheads.1If this nuclear threat expands unchecked, and if North Koreacontinues its longstanding pattern of coercion against SouthKorea, Washington could face a terrible choice: either risk amilitary confrontation that could lead to millions of Americandeaths in an ensuing nuclear war or stand by as North Koreaintimidates a US treaty ally into submission.This report contends that a proactive strategy—unlike thelargely reactive approaches that have characterized USpolicy on North Korea for decades—is required to preventsuch a situation. Though the United States and SouthKorea are investing in military modernization with hugetechnological and economic advantages over North Korea,their capabilities are not advancing quickly enough toforestall such a scenario.This report outlines a strategy of impeding the progress ofNorth Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, investing to getout ahead of improvements in North Korea’s arsenal, andadjusting operational approaches to counter the growingthreat. Under this strategy, North Korea’s weapons programswould be further inhibited by a diplomatic focus on weaponstests and a recalibrated approach to sanctions. US defenseacquisitions would encompass new theater-level countermissile assets and national missile defenses alongside overallnuclear modernization efforts. Meanwhile, reinvigoratedtraining and reinforced resilience of US and allied forces inKorea would help shore up deterrence despite North Korea’sadvancing capabilities.1231IntroductionNorth Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities—onceviewed with derision by outside observers—have beenadvancing rapidly in recent years despite internationaldiplomatic efforts and United Nations (UN) economic sanctionsdesigned to end these weapons programs. If these programscontinue along the path North Korean leader Kim Jong Unhas outlined to his country’s ruling body, then North Korea’snuclear capabilities will provide a flexible tactical nuclear force,robust regional nuclear strike options, and the capability tocredibly threaten the US homeland with nuclear retaliationwith a robust second-strike capability.2 Taken together,these capabilities increase the odds that Pyongyang wouldaggressively leverage its nuclear weapons for coercion andwould even risk escalating to limited nuclear use in the eventof war.3The continued improvement and expansion of North Koreannuclear and missile capabilities, if unchecked, would thereforedrive a dramatic increase in the risk of two serious scenarioscoming to pass in the years ahead. First, a North Koreaemboldened by its enhanced capabilities could make agrave miscalculation that would lead to spiraling escalation,eventually leading to a nuclear war that results in millions ofdeaths—many of them Americans. Alternately, North Koreannuclear-backed coercion could lead to Seoul’s acquiescenceto Pyongyang’s demands, effectively ending the US-SouthKorea alliance as Washington distances itself to avoid the riskof nuclear retaliation.“On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK,” Korea Central News Agency as reflected on KCNA Watch (website ofaggregator), September 1, 2021, -8th-congressof-wpk/.“On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK.”Nuclear use short of a full-scale attack on South Korean and American cities could be considered “limited.”ATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSNorth Korea’s Growing Nuclear CapabilitiesAfter decades of slow and halting progress, NorthKorea began demonstrating rapid growth in itsnuclear weapons capabilities in recent years.Though these capabilities were still nascent when Kim wasconsolidating power in the aftermath of his father’s death adecade ago, North Korea is now a nuclear-armed state posingan increasingly credible threat to US allies, military bases, andeven cities in the continental United States.North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities have advanced inthree key areas over the last few years: 456789102The display and testing of more advanced nuclearwarhead designs, particularly of a “standardized”fission missile warhead and an apparent “standardized”thermonuclear missile warhead (detailed below).Highly enriched uranium production and a growingstockpile of fissile material—assessed by a range ofexperts to already be sufficient for dozens of nuclearwarheads.Qualitative and quantitative growth in nuclear-capableballistic missiles and their mobile launchers. Indicators ofqualitative growth included the first flight tests of ICBMsand intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), along withrepeated tests of various new types of missiles short ofIRBM range.4 This growth also encompassed the productionand display of additional launch platforms, including largerwheeled transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with moreaxles and entirely new tracked TEL designs, as well assubmarine- and train-launched systems.ADVANCING WARHEAD DESIGNSNorth Korea has been conducting underground tests ofnuclear weapons since its first attempt in 2006 produced