UNITBP STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY SOUTHEAST ASIA .
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470l:;. , --,. . -. ' ·r· .,- .··-·· ,.---- - - - ·-,·: ., . · --,· . -·.:.;.--:1 ;:";" . ·-::1.UNITBP STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCYSOUTHEAST ASIA CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORYVolume 5, Part 6· Volume ·FiveASSI TING U. S. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGH CRYPTOLOGYSection OneASSISTANCE THROUGH SIGINTPart Two!::. ;;!'.,)SIGINT SUPPORT OF TACTICAL GROUND COMMANDERS IN SVN·.·.·· · .C.:hapter ixII jTHE JANUARY 1968 COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE\Current Intelligence and History DivisionOffice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for SecurityHeadquarters, United States Army Security AgencyArlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va.1 March 1969Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 02-07-2019 pursuant to E . O. 13526
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470Chapter SixTHE JANUARY 1968 COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVETable of ContentsDeveloped Outline:ITEM:PAGES:Preface:Table of Contents:Table of Figures and Illustrations:Chapter 6:The January 1968 Communist TET Offensive.1.Introduction; SVN, General.2.Operations in I CTZ,26a.The Build-up, Siege and Relief of Khe Sanh.26(1)The NVA/VC Build-up in Western QuangTri Province,26(2)SIGINT Aspects of the Battle of Khe Sanh;Operation NIAGARA.30(3)Provisional Corps, Vietnam (PCV),37(4)Operation PEGASUS; the Relief of Khe Sanh,42*1****r :- ,. 5 I-., ·,§ - ·- \\
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470 . :· . j -. ·. : -,,:t . ·- ·-· .l.SEAHAG Volume 5, Part 6Table of Figures and Illustrations, WORKSHEETFigure:Subject:1.Enemy and Allied Force, SVN, 1 January 1968.2.509th RR Group and DSU Disposition, Subordinationand Support Relationships, 1 January 1968, Befqre TET,3.,-· . Page:?09th RR Group and DSU Disposition, Subordinationand Support Relationships, 1 May 1968, After TET.5674.Disposition of Enemy Forces, SVN, 30 Dec 1967.155.Disposition of Enemy Forces, SVN, 15 Jan 1968.16/6.Disposition of Enemy Forces, SVN, 30 Jan 1968.177.Enemy Axes and Advance and Movements Prior to TET.188.Communications Structure of CRS System, 509th RR Group,Saigon and 8th RRFS, Phu Bai, March 1968.22Quang Tri Province.26.19.,,. - --·. I\ , .· .:-·
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470Chapter SixTHE JANUARY 1968 COMMUNIST'TET OFFENSIVEThe other day we had an intelligence investiga.tinggroup here to . [determine intelligence failures andimprovements]. I recall COL Faulk, my G2, ,, ,toldthem that· he didn't really know what the intelligencefailures were, but he simply hoped that next time hewould have as much intelligence and information on the:enemy as he had this last time! . , . The reason· that we ··turned back the enemy. , . , in large measure, ··was dueto your .efforts. *'· . ·1.Introduction. SVN, General,.,.'Between the 29th and 31stof January 1968, during the proclaimed truce'of the oriental Lunar New Year -- .TET --. holiday season, North and SouthViet-namese Communist units delivered a devastating series of attacks, in a nationwide general offensive, against Government of Vietnam (GVN) population centersand Free World Military Allied Forces installations throughout South.Vietnam(SVN),'The Communists launched initial major attacks against urban. centersasthe TET Offensive reached peak intensity by the night of 31 January - 1 February.During the next few days, additional Allied targets were attacked whilefighting continued in some cities penetrated during the first,nig ts.By the end* U, LTG -.F. C. Weyand, CG, II FFV, address to 303rd RR Bn sµpporting II FFV,'.28.Mar 68,- referring .dir·ecffy to- ·ASA SIGINT support to II FFV before and duringthe TET Offensive.1.,, l. - - -.
