COmPStat For Corrections
COMPSTAT for CorrectionsJesse Jannetta, M.P.P.Research Specialist, Center for Evidence-Based CorrectionsExecutive SummaryThe leadership of the California Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has entered intoa partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department(LAPD) to adapt the COMPSTAT strategic controlsystem and implement it to address the management andperformance challenges facing the CDCR. COMPSTAThas an impressive track record of improving the performance of police departments across the United States,and has the potential to do the same for the CDCR.This White Paper describes the elements of theCOMPSTAT system, how those elements work togetherto change an organization’s behavior and increase itseffectiveness, and issues to consider when implementingthe COMPSTAT system in the CDCR.As implemented in police departments,COMPSTAT is a related group of operationalpractices comprising of seven core elementsMission clarificationThe leadership of an organization uses COMPSTAT asa tool to clarify its mission and tighten the organizationalfocus on it. The success of the organization as a whole,and of individual managers within the organization, isdefined by their delivery on the mission. In COMPSTATpolice departments, delivery on the mission meanscrime reduction.n C OMPSTATalso includes the achievement of achallenging mission-related “stretch” goal, suchas NYPD’s goal of reducing crime by 10% overthe course of one year.Internal accountabilityn C OMPSTATfixes the responsibility for achieving its goal on a specific set of managers.n Th esemanagers are held accountable in regularCOMPSTAT meetings run by members of thesenior command staff.n Th emanagers (precinct commanders or theequivalent in police departments) presentoral reports at the weekly meetings in a setrotation. They must answer for the precinct’scrime data, shared with both the precinctcommander and the command staff prior tothe COMPSTAT meeting.n Th ecommand staff questions the manager aboutthe factors underlying crime trends in theprecinct, and the tactical interventions made toaddress them.n Th eCOMPSTAT meetings are a rare form ofdirect information exchange between field andcommand staff.n M anagerswho perform well in the COMPSTATmeetings are flagged for advancement. Thosewho don’t are given the opportunity and supportto improve, but an extended period of poorperformance, or non-performance, will result inthe replacement of that individual.n C OMPSTATmeeting performance is public,so that managers know how their peers areperforming.Geographic organization of operational commandn C OMPSTATholds middle managers to a highlevel of responsibility, but it also provides themwith the autonomy and authority to devise andexecute interventions to accomplish the departmental mission.CEBC Working Papers are designed to share Center findings and to solicit informal peer review buthave not been formally peer reviewed. Unless otherwise indicated, Working Papers can be quoted andcited without permission of the author, provided the source is clearly referred to as a working paper.WORKINGPAPERDecember 2006
n U nitsof the organization with separate, nongeographically-based command structuresare either placed under the control of theCOMPSTAT-accountable managers, or otherwise made answerable for their contributionto the COMPSTAT mission.Data-driven identification of problems and assessmentof the department’s problem-solving effortsn Th eCOMPSTAT meeting discussion beginswith data that are accurate, consistently collected,and shared with managers and command staff.n D atafacilitate the identification and understanding of the problems that the organizationmust address.n D ata make it possible to assess the success of theorganization’s units in addressing those problems.n G oodanalysis and presentation of COMPSTATdata are vital to its effective use.Organizational flexibilityn A COMPSTAT organization must have theflexibility to shift resources to managers so thatthey can act based on their enhanced understanding of the crime problems in their precinct.n P roblempatterns are dynamic, so a COMPSTATorganization must be able to continuously assessthe needs of its managers and allocate resourcesaccordingly.n T othe extent that resources cannot be shifted, oronly very slowly, the effectiveness of the managers in delivering on outcomes will be impeded.Innovative problem-solving tacticsn C OMPSTATmakes middle managers theprimary problem-solvers in their organizations.n C OMPSTATmeetings act as a forum to workshop potential or actual problem-solvinginterventions.n D ueto the comparative nature of the COMPSTAT meetings and the pressure to effectivelyaddress problems, effective innovations spreadthroughout the organization.External information exchangen C OMPSTATinformation can be used to engageexternal stakeholders and build public supportfor the organization. This support is invaluableto an organization with ambitious goals planning to engage in innovative and aggressivetactics in order to realize them.n C OMPSTATmeetings can be used to invitepotential partners to assist the COMPSTATdepartment in achieving its objectives.Applying