ayield so small that US officials characterized it as a “fizzle.”5The next two tests in 2009 and 2013 showed progress inyield, albeit slowly. Then, in 2016 and 2017, the pace of testingsharply accelerated to three more tests in just twenty-onemonths—with the seismic readings from the last one showinga dramatic increase in yield.6North Korea’s last two nuclear tests, in September 2016and 2017, also mark key milestones because North Koreaclaims they are of “standardized warhead designs” that canfit into missile reentry vehicles (RVs).7 Prior to these tests,the commander of US Forces Korea publicly expressed theview that North Korea probably had the technology to makewarheads small and light enough to mount on missiles, buthad not yet tested them.8 These tests each came after statemedia aired pictures of Kim inspecting a new warheaddesign. In 2016, North Korea displayed a “standardized”spherical fission-implosion warhead design—dubbed the“disco ball” by US analysts—months before an undergroundnuclear test estimated to have been at least as large as theexplosion that destroyed Nagasaki.9 In 2017, North Koreadisplayed a two-stage thermonuclear warhead design—thisone dubbed “the peanut”—just hours before a test thatwas over ten times larger and consistent with the yield ofa hydrogen bomb, a far more destructive and advancednuclear weapon design.10 Each of these warhead designswas displayed alongside a missile RV, to make it clear thatthe design would fit inside the appropriate RV. Though it isICBMs are typically defined as having a range greater than 5,500 kilometers (3,500 miles, and roughly the distance from North Korea to Anchorage, Alaska),while IRBMs have a range between 3,000 km and 5,500 km (missiles that could reach Guam and the Aleutian Islands of Alaska from North Korea would fallinto this category). See Kelsey Davenport, “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,” Arms Control Association, December 2017, �9 October 2006–First DPRK Nuclear Test,” Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, ber-2006-first-dprk-nuclear-test; and “U.S. Official: N. Korea Test Likely ‘Nuclear Fizzle,’” NBC News, October 13, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna15249383.American Geophysical Union, “2017 North Korean Nuclear Test 10 Times Larger than Previous Tests, New Study Finds,” EurekAlert! (science news service),June 3, 2019, https://www.eurekalert.org/pub releases/2019-06/agu-2nk060319.php.“North Korea Claims Success in Fifth Nuclear Test,” BBC News, September 9, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37314927; “North Korea NuclearTests: What Did They Achieve?” BBC News, September 3, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17823706.David Alexander and Phil Stewart, “U.S. General Says He Believes North Korea Can Build Nuclear Warhead,” Reuters, October 24, 2014, y Lewis, “North Korea’s Nuke Program Is Way More Sophisticated Than You Think,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2016, erous-than-you-think/.Jeffrey Lewis, “Welcome to the Thermonuclear Club, North Korea!” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2017, ethermonuclear-club-north-korea/; and “U.S. Nuclear Commander Assumes North Korea Tested H-bomb Sept. 3,” CBS News, September 15, 2017, C COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSKim Jong Un inspects what North Korean state media claimed to be a nuclear warhead in 2017. Source: Korea Central News Agency.hard to entirely rule out an elaborate deception wheneverPyongyang is involved, the burden of proof is now fully onanyone claiming that North Korea does not have nuclearwarheads that can fit on its missiles.Further, Kim declared in January 2021 that North Korea has“already accumulated nuclear technology” to “miniaturize,lighten and standardize nuclear weapons,” including tacticalnuclear weapons.11 If true, this development has majorimplications for the threat that North Korea poses to the UnitedStates and its allies. This development would mean that evenrelatively small North Korean missiles and larger artilleryrockets could be nuclear capable, dramatically increasing therisk that a conflict with North Korea would escalate to nuclearuse—either because Pyongyang believed that battlefield useof tactical warheads would not necessarily escalate to full-scalenuclear war or because South Korean and US forces wouldend up striking nuclear-armed systems that are essentiallyindistinguishable from conventional ones.Such a development would also mean that North Korea hasnuclear warheads small enough to dramatically expand its113options for missiles carrying multiple RVs. (See page 7 belowfor more on multiple RVs.) Warheads much smaller than the“disco ball” would allow North Korea to use RVs small enoughthat more than one could fit on a wider variety of its missiledesigns, with correspondingly larger numbers of RVs on itslargest missiles.If Kim’s statement is true, North Korea would also have theincentive to display and test a smaller tactical warhead designbeyond the two warhead designs it has already shown.EXPANDED PRODUCTION,GROWING NUCLEAR STOCKPILEIn addition to this highly publicized qualitative improvementof North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, its fissile material productioncapacity has expanded, and its nuclear stockpile has grown inquantity. Because North Korea has never claimed a particularnumber of warheads, and no precise intelligence assessmentof the number has ever been publicly released, open-sourceanalysts must base estimates of the stockpile on the limitedinformation available.