APPENDIXES - In-flight Breakup Over The Atlantic Ocean .

313Aircraft Accident Report5. AppendixesAppendix AInvestigation and HearingInvestigationThe National Transportation Safety Board was initially notified of this accidentabout 2050 eastern daylight time on July 17, 1996. A full go-team was assembled inWashington, D.C., and arrived on scene early the next morning; investigators from theSafety Board’s regional office in Parsippany, New Jersey, went immediately to the sceneof the accident. The go-team was accompanied by the Safety Board Vice Chairman andrepresentatives from the Safety Board’s Office of Government and Public Affairs.The following investigative groups were formed during the course of thisinvestigation: Systems, Structures, Maintenance Records, Airplane InteriorDocumentation, Witness, Metallurgy Structures/Sequencing, Medical Forensic, Fire andExplosion, Powerplants, Air Traffic Control, Operations, Aircraft Performance, AirportSecurity, Reconstruction, Hazardous Materials—Security, and Flight Test. Specialistswere also assigned to stand by in the Safety Board laboratories for the cockpit voicerecorder and flight data recorder.Parties to the investigation were the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); theBoeing Commercial Airplane Group; Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA); the InternationalAssociation of Mechanists, Aerospace Workers, and Flight Attendants (IAM); the AirLine Pilots Association (ALPA); the National Air Traffic Controllers Association; Pratt &Whitney; Honeywell; and the Crane Company, Hydro-Aire, Inc. (For information aboutagencies and companies that assisted during the search and recovery operation, seeappendix C.)Additionally, representatives from France’s Bureau Enquetes Accidents, theUnited Kingdom’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch, and Australia’s Bureau of AirSafety Investigations participated in the investigation as observers, in accordance with theprovisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. In addition,representatives from Canada’s Transportation Safety Board and International CivilAviation Organization, Singapore’s Civil Aviation Authority, and Russia’s InterstateAviation Committee observed portions of the investigation.

Appendix A314Aircraft Accident ReportPublic HearingA public hearing was conducted for this accident from December 8 through 12,1997, in Baltimore, Maryland. Chairman Jim Hall presided over the hearing. Parties to thepublic hearing were the FAA; Boeing; TWA; IAM; ALPA; Honeywell; and the CraneCompany, Hydro-Aire.

315Aircraft Accident ReportAppendix BCockpit Voice Recorder TranscriptThe following is a transcript of the Fairchild A-100 cockpit voice recorder (CVR)installed on the accident airplane. Only radio transmissions to and from the accidentairplane were transcribed. The CVR transcript reflects the 31 minutes and 30 secondsbefore power was lost to the CVR. All times are eastern daylight time, based on a 24-hourclock.Transcript of a Fairchild Model A-100 Cockpit Voice Recorder S/N UNK whichwas removed from a Trans World Airlines, Inc., Boeing Commerical Aircraft Co.B747-100 N93119, which was involved in an inflight accident on July 17, 1996approximately 10 miles south of East Moriches, New York.LEGENDRDORadio transmission from accident aircraftCAMCockpit Area Microphone sound or sourceINTAircraft flight/ground intercom sound or source-1Voice identified as Captain (left seat)-2Voice identified as First Officer (right seat)-3Voice identified as Second Officer-4Voice identified as Instructor Flight Engineer-5Voice identified as gate agent personnel-6Voice identified as male aircraft ground personnel-?Voice unidentifiedTWRJFK Local Controller (tower)GNDJFK Ground ControllerDEPNew York Radar Departure ControllerFICTWA Flight Information ControllerGHKennedy Gate Hold ControllerCTRBoston ARTCC Controller (center)LOADTWA passenger/freight load ControllerATISKennedy automated terminal information serviceUNKUnknown source*Unintelligible word@Nonpertinent word#Expletive deleted

Appendix B316%Break in continuity()Questionable text(( ))Editorial insertion-PauseAircraft Accident ReportNote: All times are expressed in Eastern Daylight Savings time. Only radiotransmissions to and from the accident aircraft were transcribed.