the COMPSTAT model to acorrectional agency, CDCR COMPSTAT could:Tighten organizational focus on the mission ofprotecting public safety and reducing recidivismn F orCDCR institutions, this mission focus wouldmean operating prisons and camps that areorderly and safe for staff and inmates, and inwhich inmates are engaged in activities thatmake them less likely to endanger public safetyupon their release.n F orparole, this mission focus would meanreducing re-offending by parolees and increasing the number of parolees who successfullycomplete their term of supervision and becomeproductive citizens.Hold the appropriate managers responsible for successfully contributing to the protection of public safetyn W ardenswould present at COMPSTAT meetings on the performance of institutions, andparole administrators on the performance ofparole regions.n F ocusareas for institutions would include thereduction of criminal behavior among inmates(such as assaults on staff or other inmates, ganginvolvement and drug use), and facilitationof inmate change (for example, deliveringevidence-based change programs.)n F ocus areas for parole would include the reduc-tion of criminal behavior by parolees, as indicatedby arrests and absconding from supervision, andthe facilitation of reintegration into their communities, by means of activities such as assistance infinding stable employment and housing.Orient other organizational activities toward supportingthe COMPSTAT-accountable managers in this workn “ Matrix”functions of the CDCR would beaccountable in COMPSTAT through thewardens and parole administrators. The executive leadership of the CDCR would expect themto give their full support to the actions taken bythe wardens and parole administrators toimprove their public safety and recidivismreduction performance.n R epresentatives of these functions, such as theOffices of Correctional Education, Adult Programs, Substance Abuse Management, Research,and Risk Management, would be present duringCOMPSTAT sessions to answer questions abouttheir recidivism reduction efforts.
Gather, analyze and present data for problem identification and assessment of problem-solving effortsn C OMPSTATwould require measurement ofoutcomes, rather than processes, within CDCR.n C DCR’sCOMPSTAT unit would assist CDCRcomponents in gathering, analyzing andpresenting data for the COMPSTAT meetings.Match resource allocation to problem patternsn C DCR resources should be allocated across andwithin institutions, but in many cases, resourcescannot be easily moved from institution toinstitution. In such cases, the inmate populationshould be allocated so that fixed resources canmake the maximum contribution to public safety.n I nparole, resources and agent time should beshifted from reactive activities to interventionswith parolees at risk of re-offending beforeproblems occur.Devise new problem-solving approaches and disseminate innovative approaches throughout the organizationn C DCRleadership would give its managers theautonomy to devise and execute new approachesto problem-solving.n E xperimentalapproaches would be allowedand encouraged, and successful innovationsare rewarded.n C OMPSTATsessions would be used to bringattention to successful approaches, and torecommend them to other managers facingsimilar problems.Exchange information to build partnershipsn C DCRinformation is very valuable to otherpublic safety organizations. They could beinvited to attend the COMPSTAT sessions andto exchange information with the CDCR.n Th e LAPD, for example, is interested in incorpo-rating parole information into its COMPSTATand intelligence analysis processes, and possiblyengaging in a pilot reentry project in Los Angeles.COMPSTAT for CorrectionsIn March of 2006, the California Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) entered into apartnership with the Los Angeles Police Department(LAPD) to adapt and transplant the LAPD COMPSTATmanagement system to the CDCR. Observation of LAPDCOMPSTAT convinced the CDCR that COMPSTAT heldgreat promise in addressing the management andperformance challenges facing their agency. Bringing thismodel to an organization with the complexity andgeographical sweep of the CDCR represents a bold andunprecedented application.COMPSTAT was created in the New York PoliceDepartment (NYPD) in 1994, during William Bratton’sterm as Police Commissioner, as “a ‘strategic controlsystem’ developed to gather and disseminate informationon NYPD’s crime problems and track efforts to deal withthem” (Weisburd et al., 2003). COMPSTAT has beenhonored across the country for playing a powerful role inboth transforming the NYPD into a data-driven, flexible,strategically-adept and focused crime-fighting operation,and transforming New York City, where crime has fallendramatically. COMPSTAT’s proponents emphasize itspotential to drive internal change in the operation of anorganization, and external change in the outcomes,specifically crime, that society hopes and expects a publicsafety organization to affect.Not surprisingly, a tool of this promise has provedattractive to many other police departments. A 1999survey of 515 departments with 100 or more swornofficers found that