Hazards Of Delayed Coker Unit (DCU) Operations (August 2003)
Chemical Emergency Preparednessand Prevention Office(5104A)Occupational Safety and Health AdministrationDirectorate of Science, Technology and MedicineOffice of Science and Technology AssessmentUnited StatesEnvironmental ProtectionAgencyCEPPOUnited StatesDepartment of LaborEPA 550-F-03-001August 2003www.epa.gov/ceppoHazards of Delayed Coker Unit (DCU)OperationsSHIB 03-08-29www.osha.govThe batch portion of DCUoperations (drum switching andcoke cutting) creates uniqueotherpetroleumrefineryhazards, resulting in relatively Unlikeoperations, the DCU is a semi-batchfrequent and serious accidents.operation, involving both batch andALERTChemical SafetyThis process yields higher value liquidproducts and creates a solid carbonaceousresidue called “coke.” As the supply oflighter crude oils has diminished, refinershave relied increasingly on DCUs.Safety and HealthTProblemInformation BulletinThe Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) are jointly issuing this Chemical Safety Alert/Safety and Health Information Bulletin (CSA/SHIB)as part of ongoing efforts to protect human health and the environment by preventing chemical accidents.We are striving to better understand the causes and contributing factors associated with chemicalaccidents, to prevent their recurrence, and to provide information about occupational hazards andnoteworthy, innovative, or specialized procedures, practices, and research that relate to occupational safetyand health and environmental protection. Major chemical accidents cannot be prevented solely throughregulatory requirements. Rather, understanding the fundamental root causes, widely disseminating thelessons learned, and integrating these lessons into safe operations are also required. EPA and OSHAjointly publish this CSA/SHIB to increase awareness of possible hazards. This joint document supplementsactive industry efforts to exchange fire and safety technology and to increase awareness of environmentaland occupational hazards associated with DCU operations. It is important that facilities, State EmergencyResponse Commissions (SERCs), Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), emergencyresponders, and others review this information and take appropriate steps to minimize risk. This documentdoes not substitute for EPA or OSHA regulations, nor is it a regulation itself. It cannot and does notimpose legally binding requirements on EPA, OSHA, states, or the regulated community, and themeasures it describes may not apply to a particular situation based upon the circumstances. This guidancedoes not represent final agency action and may change in the future, as appropriate.The increasingly limited supply ofhigher quality crude oils has resulted ingreater reliance on more intensiverefining techniques. Current crude oilstend to have more long chainmolecules, known as “heavy ends” or“bottom of the barrel” than the lightercrude oils that were more readilyavailable in the past. These heavy endscan be extracted and sold as a relativelylow value industrial fuel or as afeedstock for asphalt-based products,such as roofing tile, or they may befurther processed to yield higher valueproducts. One of the most popularprocesses for upgrading heavy ends isthe DCU, a severe form of thermalcracking requiring high temperaturesfor an extended period of time.continuous stages. The batch stage of theoperation (drum switching and cokecutting) presents unique hazards and isresponsible for most of the seriousaccidents attributed to DCUs. Thecontinuous stage (drum charge, heating,and fractionation) is generally similar toother refinery operations and is not furtherdiscussed in this document. About 53DCUs were in operation in the UnitedStates in 2003, in about one third of therefineries.In recent years, DCU operations haveresulted in a number of serious accidentsdespite efforts among many refiners toshare information regarding best practicesfor DCU safety and reliability. EPA andOSHA believe that addressing the hazards Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficePage 1
