EFFICIENCY OF THE ISM CODE IN FINNISH SHIPPING

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TURUNTURUN IMUSKESKUKSEN JULKAISUJAPUBLICATIONSFROMFROMTHETHE CENTRECENTRE FORPUBLICATIONSFOR MARITIMEMARITIME STUDIESSTUDIESUNIVERSITYOFTURKUUNIVERSITY OF ODE ININ SHIPPINGJuha HeijariUlla TapaninenUniversityUniversity ofof TurkuTurkuCENTREFORMARITIMECENTRE FOR MARITIME STUDIESSTUDIESFI–20014FI–20014 TURUNTURUN fi(eds.)

TURUN YLIOPISTONMERENKULKUALAN KOULUTUS- JA TUTKIMUSKESKUKSEN JULKAISUJAPUBLIKATIONER AV SJÖFARTSBRANSCHENS UTBILDNINGS- OCHFORSKNINGSCENTRAL VID ÅBO UNIVERSITETPUBLICATIONS FROM THE CENTRE FOR MARITIME STUDIESUNIVERSITY OF TURKUA 522010EFFICIENCY OF THE ISM CODE INFINNISH SHIPPING COMPANIESJuha HeijariUlla Tapaninen(eds.)Turku 2010

JULKAISIJA / PUBLISHER:Turun yliopisto / University of TurkuMERENKULKUALAN KOULUTUS- JA TUTKIMUSKESKUSCENTRE FOR MARITIME STUDIESKäyntiosoite / Visiting address:ICT-talo, Joukahaisenkatu 3-5 B, 4.krs, TurkuPostiosoite / Postal address:FI-20014 TURUN YLIOPISTOPuh. / Tel. 358 (0)2 333 51Fax 358 (0)2 281 3311http://mkk.utu.fiKopijyvä OyKouvola 2010ISBN 978-951-29-4353-1ISSN 1456-1816

ABSTRACTDue to increasing waterborne transportation in the Gulf of Finland, the risk of ahazardous accident increases and therefore manifold preventive actions are needed. As amain legislative authority in the maritime community, The International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) has set down plenary laws and recommendations which are e.g.,utilised in the safe operations in ships and pollution prevention. One of thesecompulsory requirements, the ISM Code, requires proactive attitude both from the topmanagement and operational workers in the shipping companies. In this study, a crosssectional approach was taken to analyse whether the ISM Code has actively enhancedmaritime safety in the Gulf of Finland. The analysis included; 1) performance of theISM Code in Finnish shipping companies, 2) statistical measurements of maritimesafety, 3) influence of corporate top management to the safety culture and 4) comparingsafety management practices in shipping companies and port operations of Finnishmaritime and port authorities. The main results found were that maritime safety culturehas developed in the right direction after the launch of the ISM Code in the 1990 s.However, this study does not exclusively prove that the improvements are theconsequence of the ISM Code. Accident prone ships can be recognized due to theirbehaviour and there is a lesson to learn from the safety culture of some high standardsafety disciplines such as, air traffic. In addition, the reporting of accidents and nearmisses should be more widely used in shipping industry. In conclusion, there is stillmuch to be improved in the maritime safety culture of the Finnish Shipping industry,e.g., a “no blame culture” needs to be adopted.KEYWORDSAccident, Management, Occupation, Port, Risk, Safety culture, Ship, Traffic

