C077 Certification Report

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C077 Certification ReportRSA Security Analytics v10.6.1File name: ISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Version: v1Date of document: 22 February 2017Document classification: PUBLICFor general inquiry about us or our services,please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1C077 Certification ReportRSA Security Analytics v10.6.122 February 2017ISCB DepartmentCyberSecurity MalaysiaLevel 5, Sapura@Mines,No 7 Jalan Tasik, The Mines Resort City43300 Seri Kembangan, Selangor, MalaysiaTel: 603 8992 6888 Fax: 603 8992 6841http://www.cybersecurity.myPage i of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Document AuthorisationDOCUMENT TITLE:C077 Certification ReportDOCUMENT REFERENCE:ISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1ISSUE:v1DATE:22 February 2017DISTRIBUTION:UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE ANDDISTRIBUTIONPage ii of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Copyright StatementThe copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is theproperty of CyberSecurity Malaysia.The document shall be held in safe custody. CYBERSECURITY MALAYSIA, 2015Registered office:Level 5, Sapura@Mines,No 7 Jalan Tasik,The Mines Resort City,43300 Seri KembanganSelangor MalaysiaRegistered in Malaysia – Company Limited by GuaranteeCompany No. 726630-UPrinted in MalaysiaPage iii of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1ForewordThe Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has beenestablished under the 9th Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in qualityassurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and tobuild consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model forlicensed Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluationsof ICT products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognisedstandards. The results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian CommonCriteria Certification Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information SecurityCertification Body (ISCB) Department, CyberSecurity Malaysia.By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the MyCB asserts that the product complieswith the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A SecurityTarget is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluationactivities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, inaddition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of anyassumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, itssecurity requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level)that the product satisfies the security requirements.This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 22February 2017, and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate ofproduct evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified ProductRegister (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (theofficial website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement).Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in itsentirety.Page iv of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1DisclaimerThe Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and itsassociated certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facilityestablished under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)Scheme (Ref [4]) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1revision 4 (Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,version 3.1 revision 4 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificateapply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluatedconfiguration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions ofthe MyCC Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluationtechnical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certification report andits associated certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurityMalaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificationreport and its associated certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurityMalaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, iseither expressed or implied.Page v of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Document Change LogRELEASEDATEPAGESAFFECTEDREMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCEd16 February 2017AllInitial draft of certification reportv122 February 2017AllFinal version of certification reportPage vi of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Executive SummaryRSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 (SA) is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the EvaluationAssurance Level 2 Augmented with ALC FLR.1 Evaluation.SA is a collection of appliances that form a security infrastructure for an enterprisenetwork. This architecture provides converged network security monitoring andcentralized security information and event management (SIEM). SA provides real-timevisibility into the monitored network and long-term network data storage to providedetection, investigation, analysis, forensics, and compliance reporting. SA’s Captureinfrastructure collects log and packet data from the network. Packet collection extractsmetadata, reassembles, and globally normalizes all network traffic at layers 2 through 7of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. This data allows SA to perform realtime session analysis; incident detection, drill-down investigation, reporting, and forensicanalysis functions.The scope of evaluation covers major security features as follows:a) Security Audit: The TOE is able to generate audit records of security relevantevents that include at least date and time of the event, subject identity andoutcome for security events.b) Cryptographic Support: The Transport Layer Security (TLS 1.2) protocol in FIPSmode is used to provide protection of the communications surrounding theremote administrative sessions from disclosure and from modification.c) Identification & Authentication: The TOE allows the users to acknowledge enduser license agreements and view warning banners prior to providingidentification and authentication data.d) Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): TheTOE receives network packets, reconstructs network transactions, extractsmetadata, and applies rules. The TOE is able to identify potential misuse orintrusions and send