Operations Forces, Counterterrorism, And The Resurgence Of .

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NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS(Photo courtesy of NATO Special Operations Headquarters)NATO Special Operations Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, provides training for allied and partner special operations forces to improvetheir interoperability. The purpose is to create an international network of trained personnel who can respond to a range of scenariosthat may arise simultaneously in multiple NATO nations.NATO SpecialOperations Forces,Counterterrorism,and the Resurgence ofTerrorism in Europe1st Lt. Matthew E. Miller, U.S. Army ReserveMILITARY REVIEWJuly-August 201655

The rise of violent extremism and the recent terrorist attacksshow we are dealing with a qualitatively new challenge.—NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenbergwithout a doctrinal CT mission, it is likely NATO SOFwill formally, or informally, be supplanted by a memberstate’s national SOF CT units in the event of a large-scaleterror crisis, a much less effective approach to dealingwith a collective problem. Consequently, in light of thehe Islamic State (IS) has expanded into therapid expansion of IS and the increasing threat of terrorrealm of international terrorism, with theism in Europe, it is time for NATO SOF to establish CTdowning of a Russian airliner over the Sinaias a principal mission.in October 2015, suicide bombings in Turkey in 2015NATO’s website makes it clear that NATO SOF areand 2016, and attacks in Paris in November 2015.1ready to deploy to Asia, Africa, or the Middle East, butConsequently, North Atlantic Treaty Organizationit also acknowledges that its SOF may be required to(NATO) member states, overwhelmed by the magoperate in Europe as it adapts to new threats.7 AlthoughFrance chose not to invoke Article 5 innitude of a foreign-directed threat,the latest terrorist event, it is not inconcould invoke Article 5 of the 1949ceivable that one or more member statesNorth Atlantic Treaty for collectivethat possess less robust SOF capabilitydefense in Europe.2 Article 5 statesthat the signatories “agree that anthan France could be overwhelmed byarmed attack against one or more ofa large-scale terrorist attack similar tothem in Europe or North America9/11 or, more likely, a series of complexshall be considered an attack againstattacks similar to the attacks in Mumbai3them all.” This principle of collectiveand Paris.8 Many of the NATO signatodefense recognizes that terrorism is aries that joined after the fall of the Sovietthreat to the NATO alliance.Union simply do not have the organic caIn the weeks that followed thepability to deal with foreign-directed and2015 attacks in Paris, there was sigwell-resourced terror networks operating(Image courtesy of NATO Specialnificant discussion of whether Francein or between European countries. AnyOperations Headquarters)4would invoke Article 5. France chosemember state with underdeveloped lawnot to. In fact, the al-Qaida attack against the Unitedenforcement CT or SOF CT capabilities is more likely toStates on 11 September 2001 is the only case of an allied invoke Article 5, thus obliging allied nations to take “suchnation invoking Article 5 in an effort “to restore andactions, as it deems necessary” intended to “restore and5maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Inmaintain security.”9 Therefore, NATO SOF should be theless than twenty-four hours following 9/11, the NATONATO element capable of providing CT support to thesealliance determined that the United States was the obyounger member states.ject of an armed attack and that the attack had been forOn 29 September 2015, Hungary’s prime ministereign directed. Subsequently, NATO assisted the Unitedwarned that mass migration from countries such asStates with seven NATO airborne warning and controlAfghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and Libya risked destabilizsystem aircraft, conducting more than 360 sorties ining Europe.10 Germany alone expected to receive eighthundred thousand to one million refugees by the endU.S. airspace as well as supporting maritime operations6of 2015. Some of these are believed to have traveled onin the Mediterranean.fake Syrian passports.11 At least one of the Paris attackNeed for NATO Specialers from November 2015 was found to have traveledOperations Forceson such a passport, and Frontex (the European Union’sNotwithstanding a clear and demonstrated crossborder agency) has reported that a number of individborder terrorist threat to NATO as a whole, whetheruals have requested refugee status based on false Syrianthrough a failure of politics or a rejection of reality,citizenship.12 The Danish General Intelligence andSecurity Service reported that in the first decade of thecounterterrorism (CT) is not yet a principal missiontwenty-first century, terrorist groups such as al-Qaida areof NATO special operations forces (SOF). As a result,T56July-August 2016MILITARY REVIEW

NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS(Photo by Peter Andrews, Reuters)Polish special military force personnel from Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego (Group [for] Operational Maneuvering Response, or GROM) secure hostages during hostage-rescue training 13 April 2012 as part of preparation for the UEFA Euro 2012 (Europeansoccer championship) in Gdansk, Poland.“stealthily taking root” in Europe.13 These established terror networks in Europe will now have a new opportunityto recruit from this wave of mass migration from Syriaand other parts the Middle East.Islamic terrorism in Europe is often tied, directly orindirectly, to immigration and the challenges of societalintegration or the rejection of assimilation, even in thesecond and third generations.14 The 2015 refugee crisishas changed the threat of terrorism in Europe. First,terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida and IS will likelyattempt to embed terror operatives among the legitimate refugee population for the purpose of conductingattacks or building a new cadre in Europe.15 Second,former fighters fleeing or returning from the battlefieldsof the Middle East and North Africa will continue topose a terror threat. Disillusionment in the reintegrationprocess and the challenges of Western society could leadthese combat-experienced individuals to radicalize andestablish, or re-establish, previously held terror connections.16 The third threat is the potential increase insecond- and third-generation immigrants radicalizedas independent cells or in concert with one of the otherMILITARY REVIEWJuly-August 2016two previously discussed groups.17 In light of the 2015IS attacks in Paris and the mass migration of refugeesfrom war-torn countries, it is time for the NATO SOF toadopt CT as a primary mission.History of Counterterrorism UnitsHistorically, the establishment of national-levelCT units and capabilities has always been driven byterror and crisis. The first impetus for the development of national-level CT capabilities in Europe wasa response to an attack at the 1972 Summer OlympicGames in Munich, Germany. During the games, aPalestinian group called Black September enteredthe Olympic Village and subsequently kidnappedand killed several Israeli athletes. Amid the confusion and poorly managed law enforcement response,German police initiated a rescue attempt that ended in a catastrophic failure, with the deaths of nineIsraeli athletes at the airport. None of the Germanpolice had training in hostage rescue, close-quarterscombat, or sniping. Less than sixty days later, theGerman government formed the Grenzschutzgruppe 957

der Bundespolizei, or GSG-9, Germany’s first dedicated movie Mohammed, Messenger of God, starring AnthonyCT unit.18Quinn, which they believed to be an affront to Islam.20Shortly after what became known as the MunichThe thirty-nine-hour siege ended without a significantMassacre and the establishment of the GSG-9, Franceloss of life. Of the 149 hostages, two died from gunshotfollowedwounds receivedsuit with thein the initialcreation ofattack, and theGroupe d’Inremainingtervention de lahostages wereGendarmeriereleased afterNationale, ornegotiationsGIGN.19 Aled by Egyptiansignificantambassadors.difference beDuringtween the twothe siege, U.S.organizationsleadershipwas GSG-9’scalled upon thestatus as a lawFederal Bureauenforcementof Investigationorganization(FBI) and theand GIGN’sDepartment ofposition asDefense (DOD)(Photo by Jacky Naegelen, Reuters)a unit offor assistanceFrench soldiers secure the area where shots were exchanged five days earlier in Saint-Dethe Frenchwith a potentialnis, France, near Paris, 18 November 2015, during an operation to catch fugitives responsibleforthedeadlyattacks.Armed Forces.hostage-resThis is a signifcue mission.icant distinction because there are NATO nations whoseNeither the FBI nor the DOD had units trained withmilitaries may not be allowed to operate in a law-enthe appropriate CT capabilities.21 It had not been apriority in a Cold War military or in a domestic lawforcement capacity, and other partner states that do notenforcement community that believed terrorism wasallow foreign militaries to operate within their borders.largely a European problem, but both the FBI andThe legal distinction of NATO SOF in a member state’sDOD would initiate efforts to develop significant CTArticle 5 response is beyond the scope of this discussion,capabilities within a year.but it is an important distinction if NATO adopts SOFEach of these incidents represented a change in theCT capabilities and responsibilities as a principal mission.national threat level, which required an increase in naThe United States chose to develop CT capabilities intional CT capabilities; in turn, 2015 has seen a dramaticboth law enforcement and armed forces, but only afterchange in the European threat level. Transnational terits own hostage crisis, the Hanafi Siege, 9–11 Marchrorism in Europe and the increased lethality of complex1977. Homegrown violent extremist (using the modernterrorist attacks should be the impetus for NATO SOFvernacular) and Muslim convert Hamaas Abdul Khaalisto adopt CT as a principal mission, before the formalraised a group of twelve gunmen to lay siege to threerequest for collective defense arises.buildings in Washington, D.C., holding 149 hostages forthirty-nine hours. Khaalis’s group seized one floor of theNATO Special Operations DoctrineJohn A. Wilson Building, the B’nai B’rith headquarters,and the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C. The gunmen and CounterterrorismWith an increased likelihood of NATO SOF beingmade several demands that included the U.S. governmentcalled to support a member state’s special forces CThanding over several men convicted of killing memberselement or law-enforcement CT unit, NATO needs toof Khaalis’s family and the destruction of all copies of the58July-August 2016MILITARY REVIEW

NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONSdetermine the international coordination proceduresbut it is becoming increasingly likely that NATO SOFfor such actions at the interagency and interminiscould support such a mission.terial levels. It wasNATO SOF docimperative to establishtrine does state thatcollective securityNATO “SOF should“SOF should be utilized whenarrangements for a CTbe utilized when thereresponse in advanceis high risk, a need forthere is high risk, a needof an Article 5 requestspecial capabilities, ordue to the multinarequirements to confor special capabilities, ortional nature of modduct covert or clanern terrorism threatsdestine operations.”28requirements to conduct covertTake the case of theand the increasinglyorclandestineoperations.”2004 Madrid traincomplex nature of thebombing, in whichEuropean security(NATOSOFdoctrine)191 were killed andenvironment. This1,800 were woundstarted in a generaled.29 The investigationsense with the 2006led Spanish authorities to an apartment building in theRiga Summit’s decision to launch a SOF transformaLeganes neighborhood of Madrid. On 3 April 2004,tion initiative intended to increase interoperability andthe Spanish Grupo Especial de Operaciones attempted adialogue between NATO SOF units.22As previously noted, NATO SOF doctrine doesraid on the terrorist suspect’s apartment building. Fournot hold CT as one of its three principal missions. Theterror suspects committed suicide by detonating a largefirst NATO SOF doctrine publication, Allied Jointexplosive device in the building, killing one police offiPublication (AJP)-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Specialcer and wounding eleven others.30 Spanish authoritieswere not prepared for, or capable of conducting, a raidOperations, identifies the three principal NATO SOFagainst an asymmetric threat on their own soil.missions as military assistance, special reconnais23sance, and direct action. Surprisingly, AJP-3.5 onlyConclusionincludes one paragraph dedicated to CT.24 Ostensibly,NATO member states need one central institution forNATO SOF CT doctrine amounts to four sentencsupport when faced with an overwhelming terror crisis,es taken directly from NATO’s Policy Guidelines onand NATO SOF should be that institution. And, NATOCounter-Terrorism.25 In comparison, AJP-3.5’s “Recordof Specific Reservations,” which essentially notesSOF must be adequately resourced so their CT capabildisagreements on the use of joint-doctrine terms byities meet partner-nation requirements. In the case ofpartner nations, is a full page and a half.26 AJP-3.5 does the Madrid bombers, requirements may have includedacknowledge that special operations can take placeadvanced explosive ordnance disposal personnel andas “part of Article 5 collective defense or non-Articleequipment, a determination of which units were mis5 crisis response operations to fulfill NATO’s threesion-ready, and transportation to Madrid.essential core tasks (collective defense, crisis manAnother challenge that will have to be addressed is theagement, and cooperative security),” but it does notabsence of NATO SOF CT minimum capability requiredefine any CT focus.27 It is self-evident that any of thements. AJP-3.5 provides the minimum capability requirethree NATO SOF principal missions could supportments for a number of NATO SOF elements, to includeor include a CT mission, but that is not sufficient forland and maritime units.31 These minimum capabilityrequirements include specialty skills such as “directingthe current (and increasing) threat. In the modernterminal guidance control of precision guided munitions”threat environment, CT needs to be a priority offor a land element and “opposed boarding operations” forNATO SOF. It is unlikely the NATO leadership hada maritime element.32 However, not one of the deploya direct-action raid against an IS cell in a suburb of aable NATO SOF structures comes with defined CTEuropean capital in mind when AJP-3.5 was drafted,MILITARY REVIEWJuly-August 201659