ABBREVIATIONSAIBF – Accident Investigation Board of FinlandAIS – Automatic Identification SystemAVI – Regional State Administrative AgenciesCIC – Concentrated Inspection CampaignCSM – Common Safety MethodsCST – Common Safety TargetsDP – Designated PersonEEZ – Exclusive Economic ZoneEIA – Environmental Impact AssessmentEMCIP –European Marine Casualty Information PlatformEMSA – European Maritime Safety AgencyERA – The European Railway AgencyEU – European UnionEU15 – The 15 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland andSweden) that were members of the EU before the enlargement on 1st May 2004FAII – Finnish Federation of Accident Insurance InstitutionsFSA – Formal Safety AssessmentGDB – Gross Domestic ProductGISIS – Global Integrated Shipping Information SystemGOFREP – Gulf of Finland Reporting SystemHELCOM – The Helsinki CommissionIFWA – Investigation and Reporting of Fatal Workplace AccidentsIAEA – The International Atomic Energy AgencyIMO – International Maritime OrganizationICAO – International Civil Aviation OrganizationISM Code – International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for PollutionPreventionISO – International Organization for Standardization StandardsMARPOL 73/78 – International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973as modified by the Protocol of 1978MOU – Memorandum of UnderstandingNPP – Nuclear Power PlantOHSAS – Occupational Health and Safety Management SystemParis MOU – see MOUPSC – Port State ControlROPAX – Roll-on/roll-off (RORO or ro-ro) shipsRo-Ro – see ROPAXSCART – Safety Culture Assessment TeamSMM – Safety Management ManualSMS – Safety Management SystemSTUK – The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in FinlandSYKE – Finland’s Environmental AdministrationTEU – Twenty foot Equivalent Container UnitTraFi – Finnish Transport Safety AgencyUNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaUS – United States of AmericaVTS – Vessel Traffic Service

TABLE OF CONTENTS1 INTRODUCTION . 7Juha Heijari2 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE 10Jouni Lappalainen, Anne Vepsäläinen & Ulla Tapaninen2.1 Introduction . 10 2.2 Target and structure .10 2.3 Main results .11 2.3.1 Literature review . 11 2.3.2 Interview study . 12 2.3.2 Utilization of incident reporting . 13 2.4 Summary . 15 2.5 Further research . 153 COMPARING SAFETY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES .17Mirva Salokorpi & Jorma Rytkönen3.1 Introduction . 17 3.2 Best safety management practices on a few chosen branches . 17 3.2.1 Aviation . 18 3.2.2 Nuclear power . 18 3.2.3 Chemical industry . 19 3.2.4 Railway industry . 20 3.2.5 Environment . 21 3.2.6 Occupational health and safety . 21 3.3 Best safety management practices for shipping companies . 22 3.3.1 Hazard identification and risk management . 22 3.3.2 Strategies of Safety Management . 24 3.3.3 Resources for safety ensuring . 25 3.3.4 The management of change . 25 3.3.5 Guidance material . 26 3.4 Port safety . 26 3.5 Summary . 274 MARITIME SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS .29Risto Jalonen & Pentti Kujala4.1 Introduction . 29 4.2 Safety performance indicators . 29 4.3 Accident analysis. 31 4.4 Interview study .32

4.5 Statistical analysis .33 4.6 Liabilities of the vessel and administrative tools . 35 4.7 Recommendations .36 4.8 Future actions . 375 INFLUENCE OF TOP MANAGEMENT ON SAFETY CULTURE.38Pekka Räisänen5.1 Introduction . 38 5.2 Literature survey on the influence of top management on safety culture . 38 5.3 Key risk categories and development areas . 39 5.3.1 General management . 39 5.3.2 Human resources . 40 5.3.3 Seamanship and navigation . 40 5.3.4 Fire and technology risks. 41 5.3.5 Special risks of passenger vessels . 41 5.4 Systematic maintenance . 41 5.5 Securing of cargo .42 5.6 Occupational safety onboard . 42 5.7 Results of the benchmarking study of occupational safety . 43 5.8 Summary . 456 NETWORK TYPE SAFETY MANAGEMENT AMONG AUTHORITIES .47Hilkka Dufva & Juhani Pekkola7 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION .49Ulla Tapaninen & Juha HeijariACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . 51REFERENCES . 52 APPENDICES

Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies17INTRODUCTIONJuha Heijari, Kotka Maritime Research CentreIntercontinental maritime transportation has been in continuous increase due to theglobalization of markets. For example, during the period from 1995 to 2006, worldmaritime container traffic (measured in TEU) increased over 200% and world grossdomestic product (GDB in 2007 US dollars) almost doubled in this time period (U.S.Department of Transportation, 2007). From the European point of view, the largest porthandling maritime cargo (weight of seaborne goods) are Rotterdam (Netherlands),Antwerp (Belgium), Hamburg (Germany), Marseille (France) and Amsterdam(Netherlands), respectively (Amerini, 2010). Finnish ports handle approx. 3% of theEuropean level volumes in 2007 (Amerini, 2009). The increase in handled volumes bothin import and export has been (in 2006 2007) approximately 2.5% in Europe, but theeconomic downturn has downgraded shipping volumes on a global scale (Amerini,2010).In future prospect, shipping is expected to be the most important means of transport inintercontinental and, in many cases, in continental haulage. In Europe, the Baltic Seaand especially the Gulf of Finland has considerable importance for seabornetransportation (Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009). The increasing export of oil from Russiaconstitutes a major share of volumes transported through the Gulf of Finland and thecountry is the European Union’s most important partner (United States of America issecond) measured in handled (import and export) gross weight of goods (Amerini,2010). The increase in seaborne cargo in the Baltic Sea countries has been close to theEuropean level (Figure 1). Furthermore, in Finnish ports, arrivals in foreign traffic havebeen in a constant increase for several years (Figure 1).

8Heijari & TapaninenFigure 1. The number of arrivals (solid line) in foreign traffic in the Finnish ports during 1970 – 2008(data from Statistics on Shipping between Finland and Foreign Countries, 2008) and the gross weight(dash line) of seaborne goods handled in EU 15 countries’ ports during 1998 – 2008 (data from Seatransport of goods, 2010)In relation to growing waterborne transportation, the risks for accidents increase in thevulnerable Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Transportation of oil in the Gulf ofFinland accounts for 56% of total maritime goods transported (Kuronen & Tapaninen,2009). A maritime accident, similar to the British Petroleum oil rig accident in the Gulfof Mexico on 22 May, 2010, would be catastrophic to the Gulf of Finland’s economy,environment and everyday life. In order to combat against these kinds of accidents, socalled “ex ante” operations are required. A few examples of opposite “ex post”operations are the cleaning of the shore of spilled oil or claims for loss of revenue fromthe parties responsible for the spill.Maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland has enhanced due to several “ex ante” operations,such as acts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and preventive actions ofthe United Nations, establishment of the intergovernmental organization HelsinkiCommission (HELCOM), Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) based of AutomaticIdentification System (AIS) and a mandatory reporting system named Gulf of FinlandReporting System (GOFREP). Even though the awareness of the increased risk foraccidents has ignited several operations to prevent accidents, still approximately 22 to34 accidents occur annually in the Gulf of Finland (Kujala et al., 2009). The currentregulations, guidelines, assessments, codes etc. have to be functional and easy toimplement for them to be successful in preventing accidents. The future prospects are anenhanced usability of maritime traffic surveillance and new innovations (EuropeanUnion Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 2009). The methods (not regulatory) inproactive operations against possible accidents are, for example, the utilisation ofimproved global maritime surveillance (Høye et al., 2008; Coleshill et al., 2010),probability modelling of vessel collision (Monteweka et al., 2010), enhanced shippingaccident investigations (Celik et al., 2010; Salmi, 2010), cross-disciplinary studies

Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies9(human factor, Bayesian networks; Kelmola et al., 2009) and functional policyinstruments (Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009).The ro-ro ship Estonia capsized and sunk in heavy weather in September 1994. Theprimary reason for the accident was a failure and loosing of the ship’s bow visor.Hänninen (2007) analysed the report of the investigation board thoroughly in hisdoctoral thesis concerning the Estonia accident. Hänninen (2007) stated that the causeof the Estonia accident was not only a technical failure of the bow visor, but also thatthere are major defects in the safety culture of the maritime industry.Even before the Estonia accident occurred, deficiencies in maritime safety culture wereconsidered as the reason for the accident of the Herald of Free Enterprise (FMA, 2007).Among other fatal accidents that occurred in the late 1980’s, the accident of the Heraldof Free Enterprise triggered concern about the maritime safety culture amonginternational maritime authorities. As a result, the IMO provided an International SafetyManagement Code (ISM Code) in 1993.This is the final report of project METKU “Developing Maritime Safety Culture” thatwas carried out in Kotka Maritime Research Centre during 2008 – 2010. One of theaims of the research project was to evaluate the impacts of the ISM Code on themaritime safety culture in Finland. The research partners were Aalto University, theUniversity of Turku, the Centre for Maritime Studies, Kymenlaakso University ofApplied Sciences and Turku University of Applied Sciences. The METKU project wasfunded by the European Union, Regional Council of Päijät-Häme, the City of Kotka andprivate companies. We investigate the abovementioned specific questions in five shortconcluding articles below.The aim of the METKU project was to gather a holistic view on the development ofmaritime safety in the Gulf of Finland during the past decade. Our aim specifically wasto analyse: 1) the impact of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture, 2) the tools foridentifying risk factors for individual ships, 3) to compare other high standard safetymanagement systems, 4) the influence of human factor in accident probability, 5) theinfluence of corporate top management to safety culture and 6) the need for directionsand guidelines for the authority networks.

102Heijari & TapaninenANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODEJouni Lappalainen, Anne Vepsäläinen & Ulla Tapaninen, University of Turku2.1IntroductionThe purpose of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) has been topromote safety culture for the maritime industry. The fundamental philosophy of theISM Code is the philosophy of continuous improvement. Investigating incidents is anintegral component of the process of continuous improvement in safety managementsystems. According to IMO, learning from accidents should help to improve safetyperformance since the incidents can share the same underlying causes as losses. (IMO,2008)The purpose of the study is to recognize whether the safety culture has improved due tothe ISM Code and evaluate the impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety in Finland.The research project consists of a literature study and focused interviews which werecarried out in autumn 2008 and spring 2009. The research questions are: Is there an established and actively working process of continuous improvement? Is the top management of the company committed to safety issues? Is there motivated and encouraged personnel onboard to actively initiate safetyimprovements (personnel empowerment)?2.2Target and structureThe target was to study the development of the Finnish maritime safety cultureconsidering the effects of the ISM Code from the mid-1990's to the present. The workconsisted of three parts: a literature review, interview studies and finally, premises ofincident reporting was studied.The purpose of the literature review was to provide us with a preliminary understandingof the research problem. When examining the existing literature, we tried to find out andrecognize the means and methods for eliciting the changes in the organisational culture.Moreover, we tried to find out the prerequisites for a good safety culture. Earlier studieson the impact of the ISM Code have been based on quantitative methods, such asstructured questionnaires, the results of which have been analysed statistically.The purpose of the interview study was to collect the maritime personnel’s subjectiveperceptions of the maritime safety culture in Finland. The results of the interviews wereanalysed qualitatively. A total of 94 people were interviewed in this interview study. Allthose who were interviewed were actively working in the Finnish shipping business.Almost all had a maritime education and maritime working experience. Every person

Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies11interviewed had worked with the ISM Code based safety management system. Almostall were Finnish citizens.The shipping companies involved comprehensively represent the Finnish maritimeindustry. There were seven shipping companies involved in the study, which widelyrepresent the Finnish shipping business. All important shipping business areas wererepresented. We visited 16 ships during the project. These were passenger ships,ROPAX ships and all types of cargo ships. The combined fleet of the shippingcompanies represents a large proportion of the total Finnish fleet. The other stakeholderorganisations are involved in safety management on a daily basis. They have acomprehensive idea of the current safety culture of the Finnish shipping business due totheir close cooperation with Finnish shipping companies and their personnel.The interview study revealed that the Finnish shipping companies have not been able tofully implement the incident reporting and analysing to reach continuous improvement,which is one of the core targets of the ISM Code. Therefore, it was consideredimportant to closely examine the premises of incident reporting. The aim of this study,then, was to find answers to the questions; what is IMO’s standpoint on incidentreporting and investigation, how can this standpoint be seen in the light of thetheoretical background and can the chosen standpoint have the desired effects? Inaddition, the existing reporting and investigation schemes were reviewed.2.3Main results2.3.1 Literature reviewThe literature review showed us that the ISM Code has brought a significantcontribution to the progress of maritime safety during recent years (Lappalainen, 2008).Shipping companies and crews are more environmentally friendly and more safetyoriented than they were 12 years ago (Lappalainen, 2008). Othman (2003) states thatmost (80%) of Malaysian shipping companies have implemented their safetymanagement systems effectively according to the requirements of the ISM Code. Themember states of the Paris MoU (2008) conducted a Concentrated Inspection Campaign(CIC) which focused on the effectiveness of the ISM Code. The Paris MoU (2008)discovered that most of the shipping companies and crews on vessels understand safetyand implement it. The Tokyo MoU (Tokyo MOU, 2008) conducted a CICsimultaneously with the Paris MoU. Nevertheless, the direct effects and influence of theISM Code on maritime safety could not be specified very well. No quantitativemeasurements (statistics/hard data) could be found to describe the impacts of the ISMCode on maritime safety (Mejia, 2001; Anderson, 2003; IMO 2005 ReportISM, 2008).In the light of the literature review (Lappalainen, 2008), there are major shortcomingsconcerning effective safety management in the maritime industry.The recent studies (Mejia, 2001; Anderson, 2003; IMO 2005, ReportISM, 2008)showed that near-misses are not perfectly reported. Some mariners are still reluctant toexpose their mistakes (Withington, 2006; Anderson, 2003). The Paris MoU (2008)

12Heijari & Tapaninenreported that one of the most common deficiencies in safety management systemsconcerns the reporting of nonconformities and occurrences of accidents. Hence, there isstill room for improvement in the reporting of deficiencies and non-conformities in themaritime industry. The proper reporting of deficiencies and non-conformitiesestablishes a basis for continuous improvement. Furthermore, Anderson (2003)discovered that in certain cases, further analysis of, and corrective actions on thereported incidents were not properly carried out. Under these circumstances, asuccessful cycle of continuous improvement cannot function (Lappalainen, 2008).Some shipping companies prefer short-term profits at the expense of maritime safety(Anderson, 2003). The Paris MoU (2008) reported as a result of the CIC that 176 shipswere detained due to serious deficiencies violating the requirements of the ISM Code.The reasons for the detentions were that the maintenance of the ship and its safetyequipment were badly neglected. The status of emergency preparedness was poor aswell. (Paris MoU, 2008; ReportISM, 2008). Evidently, the top management is notcommitted to safety issues in poorly performing shipping companies (Lappalainen,2008).Pun et al. (2003) stated that a high turnover of labour force could prevent theestablishment of a safety culture in the maritime industry. Anderson (2003) alsoemphasized that establishing a safety culture is not easy when the turnover of the crewis high. The British Maritime and Coastguard Agency expressed the same concern intheir study in 2008. The transient nature of the workforce with a relatively long distancebetween the ship owner and the vessel complicate the progress of safety management(ReportISM, 2008).We discovered that a safety culture has emerged and it is developing in the maritimeindustry. Even though the roots of the safety culture have been established, seriousobstacles still remain to the breakthrough of safety management. These obstacles couldbe envisaged as cultural factors obstructing the safety process. Even though the ISMCode has been effective for over a decade, long-established behaviours based on themaritime culture of the old days still occur. (Lappalainen, 2008)2.3.2 Interview studyWe conducted a field survey which had the main target of investigating the opinionsand attitudes of active seafarers employed by Finnish shipping companies. The fieldsurvey consisted of 94 interviews, which were carried out as in-depth interviews.The Finnish maritime community felt that the top management is committed to safetymanagement and the application of the ISM Code. The top management assured thatthey considered safety as a value, and their companies had taken safety issues intoconsideration in all of their operations. It was observed that a major proportion of thepersonnel working in the top management supported and encouraged their personnel byproviding adequate resources for safety work and by communicating actively on safetyissues. The maritime personnel mostly felt that the commitment of the management

Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies13with regard to safety issues has improved and reasonable safety initiatives have beensupported by the management. The management had provided financial support andother resources for safety improvements when necessary. The common view of themaritime inspectors was that the top management of the Finnish shipping companies ishighly committed to safety management. (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009)Majority of interviewees said that the communications of shipping companies haveimproved. Communications with the companies’ officers have also improved, especiallythe communication with the DPs. Our findings show that communication between themasters of the ships and the crew has significantly improved. Some interviewedmanagers indicated that the personnel should more actively put forward proposals andinitiatives concerning safety aspects. Furthermore, the majority of interviewed maritimeinspectors said that maritime personnel are not afraid to express themselves to theirsuperiors. (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009)During the studied implementation phase (1995 – 2009) of the ISM Code, the safetymanagement system confronted resistance to change. That resistance has weakenedduring the last decade. The maritime personnel’s safety attitudes have improved. Thewillingness to participate in safety training has been a good indicator of this. The groupsthat were interviewed had a common concern about the functioning of the continuousimprovement process. The reluctance to make incident reports indicated that thecontinuous improvement process was not functioning properly. Many interviewees saidthat incident reporting should be encouraged by superiors. (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009)2.3.2 Utilization of incident reportingInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) encourages shipping companies to haveprocedures to report and analyse non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations(IMO, 2002). In its Guidance on near-miss reporting (IMO, 2008), IMO emphasises theimportance of near miss reporting because “learning the lessons from near-missesshould help to improve safety performance since near-misses can share the sameunderlying causes as losses”.In the 1930s, Heinrich (1959) introduced a theory of different incident relations. Mostknown of the hypotheses base on this theory is the iceberg model, whereby for everyserious accident there are several less serious accidents and near miss cases. Thishypothesis is widely accepted. Through the iceberg model Heinrich also presented twoother hypotheses: the domino theory and identical causation hypothesis. The dominotheory is an accident model, in which models how accidents originate. The identicalcausation hypothesis states that different incidents have same kind underlying reasons.These two theories are widely argued. Therefore it should be taken into considerationwhether IMO’s guidance on near miss reporting (IMO, 2008) can have the desiredeffects.The main finding concerning existing incident reporting systems is that informationnow flows more from the ships to systems and external institutions when it should be

14Heijari & Tapaninenthe other way around. Based on this, it is highly recommended that actions to spin theflow of the information be carried out (Figure 2.1).GISIS(IMO)International Reporting SystemsEMCIP(EMSA)Accident Investigation BoardPerson on ShipDPCompanyNational Reporting SystemsIFWA(FAII)Figure 2.1 Suggested information flow between actors in maritime incident reportingAdditionally, there are already statistics and investigation reports on Finnish maritimeincidents – such as serious accidents and injuries – but the statistics and reports arescattered in the databases of different interest groups. To use that already existingknowledge in safety work, it is crucial that those databases are united in one shareddatabase. In the best scenario this collec

As a result, the IMO provided an International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) in 1993. This is the final report of project METKU “Developing Maritime Safety Culture” that . 2008) Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies. Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies. 2010) 52. . , Code. , . . Turku .

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