INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAINERS CONCERNING LAW OF SELF

reasonable and bona fide to find self-defense); Perry v. U.S., 422 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and Ingev. U.S., 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (finding whether excessive force was used is determined byall the circumstances of the particular case); Brown v. U.S., 256 U.S. 335 (1921) (finding that claimof self-defense is not necessarily defeated because defendant, acting in heat of passion brought onby the assault, used more force than would have appeared reasonable to a calmer mind; if onereasonably believes s/he is in immediate danger of grievous bodily harm, deadly force may be usedin defending her/himself); U.S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (defining deadly force asforce capable of inflicting death or serious bodily harm).Cross references: Nos. 9.500–9.505, Self-defense—related instructions.Criminal Jury Instructions for DCCopyright 2014, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.7

-IX Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 9.502Instruction 9.502 SELF-DEFENSE—AMOUNT OF FORCE PERMISSIBLEWHERE APPEARANCES ARE FALSEA. NONDEADLY FORCEIf [name of defendant] actually and reasonably believes it is necessary to use force to preventimminent bodily harm to himself/herself, s/he may use a reasonable amount of force even thoughafterwards it turns out that the appearances were false.B. DEADLY FORCEIf [name of defendant] actually and reasonably believes that s/he is in imminent danger of death orserious bodily harm and that deadly force is necessary to repel such danger, s/he may use deadlyforce in self-defense. S/he may do so even though afterwards it turns out that the appearances werefalse because either [name of defendant] was not actually in imminent danger or deadly force wasnot necessary.Comment:This instruction should be given when there is evidence that the appearances on which thedefendant claims prompted actions in self-defense were false. See Fersner v. U.S., 482 A.2d 387,391 (D.C. 1984) (quoting the instruction and noting “Indeed, the [defendant’s] personal perceptionsare so significant that they may justify the use of reasonable, including deadly, force in self-defense ”). See also Jackson v. U.S., 645 A.2d 1099, 1102 (D.C. 1994) (instruction should have beengiven in case where evidence that complainant pulled out a black object that may not have been agun but that defendant could have mistaken for one). Cf. Alcindore v. U.S., 818 A.2d 152, 157 (D.C.2003). Part A of the instruction is to be given where the defendant is charged with an offenseinvolving the exercise of non-deadly force. Part B should be given where the defendant is chargedwith homicide, or an assault with intent or attempt to exercise deadly force. See Perkins, CriminalLaw, pp. 993–96 (1969 ed.). This instruction may also be given where there is controverted evidenceof danger to the defendant. Sloan v. U.S., 527 A.2d 1277 (D.C. 1987). See generally U.S. v.Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (summarizing at length the defense of self-defense).8

Cross references: Nos. 9.500–9.505, Self-Defense—related instructions.Criminal Jury Instructions for DCCopyright 2014, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.9

-IX Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 9.502Instruction 9.502 SELF-DEFENSE—AMOUNT OF FORCE PERMISSIBLEWHERE APPEARANCES ARE FALSEA. NONDEADLY FORCEIf [name of defendant] actually and reasonably believes it is necessary to use force to preventimminent bodily harm to himself/herself, s/he may use a reasonable amount of force even thoughafterwards it turns out that the appearances were false.B. DEADLY FORCEIf [name of defendant] actually and reasonably believes that s/he is in imminent danger of death orserious bodily harm and that deadly force is necessary to repel such danger, s/he may use deadlyforce in self-defense. S/he may do so even though afterwards it turns out that the appearances werefalse because either [name of defendant] was not actually in imminent danger or deadly force wasnot necessary.Comment:This instruction should be given when there is evidence that the appearances on which thedefendant claims prompted actions in self-defense were false. See Fersner v. U.S., 482 A.2d 387,391 (D.C. 1984) (quoting the instruction and noting “Indeed, the [defendant’s] personal perceptionsare so significant that they may justify the use of reasonable, including deadly, force in self-defense ”). See also Jackson v. U.S., 645 A.2d 1099, 1102 (D.C. 1994) (instruction should have beengiven in case where evidence that complainant pulled out a black object that may not have been agun but that defendant could have mistaken for one). Cf. Alcindore v. U.S., 818 A.2d 152, 157 (D.C.2003). Part A of the instruction is to be given where the defendant is charged with an offenseinvolving the exercise of non-deadly force. Part B should be given where the defendant is chargedwith homicide, or an assault with intent or attempt to exercise deadly force. See Perkins, CriminalLaw, pp. 993–96 (1969 ed.). This instruction may also be given where there is controverted evidenceof danger to the defendant. Sloan v. U.S., 527 A.2d 1277 (D.C. 1987). See generally U.S. v.Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (summarizing at length the defense of self-defense).10

