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RPRDOUEAINPG1Form ApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEOMBNo. 0704-0188Pvte reportnin burden fort.hi colleCtIon of nformation is foern'aed to0 ai.erge i Nour p er 'e lxonje. ,ncludiq the tenie for reviewing eest eu coni. sestNng, tc nting data Ioucelt,gatherifng and mainteenleng ihe dots needed. and completitng ard reviewing the collection of information Send comments regar.gding this burden estinm ote or any other .tie . of thiscotlelIon of Informatiof . including sugle-tions fo( reducing this burden. to Watr,qton Headquarteri Service-. Oircatatefor Information Operations and leoorst. 129 JetfetrsonOavnSuihwultety, 1204, ArlingtOn, V 222024302. andt0the Otfice of Manaqemett and Buidget. PaierwoeK Reduci on PrOlec (0704-0168). W ihtnglon. DC 20S03.1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leavte bink)2. REPORT DATE3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVEREOMay 2002Monograph4. TITLE AND SUBTITLES. FUNDING NUMBERSAre Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the FirstStep in Transforming Cold War Formations?6. AUTHOR(S)Plaudy M. MeadowsLTC USA7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONU. S. Army Command and Staff CollegeREPORT NUMBERSchool of Advanced Military Studies250 Gibbon Ave.Fort Leavenworth, KS 660279. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)10. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESS12a. DISTRIBUTION /AAVAILABILITY12b. DISTRIBUTION CODESTATEMENTApproved for Public Release; Distribution is UnlimitedA13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)(see attached)15. NUMBER OF PAGES14. SUBJECT TERMS86Joint Task Force, Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Doctrine17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF REPORTUNSN 7540-01-280-550018. SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF THIS PAGEU119. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION16. PRICE CODE20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACTOF ABSTRACTUnoneStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)Prpceobed by ANI?q8.'02SId1139.18
AbstractAre Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the First Step in Transforming Cold WarFormations? by Lieutenant Colonel Plaudy M. Meadows III, U.S. Army, 85 pages.No one can predict the future but you must prepare for it. The standing joint task force (SJTF)headquarters concept in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was an attempt to preparefor the future by establishing permanent SJTF headquarters to meet the demands of the strategicoperational environment and to strengthen joint operations. The purpose of this research projectwas to determine if the SJTF headquarters concept is the first step in transforming U.S. cold warorganizations. The research approach focused on the strategic-operational environment, jointdoctrine, joint culture, and JTF lessons. The conclusions and recommendations focus on JTFheadquarters efficiency; intentionally, they do not focus on success or failure. The essence is todetermine if the SJTF headquarters is more efficient than other JTF headquarters options.During crises, the geographic commander in chief (CINC) may decide to establish a JTFheadquarters using one of three available options: form an ad hoc headquarters, augment asubordinate service component headquarters, or use an existing standing JTF headquarters. Adhoc headquarters were clearly the worst option because they were composed of disparateelements that lacked the common understanding and teamwork required for unified action; theylacked the ability to focus all efforts towards a common purpose because they had to undergo asubstantial building effort to form, equip, organize, and train the headquarters during the crises.Examples where the CINC augmented existing service headquarters to create a JTFheadquarters proved to be more efficient than ad hoc headquarters because they provided anucleus that had trained together as a team; however, after action reports identified deficiencies injoint, interagency, and coalition training and experience. These JTF headquarters requiredsignificant augmentation to make up for lack of expertise in crisis action campaign planning.Moreover, this augmentation required time to train and integrate into the existing headquarters.The SJTF headquarters has the best potential to be the CINC's most efficient JTFheadquarters option. SJTF experiences (service interaction in a joint-interagency-coalitionenvironments) will forge joint culture over time in the form of new beliefs, traditions, and values.Jointness is synonymous with culture and culture is synonymous with experience. The SJTFheadquarters offers the promise of positive experiences to reinforce change to achieve moreefficient joint-interagency-coalition operations.The SJTF offers an opportunity to transform the way the U.S. Armed Forces employs theunique contributions of the individual services from distinct instruments playing simultaneouslyto a joint symphony. The SJTF is better suited than other JTF headquarters options to integratethe individual service capabilities to create synergism -- a joint symphony. Nonetheless, the jointsymphony is just an intermediate objective in the effort to achieve national unified action.Jointness is about confluence. Just as the Mississippi river gathers power from the confluenceof its tributaries (the Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and Arkansas rivers) the U.S. Armed Forces mustharness the power of its tributaries (the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) to achieve thepower of confluence -- synergy. A cohesive joint force requires service confluence and careerpaths that expose tomorrow's senior leaders to the power ofjointness.Time is the ultimate arbiter of the SJTF's strategic-operational efficiency and its ability tostrengthen joint operations. However, the success or failure of the SJTF headquarters dependsupon several critical decisions: the SJTF joint manning document, the ultimate source of thesejoint billets, and a comprehensive joint education and training program. These decisions warrantindependent research and analysis but force planners must treat them as interdependent variablesin the application of the military instrument of power (through joint, interagency, andmultinational operations) in the complex system encompassing national interests and values.