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470 ·· . ,-.·--1 c,'··-·'t. - .3'. .-. .'.::""'"\ ::--:.(. / -'- .I. !. : .' · "- /.\of the second week of February, the initial waves of the TET Offensiv.e w:ereripples on the beach.The enemy had been met, stopped, and driven back in allbut three key areas.The Communist forces in Vietnam were elusive, possessed a uncannymobility within their limited resources and were masters of ·cov e r, c911:cealment,deception and infiltration,'They operated primarily against targets of oppor-' .tunity in battalion-size formations, except for occasional multi-regimental;planned operations, such as the TET Offe ns i ve,A large concentration ; f Communistsin one area one month could be--and usually was--a barren expanse of jungle thenext month.Therefore, COHUSMACV was required to meet varied threats by rapidlymoving and deploying his tactical commands on extremely short notice,This also'dictated a highly flexible approach to USASA's SIGINT role in direct supportofMACV and all its subordinate commands.Because of the enemy's fragmentation which applied in Vietnam, US divisions rarely deployed as complete entities.Normally, divisions deployed severalbrigade or battalion-size elements in separate concurrent operat-ions.Occasio·n/ally,due to the tactical situation, brigades or battalions opera ed outside of the division's normal tactical AO, or even out of their repective FFV TAOR"i::.This frag-2
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470L ,' kmentation of'. i:.: .,:/-1,.,L !-( 1.;.\., i.,:.j,H- -" ----- -···-- -- . .; .:\.tactical units caused a corresponding fragmentaticm or ABA DSU'sas they moved with and· continued to ( vice theirrepective supported commands.From SIGINT operational standpoint, COMINT analysts·; nece sarily, oftenwere split between the DSU platoons and companies, to provide direct support atthe brigade or separate battalion level.,.The ASA Company.' s tr"affic ·:analysis.capability might have been enhanced if all the analysts could have cpmbined theirefforts at'pue location.However, that aJ so would have precluded the instant res-ponse to the Commander-consumer's demands, with which ASA Support has ·become syn-,omous in SVN.These areas of concern engendered command and control problems allthe way up through the RR Battalions to. 509 th RR Group Headquarters.The dis per-sion and distances involved and any reduction in face-to-face consumer .contactsadversely affected optimum results . . Although problems were numerous and varied,they were not insurmountable,ASA subordinate commanders resolved many of them.sThe group alleviated some problemvby cross-attaching elements. or units from onebattalion to another, and to the 8th RRFS when necessary.The 509th RR-Groupstressed high standards of flexibility and resourcefulness on the part of DSUcommanders to insure providing maximum support for the tactical effort in Vietnam-to improve production for supported commanders.:J,;.; - 8.:.j ··'I, , .c.:', .:,·· .- /-·--··-· \3
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470l1 . ·. ·- - , .- - \USASA SEAHAG(In the beginning of 1968, a general summary of the VC/PAVN enemyforces and the friendly FWMAF forces in SVN, the shaded areas indicating thosepredominantly under VC control, looked about as shown.** · See Fig. 1, Enemy and Allied Forces, SVN, 1 January 1968.' ·f ·:·.The two following listings show the dispositio? and support relation-ships, as well as the subordination of USASA DSU's, the 509th RR Group.organization in January 1968, before TET, * and the changes in those subordinations and* See Fig. 2, if: 509 th RR Group and DSU Dispositions, Subordination and SupportRelationships, SVN, January 1968.locations reflected in the comparable listing for the 509th RR Group, in May 1968,after TET. ** See Fig. 3, ff: 509th RR Group and DSU Dispositions, Subordination and SupportRelationships, SVN, May 1968.On 29-30 January 1968, the VC/PAVN forces commenced their general offen-sive which they hoped would be supported by a general popular uprisingagainst the.GVN.r ·-:- :---, ':'·-- ·---. .\IThe TET Offensive opened with nearly simultaneous, unprecedented, savage,, . - - · . ·-:.1nbf. r f'\. .r:' "'.- ''"§ .,) ,. .Q, .,,,19,-'--'-"--'.:. · :.J4