HAZARDS OF DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU) OPERATIONSof DCU operations is necessary given the increasingimportance of DCUs in meeting energy demands, thearray of hazards associated with DCU operations, andthe frequency and severity of serious incidentsinvolving DCUs.Understanding the HazardsSafe DCU operations require an understandingof the situations and conditions that are mostprone to frequent or serious accidents.Process DescriptionEach DCU module contains a fired heater, two (insome cases three) coking drums, and a fractionationtower.August 2003This document focuses on the coke drums, which arelarge cylindrical metal vessels that can be up to 120feet tall and 29 feet in diameter.In delayed coking, the feed material is typically theresiduum from vacuum distillation towers andfrequently includes other heavy oils. The feed isheated by a fired heater (furnace) as it is sent to oneof the coke drums. The feed arrives at the coke drumwith a temperature ranging from 870 to 910 F.Typical drum overhead pressure ranges from 15 to 35psig. Under these conditions, cracking proceeds andlighter fractions produced are sent to a fractionationtower where they are separated into gas, gasoline,and other higher value liquid products. A solidresiduum of coke is also produced and remainswithin the drum.Flange andTop HeadFoamBorehole cutcompleted.Rotating cuttinghead shownreset for sidecutting operation.Water jetsdischarge atabout 5 degreesoff horizontal.3 way Valve ConveyingVapors From Filling DrumTo Fractioonator TowerVapors,Enroute ToFractionatorTowerOpen FluidMaterialChannelsPluggedChannelBottom Headand FlangeCharge Entering DrumFrom Fired HeaterCut Coke FallingTo Receiving AreaSolidCokeFigure 1 - Delayed Coker UnitCutaway to Depict Drum In Filling and Migration Mode (Left)and Drum In Cutting Mode (Right)Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficeAfter the coke has reached apredetermined level within the“on oil” drum, the feed isdiverted to the second cokedrum. This use of multiplecoke drums enables therefinery to operate the firedheater and fractionation towercontinuously. Once the feedhas been diverted, the originaldrum is isolated from theprocess flow and is referred toas the “off oil” drum. Steam isintroduced to strip out anyremaining oil, and the drum iscooled (quenched) with water,drained,andopened(unheaded) in preparation fordecoking. Decoking involvesusing high pressure water jetsfrom a rotating cutter tofracture the coke bed andallow it to fall into thereceiving area below. Once itis decoked, the “off oil” drumis closed (re-headed), purgedof air, leak tested, warmed-up,and placed on stand-by, readyto repeat the cycle. Drumswitching frequency rangesfrom 10 to 24 hours. DCUfilling and decoking operationsare illustrated in Figure 1.Equipment used in cokecutting(hydroblasting)operations is illustrated inFigure 2.Page 2
HAZARDS OF DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU) OPERATIONSAugust 2003Drilling Gantry StructureRotation MotorHydroblast Water Supply HoseRotating Drill StemCutting HeadDrill Stem Guide3 Way Valve --Isolating Open Drum andConveying Vapors To Fractionator TowerOnstream Drum - BeingChargedOpened Drum - Ready ForCoke CuttingWinchBottom Unheading Deck - SectionRemoved For Coke DischargeStripping Steam Inlet ValveQuench Water Inlet ValveDrum Feed From Fired HeaterSent To Filling Drum Via 3 Way ValveFigure 2 - Delayed Coker UnitCoke Drums and Hydroblast SystemsChemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficePage 3
HAZARDS OF DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU) OPERATIONSOnce removed from the coke drums, the coke istransported away from the receiving area. From here,the coke is either exported from the refinery orcrushed, washed, and stored prior to export.August 2003hazards during removal of the top and bottom drumheads. The most frequent and/or severe hazardsassociated with this operation are described below:fGeysers/eruptions - Under abnormal situations,such as feed interruption or anomalous shortcircuiting during steaming or quenching, hotspots can persist in the drum. Steam, followed bywater, introduced to the coke drum inpreparation for head removal can followestablished channels rather than permeatethroughout the coke mass. Because coke is anexcellent insulator, this can leave isolated hotareas within the coke. Although infrequent, if thecoke within the drum is improperly drained andthe coke bed shifts or partially collapses, residualwater can contact the isolated pockets of hotcoke, resulting in a geyser of steam, hot water,coke particles, and hydrocarbon from either orboth drum openings after the heads have beenremoved.fHot tar ball ejection - Feed interruption andsteam or quenching water short-circuiting canalso cause “hot tar balls,” a mass of hot (over800 F) tar-like material, to form in the drum.Under certain circumstances, these tar balls canbe rapidly ejected from the bottom head opening.fUndrained water release - Undrained hot watercan be released during bottom head removal,creating a scalding hazard.fShot coke avalanche - Sometimes, the cokeforms into a multitude of individual, varioussized, spherical shaped chunks known as “shotcoke,” rather than a single large mass. In thissituation, the drum contents are flowable andmay dump from the drum when the bottom headis removed, creating an avalanche of shot coke.fPlatform removal/falling hazard - Some DCUsrequire the removal of platform sections toaccommodate unheading the bottom of the drum.This can introduce a falling hazard.The following specific operations and more icantly to the hazards associated with DCUoperations:Specific operation hazards Coke drum switchingCoke drum head removal Coke cutting (hydroblasting operation)Emergency and general operational hazards Coke transfer, processing, and storage Emergency evacuation Toxic exposures, dust irritants, and burntrauma The hazards associated with these specific operationsand DCU operations, in general, are explained belowto share lessons learned and increase awareness ofthe situations and conditions that are most prone toserious accidents. Following this section, the jointCSA/SHIB describes actions that can be taken to helpminimize the risks associated with these situationsand conditions.Specific Operation HazardsCoke Drum SwitchingMost DCU operations consist of several DCUmodules, each typically alternating between two cokedrums in the coking/decoking sequence. Some DCUmodules include a third drum in this sequence. Eachdrum includes a set of valving, and each moduleincludes a separate set of valving. Differences invalving among drums and among modules may bedifficult to distinguish and can lead to unintendeddrum inlet or outlet stream routing. Similarly, valvecontrol stations, for remotely activated valves, maynot always clearly identify the operating status ofdifferent drums and modules. Activating the wrongvalve because of mistakes in identifying theoperational status of different drums and modules hasled to serious incidents.Coke Drum Head RemovalConditions within the drum, during and aftercharging, can be unpredictable. Under abnormalconditions, workers can be exposed to the release ofhot water, steam and coke, toxic fumes, and physicalChemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficeCoke Cutting (HydroblastingOperation)Coke-cutting or -hydroblasting involves loweringfrom an overhead gantry a rotating cutter that useshigh pressure (2000 to 5000 psig) water jets. Thecutter is first set to drill a bore hole through the cokebed. It is then reset to cut the coke away from thedrum interior walls. Workers around the gantry andtop head can be exposed to serious physical hazards,and serious incidents have occurred in connectionPage 4
HAZARDS OF DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU) OPERATIONSAugust 2003hazardous conditions for workers in confinedspaces.with hydroblasting operations. Some of the mostfrequent and/or severe hazards are described below:fIf the system is not shut off before the cuttingnozzle is raised out of the top drum opening, ahigh pressure water jet can be exposed andseriously injure, even dismember a nearbyworker.ffFugitive mists and vapors from the cutting andthe quench water can contain contaminants thatpose a health hazard (see section on ToxicExposures, Dust Irritants and Burn Trauma,below).Emergency EvacuationfThe water hose can burst while under highpressure, resulting in whipping action that canseriously injure nearby workers.fThe wire rope supporting the drill stem andwater hose can fail (part), allowing the drill stem,water hose, and wire rope to fall onto work areas.fGantry damage can occur, exposing workers tofalling structural members and equipment.Emergency and General OperationalHazardsCoke Transfer, Processing, andStorageThe following coke conveyance, processing, andstorage operations have presented safety and healthhazards for DCU workers:fThe repositioning of rail cars by smalllocomotives or cable tuggers to receive cokebeing cut from a drum can create physicalhazards for workers in the rail car movementarea.fMechanical conveyors and coke crushers maycontain exposed moving parts that can causefracture or crush type injuries at pinch points.fFires are common in coke piles and rail cars.Large chunks of coke can contain pockets ofunquenched material at temperatures well abovethe ignition point. When fractured and exposedto air, this material can ignite. Fires have alsobeen attributed, although less frequently, toreactions that lead to spontaneous combustion.fCombustion products and/or oxygen depletionresulting from spontaneous fires can createChemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficeWet coke in an enclosed area has been reportedto have absorbed oxygen from the surroundingair under certain circumstances. This can makethe area oxygen deficient and causeasphyxiation.The delayed coking process is very labor intensive.Each batch process cycle requires 25 or more manualoperations (valve, winch operation, drum heading,etc.), and many DCUs operate with three or more setsof drums. Tasks are performed at several levels onthe coke drum structure. The upper working platform(frequently called the “cutting deck”) is generallywell over 120 feet above ground. During anemergency, evacuation from the structure can bedifficult.In addition, moisture escaping from drum openingsduring cold weather can produce fog. This canobscure vision and make walkways, and hand railswet and slippery, creating additional difficultiesduring emergency evacuation.Toxic Exposures, Dust Irritants, andBurn TraumaDCU workers can be exposed to coke dust and toxicsubstances in gases and process water around DCUoperations. Workers can also be exposed to physicalstress and other hazardous conditions. The followingexposures to toxic substances, irritants, andhazardous conditions have been associated with DCUoperations, in general:fHot water, steam, and liquid hydrocarbon (blackoil) can escape from a coke drum and causeserious burn trauma. Contact with black oil cancause second or third degree burns. In addition,liquid hydrocarbon escaped from a coke drumcan be well above its ignition temperature,presenting a fire hazard.fHeat stress can be a health hazard during warmweather, particularly for those required to wearprotective clothing while performing tasks on thecoke drum structure.fHazardous gases associated with cokingoperations, such as hydrogen sulfide, carbonmonoxide, and trace amounts of polynucleararomatics (PNAs), can be emitted from the cokePage 5
HAZARDS OF DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU) OPERATIONSfAugust 2003through an opened drum or during processingoperations.Coke Drum Head RemovalIf allowed to accumulate and become airborne,dust around a DCU may exceed acceptableexposure limits and become a hazard.It can be difficult to anticipate the presence of eithera hot spot or a hot tar ball in the coke drum prior todrum head removal. In light of this possibility and thepotential for serious incidents, it is prudent to:Controlling the HazardsfBe alert to any operating abnormalities orvariations during charging, steaming, orquenching that may forewarn a hot spot or tarball. Have a contingency plan to deal with suchissues before proceeding with coke drum headremoval and coke cutting.fAlways assume the possibility of a hot-spotinduced geyser or the release of hot tar balls orundrained hot water, and incorporate protectiveoperational measures in drum unheadingoperations. Further control the hazard byestablishing restricted areas; minimizing thenumber of workers in restricted areas;minimizing the time spent by essential workersin restricted areas; and maintaining readiness fora rapid evacuation.fConsider equipment upgrades to further controlthe hazards associated with geysers and releaseof hot tar balls and undrained hot water duringdrum head removal, such as installing protectiveshrouds and automating both top and bottomhead removal operations to keep workers awayfrom these unprotected areas.fConsider emergency steam/cooling watersources in the event of loss of primarysteam/cooling water supply or because of druminlet flow path obstruction.fColor code and clearly label valves and controlpoints to guard against incorrect identification.Provide temporary guardrails to preventemployees from falling while platform plating isremoved for bottom head removal.fProvide indicator lights at valve and valvecontrol stations to help the operator determinewhich is the correct valve station for the intendedoperator action.Consider installation of vapor ejectors to drawvapors away from the open top head area.Coke Cutting (HydroblastingOperation)Evaluating hazardous conditions, modifyingoperations to control hazards, activelymaintaining an effective emergency responseprogram, and familiarizing workers about risksand emergency procedures will help reduce thefrequency and severity of serious incidentsassociated with DCU operations.Specific Operation HazardsCoke Drum SwitchingNo one system has proven effective in eliminating allincidents associated with incorrect valve activationdue to mistaken coke drum or module identification;however, the following actions have been reported asbeneficial:fConduct human factors analyses to identify,evaluate, and address potential operator actionsthat could compromise the safe operation of thecoke drum system.fProvide interlocks for automated or remotelyactivated valve switching systems.fProvide interlocks for valves that are manuallyoperated as part of the switching/decoking cycleto avoid unanticipated valve movement.fffUse the “buddy system” (employees working inpairs) to help verify accurate valve or switchidentification.fConduct periodic and documented trainingfocusing on the importance of activating thecorrect valve or switch and the consequence ofincorrect activation.Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficeThe following actions could help control hazardsassociated with coke cutting operations:fInstall an enclosed cutter’s shack for workerprotection--preferably supplied with air from aremote source to maintain slight positivepressure.Page 6
HAZARDS OF DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU) OPERATIONSfEnsure that personnel who must be on the cokedrum structure when a drum is open wearprescribed personal protective equipment.fConduct training in recognition and preventionof worker heat stress.fMake sure the interlocks will work to shut offand prevent restart of the cutting water pump anytime that the cutting head is raised above apredetermined point within the coke drum.Consider installing redundant switches toprovide an additional level of protection againstextracting a cutting head that is under pressure.fVerify the adequacy of the inspection andmaintenance program for cutting water hoses,wire ropes, and hoists.fEstablish a gantry structure inspection andmaintenance program. Periodically verify thatgantry structures have not been weakened due tocorrosive conditions, such as mist exiting fromthe top nozzle, that could lead to gantry collapse.fInstall drill stem free fall arresters.Emergency and General OperationalHazardsAugust 2003conveyance (see section on Toxic Exposures,Dust Irritants, and Burn Trauma, below).Emergency Evacuation - Preparationsand ProceduresDespite best efforts to prevent incidents, DCUoperators should anticipate the need for emergencyevacuation and other response measures, operate in amanner that will minimize the severity of an incident,and prepare for and implement emergencyprocedures to protect worker safety.The following specific actions are recommended:fReview and address weaknesses associated withthe location and suitability of emergency escaperoutes. Protected stairways, preferably detachedfrom the coke drum structure, are the mosteffective conventional means of emergencyescape route (egress) from tall structures, such asthose serving the coke drums. Consider installinghorizontal walkways to adjacent structures.Some refineries are exploring the use ofcommercially available escape chutes. Also, slipresistant walking surfaces will help preventfalling during an emergency evacuation.fEstablish or verify the operability of anevacuation signal (Scram Alarm) to expeditepersonnel clearing the structure in the event of anemergency. Alarm signal actuation (triggering)stations should be deployed at work areas andalong the escape routes.fInstall water sprays to protect work stations andemergency escape routes. Include activationstations at work stations and along the escaperoute.fProvide heat shields to protect work stations andescape routes. Ensure that the shield will notinterfere with evacuation and will not entrapfugitive vapors.fConduct regular emergency exercises to test theplan as well as to ensure familiarity withemergency signals, evacuation routes, andprocedures.Coke Transfer, Processing, andStorageThe following actions could help control hazardsassociated with coke conveyance, processing, andstorage operations:ffffEstablish and enforce restricted areas (e.g., areaswhere heavy equipment movement and possiblelash path of a wire rope from failed equipmentmay occur) to prevent personnel entry and,ultimately, injury.Establish and periodically verify the operabilityof an alarm system that activates immediatelybefore and during heavy equipment (rail car,bridge crane, or conveyor) movement.Verify conformance with a safe entry permitsystem to ensure that appropriate measures aretaken prior to and during entry into any enclosedarea or vessel where coke may be present.Establish personnel protective measures toprotect against inhalation or personal contactwith coke dust or potentially contaminated mistsfrom water used for cutting, quench, or cokeChemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficeToxic Exposures, Dust Irritants, andBurn TraumaThe following actions could help control exposures totoxic substances, irritants, physical stress, andhazardous conditions associated with DCUoperations, in general:Page 7