a third had implemented a COMPSTAT-like program, and another quarter were planningto do so (Weisburd et al., 2004). The Los Angeles PoliceDepartment (LAPD) adopted COMPSTAT after WilliamBratton became the Chief of Police in 2002. As in NewYork, the implementation of LAPD COMPSTAT hascoincided with an impressive drop in crime; violent PartI crimes declined 37.4% in Los Angeles from 2003 to2005, and Part I property crimes declined 17.1% over thesame period (LAPD, 2006).As part of their COMPSTAT adoption initiative, theCDCR asked the UCI Center for Evidence-Based corrections to produce this White Paper describing the elements of the COMPSTAT system, how those elementswork together to change an organization’s behavior andincrease its effectiveness, and issues to consider inimplementing the COMPSTAT system in the CDCR.The CDCR began implementation of its COMPSTATsystem while this paper was being completed. As thateffort remained in the early stages of developmentthroughout the writing of this paper, I have left aside anycomment on the early form of CDCR COMPSTAT, andfocused on the general question of adapting the COMPSTAT system as it exists in law enforcement agencies tothe CDCR.The COMPSTAT SystemWhen Commissioner Bratton took over the NYPD,his administration determined that the department faceda number of organizational problems that prevented itfrom realizing its potential to reduce crime (Weisburd etal., 2003, 2004). The NYPD lacked a sense of the fundamental importance of its crime control mission. It wasnot setting high enough expectations for what theorganization could accomplish, resulting in chronicunderachievement. Many police managers had become Part I crimes, as defined by the FBI in its Uniform Crime ReportingProgram, are murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape,robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicletheft, and arson.
“moribund” and were doing their work the way it hadalways been done, regardless of whether that work waseffective in controlling crime. The NYPD had a numberof organizational structures that impeded teamwork andthe optimal allocation of scarce resources. Finally, theNYPD lacked accurate information on both the crimeand public safety problems it hoped to address and onhow its own resources were being used.The process that came to be known as COMPSTATevolved from the efforts of Bratton’s executive leadershipteam to address these organizational problems. COMPSTAT is a related group of operational practices, ratherthan a program with an articulated model. In theirresearch on COMPSTAT implementation in policedepartments across the United States, Willis, Mastrofski,Weisburd and Greenspan (2003) identified seven coreelements of COMPSTAT. In order to describe whatCOMPSTAT is and how it works, it is necessary todescribe each core element and how it has operated in theNYPD, LAPD and other COMPSTAT police departments. The seven core elements of COMPSTAT are:1. Mission clarification2. Internal accountability3. G eographic organization of operationalcommand4. Data-driven identification of problems andassessment of the department’s problemsolving efforts5. Organizational flexibility6. Innovative problem-solving tactics7. External information exchangeMission clarificationImplementing COMPSTAT begins with a clearstatement on the organizational mission, and a consistentfocus on that mission in setting organizational goalsand devising strategies to achieve those goals. Prior toCOMPSTAT, NYPD leaders and managers focused onadministrative issues such as avoiding scandals andcorruption. Although administrative concerns areimportant issues for any police department, CommissionerBratton made it very clear that crime reduction was themission of the organization, and the COMPSTAT processcontinually reinforced that. This political and culturalcommitment from the top leadership of the NYPD, andalso from Mayor Giuliani, was indispensable in givingCOMPSTAT the power to change behavior (Moore, 2003).A COMPSTAT police department will often organizeCOMPSTAT around the achievement of a mission-related“stretch” goal, a goal that is challenging to achieve.NYPD opted for a hard numerical target, a 10% reductionin crime over the course of one year (Bratton andKnobles, 1998), an approach which Bratton duplicatedwith the LAPD. Lowell, Massachusetts adopted the nonnumerical goal of making it the safest city of its size inthe United States (Willis et al., 2003). Individual employees and overall organizations generally perform at a levelin line with their goal. In other words, the goal willgenerally set the outer bound of agency performance.Failure to set a sufficiently ambitious goal will result inthe organization failing to achieve its full potential.The stretch goal has both an external and internalpurpose. The external purpose is to make the leadershipof the organization publicly accountable to externalstakeholders. A public commitment such as Commissioner Bratton’s to reduce crime by 10% can buildstakeholder support for what an organization is doing,and keep the pressure on the executive leadership todeliver on the organization’s mission. The internalpurpose of the stretch goal is