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470- ---· · ·- - ·-·- · --- ··-·· :,.l ' .U.S. FORCES:3rd Marine Division1st Marine Division1st Marine Air Wing36th Tactical Fighter WingAmerica! Division3rd Brigade of 4th Infantry Division196th and 198th Light Infantry Brigades11th Infantry Brigade3rd Brigade of 1st Cavalry Division(Airmobile) also attachedENEMYSOUTH VIETNAM FORCES:ENEMY FORCES:NVA 324th BDivisionNVA 325th DivisionElements of NVA 341st DivisionNVA 368th BRegimentTwo Rocket Artillery BattalionsNVA 2nd DivisionNVA 3rd Division ,NVA 3rd Division NVA 1st DivisionNVA 5th Division--------- i'j7S;; ------------ :-c.VC 5th DivisionVC 9th DivisionVC 7th Divisionfive VC Main-Force BattalionsSix VC Main-Force BattalionsU.S. FORCES:1st Brigade of 4th lnfaniry DivisionElements of 2r.d Brigade 4th Infantry DivisiorElements of 173rd Airborne Brigade-;;----'. -- --- Elements of 1st Cavalry Divisio (Airmobile)2nd Brigade of 4th Infantry DivisionElemcn.ts of 25th Infantry Division·-\\-.,,.::: -. El nents of 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)31stTactical Fighter Wing',ls! Field Force Headquarters ,5th Special Forces Group Headquarters· Army Engineer Commandi12th Tactical Fighter Wing '483rd Troop Carrier Wing35th Tactical fighter WingElements of 101st Airborne DivisionEnemy andAllied Forces,SVN,l Je.n 1968Corps·Fig. L1nuary 1, 1968U.S. FORCES:Elements of 9th Infantry DivisionDelta Helicopter Aviation BattalionHeadquarters for Navy RiverPatrol Boats, Seal Teams,Junk Forces; Army Special ForcesSOUTH VIETNAM FORCES:7th Division --:-·., r·· ·-- :.:.-:- .,,'J9th Division ·· -:· · : -::,21st DivisionL .:.; .:.' : .'.-- .Enemy & Alli d force, SVN, 1 Jan 68 r ·. Royal Thai Queen's Cobra Regiment i IRepublic of Philippines Contingent2nd and 7th Battalions of Royal AustralianRegiment, 1st Australian Task f;JrceNew Zealand ArtiHery Battery : . - . -51,i.,. - U\la,
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470509th RR Group and DSU Dispositions, Subordination and Support Relationships, Jan 68 .-C-ov e r D e s i g n a t o r : ·.,,, . . :l!.1! 1. --S-t-r-e-ng.-· t- h::::s:u: p: p:o :r:t:e d- ,.c:o:m:m:a:n:d -B-a:s:e:-1-0-c a--t-i-o n--509th RR GpHeadquarters ·co101st RR Co (COMSEC)RR COMM UNIT VN403d RR SOD8th RRFS (CMA)''704495014619214465380844USMACV/USARV509th RR GpUSMACV/USARV509th RR Gp/CRITICOM5th SFGpNational/509th/III MAF911SaigonSaigonSaigonSaigonI.Nha'Trang. Phu: Bai313th RR Bn '. ·330th RR Co(Opns;CMA)371st RR Co374th RR Co404th RR Det406th RR Det408th RR Det415th RR Det601st RR . I FFVMACV/I FFV1st Cav Div (AM)4th Inf Div173d Ahn Bde1/lOlst Abn Div196th Inf Bde11th Inf Bde198th Inf Bde303d RR Bn175th RR Co(Ops;CMA)265th RR Co335th RR Co337th RR Co372d RR Co409th RR Det856th RR I FFVMACV/II FFV101st Ahn Div9th Inf Div1st Inf Div25th Inf Div11th AC Regt199th Inf Bde224th Avn Bn (RR)(HQ)138th Avn Co (RR)144th Avn Co (RR)1st RR Co (Avn)146th Avn Co (RR)156th Avn Co (RR)624624A624B638624C624D84192192215192167MACVI FFVI FFVMACVII FFVII FFV613(TSN; JGS) ·(TSN)(TSN; JGS)(TSN)Nha TrangPleiku' An KhePleik'uChulai ·Phan Rang· chu LaiChu LaiChu LqiLong BinhBien HoaBien oaBear CatDi AnCu ChiXuan LoeLong BinhSaigon(TSN)Da NangNha TrangCam .Ranh BaySaigon (TSN)Can Tho*S, Report, IAPPER-M, HQ USASAPAC, 1 Jan 68, Command Strength, US Army Security .Agency, Pacific, Units --,.-,Located in Vietnam.Note:Indentation reflects subordinad.on.L:,/ icj ·· L ., - .: jFig. 2,(bJJ,, l§5 '-".:.:O SO.:.:.:,J509th RR Gp & D§U J)ispos·i tio s, --Subordinationand Support Re1at;ionsnips., -lJan 68·, .Before TET :, · · :' ';;,- .: . -: . '--·---- ·,.l6
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470- ---·-·. 9ECl0B .""lf 509th RR Group and DSU Dispositions, Subordination and SupportRelationships, May 1968Cover Designator:Supported Command:Base Location:509th RR Group*Headquarters Co101st RR Co (COMSEC)RR COMM UNIT VN403d RR SODUSMACV/USARV509th RR GroupUSMACV/USARV509th RR Gp/CRITICOM5th SFGpnononononoNational/509tn/III. MAF/Prov Corps (I CTZ)Phu Bai101st Abn Div(-)3d Bde, 82d Abn Div1st Cav Div (AM)Phu BaiGia LeCamp Evans (TTH)I FFVI FFV4th Inf DivNha TrangPleikuPleiku and dispersed.23d Inf Div(AMERICAL)Chu Lai196th Inf Bde11th Inf Bde198th Inf BdeChu LaiDue PhoChu Lai173d Abn Bde1/lOlst Abn DivPhu HiepPhan RangFFVFFV9th Inf Div1st Inf Div25th Inf Div11th Arm Cav Regt199th Inf BdeLong BinhBien HoaLong Thanh North (Bear Cat:Di An (Ap Nhi)Cu ChiXuan Lo (Ap Suoi Ca)Cat Lai,.l8th RRFS cci1A)l'Xj. -change ·change . .change , ·:·changechangeI-' (IQ265th RR CoDet A, 358th RR Co371st RR Co.l.,.J0V,j0:i. I.Ortll :::,' 313th RR Bn(330th RR Co(Ops; CHA)374th RR CoProvisional Company408th RR Det415th RR Det601st RR Det404th RR Det406th RR Det303d RR Bn175th RR Co (Ops; CMA)335th RR Co337th RR Co372d RR Co409th RR DetDet 1, 856th RR CoIIII224th Avn Bn (RR)* Authorized Strength, 1 April 1968:Actual Strength, 1 May 1968:IIno chang:s.5,3575, 027-c-'-"":1 - .,- --. ·')- . ,r ,,.·., ·i?,f7 Ft.CS§U .L. LNo changes.* TSCW, Presentation y fQ th RR Group, Commanders' Conference, HQ USASA, May 68;S, Report, IAPPER-M, HQ, USASAPAC, 1 May 1968, Command Strengths, US Army SecurityAgency, Pacific, Units Located in Vietnam.7
