INTERNATIONAL COLD WAR BULLETIN HISTORY PROJECT
COLD WARINTERNATIONALHISTORY PROJECTIssues 6 - 7for Scholars, Washington, D.C.BULLETINWoodrow Wilson International CenterWinter 1995/1996THE C OLD WAR IN ASIADRAFT VERSION
2 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETINThe Cold WarInternational History ProjectThe Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson InternationalCenter for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials bygovernments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectiveson Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the formerCommunist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. Theproject is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College)and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I.Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr.Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (GeorgeWashington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of InternationalStudies, headed by Ambassador Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readersare invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does notconstitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.Cold War International History Project BulletinIssues 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996)Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars1000 Jefferson Drive, SWWashington, D.C. 20560Tel.: (202) 357-2967Fax: (202) 357-4439e-mail: wwcem123@sivm.si.eduEditor: James G. HershbergManaging Editor: P.J. SimmonsAssociate Editor: Bonnie SouthwickResearchers: Anne Chiorazzi, Helen Christakos, Andrew Grauer, Michelle King, Sara Kirchhoff,Mark TorokSpecial thanks to: Malcolm Byrne, Chen Jian, Mark Doctoroff, Ilya Gaiduk, Maxim Korobochkin,Mark Kramer, Sasha Mansourov, Christian Ostermann, Priscilla Roberts, Danny Rozas, KathrynWeathersby, Odd Arne Westad, Vladislav Zubok
C OLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 3Table of ContentsStalin’s Conversations With Chinese LeadersTalks with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1949-53, with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny,Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok.3Rivals and Allies: Stalin, Mao, and the Chinese Civil War, January 1949, introduction by Odd Arne Westad.7New Evidence on the Korean WarNew Russian Documents on the Korean War, introduction and translations by Kathryn Weathersby.30China’s Road to the Korean War, by Chen Jian.41Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51, by Evgueni Bajanov.54The Shtykov Diaries, by Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng.69Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence fromthe Russian Archives, article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov.94Bruce Cumings and Kathryn Weathersby: An Exchange on Korean War Origins.120Soviet Interrogation of U.S. POWs in the Korean War, by Laurence Jolidan.123New Chinese SourcesConstructing a History of Chinese Communist Party Foreign Relations, by Michael H. Hunt.126CCP Foreign Relations: A Guide to the Literature, by Michael H. Hunt.129CCP Leaders’ Selected Works and the Historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution, by Chen Jian.131The Second Historical Archives of China, by Gao Hua with Scott Kennedy.147New Evidence on Sino-Soviet RelationsThe Emerging Disputes Betwen Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958,introduction, translations, and annotations by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian.148Mao on Sino-Soviet Relations: Two Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, introduction by Odd Arne Westad.157The Soviet Foreign Ministry Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, by Mark Kramer.170East German Documents on the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969, by Christian F. Ostermann.186The Cold War in Asia: Khabarovsk Conference Held on Russian Far East, by David L. Wolff.191Soviet Reactions to the Sino-Soviet Border Rift, introduction and translations by Elizabeth Wishnick.194Sino-Soviet Tensions, 1980: Two Russian Documents, introduction and translations by Elizabeth Wishnick.202New Evidence on Sino-American RelationsMao Zedong’s Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents, introduction,translations, and annotation by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson.208Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise to Beijing during the Crisis, introduction by Vladislav Zubok.219Mao Zedong and Dulles’s “Peaceful Evolution” Strategy: Revelations from Bo Yibo’s Memoirs, introduction andtranslation by Qiang Zhai.228New Evidence on the Vietnam/Indochina WarsThe Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations, 1964-73: New Russian Evidence, by Ilya V. Gaiduk.232Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence, article and translations by Qiang Zhai.233Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam, by Jerzy Michalowski.241The Cambodian National Archives, by Kenton J. Clymer.260Sources on the Khmer Rouge Years: The Cambodian Genocide Program.260Research NotesDocumenting the Early Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program, by Mark Kramer.266Secret East German Report on Chinese Reactions to the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, by Mark Kramer.271Book ReviewsG.M. Kornienko, The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant, review by David R. Stone.272Chen Hansheng, My Life During Four Eras, review by Maochen Yu.274Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers’ Defense Committee “KOR”, and Ya.Ya.Grishin, Dramaticheskie sobytiya v Pol’she, 1980-1981 gg, review by Mark Kramer.277Response: Sudoplatov Controversy (cont.), More on 1956 Polish & Hungarian Crises.280Update.286