Are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters theFirst Step in Transforming Cold War Formations?A MonographbyLieutenant Colonel Plaudy M. Meadows IIIUnited States ArmySchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasFirst Term AY 01-0220060411019Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
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AbstractAre Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the First Step in Transforming Cold WarFormations? by Lieutenant Colonel Plaudy M. Meadows III, U.S. Army, 85 pages.No one can predict the future but you must prepare for it. The standing joint task force (SJTF)headquarters concept in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was an attempt to preparefor the future by establishing permanent SJTF headquarters to meet the demands of the strategicoperational environment and to strengthen joint operations. The purpose of this research projectwas to determine if the SJTF headquarters concept is the first step in transforming U.S. cold warorganizations. The research approach focused on the strategic-operational environment, jointdoctrine, joint culture, and JTF lessons. The conclusions and recommendations focus on JTFheadquarters efficiency; intentionally, they do not focus on success or failure. The essence is todetermine if the SJTF headquarters is more efficient than other JTF headquarters options.During crises, the geographic commander in chief (CINC) may decide to establish a JTFheadquarters using one of three available options: form an ad hoc headquarters, augment asubordinate service component headquarters, or use an existing standing JTF headquarters. Adhoc headquarters were clearly the worst option because they were composed of disparateelements that lacked the common understanding and teamwork required for unified action; theylacked the ability to focus all efforts towards a common purpose because they had to undergo asubstantial building effort to form, equip, organize, and train the headquarters during the crises.Examples where the CINC augmented existing service headquarters to create a JTFheadquarters proved to be more efficient than ad hoc headquarters because they provided anucleus that had trained together as a team; however, after action reports identified deficiencies injoint, interagency, and coalition training and experience. These JTF headquarters requiredsignificant augmentation to make up for lack of expertise in crisis action campaign planning.Moreover, this augmentation required time to train and integrate into the existing headquarters.The SJTF headquarters has the best potential to be the CINC's most efficient JTFheadquarters option. SJTF experiences (service interaction in a joint-interagency-coalitionenvironments) will forge joint culture over time in the form of new beliefs, traditions, and values.Jointness is synonymous with culture and culture is synonymous with experience. The SJTFheadquarters offers the promise of positive experiences to reinforce change to achieve moreefficient joint-interagency-coalition operations.The SJTF offers an opportunity to transform the way the U.S. Armed Forces employs theunique contributions of the individual services from distinct instruments playing simultaneouslyto a joint symphony. The SJTF is better suited than other JTF headquarters options to integratethe individual service capabilities to create synergism -- a joint symphony. Nonetheless, the jointsymphony is just an intermediate objective in the effort to achieve national unified action.Jointness is about confluence. Just as the Mississippi river gathers power from the confluenceof its tributaries (the Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and Arkansas rivers) the U.S. Armed Forces mustharness the power of its tributaries (the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) to achieve thepower of confluence -- synergy. A cohesive joint force requires service confluence and careerpaths that expose tomorrow's senior leaders to the power ofjointness.Time is the ultimate arbiter of the SJTF's strategic-operational efficiency and its ability tostrengthen joint operations. However, the success or failure of the SJTF headquarters dependsupon several critical decisions: the SJTF joint manning document, the ultimate source of thesejoint billets, and a comprehensive joint education and training program. These decisions warrantindependent research and analysis but force planners must treat them as interdependent variablesin the application of the military instrument of power (through joint, interagency, andmultinational operations) in the complex system encompassing national interests and values.
