BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Middle East 2020
Atlantic CouncilBRENT SCOWCROFT CENTERON INTERNATIONAL SECURITYMiddle East 2020:Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?Mathew J. Burrows
Middle East 2020:Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?by Mathew J. BurrowsAcknowledgements: The author would like to thank Jonathan Paris, a London-based Middle East expert, for his help. JonathanParis is a former Middle East fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and currently is a senior adviser with the Chertoff Groupand associate fellow with the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London. 2014 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced ortransmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of briefquotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to:Atlantic Council1030 15th Street, NW, 12th FloorWashington, DC 20005ISBN: 978-1-61977-061-4Cover Image: Al Jazeera English (Flickr, Creative Commons).August 2014
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYWith new crises sprouting almost on a daily basis inthe Middle East, there is increasing interest in knowingthe possible medium- and long-term consequences ofthe cascading developments in the region. This reportattempts to think about the alternative futures possiblein the Middle East over the next five to ten years. Thisis a shorter-term forecast than usual,1 but in the MiddleEast more deep-seated and structural factors are in fluxthan in most other regions. A longer-term forecast wouldallow for more optimism, but would be less useful fordecision-makers who not only need a bird’s eye view ofwhere developments are headed but also a notion of thepressure points to effect positive change now.It is difficult to discern any truly positive scenarios in theshort term. For example, fixing youth unemployment andbuilding human capital—which the region desperatelyneeds in this increasingly competitive world—is a goalthat can only be accomplished over the longer term.Instead, it is more likely that finding political solutionsto the increasing conflicts will be a prerequisite toeconomic and social development. This is oppositefrom the usual pattern in other regions where economicadvances have led to positive political change.A possible “turning-the-corner” scenario exists thatstarts with a successful nuclear deal with Iran that couldlower Sunni-Shia tensions and open the way to greaterregional cooperation. This is not a far-fetched possibility,but nevertheless it is far from assured.1See two previous Strategic Foresight reports, entitled Envisioning2030: US Strategy for the Coming Technology Revolution (December2013) and Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World(December 2014).However, a much bleaker scenario—a so-called“sectarianism-on-steroids” outcome—appears to beunfolding during the writing of this report. The recentescalation in sectarian tensions, particularly in Iraq,increases the chances for an all-out conflict betweenSunni and Shia powers, which could shatter the MiddleEast for a generation, similar to what happened inEurope after the First World War. One of the worst thingsabout civil conflict is that it often sparks more violence;according to scholars, such conflicts sometimes take aslong as six to nine years to wind down.Even if the worst case does not happen, a growing “newauthoritarianism” could arise in states like Egypt thatare not directly involved in the sectarian conflict. Thoughmany expected the Arab Spring to lead to democracy,support for new freedoms has diminished among themiddle class who appear, for the moment, to favorstability. Even there, social and religious tensions arebubbling beneath the surface, fraying social cohesion.In this “new authoritarianism” scenario, necessarystructural economic reforms will be difficult toundertake.However troubling and detrimental the current turmoil,identifying the longer range, structural reforms—building better educational systems to teach twenty-firstcentury skills, enhancing the environment for greaterentrepreneurship and diversifying economies in theGulf and other countries from an overdependence onenergy exports—is needed more than ever. Although notsufficient in themselves so long as the sectarian conflictscontinue to spread, these long-needed reforms arenecessary if the region is to overcome its decades-longloss in competitiveness and finally put behind itself thedeadly cycle of conflict and violence.