4 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETINSTALIN’S CONVERSATIONSTalks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950,And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav ZubokThis issue of the Cold War International History ProjectBulletin leads off with translations of five meetings betweenSoviet leader Joseph Stalin and top leaders (Mao Zedong andZhou Enlai) of the newly-created People’s Republic ofChina (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of thedocuments, which constitute some of the most intimateglimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet andChinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closedarchives of the communist world, are kept in the RussianPresidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of thePresident, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. Theywere recently declassified by Russian authorities in connection with efforts to gather materials related to the KoreanWar for presentation by the Russian Government to SouthKorea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as wellas many other Russian archival records concerning theKorean War which appear later in this issue of the Bulletin,as a consequence of its cooperation with a research projectinvolving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia University, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation.(Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained byCWIHP are available to researchers through the NationalSecurity Archive, a non-governmental documents repository, library, and research institute located on the seventhfloor of The Gelman Library at The George WashingtonUniversity in Washington, D.C., and will also be madeavailable through Columbia University.)The documents that follow begin with transcripts of twoconversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong,which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22January 1950, during the Chinese leader’s two-month visitto the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC inOctober 1949. Those conversations came as the two countries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alliance following the Communist victory in the Chinese CivilWar, and also constituted the first and only personal encoun-ter between these two communist titans and major figures of20th-century world history.Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscowbetween Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai inAugust-September 1952, where issues on the table for discussion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and therelationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcriptsyield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind ofStalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), oneof the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over theUSSR.To assess the significance of these documents, the CWIHPBulletin has assembled four specialists familiar with SinoSoviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, fromvarious perspectives: Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale), author of China’s Road to the KoreanWar: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1994); Prof. Vojtech Mastny(Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School ofAdvanced International Studies, currently at the University ofHokkaido, Japan), author of The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953 (Oxford University Press,1996), a forthcoming sequel to his Russia’s Road to the ColdWar, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979);Dr. Odd Arne Westad (Director of Research, NorwegianNobel Institute), author of Cold War and Revolution: SovietAmerican Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War,1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); andDr. Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), coauthor (with Constantine Pleshakov) of Inside the Kremlin’sCold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996).Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHPby Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from KathrynWeathersby and Chen Jian.—Jim Hershberg, Editor, CWIHP Bulletin
C OLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 5WITHCHINESE LEADERSI: Conversation between Stalin andMao, Moscow, 16 December 1949[Classification level blacked out:“NOT SECRET” Stamped]RECORD OF CONVERSATIONBETWEEN COMRADEI.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMANOF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’SGOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’SREPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONGon 16 December 1949After an exchange of greetings and adiscussion of general topics, the followingconversation took place.Comrade Mao Zedong: The most important question at the present time is thequestion of establishing peace. China needsa period of 3-5 years of peace, which wouldbe used to bring the economy back to prewar levels and to stabilize the country ingeneral. Decisions on the most importantquestions in China hinge on the prospectsfor a peaceful future. With this in mind theCC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] entrusted me to ascertain from you, comr[ade]. Stalin, in whatway and for how long will internationalpeace be preserved.Comrade Stalin: In China a war forpeace, as it were, is taking place. The question of peace greatly preoccupies the SovietUnion as well, though we have already hadpeace for the past four years. With regards toChina, there is no immediate threat at thepresent time: Japan has yet to stand up on itsfeet and is thus not ready for war; America,though it screams war, is actually afraid ofwar more than anything; Europe is afraid ofwar; in essence, there is no one to fight withChina, not unless Kim Il Sung decides toinvade China?Peace will depend on our efforts. If wecontinue to be friendly, peace can last notonly 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhapseven longer.Comrade Mao Zedong: Since LiuShaoqi’s return to China, CC CPC has beendiscussing the treaty of friendship, allianceand mutual assistance between China andthe USSR.Comrade Stalin: This question we candiscuss and decide. We must ascertainwhether to declare the continuation of thecurrent 1945 treaty of alliance and friendship