TR-138 Special Report: Security (Burglar) Bars
U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report SeriesSpecial Report:Security (Burglar) BarsUSFA-TR-138/February 2002HomelandSecurity
U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations ProgramThe U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country.The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterionfor deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In somecases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction orcontents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enoughto highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report.The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. TheInternational Association of Fire Chiefs assists USFA in disseminating the findings throughout thefire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from USFA; announcementsof their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakerswho must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and withinthe fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, buildingtechnology, and other related areas.The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigatorinto a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authoritiesto insure that USFA’s assistance and presence would be supportive and would in no way interferewith any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive duringthe event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objectivereview of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review USFA’sreport while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities should theywish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Data Center,16825 South Seton Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727 or via USFA Web page at http://www.usfa.dhs.gov.
Special Report: Security (Burglar) BarsAuthored by: Jennifer RobersonThis is Report 138 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conductedby Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation undercontract EMW-97-CO-0506 to the United States Fire Administration,Federal Emergency Management Agency.HomelandSecurityDepartment of Homeland SecurityUnited States Fire AdministrationNational Fire Data Center
U.S. Fire AdministrationMission StatementAs an entity of the Department of HomelandSecurity, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fireand related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support.We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies,and in partnership with fire protection andemergency service communities. With acommitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and datainitiatives.HomelandSecurity
TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2CASE STUDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5PUBLIC EDUCATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Sources of Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9CODES AND LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11California. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13TACTICS TO DEAL WITH BARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15APPENDIX A—USFA Fact Sheet: “FIRE SAFE AND SECURE: A FACTSHEET ONSECURITY BAR SAFETY” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17APPENDIX B—State Farm Insurance Brochure: “Security bars stop criminals and possibly your escape from fire”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21APPENDIX C—State of California Fact Sheet about Burglar Bars:“Security/Burglar Bar Facts” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27SOURCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYBurglar bars, also known as security or window bars, can be found on any type of structure– single-family home, apartment building, storefronts. The bars provide a visible sign ofsecurity serving as both a deterrent to potential burglars, and a reassurance to those whohad the bars installed. However, burglar bars can also be dangerous, preventing residents and otheroccupants from escaping in the event of a fire and leading to fatalities.Based on data obtained from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS), on average about25 civilians are injured or die each year in fires where escape is compromised by unauthorized barsor gates. The actual numbers may be larger than that, due to the fact that the presence of burglar barsis not always collected in a way that is recorded by NFIRS (e.g., written in text but not coded). Themost recent version of NFIRS, version 5.0, allows for the collection of data concerning burglar bars;however, data from the new version is not yet available.Most fatalities/injuries involving burglar bars occur in residences, when people become entrappedby the very bars that are supposed to protect them. Children, the elderly, the mobility impaired, andfirefighters are especially vulnerable. The bars also can hamper rescue efforts, especially the effortsof those who arrive before public safety personnel.Due to the fire egress risk posed by burglar bars, most building codes regulate their installation/use.Several states have passed legislation specific to burglar or security bars. Generally, the codes andlegislation require that burglar bars have some form of quick-release mechanism, enabling rapidescape in case of fire. Furthermore, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Life Safety Code101 addresses the risk posed by unauthorized bars, stating that a window or other means of escapeshould be operable from the inside “without the use of tools, keys, or special effort.”The cost of retrofitting or replacing existing burglar bars, along with a lack of awareness, has hindered the compliance to these regulations. The fear of burglary, theft, and/or physical attack presentsa greater perceived risk with people than the threat of fire, especially among those who have beenpreviously victimized.Several fire departments have experienced success in reducing the presence of unsafe bars by activelyworking with the public to provide information about the devices. The public can be educatedactively (door-to-door information), passively (websites, posters, etc.), and at points-of-sale. Whilepre-planning in neighborhoods, firefighters should note structures that have burglar bars on theirwindows/doors, and make a note of them for use in a response. They may also consider proactivelyproviding safe practices information to the location noted.While burglar bars may slow rescue they are not impenetrable. Fire departments have found successwith a variety of strategies to gain entry, or prepare a route of egress, through burglar bars.