Cross references: Nos. 9.500–9.505, Self-Defense—related instructions.Criminal Jury Instructions for DCCopyright 2014, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.11

1-IX Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 9.503Instruction 9.503 SELF-DEFENSE—NO DUTY TO RETREAT BEFOREUSING DEADLY FORCEThe law does not require a person to retreat or consider retreating when s/he actually andreasonably believes that s/he is in danger of death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force isnecessary to repel that danger. But the law does say that a person should take reasonable steps,such as stepping back or walking away, to avoid the necessity of taking a human life, so long asthose steps are consistent with the person’s own safety. In deciding whether [name of defendant]acted reasonably, you should therefore consider whether s/he could have taken those steps,consistent with his/her own safety.Comment:This instruction represents the “middle ground” between “the right to stand and kill, and the duty toretreat to the wall before killing,” Gillis v. U.S., 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979), and may be given“when there is a truly relevant question as to whether a defendant could have safely retreated.”Broadie v. U.S., 925 A.2d 605, 621 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation omitted).This instruction should be given in any case in which the jury could reasonably find that thedefendant used deadly force. For a definition of deadly force, see Instruction No. 5.13. See generallyAlcindore v. U.S., 818 A.2d 152 (D.C. 2003) (recognizing that under D.C. law, “the actor’s ‘subjectiveperceptions are the prime determinant of the right to use force—and the degree of force required—inself-defense, subject only to the constraints that those perceptions be reasonable under thecircumstances.’ ” (citing Fersner v. U.S., 482 A.2d 387, 391–92 (D.C. 1984)); Laney, supra(suggesting no duty to retreat if defendant is “assailed in a place where he has a right to be, unlessby so doing an affray can be clearly avoided[,]” even to the point of taking life if necessary); Marshallv. U.S., 45 App. D.C. 373 (1916) (“The right of a defendant when in imminent danger to take lifedoes not depend upon whether there was an opportunity to escape.”); Grant v. U.S., 734 A.2d 174(D.C. 1999) (finding that it was proper for prosecution to inquire on cross-examination as to whydefendant did not continue flight or retreat, once it had started); U.S. v. Bush, 416 F.2d 823 (D.C.Cir. 1969) (jury could not find that accused had exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense when hebacked into a wall and the assailant kept coming at him); Perkins, Criminal Law, pp. 993–96 (196912

ed.); Model Penal Code § 3.11 (2001); 2 Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,§ 41.21, 234–35 (3d ed. 1977) (citing previous version of this instruction at p. 234).Where defendant is in his own home or on his own property, it may be necessary for the court todraft an additional instruction to incorporate the “castle doctrine.” See generally Smith v. U.S., 686A.2d 537 (D.C. 1996) (declining to decide whether the “castle doctrine” applies when one is attackedin his home, through no fault of his own, by an invitee whose invitation has been withdrawn; failure toso instruct not plain error; jury may consider a failure to retreat, together with all othercircumstances, in determining if there was a case of true self-defense); Cooper v. U.S., 512 A.2d1002 (D.C. 1986) (holding that the “castle doctrine” does not apply in the circumstance of an attackfrom a co-occupant in one’s own home).The court may also wish to modify the instruction that the jury should consider whether thedefendant could have retreated without compromising the safety of any other person in a casewhere the defendant claims to have acted in reasonable belief that another person is in danger ofdeath or serious bodily harm. Cf. Broadie, 925 A.2d at 621.Cross references: Nos. 9.500–9.505, Self-defense—related instructions.Criminal Jury Instructions for DCCopyright 2014, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.13