TABLE OF CONTENTSI. The Middle East in the Eye of the Storm1II. Drivers of Change2III. Alternative Scenarios9
Middle East 2020: Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?I. THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE EYE OF THE STORMThe Middle East will remain the region undergoingthe greatest amount of change over the next five toten years. Middle East futures run a wide gamut fromfragile growth and development to chronic instabilityand potential regional conflicts. The Arab state systemis under assault like never before with disintegrationof some states, such as Syria and Iraq, as a distinctpossibility. The economic outlook is gloomy despiterising public expectations of greater prosperity. Highunemployment is coming at the worst time for regionaldevelopment. Demographically, the youth bulge willremain a driving force over the next five to ten years.Such a large youthful population should be an asset,but is more likely to be a destabilizing force given thehigh levels of unemployment throughout practicallythe whole region, including the more prosperous Gulfcountries. The global trend in higher food prices alsoposes a threat to political and social stability in severalMiddle East countries. For the whole region, educationlevels—although improving—lag those of other regions,making it more difficult for the Middle East to competeglobally.The pattern of uneven development in the MiddleEast is likely to continue, with the oil-producing Gulfstates offering the most opportunity for their youthfulpopulations as well as talent from other countries, andthe gap between these states and the rest of the regiongetting worse. The financially secure oil producerswill be called upon for regional leadership, while alsoneeding to address growing demands at home. Newglobal sources of energy, including the likely exportof US unconventional sources of oil and gas, also posea systemic threat unless the Gulf region becomesincreasingly diversified.The next five to ten years could see Iran break outof its isolation, opening up new opportunities forregional cooperation but also setting the scene for anintensified regional competition for influence. Successfulnegotiations limiting Iran’s nuclear development topeaceful purposes under strict international supervisioncould start a whole new narrative, triggering a widerset of regional scenarios. Iran has many attributes—aneducated population, a low birth rate, and substantialinformation technology (IT) capacities—that couldmake it competitive in the regional and global arena.A stronger Iran is likely to be seen by its neighbors inboth positive and negative lights. An Iran that beginsto put greater priority on economic modernization willgive others some degree of leverage over it because ofAT L A N T I C C O U N C I LIran’s desperate need for outside technological help inmodernizing its energy and other industries. The recentsuccess of sanctions shows that Iran can be brought tothe negotiating table. The “carrot” as well as the “stick”are both likely to be needed in any attempt to steerIran away from its traditional support for radical andterrorist groups. Rising powers are always disruptiveand an economically stronger Iran that begins tonormalize its ties with the West will likely upset “applecarts” in the region, even if Iran’s behavior is morenormal and less belligerent.A breakdown in the P5 1 talks,1 which are seekingto limit Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful energypurposes, would reinforce the hardliners in the Iranianregime and a possible decision to continue pursuingnuclear weapons. A US and/or Israeli decision to takemilitary action to forestall further development ishighly conceivable. If Iran manages to become a nuclearpower, an arms race in the region would trigger otherpowers like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey to acquireor develop nuclear arsenals. Washington would comeunder increased pressure to defend its partners againstIranian aggression.The Middle East is not just being shaped by globaltrends, but will most likely determine whetherthe rest of the world has a good or bad future. Anypotential Middle East scenario has huge implicationsfor the rest of the world. This is most obvious for thenegative scenarios: a major regional conflict may notbe containable and would most likely undermineprospects for the global economy too. The emergenceand consolidation of terrorist safe havens—for examplein a war-torn Syria and more recently Iraq—would alsothreaten other countries. On the other hand, situatedstrategically at the crossroads among Europe, Asia, andAfrica, a Middle East that gets on a growth path couldprovide another cylinder to the global economic engine,adding hundreds of millions of middle-class consumersto the global marketplace. A more prosperous andpeaceful world is not possible without a stable andsecure Middle East.1The P5 1 refers to the five permanent members of the UN SecurityCouncil (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France)plus Germany.1