“On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK.”ATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSToday, it is widely known that North Korea has producedtwo different types of fissile material: plutonium andhighly enriched uranium (HEU). In the early days of NorthKorea’s nuclear weapons program, it established a reactorat Yongbyon—along with the equipment for reprocessingspent reactor fuel into plutonium for nuclear weapons.12Ending the plutonium program was the focus of the 1994US-North Korean Agreed Framework, which collapsed afterNorth Korea admitted it had also been enriching uraniumfor nuclear weapons.13 Though the North Koreans revealeda uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon in 2010, a rangeof international nuclear experts have since warned thatNorth Korea has also been producing highly enriched (i.e.,weapons-grade) uranium at other sites.14year.15 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—anoft-cited source for global nuclear stockpiles—estimated forty tofifty North Korean warheads as of June 2021, an increase from itsestimate of thirty to forty in 2020.16There is virtual unanimity in published analysis of North Korea’snuclear weapons program that fissile material and warheadproduction is continuing, making the size of North Korea’sstockpile a moving target. As a result of this combination ofuncertainty and ongoing production, publicly available estimatesof North Korea’s stockpile vary, and are typically expressed asa range of figures with an estimate of growth in warheads perAfter a limited success with test launches of the Hwasong-10(Musudan) IRBM in 2016, North Korea began testing theHwasong-12 IRBM in 2017.17 With two test launches over Japanwell into the Pacific, the Hwasong-12 proved it had the range toreach the US strategic bomber base on Guam and potentiallyUS missile defense facilities in Alaska.18 Pyongyang’s statemedia claimed that the Hwasong-12 can carry a “large-size121314151617184IMPROVING, GROWING NUCLEAR-CAPABLEMISSILE FORCEIn 2017, North Korea’s ability to threaten US cities with nuclearweapons moved from just a notional possibility to at least anascent capability. North Korea test-launched new mobileballistic missiles that can reach US territory, including Guamand parts of Alaska, with IRBMs and Hawaii and the contiguousUnited States with ICBMs.David Albright, “North Korean Plutonium Production,” Science & Global Security Vol. 5 (1994): 63-87.Paul Kerr, “North Korea Admits Secret Nuclear Weapons Program,” Arms Control Association, November 2002, ried S. Hecker, “What I Found in Yongbyon and Why It Matters,” APS News 20, No. 3 (March 2011), ckpage.cfm; Peter Krail, “N. Korea Judged to Have More Enrichment Sites,” Arms Control Association, March 2011, ged-more-enrichment-sites; also see Jack Kim and James Pearson, “North Korea Ramps Up Uranium Enrichment, Enough for Six NuclearBombs a Year: Experts,” Reuters, September 13, 2016, 1K07Y.Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 77 (2021):4, 223-224, lobal nuclear arsenals grow as states continue to modernize–New SIPRI Yearbook out now,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June14, 2021, e-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now; citedby Kelsey Davenport, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, October 2021, onswhohaswhat.Ankit Panda, “What’s Up with North Korea’s Repeated Failed Musudan Launches?” Diplomat, June 7, 2016, -koreas-repeated-failed-musudan-launches/; Anna Fifield, “North Korea’s Missile Launch Has Failed, South Korea’s Military Says,” Washington Post, April15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia 655bed26764 story.html; and Ralph Savelsberg, “A Quick Technical Analysis of the Hwasong-12,” 38 North (website), Stimson Center, May 19, 2017, it Panda, “North Korea Overflies Japan With Another Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile: Early Analysis,” Diplomat, September 15, 2017, c-missile-early-analysis/; and Brad Lendon, “US Air Force PullsBombers from Guam,” CNN, April 24, 2020, rce-bombers-pull-out-intl-hnk/index.html. Such US missiledefense facilities in Alaska include the COBRA DANE radar and the ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely; see Missile Defense Agency, US Departmentof Defense, “Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet,” Missile Defense Agency, September 30, 2020, .pdf;and “Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD),” Missile Defense Agency, April 8, 2021, https://www.mda.mil/system/gmd.html.ATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSheavy nuclear warhead”—apparently referring to the “peanut”thermonuclear design.19 A variety of credible internationalnongovernment research centers also assess that theHwasong-12 can carry a nuclear payload.20with a nuclear weapon—much less do so reliably. Skepticsparticularly point to open questions regarding accuracy at thatdistance and whether the RVs would survive reentry on anintercontinental trajectory.25 These are fair questions to raise.In 2017, North Korea also conducted three test launches ofmobile ICBMs that demonstrated North Korea’s ability tostrike the continental United States for the first time. The firsttwo launches, in July, of the Hwasong-14, were followed bythe even larger Hwasong-15 in November.21 Though all threetests were on a “lofted” trajectory high into outer space, theydemonstrated the capability to range the United States witha sizeable payload if launched on a flatter trajectory.22 TheHwasong-15 was so massive that international missile expertsassessed North Korea’s claim that it could reach anywhere inthe United States with even a large warhead to be credible.23Some went even further, assessing that the Hwasong-15’spayload capacity was sufficient for it to also carry decoys orother countermeasures to US national missile defense (NMD).24However, these are incremental details compared to thesubstantial progress North Korea has already made on ICBMs.Given the opportunities that North Korea has had to learnfrom the experience of others, and to exploit off-the-shelftechnologies undreamt of when the Soviets were conductingtheir early ICBM tests, analysts should not be complacentabout North Korea’s potential to succeed with its first ICBM teston a realistic trajectory. Once the Soviet Union had developeda sufficiently powerful ICBM booster and a practical nuclearwarhead, the remaining technical obstacles to refining areliable RV and achieving accuracy sufficient to hit a city werequickly overcome—even with the primitive state of computingpower and materials science seventy years ago.26 Even if thefirst such test were to fail, there is no reason to believe thatNorth Korea could not quickly learn from it to field a reliableand sufficiently accurate RV if it continued flight testing.Though these tests demonstrated an increasing North Koreannuclear threat to the continental United States, just threelaunches on a lofted trajectory do not definitively prove thatNorth Korea can successfully strike a city in the United States19202122232425265In addition to testing these systems capable of reaching UnitedStates territory, North Korea also has developed, flight tested,Jesse Johnson, “North Korea Says New, Longer-range Missile Can Carry ‘Large’ Nuclear Warhead,” Japan Times, May 15, 2017, ing-carrying-large-nuclear-warhead/.Savelsberg, “A Quick Technical Analysis of the Hwasong-12”; Zach Berger, “Hwasong-12/KN-17,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, May 2017, a/hwasong-12/; and “Hwasong-12,” Missile Defense Project,Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 16, 2017, last modified June 24, 2019, .Michael Elleman, “The New Hwasong-15 ICBM: A Significant Improvement That May Be Ready as Early as 2018,” 38 North, November 30, 2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/11/melleman113017/; Theodore A. Postol, “North Korean Ballistic Missiles and US Missile Defense,” Physics & Society 47, No. 2 (April2018): 16, pril-2018; and “Hwasong-15/KN-22,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, November 2017, a/hwasong-15/.John Schilling, “What Next for North Korea’s ICBM?” 38 North, August 1, 2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/08/jschilling080117/; and “Hwasong-14 (KN-20),”Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 27, 2017, last modified November 5, 2019, .Dave Majumbar, “Hwasong-15: North Korea’s New Missile That Shocked the World,” The Buzz (blog), National Interest (magazine website), Center for theNational Interest, November 29, 2017, 16 .Elleman, “The New Hwasong-15 ICBM”; and Majumbar, “Does North Korea’s New Hwasong-15 ICBM Have Soviet and Chinese ‘DNA’?’”Robert A. Manning and Patrick O’Reilly, “North Korea’s Progress Towards an ICBM (In One Graphic),” Korea Watch (blog), National Interest, December 23,2019, Vincent J. Wilson, Jr. “The Soviet Land-based Ballistic Missile Program 1945-1972: An [sic] Historical Overview,” National Security Agency, Declassified in2010, cap/pdf/2010-005-doc2.pdf#page 72.ATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSA test launch of the Pukuksong-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Source: Rodong Sinmun.and displayed a growing variety of new shorter-range missilesthat could reach US and allied targets throughout SouthKorea and parts of Japan.27 Once operationally ready, thesenew missiles would be far more advanced and effective thanNorth Korea’s aging Scud missiles, with much greater potentialaccuracy, better performance against missile defenses, andthe flexibility and survivability that come from not requiringfueling before