Instruction 9.504 SELF-DEFENSE—WHERE DEFENDANT MIGHT HAVEBEEN THE AGGRESSORA. MERE WORDS NOT PROVOCATIONIf you find that [name of defendant] [was the aggressor] [or] [provoked the conflict uponhimself/herself], s/he cannot rely upon the right of self-defense to justify his/her use of force. [Onewho deliberately puts himself/herself in a position where s/he has reason to believe that his/herpresence will provoke trouble cannot claim self-defense.] Mere words without more by [name ofdefendant], however, do not constitute [aggression] [or] [provocation].B. NONDEADLY FORCE WHERE DEFENDANT WITHDRAWSIf you find that [name of defendant] [was the aggressor] [or] [provoked the assault uponhimself/herself], s/he cannot rely upon the right of self-defense to justify the use of force. However, ifone who [is the aggressor] [or] [provokes a conflict] later withdraws from it in good faith, andcommunicates that withdrawal by words or actions, s/he may use reasonable force to savehimself/herself from imminent bodily harm.C. DEADLY FORCE WHERE DEFENDANT WITHDRAWSIf you find that [name of defendant] [was the aggressor] [or] [provoked the assault uponhimself/herself], s/he cannot invoke the right of self-defense to justify his/her use of force. However,if one who [is the aggressor] [or] [provokes a conflict] later withdraws from it in good faith, andcommunicates that withdrawal by words or actions, s/he may use deadly force to savehimself/herself from imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.Comment:Where some evidence is introduced that the defendant might have been the attacker or provokedthe assault by the complainant/decedent, Part A of this instruction should be given, and Part B orPart C should follow, depending on whether the defendant is charged with an offense involving theexercise of nondeadly force (B) or deadly force (C). See U.S. v. Grover, 485 F.2d 1039,1041–42(D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding that trial court’s refusal to give instruction was within its discretion where noevidence proffered showing defendant’s good faith effort to retreat); U.S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d1222, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reaffirming principle that self-defense is available as defense toaggressor only if he communicates to his adversary his intent to withdraw and makes a good faithattempt to do so); Rowe v. U.S., 370 F.2d 240, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“Self-defense may not be14

claimed by one who deliberately places himself in a position where he has reason to believe hispresence would provoke trouble.”); Harris v. U.S., 364 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“One cannotprovoke fight and then rely on claim of self-defense when such provocation results in counterattackunless he has previously withdrawn from fray and communicated such withdrawal.”); Laney v. U.S.,294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (finding that charging on the law of self-defense not warrantedwhere defendant voluntarily re-entered the fray after escaping to safety); Perkins, Criminal Law, pp.1129–33 (1982).The Committee has bracketed language referring to an aggressor and one who provokes the assaultto indicate that aggression and provocation are distinct legal theories under D.C. law and there willbe times when it is not appropriate to instruct on both. See Rorie v. U.S., 882 A.2d 763, 771 (D.C.2005) (discussing charge “relating to the defendant as ‘the aggressor’ or the defendant as theperson who ‘provoked the conflict upon himself,’ ”); Swann v. U.S., 648 A.2d 928, 930 n. 7(D.C.1994) (“a defendant cannot claim self-defense if ‘the defendant was the aggressor, or if s/heprovoked the conflict upon himself/herself.’ ”). Compare, e.g., Sams v. U.S., 721 A.2d 945, 953 (D.C.1998) (discussing provocation doctrine), with U.S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(holding that “an affirmative unlawful act reasonably calculated to produce an affray forebodinginjurious or fatal consequences is an aggression which, unless renounced, nullifies the right ofhomicidal self-defense”); cf. Kleinbart v. U.S., 426 A.2d 343, 357 (D.C. 1981) (equating “aggressor”and “attacker”), mandate recalled on other grounds, 553 A.2d 1236 (1989). As to the availability ofself-defense to a person who is the aggressor or who deliberately puts himself or herself in aposition where he or she has reason to believe his or her presence will provoke trouble, see Sams v.U.S., 721 A.2d 945, 953 (D.C. 1998) (finding that case law from Laney to Howard v. U.S., 656 A.2d1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995), makes clear that self-defense is not available to a defendant whodeliberately puts himself in a position where he has reason to believe that his presence will provoketrouble, even if his purpose in putting himself in that position was benign); Howard v. U.S., 656 A.2d1106 (D.C. 1995) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on self-defense whereevidence showed that defendants had deliberately placed themselves in a position where they havereason to believe that their presence would provoke trouble); Martin v. U.S., 452 A.2d 360, 363 (D.C.1982) (holding that self-defense could not be invoked unless jury found that defendant’s first slap ofvictim was an exercise of reasonable discipline, not aggression); Mitchell v. U.S., 399 A.2d 866, 869(D.C. 1979) (finding against defendant’s claim of self-defense where defendant followed victim intothe street, placing himself in a position reasonably calculated to provoke trouble); Nowlin v. U.S.,382 A.2d 9, 14 n. 7 (D.C. 1978) (“[A]ppellant had no legitimate claim to the defense of self-defense,since he had voluntarily placed himself in a position which he could reasonably expect would result15