Middle East 2020: Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?II. DRIVERS OF CHANGEThe Middle East will be shaped by many of the sameglobal trends influencing developments in other regions.Many global trends are double-edged, harbingers ofprogress but also destabilizing in their immediateimpact. Understanding their effects and the roles theywill play in the possible futures they can produce in theMiddle East is the purpose of this paper.The State under threat. Even before the ArabSpring and the civil war in Syria, the Arab state systemhad been weakening. It is good to remember it has beenunder assault before and survived, although recentchallenges appear greater. The Arab state system wascreated in the wake of the Sykes-Picot Agreementcarving up the Ottoman Empire between the UnitedKingdom (UK) and France, later implemented by the1923 Treaty of Lausanne. In the 1950s through June1967, pan-Arabism emerged under the leadership of acharismatic army officer, Gamal Abdel Nasser, presidentof Egypt. The emphasis on Arab identity threatenedthe dominant state structure and many of the rulingmonarchies at that time. Yet the Nasserist ideologythat emerged did not lead to the decline of the statestructure, rather it embodied a strong state trying tobring other states into its own orbit, using the mantra ofpan-Arab unity against Israel.In fact, the Arab states proved resilient. The Nasser eramarked much Arab state rivalry, most notably, pittingthe conservative Saudi Arabia under King Faisal againstNasser. Like today’s proxy war between Saudi Arabiaand Iran in Syria, the 1960s featured a proxy warbetween Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Yemen, with theroyalist, pro-Saudi faction emerging victorious after along war of attrition. Although Nasserism contributedto the downfall of the Hashemites in Iraq, the IdrissKingdom in Libya, and serious tensions in Lebanon,Jordan, and elsewhere, the Arab state system did notcollapse. Indeed Syria—subordinated to Egypt in 1958by the creation of the United Arab Republic—regainedindependence through secession in 1961.Another assault on the Arab state system came in 1979with the Islamic revolution in Iran. Political Islamsought to fill the vacuum left by the decline of pan-Arabnationalism, which was dealt its death blow by Israelwith Nasser’s defeat in the June 1967 War. AyatollahKhomeini sought to export the revolution throughoutthe Arab world under the banner of Islam. But again,revolutionary Iran had limited success in overturningArab states. The one success abroad for the mullahs was2the establishment of an Iranian foothold in Lebanonunder Hezbollah in the early 1980s. Like today, SaudiArabia led the resistance against the Iranian Islamicrevolution by forging a network of Sunni Arab states thatwanted to preserve, rather than overturn the regionalstatus quo.THE MIDDLEEAST IS NOT JUSTBEING SHAPED BYGLOBAL TRENDS,BUT WILL MOSTLIKELY DETERMINEWHETHER THEREST OF THEWORLD HAS AGOOD OR BADFUTURE.Will it be any different today? There are a numberof reasons to think that the past is not a guide to thefuture and the weakening is more long lasting. First,the state is much weaker in terms of ensuring physicalsecurity in a number of key countries. Syria and Iraqcan no longer project power within their borders, letalone outside their borders. Egypt’s domestic challengesprevent it from providing strategic depth for its Gulfallies. Governments’ moral authority has also weakenedsignificantly as economic prospects have dwindled for allbut a very small elite at the top. In the 1950s and 1960s,governments were largely able to provide economicsecurity to a middle class that in return showeddeference to the rulers. According to the Arab HumanDevelopment Reports, this social contract has beencoming under increasing pressure since the 1970s. Nolonger can Arab governments “co-opt the educated youthAT L A N T I C C O U N C I L
Middle East 2020: Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?into what used to be a relatively well paid civil service.”2For most countries in the region, the state no longer hassufficient means, and the number of graduates anglingfor well-paid employment has exploded. In undertakingmarket liberalization in the early 2000s, the situationactually worsened with a tiny segment—many of whomwere political cronies as well—benefiting from thereform. In 2008, the top ten companies on the Egyptianstock exchange were controlled by less than twentyfamilies and some 40 percent of private sector creditwent to just thirty companies.3Iran at the center of the changing powerdynamics. While some would not consider Iran asa Middle Eastern country, there is no argument thatIran is projecting considerable power and influencein the region. Iran’s growing importance derives fromits relative gains in regional power as Iraq and otherArab states have grown weaker. The US war in Iraq in2003 had the strategic effect of removing an importantbalance against Iranian regional hegemony, namelySaddam’s Iraq. How Iran steers a path in the next decadewill affect the broader regional trajectory.One road that Iran could take would be to focus onmodernization and domestic reform. Current policiesas well as the isolation caused by sanctions havehollowed out the Iranian economy and created a sea ofdissatisfaction among large segments of Iranian society.An agreement with the West that enables Iran to growits economy could create a new and positive dynamic.Alternatively, if Iran does not come to an agreementwith the West, it is likely to become a wrecker of anyoptimistic scenario for the region. In either case, Iran is akey driver of the region’s future.A possible change in the geopolitics of the Middle Eastoccurred with the election of President Hassan Rouhani.The rise of the moderate wing in the wake of Rouhani’selection holds out the possibility of a successful outcometo the P5 1 negotiations. A good deal would be one thatincreases the break out time for any Iranian decision todevelop nuclear weapons from the current few monthsto a few years. The United States probably won’t accept adeal that shortens the break out time to less than a year.Israel and Saudi Arabia may live with a deal that sharplylimits Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, butthey