INTRODUCTIONMany people feel they have a greater risk of being robbed than of being trapped in a fire. Reportsin the media tend to accentuate this fear, as robberies are generally more well-publicized than fires.According to the Uniform Crime Report compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, over twomillion people, or 18 percent of the population reporting, were burglarized in 1998. Accordingto information provided by NFIRS, that same year only 381,000 residential fires were reported.Figure 1. Burglaries vs. Residential FiresComparative information for burglaries and fires from 1995-1998 can be found in Figure 1.Burglar bars are used as a visible reminder of security. In many cases where bars are used, residentshave had personal experience as a victim of robbery, while having had little to no experience as thevictim of a fire. The threat of being burgled or having their residence broken into is more real to them than the threat ofbeing trapped in a fire. Burglar bars provide a quick, obvious, and relatively easy solution. The presenceof non-compliant burglar bars-those not consistent with modern code-results in many difficulties.The hazards primarily affect those who live behind them, but can affect both civilian and fire department rescuers once a fire has started.The installation of the bars leads to the creation of a prison-like condition-the occupants may feelsafe, but they have severely limited their avenues of egress. By blocking windows with bars, they areensuring that alternative escape paths through windows are no longer an option.In addition to those who have recently installed unsafe burglar bars (not code-compliant), thereare homes that have had burglar bars since before any legislation came into effect governing theirinstallation and safety. Most legislation governing the installation/use of burglar bars was enactedafter 1993; burglar bars installed prior to that year are mostly likely not complaint with currentlegislation. Despite the fact that such legislation is often retroactive, many homes are not retrofittedbecause of the cost involved in making existing installations complaint. It may cost up to 300 perwindow to either install complaint bars, or to retrofit existing ones. In contrast, the cost of installingunauthorized bars may be no more than 100 per window.
USFA-TR-138/February 20023Enforcement of codes relative to burglar bars, while important, often is not a top priority for building officials or fire inspectors, and so property owners are often unaware of non-complaint withsuch laws. Most homes are not re-inspected once built, unless they undergo major renovation.Immediately after fires involving fatalities, enforcement of burglar bar codes often increases sharply.However, due to other demands on inspector’s time (e.g., new construction, public assembly properties), the enforcement of the laws often fades. While most legislation is drafted in the wake of multiple-fatality fires involving bars, public demand for the passing of such legislation often diminishesas the memory of the fire tragedy fades.The occupant’s risk from the unsafe burglar bars is compounded greatly where there is no workingsmoke alarm. With the early warning provided by a working smoke alarm, people have a chance toextinguish an incipient fire or leave through exits. Anecdotal evidence suggest that when there aremultiple fatalities due to burglar bar entrapment, there often is not a working smoke alarm. It shouldbe noted that the model building codes will often require smoke alarms be installed in dwellingswhere security bars have been installed.Several firms offer “aesthetically pleasing” burglar bars that have been treated or coated with a substance so that they do not detract from the overall appearance of the house. These aesthetic enhancements are designed to increase the appeal of burglar bars for property owners.Just as burglar bars keep criminals out, they also keep rescuers out. Neighbors of victims entrappedby bars frequently state that they tried to rescue the people as they called for help, but were deniedentry due to the presence of burglar bars. Pry bars, axes even car jacks have been known to be usedby neighbors in an attempt to gain entry to assist victims prior to the arrival of fire departmentunits sometimes with success, often without. Regardless, the bars often significantly delay entryinto the structure, and rescue, by neighbors.The bars also provide a substantial challenge to fire suppression and rescue efforts. Entry by firefighters should be delayed until at least one set of bars has been removed on each level (and, ideally,each side) of the structure, providing an emergency escape route for occupants and responders.Command/safety officers should relay the location of the emergency egress points to interior attackcrews and rapid-intervention teams.Pre-planning is a crucial key to speeding up action on a fire ground. Anytime a unit is “on the air,”be it during driving training or an administrative function, personnel should try to pay attention tothe buildings with security bars in their first due area. Any notation about burglar bars on a structureshould be shared with all firefighting personnel responsible for responding to that structure, including second due and mutual aid companies. For example, information could be noted on dispatchcards and relayed to responding companies.Having a coordinated plan for the removal of bars on a structure can result in speedier rescue and firesuppression. Notations about which structures are known to have burglar bars should be kept in acentral, easily accessible location for ready reference when responding to an incident. Data collectedmight be stored in a computer-aided dispatch system, a map book, or a neighborhood informationbook. If possible, firefighting personnel should target the neighborhood surrounding a structurewith burglar bars as an area for fire prevention and safety education, and as a location where smokealarm checks and installation should be performed.