the continual clarificationand reinforcement of the relationship between theactivities of operational commanders and the mission.In an analysis of what made COMPSTAT powerful inchanging behavior in the NYPD, Moore and Braga (2003)note that COMPSTAT’s goal of crime reduction is“closely aligned with what external overseers want andexpect from the organization, with an important valuethat the organization is trying to produce, and with a goalthat the organization itself wants to produce.” TheNYPD’s crime reduction stretch goal was well-suited forboth the external and internal purpose, which contributed greatly to the power of COMPSTAT.Internal accountabilityOnce the organization’s mission is clarified and a goalis identified, the COMPSTAT system fixes responsibilityfor achieving its goal on a specific set of “middle managers” and initiates a formal process for the leadership ofthe organization to call them to account for their performance (Weisburd et al., 2003). An underlying assumptionof COMPSTAT is that the organization is able to act togenerate outcomes consistent with its mission. Bratton’sbelief that police activities could reduce crime was notuniversally shared within NYPD management, but hebuilt an internal accountability structure around the ideathat the NYPD’s precinct commanders could reasonablybe held accountable for reducing crime in their precincts.Bratton established seven objectives for the NYPD atthe initiation of COMPSTAT (McDonald 2002). Theobjectives were:1. Get guns off the streets2. Curb youth violence in the schools and onthe streets3. Drive drug dealers out of the city4. Break the cycle of domestic violence5. Reclaim the public spaces of the city6. Reduce auto-related crime in the city7. Root out corruption and build organizationalintegrity in the NYPD
These objectives provided guidance to all levels ofthe organization and a key bridge between the broadstretch goal and the daily tactical decisions necessary tomeet it. COMPSTAT meetings became the forum forholding NYPD middle managers accountable formeeting the objectives.COMPSTAT meetings are held at least weekly(depending on the size of the department), and precinctcommanders are called to present at the meetings in a setrotation, each one appearing once every four to six weeks(Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Silverman, 1999). Crime dataare collected routinely and shared with both the precinctcommander and the command staff prior to the COMPSTAT meeting. Measures can be compared both with pastperformance in the unit, or across units within thedepartment. Precinct commanders must answer for theirprecinct’s crime data, particularly as it reflects on theseven objectives.COMPSTAT meetings are run by one or moremembers of the senior command staff, who directquestions to the precinct commander. Questions requirethe precinct commanders to demonstrate both analyticalability and understanding (to explain what is drivingtheir crime figures) and tactical knowledge and creativity(to devise and execute interventions to address crime inthe precinct.) Managers who excel are noticed andflagged for advancement. Those who don’t are given theopportunity and support to improve, but an extendedperiod of poor performance, or non-performance, willresult in the replacement of that individual.It is important to note that in the NYPD and LAPDCOMPSTAT, precinct commanders are not strictlyaccountable for their numbers, but for their efforts.Managers were expected to develop an understanding ofthe crime problems, and act on that understanding. Managers who got in trouble were those who did not demonstratean understanding of what was happening in their precincts,or who were not taking any action to address the problemsidentified in the COMPSTAT data (Moore, 2003). WithinNYPD, this proved to be an exacting standard. The NYPDreplaced two-thirds of its precinct commanders during thefirst year of Bratton’s tenure (Silverman, 1996). NYPDCOMPSTAT sessions are famously high-pressure, aggressive, and occasionally confrontational. The COMPSTATmodel does not dictate this, however. LAPD has realizedcomparable COMPSTAT success with a much less confrontational COMPSTAT style.Under COMPSTAT, there is no ambiguity regardingwho in the organization is accountable for performanceof the organization’s units. It rests squarely on the I will use the NYPD term precinct commander to denote this level andtype of manager within a COMPSTAT police department. The term forthe equivalent position varies from department to department. NYPD COMPSTAT was run jointly by the Chief of Department andthe Deputy Commissioner for Crime Control Strategies. LAPDCOMPSTAT meetings are chaired by the Chief of Police and theDirector of the Office of Operations (http:// www.lapdonline.org/crime maps and compstat/content basic view/6363, retrieved May30, 2006). Lowell PD COMPSTAT meetings are run by the Chief ofPolice (Willis et al., 2003).precinct commander level of management. In thismanner, they “own” the challenge of delivering on theorganization’s mission. Clear responsibility for addressing a problem leads to more forceful and concentratedaction regarding that problem. Problems that are