launch.28 If North Korea truly has a tacticalnuclear warhead, then all of these new missiles would benuclear-capable ones, but at least some of them are likelyso already. Pyongyang twice tested a missile in March 2021,which it claimed to have a 2.5-ton payload, more than enoughfor even a primitive nuclear warhead.29Though most of these missiles would be fired from the newtypes of tracked and wheeled mobile launchers shown off atPyongyang parades, North Korea has test fired missiles from atrain, and some of its missiles are submarine-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBMs) suited for deployment as part of a future NorthKorean ballistic missile submarine force.30 This increasingdiversity of launchers also enhances the survivability andflexibility of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.27 “North Korea Military Power,” Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), September 2021, 22-27, P.pdf.28 Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s New Short-range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation,” 38 North, October 9, 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/10/melleman100919/; and Vann Van Diepen, “Six Takeaways from North Korea’s ‘Hypersonic Missile’ Announcement,” 38 North, October 13, 2021, -north-koreas-hypersonic-missile-announcement/.29 Josh Smith, “Analysis: Inter-Korean Missile Race May Leave North Korea with Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, March 30, 2021, iles-southkorea-analys-idUSKBN2BM0G8.30 “North Korea Military Power,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 50, 62.6ATLANTIC COUNCIL
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA’S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATSProspects and Implications for Further GrowthAt Pyongyang’s Eighth Party Congress in January, Kimpersonally briefed a detailed report on North Korea’sweapons programs, including both past successesand future plans for North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missiledevelopment.31 Kim’s report provided official confirmation ofNorth Korea’s intentions to develop and field nuclear andmissile capabilities that US analysts had long consideredunder development, including missiles with multiple warheads,tactical nuclear weapons, cruise missiles, solid-propellantICBMs, and other advancements.32Taken together with the ongoing quantitative growth in NorthKorea’s fissile material stockpile and missile force, the fielding ofsuch weapons systems would be destabilizing and dramaticallyincrease the risks posed by North Korea to the UnitedStates hom
PROACTIVELY COUNTERING NORTH KOREA'S ADVANCING NUCLEAR THREATS IV ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and
·Hyun Chang Lee, Wonkwang University, Korea ·Chul Hong Kim, Chonnam National University, Korea ·Seong Kwan Lee, Kyunghee University, Korea ·Jung Man Seo, Korea National University of Welfare, Korea ·Jun Hyeog Choi, Kimpo College, Korea ·Young Tae, Back, Kimpo College, Korea ·Kwang Hyuk Im, PaiChai University, Korea
North Korea became a Communist state under the influence of the Soviet Union while South Korea allied themselves with the United States and became a republic. Military confrontations continued along the border and in 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. The U.N. sent military support to South Korea while China did the same in North Korea.
Korea University Business School Fact Sheet for Student Exchange Program Contact Mailing Address International Office Korea University Business School A304, Korea University Business School Main Building 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 02841 Telephone & Fax Tel: 82-2-3290-5362 Fax: 82-2-3290-5368 Websites Korea University korea.ac.kr
Red Scare political cartoons . Korean War (June 1950-July 1953) Japan controlled Korea – after WW2, Korea divided at 38th parallel USSR - North Korea US – South Korea June 25, 1950 – N. Korea invaded S. Korea . UN and US sends troops – Truman appoints General
6 conventional deterrence of north korea conventional deterrence of north korea 7 below the nuclear level.3 As with Russia and China, the central challenge for U.S. de- terrence posture is the risk that North Korea could attempt to impose a fait accompli,
North Korea's apparently successful July 2017 tests of its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, along with the possibility that North Korea (DPRK) may have successfully . Korea 1994 Agreed Framework, under which the United States agreed to arrange for North Korea to receive two light . The North Korean Nuclear Challenge .
KOREA PHARM 2014 10(Tue.) 13(Fri.) June 2014 KINTEX, KOREA KOREA PHARM, Korea's representing Pharmaceutical Exhibition On behalf of Organizer, we cordially invite you to KOREA PHARM 2014 to be held on June 10 13,
on criminal law reforms which I had begun in 2001 when still working as an attorney. Observing the reforms in action and speaking with judges and lawyers not only helped to inform my own work, but also helped me to see how legal reform operates in a