Table of ContentsT able of C ontents .IChapter I - Introduction .3The QDR Transformation Challenge .4Research Question & Methodology .7Chapter II- JTF Environment (External Factor) .10The Strategic-Operational Context: Global, Changing, and Uncertain .11JTF Operations to Protect Interests and Values .14Conclusion .19Chapter III - Joint Doctrine & Culture (Internal Factors) .20Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters Evaluation Criteria .20Joint Doctrine and the Joint Task Force .20Joint Command & Control and Unified Action. .22Establishing a Joint Task Force .25JTFs in Complex Contingency Operations .26JTF Strategic-Operational Warfighting Competencies .28Jointness and Joint Culture .34Impediments to Jointness and Standing JTF Headquarters .40The Budget and Force Planning .41Service Education, Training, & Doctrine .43Con clusion .Chapter IV - Contemporary JTF History .What are the lessons learned from the contemporary history of JTFs? .485051The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force & Operation Eagle Claw . 51Grenada & Operation Urgent Fury .155
Panam a & Operation Just Cause .59Som alia & Operations Provide Relief/Restore Hope .61Haiti & Operation Uphold D emocracy .65Conclusion .69Chapter V - Conclusions & Recom mendations .71Conclusions .71Recom m endations .76Thoughts on Future Research Requirem ents .78SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .802
Chapter I - IntroductionThe enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engagedin the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. Wewill defend our allies and our interests. To all nations, we will speak for the values thatgave our nation birth.President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address - January 20, 2001'President Bush's comments are clear. The United States is a global power committed to aproactive global strategy designed to protect its interests and promote its core values. Superpowerstatus requires a foreign policy and national strategy that integrates all the traditional instrumentsof power - Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. Critical to this effort is anunderstanding of the global environment and the United States Armed Forces' responsibilities inthat environment. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, comprehending the globalenvironment has become increasingly more difficult. According to Joint Pub 1-0, "The ArmedForces of the United States face the most challenging environment of any military power. Thestrategic context confronting the United States is unique, and our friends, allies, and interests are2worldwide. Accordingly, the arena of our potential operations is the entire planet."The planet became more complex and dangerous when the Soviet Union collapsed and brokethe bipolar stalemate of the Cold War. The Cold War, pitting East against West and communismagainst democracy, created a global political stasis founded on a bipolar world. The fall of theBerlin Wall disrupted the stasis and initiated a period of global dissonance characterized byincreased tensions and conflicts motivated by desires to expand political, military, economic, andinformational influence.The post Cold War vacuum initiated a rush to find a new paradigm to understand thechanging strategic environment. Desert Storm and its technological advances, on the heels of theI An excerpt from President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address delivered on January 20. 2001. The excerpt is from the Official White House Home Page atwww.whitehouse.gov. on 15 Jan 2002.2 Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare oftheArmedForcesof the UnitedStates,(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1995). 1-2 thru 1-2.3
Soviet collapse, provided fertile ground for the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA).Steven Metz and James Kievit, members of the Army's Strategic Studies Institute, characterizedthe RMA dilemma as a crossroads. They offered three options: "push further along the road ofprecision, stand-off strikes and disruptive information warfare aimed primarily at conventionallyarmed regional aggressors; to put a brake on the RMA and stand pat in order to consolidateexisting advantages; or, to push the revolution in a different direction." 3Senior military and political leaders must make policy decisions concerning the RMAcrossroads. These leaders must also make these decisions even though the future is murkybecause it lacks a universal construct for the 21 st Century strategic landscape. The 2001Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) attempted to solidify a concept for "exploiting therevolution in military affairs [that] requires not only technological innovation but alsodevelopment of operational concepts, undertaking organizational adaptations, and training and4experimentation to transform a country's military forces" to meet the 21 st Century challenges.The QDR Transformation ChallengeThe global security environment involves a great deal of uncertainty about the potentialsources of military threats, the conduct of war in the future, and the form that threats andattacks against the Nation will take. History has shown that rapid and unexpected changes,such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, can transform the geopolitical landscape. It also hasdemonstrated that new military technologies can revolutionize the form of militarycompetition and the nature of armed conflict in ways that render military forces and doctrinesof great powers obsolescent.52001 Quadrennial Defense ReviewThe 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) painted a geo-strategic landscape absent aclearly defined threat, subject to revolutionary changes that could threaten America's ability toprotect its interests and promote its values. The QDR called for a shift from "threat-based defense3 Steven Metz and James KievitL Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy, (Carlisle, PA: 1995), 26. Obtained from the September2001 JEL CD Rom)4 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington: U.S. Govermment Printing Office. 2001). 6.5 Ibid., 3.4
planning to "capabilities-based" defense planning and a transformation of U.S. forces"Antecedent to the QDR, the Secretary of Defense commissioned a transformation study group(senior military leaders and defense analysts) to identify "capabilities needed by U.S. forces toeffectively address the 21 st century security environment" and "transformation recommendationson how to develop and field the desi
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