will be dissatisfied with an agreement that permitscontinued uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing.2 United Nations Development Program, Strategy of Response toTransformative Change Championed by Youth in the Arab Region, p.12, %20Region-Final%20(2).pdf.3 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 2011).AT L A N T I C C O U N C I LThe Iranian leadership, including Supreme LeaderAyatollah Ali Khomenei, may agree to limit Iran’s nuclearprogram in order to avoid domestic turbulence andpossibly a return to 2009 street demonstrations orworse if the international sanctions are not lifted. Themessage from the 2013 election was that most Iraniansare prepared to sacrifice the nuclear program, or at leastthe current pace of nuclear development, in favor ofeconomic growth and employment.WITH A RELATIVELYWELL-EDUCATEDPOPULATIONWITH ONE OFTHE HIGHESTLEVELS OF ITCONNECTIVITY INTHE MIDDLE EAST,IRAN COULD TAKEOFF THE SAME WAYOTHER COUNTRIESHAVE.An agreement that demonstrates an immediate payoffby lifting sanctions could further bolster the moderates,positioning them to introduce domestic reforms,including economic liberalization. Iran desperatelyneeds technical help to modernize its oil and gasproduction facilities. Increased Iranian gas exportscould help diversify supplies for both European andAsian customers. Iranians outside Iran are poisedto help with investment capital if the economy isopened up. In this scenario, a positive feedback loopis established that begins to steer Iran along a pathtoward economic development. Fifty years ago, SouthKorea, Israel, China, and Finland were relatively nonindustrialized, scientifically unsophisticated, rawmaterial exporters. Agricultural products, for example,constituted approximately 70 percent of Israel’s exportsduring the 1960s. Today, knowledge-intensive products3
Middle East 2020: Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?Figure 1. Economic Outlook for MENA’s OilImportersconstitute more than 50 percent of Israel’s exports.With a relatively well-educated population and one ofthe highest levels of IT connectivity in the Middle East,Iran could take off the same way other countries have.However, this is all predicated on Iran not breaking outof its agreement and trying to restart nuclear activitiesthat could lead to nuclear weapons development.But an alternative—much less positive—scenario is equally conceivable. It is not clearto what extent the Supreme Leader and others likeQasem Soleimani—the commander of the Quds force,the external division of the Islamic RevolutionaryGuards Corps (IRGC)—are willing to compromiseon the nuclear issue. If negotiations trail on, it couldstrengthen the hand of hardliners who are not keenon an agreement in the first place. One factor againstcompromise is Iran’s perception of the Obamaadministration’s policy. In both the Syrian chemicalweapon crisis and the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, theAdministration was seen as avoiding tough action.As long as the Supreme Leader and his key hardlineassociates do not face an either/or choice, it may behard to win enough hardliner support for reaching anagreement.The longer the negotiations continue along an uncertaintrajectory, the less likely is an agreement. If the Westrefuses to extend another interim agreement, theIranian hardliners could use it as a pretext to end thenegotiations, particularly if they see the US Congress asready to strengthen US sanctions.A failure is unlikely to mean that Iran and the Westgo back to the status quo ante. Hardliners will bestrengthened. The chances of a military attack byeither United States or Israel increase markedly inthis scenario, particularly if Iran is seen as renewingits military program. With the moderates discredited,Tehran is likely to step up its “wrecker” behavior, armingHezbollah and Hamas, redoubling support for SyrianPresident Bashar al-Assad, and backing Shia oppositiongroups in Gulf countries.Also possible if negotiations break down: Iran succeedsin building nuclear weapons, other countries seek toproliferate in response, US credibility is weakened, Iranis emboldened, and several Middle East nuclear scaresfollow in the coming years as Iran, Israel, and the UnitedStates adjust to each other’s red lines and the newnuclear balance of power. Such an extended scenariowith a much higher threshold of tensions could also becrippling to the regional economy as investors shy awayfrom any risk-taking. The global economy is also likely tobe affected if such tensions increase the global price ofoil.4Source: International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook:Middle East and Central Asia, World Economic and Financial Surveys(Washington, DC: IMF, November 12, 2013), 3/CAR111213A.htm.The economy, stupid! If anything, the economicoutlook for the region as a whole has worsened since thebeginning of Arab Spring in December of 2010. Whilemany economies may begin to improve in 2014, a rapidturnaround is highly unlikely over the next five to sixyears. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expectsthe average economic growth in Arab countries to belower than 4 percent in 2014. The World Bank projectsweak growth through at least 2016 (its forecast period).They see growth picking up from 2.8 percent in 2014 to3.6 percent in 2016, still significantly below 4.6 percentgrowth in 2010 before the Arab Spring.Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are in astronger position than the rest of the Middle East.According to the IMF, growth will be slower over thenext few years than it has been in the recent past. RealGDP in the GCC economies was down to 3.7 percent in2013 off from 5.2 percent in 2012 and 7.7 percent in2011. The economies of the six Gulf Arab monarchiesare now expected to expand by 4.4 percent in 2014. TheIMF believes the “path of oil prices remains the mainuncertainty for region.” Rising US unconventional oilproduction is likely to reduce future demand for OPECoil, necessitating greater efforts by the better-off Gulfcountries to diversify their economies. As with thebroader region, generating jobs in the private sector isa key challenge. The IMF believes some effort is alreadybeing made, but more is needed to make nationalscompetitive in the private labor market.44Ibid.AT L A N T I C C O U N C I L