Burglar bars should be specifically looked for during arrival and size-up on the fireground. Dueto the hazards presented by the bars, firefighters need to be cognizant not only of the presence ofbars on the fireground, but how the bars are assembled and attached to the building. Observing thecharacteristics of the bars and their installation will assist in deciding how best to remove them. It isimportant for responders to be aware of what is contained in some of these architectural touches aspart of their pre-planning, so that rescuers are not facing unforeseen challenges when trying to gainentry to the structure on fire. Department training personnel or training officers should considerestablishing standard operating procedures and training-related activities targeted at the removal ofburglar bars using forcible entry tools.
USFA-TR-138/February 20025CASE STUDIESDespite the best efforts of fire department personnel and legislators, civilian fire fatalities as the resultof burglar bars continue to occur. The burglar bars are just one of a series of factors contributing tothe fire deaths; nevertheless, they often are the final step in a chain of events that led to preventabledeaths. The following are some representative cases, including ones that occurred as this report wasbeing written. Just these eight fires killed 19 people, and came close to killing more. They are allrelatively recent, and be used to illustrate the need for enhanced vigilance by building/code officials,tactical consideration, and public education.Case Study #1: Detroit, MIThree Killed in Duplex – December 26, 2001Three children were killed, and another three people were injured, after an early-morning firebroke out in their duplex. Burglar bars on the windows prevented escape, and thwarted anyrescue attempts by neighbors.The deceased, ages 17, 11, and 5 months, were siblings who were all trapped and killed bythe fire. The survivors were a 15-year old girl and a 4-year-old girl, and the mother of thechildren. The mother, trapped on the roof of the duplex, threw her 4-year-old daughterdown to rescuers, and then jumped from the roof. The 15-year-old girl was pulled from thefire by a neighbor.The duplex, which housed two families, was heavily damaged; two neighboring houses werealso damaged. At the time of this report, there was no indication of cause, or whether theduplex had working smoke alarms.Case Study #2: Baton Rouge, LAThree Children Injured – December 12, 2001Three siblings were rescued from a house fire by a neighbor who pried burglar bars off thedoor to their house. The children, ages 6, 4, and 3, were home alone at the time of the fire, andwere found unconscious in the rear of the house suffering from severe smoke inhalation.Neighbors noticed the fire and, after calling 9-1-1, began attempting to rescue the children.One neighbor instructed the children to go to the rear of the house if the fire started to comenear them, while another began to tear the burglar bars from the door of the house. By thetime the fire department arrived, the bars had been pried off of the door, and the door kickedin. Fire department spokesmen credited the actions of the neighbors with saving the lives ofthe children. A cause was not given for the fire.
Case Study #3: Houston, TXFour Killed in Single-Family Home – July 3, 2001Four people were killed, and another five injured, after an early-morning fire broke out in asingle-family house the day before the 4th of July. The home did not have a working smokealarm, and several doors and windows of the house had been blocked with burglar bars. Thebars were secured with a key, and did not have the quick-release mechanism required by Cityof Houston ordinance.The deceased, ages 30, 16, 13, and 4, were found in a back bedroom of the house, and diedof smoke inhalation. The 30-year old had initially escaped with two of her children, butreturned to the house to try to save the other children. It appears that she became overcometrying to get back out of the house. The victims were found near a window, leading investigators to theorize that they were trying to escape that way, however, the window was blockedby burglar bars. The woman’s mother escaped with two other children.Neighbors reported that they had tried to gain entry to the house, but heavy fire through thefront door prevented entry via that route. Burglar bars blocked entry through windows. Thefire, started by one of the children playing with a fireplace lighter, was quickly extinguishedupon the arrival of firefighters.As a result of the fire, firefighters went door-to-door throughout the neighborhood to checksmoke alarms, warn residents of the dangers of burglar bars, and hand out fire safety information. Residents were advised to conduct Exit Drills in the Home, practicing opening burglarbars.Case Study #4: Houston, TXThree Killed in Single-Family Home – June 20, 2001One person was injured and three killed after a fire broke out in their home at 3:00 a.m. A 65year-old female, a wheelchair-bound 70-year-old male, and a 42-year-old male all died fro
Special Report: Security (Burglar) Bars Authored by: Jennifer Roberson This is Report 138 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under contract EMW-97-CO-0506 to the United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Homeland Security
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