HAZARDS OF DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU) OPERATIONSfConfigure coke drum inlets and outlets withdoubleblock valve and steam seal isolation toreduce the likelihood of unanticipated leakage.fEstablish burn trauma response procedures,including procedures for interacting withemergency medical service providers and theburn trauma center that would be used in theevent of a burn incident.fConduct burn trauma simulation exercises toensure appropriate use of the emergencyresponse procedures and the training level ofrelevant personnel.fEvaluate health exposure potential and establishappropriate protective measures based on anindustrial hygiene survey plan that anticipatesvariations in the range of DCU feed stocks andoperating conditions.fAugust 2003Information ResourcesInternet resources - The search entry, “DelayedCoker Unit,” yields many sources of information thatare believed to be useful. However, neither EPA norOSHA control this information and cannot guaranteethe accuracy, relevance, timeliness or completenessof all facets of the information.Further, the citation to these resources is not intendedto endorse any views expressed, or services offeredby the author of the reference or the organizationoperating the service identified by the reference. Thefollowing are examples of informative additionalreading.Shovel, sweep, vacuum, and provide properventilation to keep exposures to dust around aDCU to within acceptable limits.fhttp://www.coking.com - focuses on ations within the DCU html – describes a May 1999 coking unit fireand offers recommendations on fire protection.For More Information:To report an emergency, file a complaint, orseek OSHA advice, assistance, or products,callContact EPA’s RCRA Superfund &EPCRA Call Center(800) 424-9346 or (703) 412-9810TDD (800) 553-76721-800-321-OSHA (6742)TTY 1-877-889-5627Monday-Friday, 9 AM to 5 PM, Eastern Time24-hours******Visit the OEPPR Home Page:http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/Visit the OSHA Home Page:http://www.osha.gov/NOTICE:The statements in this document are intended solely as guidance. This document does not substitute for EPA’s or other agency regulations, nor isit a regulation itself. Site-specific application of the guidance may vary depending on process activities, and may not apply to a given situation.EPA may revoke, modify, or suspend this guidance in the future, as appropriate.This Safety and Health Information Bulletin is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations. Likewise, it cannot and doesnot diminish any obligations established by statute, rule, or standard. The Bulletin is advisory in nature, informational in content, and is intendedto assist employers in providing a safe and healthful workplace. The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires employers to comply withhazard-specific safety and health standards. In addition, pursuant to Section 5(a)(1), the General Duty Clause of the Act, employers mustprovide their employees with a workplace free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm. Employers can be citedfor violating the General Duty Clause if there is a recognized hazard and they do not take reasonable steps to prevent or abate the hazard.However, failure to implement any recommendations in this bulletin is not, in itself, a violation of the General Duty Clause. Citations can onlybe based on standards, regulations, and the General Duty Clause.Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention OfficePage 8
jointly publish this CSA/SHIB to increase awareness of possible hazards. This joint document supplements active industry efforts to exchange fire and safety technology and to increase awareness of environmental and occupational hazards associated with DCU ope
found the resurgence of Coker Creek in the time of the Civil War (1861-1865), as the place of a military encampment referred to as Camp Coker Creek. The endeavor was then to figure out the role that Coker Creek played in the War Between the States, and to connect, if proper to do so, the archaeological camp remains at 40MR708 with the Camp
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Due date of deliverable: 31.12.2012 Document identifier: docx Revision: 1_ 1 Date: 2013-04-16 . SmartAgriFood 31.12.2012 docx Page 2 of 58 The SmartAgriFood Project The SmartAgriFood project is funded in the scope of the Future Internet Public Private Partner-ship Programme (FI-PPP), as part of .