no one’sdirect responsibility, serious as they may be, are muchmore resistant to action.Many observers of COMPSTAT from within theNYPD noted that COMPSTAT meetings were unusualin that they put field managers in direct, face-to-facecommunication with command staff. Closing the gapbetween managers and command staff has benefits forboth. It ensures that the field will be clear on the missionderived priorities of the command staff. Command staff,in turn, will be better-informed of the operational realitiesthat are shaping the performance of the organization.Moore and Braga (2003) cite three aspects of theCOMPSTAT internal accountability mechanism ascontributing to its power to change behavior. First, thesystem holds managers to account frequently enough tocapture their attention. A COMPSTAT cycle brings everyprecinct commander up every four to six weeks. Second,the managers think that their current standing and pay aswell as their future promotional opportunities depend onperforming well with respect to the COMPSTAT measures. Third, the reviews of performance are public so thateveryone can see how well a particular manager has done.Geographic organization ofoperational commandCOMPSTAT vests operational command in the samemanagers being held accountable for organizationalperformance. Concentration of such a high degree ofaccountability on precinct commanders can be fair andeffective only if they have the operational control necessary to bring the organization’s resources to bear on theproblems they are accountable for solving.The geographical division of cities into precincts orsectors makes the precinct commander a logical managerto hold accountable in COMPSTAT. However, units ofCOMPSTAT police departments have separate, nongeographically-based command structures, such as detective bureaus. Under COMPSTAT, these units are eitherplaced under the control of the precinct commanders, orotherwise made answerable through the precinct commander for their contribution to the COMPSTATmission. They may be required to attend the COMPSTATmeetings, at which the executive leadership can reinforcethe need for them to provide the precinct commanderswith their cooperation. This gives the managers directlyaccountable to the executive command staff maximumlatitude and support in devising and executing their tactical interventions.NYPD replicated the COMPSTAT accountabilitystructure down the chain of command in each precinct(Walsh and Vito 2004). Precinct commanders empowered and interrogated their platoon commanders on theirefforts to reduce crime, who in turn did the same with
their sergeants, who did the same with the officers at rollcall. This process arose naturally from the hierarchywithin the precinct units of operational command, andresulted in COMPSTAT influencing the behavior of manywithin NYPD who had never and would never attend aCOMPSTAT meeting.evaluative uses of data, respectively.Data for diagnostic use assists precinct commanders infinding crime patterns and recognizing previously invisibleconnections between crimes, so that individual incidentsare connected as manifestations of larger problems. Gooddata are merely the grist for the COMPSTAT mill. Inorder to use them diagnostically, data must be effectivelyanalyzed and presented. The challenge of gatheringtimely and accurate data can be so daunting for a largeand complex organization that data analysis can receiveshort shrift. The NYPD and LAPD created COMPSTATunits to gather, analyze and disseminate the COMPSTATdata, which were made available throughout the department. Both the command staff and the accountablemanagers must have access to the same data at COMPSTAT sessions (indeed, prior to them) in order to have aproductive discussion based on the information.In police departments, the primary mode of dataanalysis has been mapping. Participants in COMPSTATData-driven identification of problemsand assessment of the department’sproblem-solving effortsWith the mission clarified, accountability fixed andcommand authority provided to the accountable, theCOMPSTAT system focuses on providing timely andaccurate data to 1) precinct commanders so that they candiagnose the crime problems in their precincts, and 2) tothe executive leadership so that they can evaluate theefforts of the precinct commanders to address thoseproblems. Prior to the implementation of COMPSTAT,the data infrastructure in the NYPD was poor, withcrime data available three tosix months after the fact, ifat all (Silverman, 1996). Asthe executive leadershiprunning the early COMPMissionSTAT meetings demandedClarificationInternalthat precinct commandersAccountabilityFocus on crimeaccount for what wasreduction goalCOMPSTATmeetings centeredhappening with crime inon accountabilitytheir precincts, an effectivefor crime statisticsdata-gathering effortdeveloped to answer thatquestion. The NYPD did notExternalbuild COMPSTAT to utilizeInformationtheir data architecture; theGeographicExchangeOrganization ofNYPD data architectureCOMPSTATCommandinformation shared togrew to meet the needs ofOperationalcontrol forbuild support andprecinct commandersprecinct commanderspartnershipspresenting at COMPSTAT.One of the virtues