Appendix B317Aircraft Accident ReportCVR Quality Rating ScaleThe levels of recording quality are characterized by the following traits of thecockpit voice recorder information:Excellent QualityVirtually all of the crew conversations could be accuratelyand easily understood. The transcript that was developedmay indicate only one or two words that were notintelligible. Any loss in the transcript is usually attributed tosimultaneous cockpit/radio transmissions that obscureeach other.Good QualityMost of the crew conversations could be accurately andeasily understood. The transcript that was developed mayindicate several words or phrases that were notintelligible. Any loss in the transcript can be attributed tominor technical deficiencies or momentary dropouts in therecording system or to a large number of simultaneouscockpit/radio transmissions that obscure each other.Fair QualityThe majority of the crew conversations were intelligible.The transcript that was developed may indicate passageswhere conversations were unintelligible or fragmented.This type of recording is usually caused by cockpit noisethat obscures portions of the voice signals or by a minorelectrical or mechanical failure of the CVR system thatdistorts or obscures the audio information.Poor QualityExtraordinary means had to be used to make some of thecrew conversations intelligible. The transcript that wasdeveloped may indicate fragmented phrases andconversations and may indicate extensive passageswhere conversations were missing or unintelligible. Thistype of recording is usually caused by a combination of ahigh cockpit noise level with a low voice signal (poorsignal-to-noise ratio) or by a mechanical or electricalfailure of the CVR system that severely distorts orobscures the audio information.UnusableCrew conversations may be discerned, but neitherordinary nor extraordinary means made it possible todevelop a meaningful transcript of the conversations. Thistype of recording is usually caused by an almost totalmechanical or electrical failure of the CVR system.

TIME andSOURCECONTENT1959: 40AIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONTIME andSOURCECONTENTAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATIONStart of recording.1959: 41CAM-?got it.1959: 42CAM-?an agent comin'.1959: 43CAM-?yeah right.passenger's bag pulled, the passenger was on board the wholetime.all right.1959: 50CAM-1is the bags back on?1959: 52CAM- 5huh?1959: 53CAM-?yes.Aircraft Accident Report1959: 49CAM- 53181959: 44CAM- 5

TIME andSOURCECONTENT1959: 54CAM- 1okay.1959: 56CAM- 4are we reconciled?1959: 56CAM-?let's go.1959: 58CAM-?push.1959: 59CAM(( sound similar to cockpit door closing)).2000: 01CAM- 1we won't bother telling them that.2000: 03CAM-?nope.2000: 04CAM- 1you don't mind, huh?2000: 11CAM- 3we'd have a mutiny back there.CONTENTAircraft Accident Reportyeah he was on the whole time.TIME andSOURCE3191959: 53CAM- 1AIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

TIME andSOURCECONTENT2000: 14CAM- 4now the lavatories are full.2000: 15CAM- 1okay, well she said she'd call me as soon as they ah --.2000: 16CAM- 3probably have to get the ATIS now, huh?2000: 18CAM- 22000: 36CAM- 3all door lights are out.2000: 37CAM- 1thank you.CONTENTAircraft Accident Report-- visibility greater than one zero ceiling better than five thousandtemperature two eight due point two one altimeter three zero zeroseven approach in use VOR DME runway two two left departurerunway runway two two right and southwest departures runwaythree one left from intersection of kilo kilo all pilot are require toread back all runway hold short instructions in interest of noiseabatement please use the assigned runway advise you have tangoKennedy airport information tango two three five one Zulu weatherwind two two zero eight visibility --.TIME andSOURCE3202000: 22ATISdon't don't ah let them do their job Ralph they'll tell you whenthey're seated.AIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