capabilities. In fact, there are no doctrinal minimumcapability requirements for NATO SOF CT in AJP-3.5.If a member state invoked Article 5 today and includeda requirement for CT support, that embattled nationwould likely receive a hodgepodge of CT capabilities.Estonian Maj. Margus Kuul, in “NATO SOFCountries’ Three Main Mission Sets: Direct Action,Special Reconnaissance, Military Assistance,” suggestsmost NATO SOF partners lack the resources to maintainSOF capabilities, including essential secondary capabilities such as maritime operations.33 The question shouldbe asked: What minimum capability requirementsare more valid in the current threat environment, CTrequirements such as hostage rescue and urban sniperor maritime skills such as “combat swimming operationusing closed circuit breathing apparatus with man-packexplosive devices?”34 The answer is beyond the scope ofthis review, but the question will have to be answered byNATO SOF leadership if CT becomes a principal mission in a resource-scarce environment.Kuul recommends “mapping the real capabilities” ofpartner state SOF units to determine specific needs.35A survey of preexisting NATO SOF CT capabilitieswould certainly pay dividends if CT were adopted asa principal mission. Prior to establishing minimumcapability requirements for NATO SOF CT, a NATOwide assessment of member-state training programsand doctrine should be conducted to find the mostefficient path for CT standardization and training forNATO SOF.Terrorism in Europe will continue to expand in thenear term, and, regardless of current NATO doctrineand politics, CT will grow in importance for NATO SOF.NATO SOF should not wait for the next terror crisis toinfluence politicians to force a change in CT doctrine.They should begin preparation for CT as a principalmission now if they want to be relevant when a memberstate invokes Article 5.Several steps should be taken in anticipation of aformal realignment of principal missions. First, conductan honest survey of CT capabilities across NATO SOFpartners. Second, begin a dialogue between partner stateson what supporting CT roles NATO SOF should, orcould, provide, following a single- or multi-state invocation of Article 5. Last, examine member-state SOF CTdoctrine to develop the best plan for the standardizationof training and resourcing the CT mission. In the spirit ofthe SOF adage, “Competent SOF cannot be created afteremergencies occur,” and neither can CT partnerships,doctrine, or mission capabilities.36Biography1st Lt. Matthew E. Miller is a U.S. Army Reserve military intelligence officer with the 5th Space Company, 1stSpace Battalion. His nineteen years of enlisted service include serving as a psychological operations team chief,2005–2006, in Baghdad, Iraq. He holds degrees from the University of California, San Diego, and the LondonSchool of Economics.NotesEpigraph. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary general, “DoorstepStatement,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) website, 1December 2015, accessed 1 December 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions 125358.htm.1. U.S. Department of State (DOS), “Terrorist Designations ofGroups Operating in Syria,” DOS website, 14 May 2014, accessed11 May 2016, m. DOS designates Islamic State a terrorist group. Other namesfor the group include Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria(ISIS), ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq wa-sh-Sham, Daesh, Dawla alIslamiya, and Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production.602. DOS, “What is NATO?” DOS website, accessed 11 May2016, ;(NATO), “Collective Defence-Article 5,” NATO website, lastmodified 22 March 2016, accessed 11 May 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 110496.htm. NATO is a political and military alliance of twenty-eight North Americanand European countries, bound by shared democratic values,that have joined to pursue security and defense based on the1949 NATO treaty. Article 5 of the treaty can be invoked by amember state to mobilize the forces of other member states forcollective defense measures.3. North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, accessed24 November 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official texts 17120.htm.July-August 2016MILITARY REVIEW

NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS4. Damien Sharkov, “Ex-NATO Chief Says Paris Attacks Qualifyfor Global Response, Should France Request It,” Newsweek website,17 November 2015, accessed, 24 November 2015, st-395410?piano t 1 (subscriptionrequired).5. NATO, “Collective Defense-Article 5.”6. Linda D. Kozaryn, “Rumsfeld Thanks NATO as AWACSPlanes Head Home,” American Forces Press Service, 2 May 2002,accessed 11 May 2016, d 44105.7. “Versatile Special Operations Forces for New Threats,” NATOwebsite, 22 May 2014, accessed 11 May 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news 111124.htm.8. Kevin Johnson, “Mumbai was Big Lesson in Paris-StyleAttack,” USA Today website, 22 November 2015, accessed 11May 2016, ai-p

NAO SPECIAL PERAIONS NATO Special Operations Forces, Counterterrorism, and the Resurgence of Terrorism in Europe 1st Lt. Matthew E. Miller, U.S. Army Reserve NATO Special Operations Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, provides training for allied and partner special operations forces to improve their interoperability.

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