ofCOMPSTAT is that it makesmiddle managers consumersof data, and expands theinterest in collectingaccurate and useful dataData-Driving ProblemInnovative ProblemIdentification andthroughout organization.Solving TacticsAssessmentData perform two relatedPrecinct commanders deviseCrime maps for problemstrategies; successful strategiesbut distinct functions inidentification, crime data fordisseminated via COMPSTATproblem-solving assessmentCOMPSTAT. First, theymeetingsallow for the identificationand understanding of theOrganizationalproblems that the organizaFlexibilityResources shifted sotion must address. Second,precinct commandersthey make possible thecan act on identifiedassessment of the success ofproblemsthe organization’s units inaddressing those problems.Moore (2003) refers to theseFigure 1. COMPSTAT in the New York and Los Angelesas the diagnostic andPolice Departments
processes in diverse police departments describe thepresentation of crime data in maps as a revelation, andthe spur to powerful problem identification and intervention work. Crime maps have become such an integralcomponent to COMPSTAT operations that it can be easyto lose sight of the fact that it is not maps in and ofthemselves that are the key component. Rather it is themaps as an efficient and readily comprehensible tool forinterpreting crime data that is important. Another modeof data presentation might allow for completely differentbut equally valuable insights.Data for diagnostic use might take many forms andvary over time, because it is being used to find newpatterns and assist with new understandings. NYPD’sheadquarters COMPSTAT unit would occasionallyphotograph graffiti and other signs of disorder inprecincts, and use that information in COMPSTATsessions. LAPD employs a station inspection protocol touncover performance inhibitors known as COMPSTATPlus (Gascon, 2006).Data for evaluative uses, by contrast, should beconsistent across time. COMPSTAT gains much of itspower due to its evaluative data coming in measures that“are simple, objective, reliably measured, and continuousso that changes in performance can be observed overtime within an operational unit, and across units that areroughly similar” (Moore and Braga, 2003).Organizational flexibilityA COMPSTAT system must allow for organizationalflexibility, because the understanding of crime problemsfacilitated by timely and accurate data is of little use if theorganization cannot adapt its practices to act on thatunderstanding. Presumably, some of the problems andpatterns revealed by the data will be of a nature that theorganization’s structure and routine activities are notconfigured to address. In these cases, the organizationmust have the flexibility to shift resources to the precinctcommanders so that they can act based on theirenhanced understanding of the crime problems in theirprecinct. In New York, precinct commanders weregranted the resources to have their personnel performdecoy operations, execute felony arrest warrants and useplainclothes officers for vice enforcement, activitiespreviously the province of other departmental units(Silverman, 1999).As problem patterns are dynamic and change overtime, a COMPSTAT organization must be able tocontinuously assess the resource needs of its precinctcommanders and allocate its resources accordingly. Tothe extent that resources cannot be shifted, or only veryslowly, it will impede the effectiveness of the precinctcommanders in delivering on outcomes.Innovative problem-solving tacticsBy making precinct commanders highly accountablewhile providing them with operational control, usefuldata and resource flexibility, COMPSTAT fosters theircreativity in devising innovative problem-solving tactics.The data elements of COMPSTAT give the middlemanagers a new tool for analyzing the problems theymust solve, and also gives the executive leadership a toolfor assessing their success at doing so. The geographicorganiza
Devise new problem-solving approaches and dissemi-nate innovative approaches throughout the organization n CDCR leadership would give its managers the autonomy to devise and execute new approaches to problem-solving. n Experimental approaches would be allowed
The CompStat Process: Four Principles for Managing Crime Reduction . clusters, suspects, and hot spots. Strategies are then formulated to counter increasing incidences of crime. The CompStat process encourages creativity in creating strategies, allocating resources, and deploying police personnel whileFile Size: 214KBPage Count: 7
Mar 08, 2011 · with representatives of law enforcement agencies using Compstat.2 The survey effort began in early 2011 and re-sulted in responses from 166 agencies. The execu-tive session, held in Baltimore, was attended by 65 participants including chief law enforcement executives, Compstat commander
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From Compstat to Gov 2.0 Big Data in New York City Management In the 1980s and early 1990s, New York City was a dangerous place to live. The citys homicide rate peaked at more than 2,200 in 1990 ò meanwhile the risk of robbery and muggings was a daily reality for the citys roughly 7 million residents. .