Middle East 2020: Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?A 1 million jobs deficit?Figure 2. Bleak Employment Prospects in the Gulf RegionGCC Nationals(Millions, 2013-2018)1.81.61.41.21.00.80.60.40.20.01 million20132014201520162017Labor force entrants (cumulative since 2012)Private-sector jobs creation (cumulative since 2012)2018Source: International Monetary Fund, “Middle East and North Africa Regional Economic Outlook,” November 12, 2013, eng/pdf/mreo1113p.pdf.MENAPAccording to the International Labor Organization (ILO), by significant inequalities. Even moreso thanoilinexportersthe15 other regions, students coming from a disadvantagedyouth unemployment in the Middle East is more thantwice the global average and the highest in the world,background have less chance of completing their primaryreaching 27.2 percent in the Middle East and more thaneducation. They also have a lower probability of gaining29 percent in North Africa in 2013. Young women areaccess to better quality education. Therefore, they will bethe worst hit—42.6 percent of the female labor forceless able to access university education. This inequalityin the Middle East is out of work, 37 percent in Northis aggravated by the rapid decline in public investment inAfrica. The youth labor force is expected to decline overeducation in some countries. Despite large investmentsthe coming years, but this will provide only short-termin education by some of the Gulf countries, the unequalrelief. Long-term demographic projections indicate adistribution and, on average, inadequate quality ofreturn to stronger growth of the youth population byeducation, including overcrowding in public universities,2020, making it essential that the region develop a laborinsufficient training for teachers and outdated curricula,market that can utilize the new entrants and benefitreduce the returns that many people receive from theirfrom the demographic dividend.education and prevent the region from benefiting from theinvestment they have made in education.In many Middle East and North Africa (MENA)countries, higher educational attainment surprisinglyTechnology—A Bright Spot. Youth is ancorrelates with rising joblessness. According to the ILO,advantage when it comes to IT. No country in the Middleunemployment rates for those with tertiary educationEast has a median age older than thirty-one (the Unitedare over 43 percent in Saudi Arabia, 24 percent in theStates is thirty-eight, for reference) and 85 percent ofPalestinian Territories, 22 percent in the United ArabArab Internet users are younger than forty.5 AccordingEmirates (UAE) and Morocco, 14 percent in Tunisia,to Google, Saudi Arabia ranks number one globallyand over 11 percent in Algeria. Education systems inin YouTube views per capita and the Middle East as aother countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, struggle towhole ranks second behind the United States in totaldeliver graduates with the necessary skills for findingviews. According to a survey conducted by the Americanproductive jobs. Given these trends, many young peopleventure capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers,in the region are both overqualified and underqualifiedSaudis are more likely than any other nationality tofor available positions compared to countries in otherregions at similar levels of development.Skills mismatches in most MENA countries are worsenedbecause the educational systems are characterizedAT L A N T I C C O U N C I L5Zach Finkelstein, “Why the Middle East Is the Next Big Destinationfor Online Video,” VentureBeat, December 20, 2013, ast-is-the-nextbig-destination-for-online-video/.5
Middle East 2020: Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends?share “most things” or personal information online. Infact, nine out of ten Internet users in the Middle Eastperuse social networking sites daily. Middle Easternersalso spend their incomes online. Forty-three percentof Internet users in the GCC countries buy productsor services online each month. According to Visa, theMiddle East is the fastest growing e-commerce region inthe world at 15 billion, growing 45 percent annually,6although it is starting from a very low base.Internet penetration in most Arabian Gulf countries ison par or higher than in the United States. Accordingto a report by Frost & Sullivan, an American consultingfirm, the UAE is expected to be the first country inthe world to have 100 percent household broadbandInternet penetration. Furthermore, consumers in theGulf are more likely than almost any other geographyto own a smartphone. Two of the top five countries bysmartphone penetration are in the Gulf. This has ledto a situation where 34 percent of the Saudi Arabianpopulation and 52 percent of the UAE populationuse smartphones to watch TV. With few options forsocializing and poor quality TV content, Arabs areturning to the Internet in droves for entertainment.7All