TIME andSOURCE2000: 53CAM- 2CONTENTAIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONTIME andSOURCEtango.2001: 02INT- 6cockpit ground.2001: 05INT- 1hello ground2001: 06INT- 6all right every thing is shut down here you shouldhave all doo lights out and when you have clearanceyou can release the brakes.3212001: 13INT- 12001: 18CAMCONTENTAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATIONyeah we'll get the clearance we're waitin' on all thepeople to sit down I'll be back with ya in just a second.(( sound of cabin chime)).2001: 23CAM- 3hello darling.2001: 24CAM- 3everybody seated thanks.okay we're standing by.Aircraft Accident Report2000: 40INT- 6

TIME andSOURCECONTENTamazing.2001: 26CAM- 3everybody's seated.2001: 27CAM- 1do we have push back clearance to move?2001: 28CAM- 3we’re we’re we cleared to push from FIC or -.2001: 30CAM- 1no not yet.2001: 31CAM- 2you have to call them.TIME andSOURCECONTENT3222001: 25CAM- 1AIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATIONFIC TWA eight hundred gate twenty seven.2001: 37FICTWA eight hundred?2001: 38RDO- 3yeah we're ready to push.Aircraft Accident Report2001: 32RDO- 3

TIME andSOURCE2001: 39CAMCONTENTAIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONTIME andSOURCECONTENTAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATION(( sound of electric seat adjustment)).2001: 42FICcleared to push.2001: 47CAM- 1cleared to push.2001: 48RDO- 32001: 50INT- 1did they say everybody was seated yeah they did.2001: 54CAM- 3yes.2001: 58INT- 1cleared to to push eight hundred.okay ground we are cleared to push yeah well wait a minutehang on a minute.okay, we're cleared to push sorry.Aircraft Accident Report2001: 53CAM- 13232001: 46CAM- 2TWA eight hundred you're cleared to push gate twentyseven.

TIME andSOURCECONTENTAIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONTIME andSOURCECONTENT2001: 57INT- 6brakes released please.2001: 59INT- 1beacon on brakes released.2002: 00INT- 6thank you.Appendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATION2001: 58CAM(( sound similar to parking brake being released)).2002: 05CAM- 1number one ADP-.2002: 06CAM- 2there you go.2002: 07CAM- 1and the electric.2002: 08CAM- 2it's a command.2002: 09CAM- 1electric's on.Aircraft Accident Reportyou got something else to do Ralph.3242002: 02CAM- 2

TIME andSOURCECONTENTright.2002: 10CAM- 2that's a command.2002: 11CAM- 1command.2049: 27CAM- 1number one ADP on and the electric.2002: 16CAM- 2before you release the brakes.2002: 22CAM-?*.2002: 27CAM- 2block's at oh two I assume.2002: 29CAM- 3I'm showin’ oh two out. is that what you want?2002: 32CAM- 2that's fine.TIME andSOURCECONTENT3252002: 10CAM- 2AIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATIONAircraft Accident Report

TIME andSOURCE2002: 33CAM- 1yeah.2002: 34CAM- 2that's fine.2002: 35CAM- 1okay.2002: 38CAM- 2that's a minute over kill.yeah well that was because they weren’t seated theyprobably had people standing up and they were *.* down.2002: 48CAM- 2exactly.2002: 50CAM- 1you can bet on it.2002: 54CAM- 1I still think I'm sittin' too high in this thing.CONTENTAircraft Accident Report2002: 46CAM- 2TIME andSOURCE3262002: 40CAM- 1CONTENTAIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

TIME andSOURCE2003: 11CAM- 1CONTENTAIR- GROUND COMMUNICATIONTIME andSOURCE2003: 10FICeight hundred.2003: 12RDO- 3go ahead.somebody calling us .2003: 13FIC2003: 21INT- 1okay.and ah ground FIC wants you to push us back far enough sothey can bring somebody in our gate.2003: 27INT- 6okay we'll do that.2003: 30INT- 1thank you.Aircraft Accident Report* where's this thing.tell your mechanic to pull you back push you backfar enough so we can get an arrival into your gate.3272003: 18RDO- 32003: 32CAM-?CONTENTAppendix BINTRA- COCKPIT COMMUNICATION