an alarm to incident management SA views.e) Security Management: The TOE allows only authorized administrators to managethe security functions and TSF data of the TOE via a web-based User Interface.f)Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides protection mechanisms for its securityfunctions.g) TOE Access: The TOE terminates interactive sessions after administrativeconfigured period of time.h) Trusted path/channels: The TOE requires remote users to initiate a trustedcommunication path using TLS for initial user authentication.The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target (Ref [6]), which identifiesassumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, thesecurity function requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the productis intended to satisfy the security requirements. Prospective consumers are advised toverify that their operating environment is consistent with the evaluated configuration,Page vii of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations inthis certification report.This report confirms the findings of the security evaluation of the TOE to the CommonCriteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2) Augmented with ALC FLR.1. Thisreport confirms that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the relevantcriteria and the requirements of the Malaysia Common Criteria Evaluation andCertification (MyCC) Scheme (Ref [4]).The evaluation was performed by BAE Systems Applied Intelligence MySEF (MalaysiaSecurity Evaluation Facility) and completed on 27 January 2017.The Malaysia Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC SchemeCertification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the Arrangements on theRecognition of Common Criteria certificates and the product will be listed in the MyCCScheme Certified Products Register (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and theCommon Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria RecognitionArrangement) at www.commoncriteriaportal.org.It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 meetstheir requirements. It is recommended that a potential user of RSA Security Analyticsv10.6.1 refer to the Security Target (Ref [6]) and this Certification Report prior todeciding whether to purchase the product.Page viii of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Table of ContentsDocument Authorisation . iiCopyright Statement. iiiForeword. ivDisclaimer .vDocument Change Log . viExecutive Summary .viiTable of Contents . ixIndex of Tables .x1Target of Evaluation. 11.1TOE Description . 11.2TOE Identification . 21.3Security Policy . 31.4TOE Architecture . 31.4.1 Logical Boundaries . 51.4.2 Physical Boundaries . 61.5Clarification of Scope . 61.6Assumptions . 61.6.1 Usage assumptions. 71.6.2 Environment assumptions . 721.7Evaluated Configuration. 71.8Delivery Procedures . 71.9Documentation . 7Evaluation . 92.1Evaluation Analysis Activities . 92.1.1 Life-cycle support . 92.1.2 Development. 102.1.3 Guidance documents . 10Page ix of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v12.1.4 IT Product Testing . 103Result of the Evaluation . 153.1Assurance Level Information . 153.2Recommendation . 15Annex A References. 16A.1References . 16A.2Terminology . 16A.2.1 Acronyms. 16TOE Security Functions Interface . 16Security Functional Requirement . 16A.2.2 Glossary of Terms . 18Index of TablesTable 1: TOE identification . 2Table 2: List of Acronyms . 16Table 3: Glossary of Terms. 18Page x of xPUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v11Target of Evaluation1.1TOE Description1The TOE is RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 (SA). SA is a collection of appliances thatform a security infrastructure for an enterprise network. This architecture providesconverged network security monitoring and centralized security information andevent management (SIEM). SA provides real-time visibility into the monitored networkand long-term network data storage to provide detection, investigation, analysis,forensics, and compliance reporting. SA’s Capture infrastructure collects log andpacket data from the network. Packet collection extracts metadata, reassembles, andglobally normalizes all network traffic at layers 2 through 7 of the Open SystemsInterconnection (OSI) model. This data allows SA to perform real-time sessionanalysis. SA recognizes over 250 event source types, which are aggregated,analyzed, and stored for long-term use.2The TOE implements additional security functions such as Security Monitoring withSecurity Information and Event Management (SIEM); identification and authenticationof TOE users; security management; and trusted path.3The details of TOE functions can be found starting in section 2.1 of the SecurityTarget version 1.04There are eight security functionalities covered under the scope of the evaluationwhich are:Security FunctionDescriptionSecurity AuditThe TOE is able to generate auditrecords of security relevant events thatinclude at least date and time of theevent, subject identity and outcomefor security events.The Transport Layer Security (TLS 1.2)protocol in FIPS mode is used toprovide protection of thecommunications surrounding theremote administrative sessions fromdisclosure and from modification. TLSis also used for distributed internalTOE component communications.The TOE allows the users toacknowledge end-user licenseagreements and view warning bannersprior to providing identification andauthentication data.The TOE receives network packets,reconstructs network transactions,extracts metadata, and applies rules.The TOE receives log data, parses theCryptographic SupportIdentification & AuthenticationSecurity Monitoring with SecurityInformation and Event Management(SIEM)Page 1 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1data, extracts metadata, correlatesevents, and applies rules. Throughstatistical and signature analysis, theTOE can identify potential misuse orintrusions and send an alarm toincident management SA views.The TOE allows only authorizedadministrators to manage the securityfunctions and TSF data of the TOE via aweb-based User Interface.The TOE provides protectionmechanisms for its security functions.One of the protection mechanisms isthat users must authenticate and havethe appropriate permissions beforeany administrative operations oraccess to TOE data and resources canbe performed on the TSFThe TOE terminates interactivesessions after administrativeconfigured