between the USSR and China, to announce impending changes in the future, orto make these changes right now.As you know, this treaty was concludedbetween the USSR and China as a result ofthe Yalta Agreement, which provided forthe main points of the treaty (the question ofthe Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, PortArthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty wasconcluded, so to speak, with the consent ofAmerica and England. Keeping in mind thiscircumstance, we, within our inner circle,have decided not to modify any of the pointsof this treaty for now, since a change in evenone point could give America and Englandthe legal grounds to raise questions aboutmodifying also the treaty’s provisions concerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin,etc. This is why we searched to find a wayto modify the current treaty in effect whileformally maintaining its provisions, in thiscase by formally maintaining the SovietUnion’s right to station its troops at PortArthur while, at the request of the Chinesegovernment, actually withdrawing the Soviet Armed forces currently stationed there.Such an operation could be carried out uponChina’s request.One could do the same with KChZhD[Chinese Changchun Railroad, whichtraverses Manchuria], that is, to effectivelymodify the corresponding points of the agreement while formally maintaining its provisions, upon China’s request.If, on the other hand, the Chinese comrades are not satisfied with this strategy, theycan present their own proposals.Comrade Mao Zedong: The presentsituation with regard to KChZhD and PortArthur corresponds well with Chinese interests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate toeffectively fight against imperialist aggression. In addition, KChZhD is a trainingschool for the preparation of Chinese cadresin railroad and industry.Comrade Stalin: The withdrawal oftroops does not mean that Soviet Unionrefuses to assist China, if such assistance isneeded. The fact is that we, as communists,are not altogether comfortable with stationing our forces on foreign soil, especially onthe soil of a friendly nation. Given thissituation anyone could say that if Sovietforces can be stationed on Chinese territory,then why could not the British, for example,station their forces in Hong Kong, or theAmericans in Tokyo?We would gain much in the arena ofinternational relations if, with mutual agreement, the Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur. In addition, thewithdrawal of Soviet forces would provide aserious boost to Chinese communists in theirrelations with the national bourgeoisie. Everyone would see that the communists havemanaged to achieve what [Nationalist Chinese leader] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]could not. The Chinese communists musttake the national bourgeoisie into consideration.The treaty ensures the USSR’s right tostation its troops in Port Arthur. But theUSSR is not obligated to exercise this rightand can withdraw its troops upon Chineserequest. However, if this is unsuitable, thetroops in Port Arthur can remain there for 2,5, or 10 years, whatever suits China best. Letthem not misunderstand that we want to runaway from China. We can stay there for 20years even.Comrade Mao Zedong: In discussingthe treaty in China we had not taken intoaccount the American and English positionsregarding the Yalta agreement. We must actin a way that is best for the common cause.This question merits further consideration.However, it is already becoming clear thatthe treaty should not be modified at thepresent time, nor should one rush to withdraw troops from Port Arthur.Should not Zhou Enlai visit Moscow inorder to decide the treaty question?Comrade Stalin: No, this question youmust decide for yourselves. Zhou may beneeded in regard to other matters.Comrade Mao Zedong: We would liketo decide on the question of Soviet credit toChina, that is to draw up a credit agreement
6 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETINfor 300.000.000 dollars between the governments of the USSR and China.Comrade Stalin: This can be done. Ifyou would like to formalize this agreementnow, we can.Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, exactlynow, as this would resonate well in China.At the same time it is necessary to resolvethe question of trade, especially between theUSSR and Xinjiang [Sinkiang], though atpresent we cannot present a specific tradeoperations plan for this region.Comrade Stalin: We must know rightnow what kind of equipment China willneed, especially now, since we do not haveequipment in reserve and the request forindustrial goods must be submitted ahead oftime.Comrade Mao Zedong: We are havingdifficulties in putting together a request forequipment, as the industrial picture is as yetunclear.Comrade Stalin: It is desirable to expedite the preparation of this request, as requests for equipment are submitted to ourindustry at least a year in advance.Comrade Mao Zedong: We would verymuch like to receive assistance from theUSSR in creating air transportation routes.Comrade Stalin: We are ready to render such assistance. Air routes can be established over Xinjiang and the MPR [Mongolian People’s Republic]. We have specialists. We will give you assistance.Comrade Mao Zedong: We would alsolike to receive your assistance in creating anaval force.Comrade Stalin: Cadres for Chinesenavy could be prepared at Port Arthur. Yougive us people, and we will give you ships.Trained cadres of the Chinese navy couldthen return to China on these ships.Comrade Mao Zedong: Guomindang[Kuomintang] supporters have built a navaland air base on the island of Formosa [Tai
Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996). Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHP by Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from Kathryn Weathersby and Chen Jian. —Jim Hershberg, Editor, CWIHP Bulletin. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 5 WITH CHINESE LEADERS I: Conversation between Stalin and Mao .
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