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470it:r,·,:40 '§.·USASA SEAHAGl ·,-. .,:, il'·11 ·.even suicidal -- attacks on major cities, Province capitals,!p\strict towns, USF. and ARVN base installations and USSFG/CIDG camps and outposts throughout SVN.This was conjoined with the beginning of a renewed major offensive in northernSVN, at the Marine bastion at Khe Sanh and along the DMZ.Heavy penetration andcity fighring wracked Saigon, Pleiku, Da Nang, Hue, and other principal cities.This effort, while unleashed with a certain amount of shock and local VC successI-Ibecause of its general magnitude, did not catch USF by surprise, but in alert pos-' .\ture and with reinforcements of key bases and certain cities already in motio\.The original attacks of 30 and11IIJanuary had been directed against ; key'Iurban centers and G\lN targets primarily by VC LF and MF units, augmented by NVApersonnel and units, while many of the best PAVN and VC units had been·\ withheldfrom initial attacks, remaining near key Allied military bases, apparen¼y poisedto engage Allied reaction forces or follow up original assaults, if successful,with a fresh wave of overwhelming attacks.On 1 February and in the succeed.ingweek, some of those units were committed as the enemy sought to press limited local advantages gained in initial stages,However, the general uprising of the pop-ulace, for which the VC had hoped, did not take place and Allied forces reacted!.;.'. ; . .-·.- :, : - .\ .: .-,, .8
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470USASA SEAHAG(swiftly to the initial assaults.The attacks which did take place were generallyunsuccessful as Allied Forces expelled .the attackers almost immdiately in mostareas, inflicting very heavy losses on their ranks.Although considerable evidence pointing to attacks during . TET had beeriavailable in advance, the Communists achieved a measure of tactical surprise insome areas, chiefly because of the unprecedented scope and nature of their attacksdirected, unexpectedly, against urban centers.A CIA Intelligence Memorandum, of21 February 1968; observed that the intensity of the Communist TET Offensive wasreflected in their attacks on 39 of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capi als andthe ·autonomous cities of Da Nang and Saig on.All of them were subjected to artiller:and mortar fire or ground assault, and most of them were hit within the first threedays.At least 35 of these capitals and the two cities were penetrated physicallyby Communist armed forces, with varying tenure.capitals were attacked,In addition, at least 71 districtThe offensive was aimed at civilian centers of authorityas well as military installations such as base camps, air fields, and logisticalinstallations.The memorandum summarized Communist objectives as hoping the cam-paign would culminate in a general uprising which would lead to severe defeats1. . ·1r· .; fr:)f;).,CJ, . , , r ,., . :.:11-j Li w .ru J.L l; 9
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470. . ,.,. . ,:. : . ., .,-·- I -·· ·- . · - ---· . . ··· ]USASA SEAHAG(for Allied military forces and US withdrawal frbm South Vietnam.At the sametime, they hoped that large-scale political agitation combined with attacks .onurban areas would cause the collapse of the South Vietnamese government,more immediate tactical objectives appeared to have been to:tie down Allied military units in defensive positions; (2)namese political centers; and (3)demonstrate the . inabilitynarnese government to protect the population.The(1) disperse anddisrupt South Vietof the South Viet-In addition, the Communists may havehoped to gain greater control over a larger segment of the rural population byd·i srupting or destroying the pacification program while Allied forces were protecting urban areas.Although the Communists failed to spark a general uprising, they disrupted the South Vietnamese governmental apparatus; interrupted the pacificationprogram; and showed the inability of the government to protect the people fromCommunist terrorism.Despite these gains, the Communists failed to organize pop-ular support anq suffered severe losses, particularly among elite sapper and specialaction units.Although the official body count of 32, 549 enemy dead may have beenexaggerated, total enemy losses undoubtedly exceeded · that figure, while Allied· . ;.'. ,, ., . · .·. !. --:.L10