told, there are around ninety million Internet usersin the Middle East, which is 40.2 percent of the totalpopulation. This means that the Middle East has arelatively low overall penetration rate although it is stillhigher than the global average at 34.3 percent. The mostInternet users in the Middle East can be found in Iran, atforty-two million, followed by Saudi Arabia with thirteenmillion. The United Arab Emirates is ranked as thethird-biggest online market in the Middle East. Althoughuneven and lagging especially in the poorer countries,Middle Eastern Internet growth is higher than in otherworldwide regions.8While the degree of adoption of new technologies isrelatively high in parts of the region, measuring theprecise economic, social, and political impact is difficult.Governments are at once eager for new technologiesand often wary of their possible uses as mobilizinginstruments. This ambivalence about the uses of newcommunications technologies, along with a shallowtechnological base in the region, is likely to delay andlimit the transformational effects of technology relativeto other regions.Vulnerability to Climate Change. The MENAregion is particularly vulnerable to climate changedespite contributing relatively little—less than 66 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 European Travel Commission Digital Portal, “Internet Usage,Middle East,” E MENA REGIONIS PARTICULARLYVULNERABLETO CLIMATECHANGE DESPITECONTRIBUTINGRELATIVELYLITTLE—LESSTHAN 6 PERCENT—TO GLOBALEMISSIONS.percent—to global emissions. It is one of the world’smost water-scarce and dry regions, with a highdependency on climate-sensitive agriculture and alarge share of its population and economic activity inflood-prone urban coastal zones. According to the latestIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)assessment and the World Bank, the MENA regionwill become even hotter and drier over the next fewdecades. Higher temperatures and reduced precipitationwill increase the occurrence of droughts, an effectthat is already materializing in the Maghreb. Syriasaw a number of serious droughts in the past decade,contributing to the rural impoverishment that helpedprovoke the 2011 uprising. It is further estimated that anadditional eighty to one hundred million people will beexposed by 2025 to water stress, which is likely to resultin increased pressure on groundwater resources. Manyaquifers are seeing extractions beyond their rechargepotential. In addition, agriculture yields, especially inrain-fed areas, are expected to fluctuate more widely,ultimately falling to a significantly lower long-termaverage. Heat waves, an increased “heat island effect,”water scarcity, decreasing water quality, worse
The financially secure oil producers will be called upon for regional leadership, while also needing to address growing demands at home. New . Asia, and Africa, a Middle East that gets on a growth path could . I. THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE EYE OF THE STORM. 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Middle East 2020: Shaped by or Shaper of Global Trends? .
the world.4 In a nutshell, the assessment of the Dated Brent benchmark is based on four pillars: Physical assessment of BFOET grades. A forward curve based on the Dated swaps market. The fixed price of the forward or futures 'Brent' contract. Quality differentials on 5crudes other than Brent or Forties.
The Brent Family Front Door (incorporating Brent's Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub) may signpost, or refer families onto appropriate services. This may include a referral to Brent Children's Social Care for a Child & Family Assessment (CFA) or initiating Child Protection Enquiries (Section 47) where a child may be at significant risk of harm.
parallel global governance structures on their own for some time now. They have become important actors in shaping global politics, helping to forge new patterns of transnational relations. The US National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) Global Trends 2030 report, released in December 2012, focused on how relatively certain megatrends and uncertain disruptive factors will shape the world of .
Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies “New York Leadership Dinner and Dialogue,” New York, June 14, 2007. See also Daniel W. Drezner, “The New New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, New York, March/April 2007, pp.
Nordic-Baltic Security and the US Role ISSUE BRIEF BY MARK SEIP Mark Seip was the Senior Navy Fellow at the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security from 2014 to 2015. He commanded an E-2C Hawkeye squadron in Norfolk, Virginia, and deployed onboard USS Enterprise (CVN 65) prior
Guide MAX BROOKS is a senior nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point and the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. His bestselling books include Minecraft: The IslandThe , Zombie Survival GuideDevolution, , and World War Z, which was adapted into a 2013 movie starring Brad Pitt.
Brent spot oil prices stalled from late November until the middle of December at near 60 per barrel, sinking to 51 in late December, before rallying back to the near 60 in January. December was the weakest month of 2018 for Brent at 56.78 per barrel down 7.97 from the November average price. Figure 2: WTI - Brent Crude Oil Spot Price Spreads
Peninsula School District School Improvement Worksheet. version 1.0 . ELA SMART Goal Worksheet 2015-16 School: DISCOVERY ELEMENTARY Team: ELA Leaders: ALL The primary focus of our work is for all students to meet or exceed rigorous standards.