period of time. The TOEalso allows user-initiated terminationof the user's own interactive session byclosing the browser or explicitlylogging off.The TOE requires remote users toinitiate a trusted communication pathusing TLS for initial userauthentication. The TOE also requiresthat the trusted path be used for thetransmission of all SA interface sessiondata.Security ManagementProtection of the TSFTOE AccessTrusted path/channels1.2TOE Identification5The details of the TOE are identified in Table 1 below.Table 1: TOE identificationEvaluation SchemeMalaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification(MyCC) SchemeProject IdentifierC077TOE NameRSA Security AnalyticsTOE Versionv10.6.1Security Target TitleRSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 Security TargetSecurity Target Version1.0Page 2 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Security Target Date15 December 2016Assurance LevelEvaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2) Augmented withALC FLR.1CriteriaCommon Criteria for Information Technology SecurityEvaluation, September 2012, Version 3.1 Revision 4 (Ref[2])MethodologyCommon Evaluation Methodology for InformationTechnology Security Evaluation, September 2012, Version3.1 Revision 4 (Ref [3])Protection ProfileConformanceNoneCC Part 2 ExtendedCommon CriteriaConformanceCC Part 3 ConformantPackage conformant to EAL2 Augmented with ALC FLR.1Leidos Inc.SponsorDeveloperEvaluation Facility6841 Benjamin Franklin21046Drive, Columbia, MarylandRSA Security LLC (RSA)10700 Parkridge Blvd. Suite 600, Reston, VA 20191BAE Systems Applied Intelligence MySEF1.3Security Policy6There are no organisational security policies that have been defined regarding theuse of the TOE.1.4TOE Architecture7The TOE includes both logical and physical boundaries, which are described inSection 2.2 of the Security Target (Ref [6]).8The following figure 1 shows the evaluated configuration that comprise the TOE:Page 3 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1Figure 1Page 4 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v11.4.1 Logical Boundaries9The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target(Ref [6]) and includes only the following evaluated security functionality:a) Security Audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events thatinclude at least date and time of the event, subject identity and outcome forsecurity events. The TOE provides the default Administrator and Operator roleswith the ability to read the audit events. The environment stores the auditrecords and also provides the system clock information that is used by the TOEto timestamp each audit record.b) Cryptographic Support: The Transport Layer Security (TLS 1.2) protocol in FIPSmode is used to provide protection of the communications surrounding theremote administrative sessions from disclosure and from modification. TLS isalso used for distributed internal TOE component communications. The TOEuses a FIPS-validated module for SSH protected communication pathways for thetransfer of file event source data from log data sources to the TOE.The TOE uses Crypto-C ME 4.1.2 (FIPS 140-2 validation certificates #2300/2294)for both SSH and TLS communications.The TOE uses the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J cryptographic library: BSAFE SSL-J 6.1.3.1for Java applications, which incorporates BSAFE Crypto-J 6.1 (FIPS 140-2Certificates #2058/2057).c) Identification and Authentication: The TOE allows the users to acknowledge enduser license agreements and view warning banners prior to providingidentification and authentication data. No other access to the TOE is permitteduntil the user is successfully authenticated. The TOE maintains the followingsecurity attributes belonging to individual human users: username, passwordand role.The TOE provides authentication failure handling that allows administrators toconfigure the number of times a user may attempt to login and the time that theuser will be locked out if the configured number of attempts has been surpassed.The TOE detects when the defined number of unsuccessful authenticationattempts has been surpassed, and enforces the described behavior (locks theuser account for a specified time period).d) Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): TheTOE receives network packets, reconstructs network transactions, extractsmetadata, and applies rules. The rules identify interesting events, effectivelymatching signatures and performing statistical analysis. Likewise, the TOEreceives log data, parses the data, extracts metadata, correlates events, andapplies rules. Through statistical and signature analysis, the TOE can identifypotential misuse or intrusions and send an alarm to incident management SAviews. The incident management SA views provide the analytical results toauthorized users in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.The analytical results are recorded with information such as date and time. Onlyusers with the Analysis and Administrator roles can read the metadata, raw logs,raw packet data, and incident management data from the IDS data.e) Security Management: Authorized administrators manage the security functionsand TSF data of the TOE via the web-based User Interface. The ST defines andmaintains the administrative roles: Administrator, Analyst, Operator, SOCManager, and Malware Analyst. Authorized administrators perform all securityfunctions of the TOE including starting and stopping the services and auditPage 5 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1function, creating and managing user accounts, manage authentication failurehandling and session inactivity values and read the audit and analyzer data.f)Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides protection mechanisms for its securityfunctions. One of the protection mechanisms is that users must authenticateand have the appropriate permissions before any administrative operations oraccess to TOE data and resources can be performed on the TSF. The TOE is acollection of special-purpose appliances. Each appliance provides only functionsfor the necessary operation of the TOE, and limits user access to authorizedusers with an administrative role.Communication with remote administrators is protected by TLS in FIPS mode,protecting against the disclosure and undetected modification of data exchangedbetween the TOE and the administrator. The TOE runs in a FIPS compliant modeof operation and