Defense-in-Depth In Understanding And Countering Nuclear .

Defense-in-Depth in Understanding andCountering Nuclear and RadiologicalTerrorismCharles D. FergusonPresidentFederation of American ScientistsPresentation to Countering Nuclear andRadiological Threats SymposiumMay 15, 20131

Why Have Many Experts Been Wrong? “I don't want to fan hysteria but . a dirtybomb attack is all but inevitable in thecoming years,” as quoted in the SanFrancisco Chronicle, September 5, 2004 Who said this?Charles D. Ferguson Why hasn’t the attack happened?2

The Lugar Survey On Proliferation Threats andResponses, June 2005 More than 80 experts surveyed Even within the limited time spanof five years, 82% (68 of 83) saidthat there was at least a 10%chance of a radiological attack thataffects a major portion of a city. Almost half of respondents (40 of82) judged the risk of such anattack as 50 percent or greaterover 10 years.3

Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism “In the judgment of former U.S. SenatorSam Nunn, the likelihood of a singlenuclear bomb exploding in a single city isgreater today than at the height of the ColdWar. Nuclear Terrorism states my ownjudgment that, on the current trend line,the chances of a nuclear attack in the nextdecade are greater than 50 percent.”--Graham Allison, April 16, 20074

Another Expert’s Assessment Matthew Bunn ofHarvard has created aprobability model thatestimates the probabilityof a nuclear terroristattack over a ten-yearperiod to be 29 percent.An assessment madeabout eight years ago.5

But Can We Make Such Estimates? Risk Probability XConsequence Large uncertainties Lack of data Relative vs. absolute riskassessment Probability Function(Motivation, Intention, Capability) Risk Function (Motivation,Intention, Capability) XConsequence6

Relative Risk Assessment Intact Nuclear Weapon Improvised Nuclear Device Attacks on or Sabotage ofNuclear Facilities such asNuclear Power Plants or SpentFuel Pools Radiological Weapon such as“Dirty Bomb”

Radiological Weapons “Dirty bombs” are only one typeof RDD, radiological dispersaldevice Do not need conventionalexplosives to disperse certaintypes of radioactive material, e.g.cesium chloride RED: Radiation emission device– could think of as a motionlessRDD Radiological Incendiary DeviceMobile Cesium Irradiators

Improvised Nuclear DeviceConclusion Focus on securing and reducing highly enriched uraniumas top priority because of its relative ease of use in gun-type deviceOnly takes about 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium orabout 6 kg of plutonium per bomb

Knowing the Mind of Nuclear Terrorists “We know more of the interior of the atom thanwe do of the interior of the mind of the terrorist,”Dr. Jerrold Post, 198710

Terrorist Motivations Those who study terroristmotivations are“underwhelmed by theprobability of such an event[radiological or nuclearterrorism] for most – but notall – terrorist groups.” –Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation,Nov. 2001 Psychological and politicalfactors would constrain mostgroups11

Rise of Mass Casualty Terrorism12

Terrorists’ Interest inRadiological Terrorism Al Qaeda-in-Iraqleader José Padilla? “Radicalized”Chechen rebels? Jihadist groups inSouth Asia Dhiren Barot a.k.a.Issa al-Hindi But why no attacks?

Terrorists are People, Too Dhiren Barota.k.a. Issa al-Hindi14

Unexpected Radiological Attack Litvinenko’s murderusing Po-210 October 2006 inLondon Criminal act withpossible terrorismimplications15

Bale of Marijuana Argument Learn from the drug smugglers:They bring in “bales” of marijuanaevery day into the United States Nuclear terrorists can do the samewith fissile material or even a fullybuilt nuclear explosive Think Again: Drug smugglers knowthat the cost of doing business isseveral seizures of marijuana, butthey stay in business because thereis plenty of supply Nuclear terrorists would likely havepaid a dear price for nuclearmaterials or weapons they wouldbe extremely reluctant to run asignificant chance of seizure

No Gold is Lost from Fort Knox Graham Allison has recommended thegold standard for nuclear security. All we need to do is lock up all of thefissile material in Fort Knox-likecompounds. As we all know, no gold has been lostfrom Fort Knox. While probably true,gold like fissile material is used inplenty of places that are not like FortKnox. And certain countries will continue touse highly enriched uranium forweapons, naval fuel, and perhaps forcivilian purposes

Al Qaeda’s “Superbomb” Documents [David] Albright has cautioned thereis no indication that al Qaeda'snuclear work has gone beyondtheory. To create a nuclear weapon,Albright said a designer must learna whole set of manufacturing stepsnot mentioned in al Qaeda's manualand develop confidence in theweapon's design. "Even a terrorist group that's goingto go to the trouble of working on anuclear weapon wants to havesome certainty that it's going toexplode as a nuclear explosive andnot just explode as a highexplosive," Albright said.From a CNN January 2002 story

We Have to Succeed Every Time But terrorists would onlyhave to succeed once. Think Again: Nuclearterrorists would have tosucceed with every step ofa complicated plan. Many terrorists also fearfailure. They feardisappointing their leadersand most importantly theirhigher power if they believein such.

Terrorists are cool, calm, and cold-bloodedmurders, right? But nervous terroristshave revealed their plots.For example, theMillennium bomber wasdetained at the bordercrossing betweenCanada and the UnitedStates Some terrorists have alsooften show themselves tobe bunglers. Forexample, the medicaldoctors who botched the2007 bombings in GreatBritain.

Chain of Causation for Radiological or NuclearTerrorism1. Terrorists must be motivated to launch anunconventional attack using radiological ornuclear means.2. They must have or must acquire therequisite technical expertise.3. They must acquire radioactive or fissilematerials and build the weapon.4. They must be able to plan the attackwithout being detected and caught.5. They must finally be able to carry out theattack by delivering the weapon to thetarget.21

Murphy’s Law of NuclearTerrorism “Nuclear terrorists have a lot of chancesto make mistakes.” –Michael Levi, OnNuclear Terrorism, 200722

Defense-in-DepthSecurity System SecureReduceReplaceDetectRespondRecovery23

Secure Radioactive and NuclearMaterials International Atomic Energy Agency National Nuclear Security Administration’sGlobal Threat Reduction Initiative World Institute for Nuclear Security Obama administration’s Nuclear SecuritySummit in April 2010 and the follow-on summitsin 2012 in Seoul and next year in the Hague24

Reduce Returned 900 kg ofSoviet-origin highlyenriched uranium(HEU) Returned 1,200 kg ofU.S.-origin HEU Recovered 32,000unwanted or excessradioactive sources But much more to bedone25

Replace Convert HEU-fueled research reactors withLEU More than 50 research or isotopeproduction reactors converted Dozens of reactors shut down But few dozen more remain to beconverted Need to develop alternative fuels Continue to develop more alternatives,where appropriate, to certain types ofradioactive sources For example, x-ray devices to replaceresearch or blood irradiators26

Detect “Second Line ofDefense” Container SecurityInitiative Mega-ports Initiative Secure the CitiesInitiative27

Preparing for Radiological andNuclear Attacka) Educate the public, the press, and politicalleadershipb) Equip and train first respondersc) Conduct planning exercisesd) Develop effective mitigation and recoverytechniques28

Thank you for your attentionAny Questions?See FAS.org for more information and analysis29

Secure Radioactive and Nuclear Materials International Atomic Energy Agency National Nuclear Security Administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative World Institute for Nuclear Security Obama administration’s Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 and the follow-