in violence.”); U.S. v. Taylor, 510 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that defendant could notclaim self-defense, since his pursuit of a third party created deceased’s pursuit of him as an officer ofthe law). See also Bedney v. U.S., 471 A.2d 1022, 1023–24 (D.C. 1984) (approving trial court’s useof instruction 5.17(D)). But see Rorie v. U.S., 882 A.2d 763 (D.C. 2005) (holding that there wasinadequate evidentiary basis for giving aggressor or provocation instruction).The fact that a defendant may have been an aggressor at an earlier point in time does not by itselfrule out a defense of self-defense. Rorie, 882 A.2d at 772 (“Thus, the fact that a defendant may havebeen an aggressor or a provocateur at an earlier point in time, does not by itself rule out a defenseof self-defense.”); Grover, 485 F.2d at 1043. If there is evidence of a “disengagement” due to thepassage of time, and “[t]he effect of the disengagement of the parties and the passage of time restore[s] them to the status quo ante.” Id. At that point, “any disability on [the defendant] because ofhis prior aggression [is] lifted, and he [is] able to defend himself against any subsequent attack.” Id.See also Rorie v. U.S., 882 A.2d 763 (D.C. 2005) (holding court’s sua sponte giving of Instruction5.16 constituted reversible error when evidence did not justify giving the “first aggressor” orprovocation instruction).As to the availability of the defense to the aggressor who effectively disengages in good faith froman altercation and communicates that intent to withdraw to his or her opponent, see generallyPeterson, 483 F.2d at 1231; Harris, 364 F.2d at 702; Parker v. U.S., 158 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Cir.1946) (finding that trial court properly instructed about aggressor’s right to claim self-defense if hewithdrew in good faith); Rowe v. U.S., 164 U.S. 546 (1896) (holding that the right to self-defense isrestored to the aggressor if he withdraws in good faith from further contest).Cross references: Nos. 9.500–9.505, Self-Defense—related instructions.Criminal Jury Instructions for DCCopyright 2014, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.16

Instruction 9.505 SELF-DEFENSE—PAST VIOLENCE BY COMPLAINANTOR DECEDENTA. DEFENDANT WAS AWARE [Applicable in D.C. Superior Court and U.S. District Court]1. Complainant’s or Decedent’s Specific Acts of ViolenceYou have heard evidence about past acts of violence by [name of complainant] [name of decedent]and that [name of defendant] knew about those past acts. You may consider such evidence asbearing on the reasonableness of [name of defendant]’s fear for his/her own safety.2. Complainant’s or Decedent’s ReputationYou have heard evidence that [name of complainant] [name of decedent] had a general reputationfor violence and that [name of defendant] knew about that reputation. You may consider suchevidence as bearing on the reasonableness of [name of defendant]’s fear for his/her own safety.B. DECEDENT’S CHARACTER FOR VIOLENCE REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT’SAWARENESS [Applicable Only in Homicide C

Self-defense is a defense to the charges of [ insert all charges to which self -defense applies]. [Name of defendant] is not required to prove that s/he acted in self -defense. Where evidence of self - defense is present, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [ name of defendant] did n