uses FIPS-validated cryptographic modules.g) TOE Access: The TOE terminates interactive sessions after administrativeconfigured period of time. The TOE also allows user-initiated termination of theuser's own interactive session by closing the browser or explicitly logging off.Before establishing a user session, the TOE displays an advisory warningmessage regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.h) Trusted path/channels: The TOE requires remote users to initiate a trustedcommunication path using TLS for initial user authentication. The TOE alsorequires that the trusted path be used for the transmission of all SA interfacesession data. The use of the trusted path provides assured identification of endpoints and protection of the communicated data from modification, anddisclosure.The TOE uses a FIPS-validated module for SSH protectedcommunication pathways for the transfer of file event source data from log datasources to the TOE. TLS and SSH ensure the administrative session and filetransfer communication pathways are secured from disclosure and modification.1.4.2 Physical Boundaries10The TOE includes both logical and physical boundaries, which are described inSection 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 of the Security Target (Ref [6]).1.5Clarification of Scope11The TOE is designed to be suitable for use in well-protected environments that haveeffective countermeasures, particularly in the areas of physical access, trainedpersonnel, and secure communication in accordance with user guidance that issupplied with the product.12Section 1.4 of this document describes the scope of the evaluation which was limitedto those claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6]).13Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some functions and services of theoverall product have not have been evaluated as part of this evaluation. Potentialconsumers of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for usingfunctions and services outside of the evaluated configuration.1.6Assumptions14This section summarises the security aspects of the environment/configuration inwhich the IT product is intended to operate. Consumers should understand theirPage 6 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1own IT environments that are required for secure operation of the TOE, which isdefined in the Security Target (Ref [6]).1.6.1 Usage assumptions15Assumption for the TOE usage as listed in Security Target:a) It is assumed that there will be one or more competent individuals assigned tomanage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.b) The authorized TOE administrators will follow and apply all administratorguidance in a trusted manner.c) Users will protect their authentication data.1.6.2 Environment assumptions16Assumptions for the TOE environment listed in the Security Target are:a) TOE Administrators will properly configure the network in the TOE operationalenvironment and configure adequate network capacity for the deployed TOEcomponents.b) The TOE hardware and software critical to the security policy enforcement will belocated within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorizedphysical access.1.7Evaluated Configuration17The evaluated configuration (see Figure 2-1 Evaluated Configuration) is described inSection 2.2 of the Security Target (Ref [6]).1.8Delivery Procedures18The delivery process for the TOE consists of three phases:a) Security Environmentb) Pre-Delivery Activitiesc) Shipping Process19Further information about these procedures is provided in Section 4.2 of the Deliverydocumentation.1.9Documentation20It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with the guidance documentationin order to ensure secure usage of the product.21The following documentation is provided by the developer to the end user asguidance to ensure secure delivery, installation and operation of the product:[1].RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 Security Target v1.0[2].RSA Security Analytics Security Analytics Getting Started Guide for Version10.6.1Page 7 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v1[3].RSA Security Analytics System Security and User Management Guide forversion 10.6[4].RSA Security Analytics Command Line Interface for Version 10.6.1[5].RSA Security Analytics Data Privacy Management Guide for Version 10.6.1[6].RSA Security Analytics Deployment Guide for version 10.6.1[7].RSA Security Analytics Virtual Host Setup Guide for version 10.6.1[8].RSA Security Analytics Warehouse Analytics Guide for version 10.6.1[9].RSA Security Analytics Log Collection for version 10.6.1[10].RSA Security Analytics Hosts and Services Getting Started Guide for version10.6.1[11].RSA Security Analytics Licensing for version 10.6.1[12].RSA Security Analytics System Maintenance Guide for version 10.6.1[13].RSA Security Analytics System Configuration Guide for version 10.6.1[14].RSA Security Analytics Archiver Configuration Guide for Version 10.6.1[15].RSA Security Analytics Broker and Concentrator Configuration Guide forVersion 10.6.1[16].RSA Security Analytics RSA Product Verification Checklist[17].RSA Security Analytics Decoder and Log Decoder Configuration Guide forVersion 10.6.1[18].RSA Security Analytics Incident Management Configuration Guide for Version10.6.1[19].RSA Security Analytics Investigation and Malware Analysis Guide for Version10.6.1[20].RSA Security Analytics User Documentation[21].RSA Security Analytics Reporting Engine Configuration Guide for Version10.6.1[22].RSA Security Analytics Alerting Using ESA for Version 10.6.1[23].RSA Security Analytics Event Stream Analysis Configuration Guide for Version10.6.1[24].RSA Security Analytics Malware Analysis Configuration Guide for Version10.6.1[25].RSA Security Analytics System Security and User Management for Version10.6.1Page 8 of 19PUBLIC

PUBLICFINALC077 Certification ReportISCB-5-RPT-C077-CR-v12Evaluation22The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CommonCriteria, version 3.1 Revision 4 (Ref [2]) and the Common Methodology f

1 The TOE is RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 (SA). SA is a collection of appliances that form a security infrastructure for an enterprise network. This architecture provides converged network security monitoring and centralized security information and event management (SIEM). SA provides real-time visibility into the monitored network

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