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470( '',c., -;-···, : : 1USASA SEAHAG; y' :.k,-;l- ·-. -. -.·· ·--- - · - . .,.,. ·-· - -1:::-- --.:1- - : ·-. ' -- '.:1i .,.::J ·,-; ,r·.-·.·--. -'.\ . { - : . · . : . :).'l.:· ::,,1.\,:.'-forces captured nearly :8, 000 individual weapons, ·and over 1 , 200 !crew served ·weapons from the Communists during the attacks.Allied dead were reported as3,383.'·CIA estimated that perhaps 58,000 enemy troops took part in·TETattacks throughout South Vietnam; far short of the actual number of enemy troops' ,.· .committed, inasmuch as many local units were built up just prior to the TETattacks," while other participating units· were new, or otherwise unidentified.SIGINT and evidence from other collateral sources indicated that many units notmentioned in the CIA memorandum were involved in the TET offensive.Thus, their.estimate of 58,000 is far lower than the actual total of enemy troops committedduring TET.SIGINT collection and reporting, aided materially by ARDF pat ern analy-(sis studies based on approximately 20 ,.000 location/identification reports in thefirst two months of the new year, had provided USF throughout·sVN ·with sufficientadvance warning of probable VC/PAVN offensive intentions and locati-0ns of keyenemy build-ups, to rapidly counte o the actual commencement of the TET*SCW, NSA's 2/0/VCM/R32-68, 25 Jan 1968.Offensive, treating wrap-ups on all the CTZ's in Vietnam,One of these reportsadvised that hostile action would commence 300200 January 1968, Saigon time, issuedon 29 January 1968,.These reports summarized, confirmed and ient weight to thethousands of fragmentary and similar summary reports and indications which had beenthrough ASA channels,·· on which nearly .all major commandssubmitted earlier to major tactical commands/had already al rted units, commencedredeployment, dispositions and preparatory 'coordination and actions The VC/PAVNI,. :14·-- "'\·- ·; ., .:. . .:. . ;.LL .--.:. i . ' .:.:.:./r
Doc ID: 6640471Doc Ref ID: A6640470.,.!c.·-·HQ'lt: Ill AGTHQw 2 ., POTHOMa 2d .N\JAl?dRGT.,. .I.'. . - . .,.PLEU(U'.} .'.#·---. c . ' ; .IS rRONT .'. f. . ·.,·.'\1(),JII!;, · itJ. . r "'iA TRAIHO N'.A r1\, HO ftVA!.'HONV& '"' ·o,v 111,Ii.·.11··.lCAL30 DEC 67 :.,. .-·-mnttha·,. .,.
Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va. 1 March 1969 \ ! ::. ! ;; ,) I I j Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 02-07-2019 pursuant to E .O. 13526 . Doc ID: 6640471 Doc Ref ID: A6640470 ITEM: Chapter Six THE JANUARY 1968 COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE .
eric c. newman air force 2001-2009 george f. giehrl navy 1941-1945 f conrad f. wahl army 1952-1954 sidney albrecht . william c. westley jr. army 1954-1956 roland l. winters navy 1945-1946 michael a. skowronski army . joseph a. rajnisz army 1966-1971 james l. gsell army army army army army navy army navy air force army army
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Readers should refer to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, for detailed explanations of the Army leadership principles. The proponent of ADP 6-22 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army
Readers should refer to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, for detailed explanations of the Army leadership principles. The proponent of ADP 6-22 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center - Leader Development and Education.
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applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/United States Army Reserve, and the Marine Corps/Marine Corps Reserve of the United States unless otherwise stated. The proponent of ATP 3-06/ MCTP 12-10B. is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army .
INTERNATIONAL GCSE Accounting . SPECIFICATION Pearson Edexcel International GCSE in Accounting (4AC1) For first teaching in September 2017 First examination June 2019
