An Economic Analysis Of Fiscal Federalism In Ethiopia
An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in EthiopiaAbu Girma Moges*Abstract: Fiscal federalism is a process of redistribution of fiscal decision-making power in an effort toimprove the performance of the public sector in resource mobilization, efficient resource allocation and inthe process enabling the economy achieve fast and sustainable economic growth. This paper addressesthe economic rationale, implications and concerns of pursuing fiscal federalism in a poor country and ina political environment of ethnic federalism. The main findings suggest that when fiscal decentralizationis exercised with high horizontal and vertical imbalances, it fails to diversify public output in line with thepreferences and priorities of local population and to internalize the decisions of regional governmentswithin their own jurisdictions. This in turn encourages the prevalence of big and yet weak governmentthat extracts resources and fails to allocate for the purpose of sustainable and shared economic growth.Key Concepts: Fiscal federalism, vertical and horizontal imbalances, federal grants,ethnic federalism, economic growth, poverty.JEL Classification: E62, H11, H711. IntroductionA growing number of countries have adopted fiscal federalism in an effort toimprove the performance of their public sector. The underlying theme of the reforms isrestructuring the public sector and improving its efficiency. In the context of fiscalpolicy, the reforms entailed decisions in identifying the optimal distribution of functionsand powers between the federal and sub-national governments. This process introducesspecialization of functions and changing the very relationship between the governmentand the citizen-voters in important ways.Fiscal federalism can essentially be described as the choice and distribution offiscal decision-making power across multi-leveled governments. The adoption of fiscaldecentralization in most countries has taken a clear departure from their practice ofcentralized fiscal system within a unitary political regime. The failure of the centralized*The author would like to express his thanks to Dr. Befekadu Degefe and participants of the EAFInternational Symposium on Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia for comments andsuggestions on an earlier version of the paper and Ato Fantahun Belew for providing detailed data onfiscal variables. The usual disclaimer applies. Correspondence: abu girma@hotmail.com
Abu G.M.: An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopiasystem of economic and political administration is one of the forces behind thetemptation of a number of countries to experiment with the decentralization of bothpolitical and fiscal power (Tanzi, 1996). In some cases, fiscal decentralization followedthe political imperative of establishing federal political structure. However, fiscaldecentralization might involve significant economic cost and inefficiency in resourceutilization when decentralization is exercised before local capacity is developed. Afterall, partial decentralization may not necessarily bring improved governance andaccountability to the people at the grass root level that responds to local priorities andpreferences.Fiscal federalism in Ethiopia, the subject matter of this paper, has been adoptedwithin a unique political landscape of ethnic federalism. The TPLF-led government thatreplaced the Dergue has redrawn the political map of the country and adopted ethnicbased federal structure of government. This experiment has been formalized in the 1994Constitution. However, the constitutional provisions operate with political centralismthat has remained to be the distinguishing feature of the current political system.The theme of this article is that fiscal federalism in the context of ethnicpolitics and de facto political centralization continue to hamper the realization of theeconomic potentials of the country and hence constrains efforts to address coreeconomic problems. We address how and to what extent the policy and practice of fiscalfederalism in the country has affected fiscal discipline, resource allocation, andefficiency of resource utilization as well as growth performance of sectors in theeconomy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews themain strands of the theory of fiscal federalism and develops an economic argument onissues of fiscal federalism, section three reviews the fiscal system of Ethiopia andsection four addresses the issues involved in the practice of fiscal federalism in Ethiopiaand their implications on fiscal performance. The final section draws concludingremarks and highlights areas for policy actions.2. The Theory of Fiscal FederalismFederalism is a system in which the lower levels of government are representedin the central government and its institutions. Pursing the federal structure involves bothdecentralization of decision-making power and representation of regional units at thenational level. This process influences the allocation and distribution of economic2
Abu G.M.: An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopiaresources across regions and economic agents.Fiscal federalism derives its nature and characteristics from constitutionalprovisions as well as the state of economic development, the pattern of income andresource distribution, and the institutional capacity of the system. The constitutionalprovisions define the framework within which decision-making would be exercisedand establishes the vertical and horizontal structures that find meaning within theprevailing socio-economic environment of the system. The vertical structure defines theassignment of fiscal decision-making power between the federal and lower tiers ofgovernment. The horizontal structure outlines the nature of interaction across crosssections of government levels. This aspect addresses how regional governments interactto each other especially when there are externalities and spillovers.The main economic rationale behind fiscal decentralization is improvingefficiency of public resource utilization, creating enabling environment for privatesector development and the growth of the national economy. The theory of fiscalfederalism addresses three issues related to fiscal decision-making: assignment ofresponsibilities and functions between the federal government and the regionalgovernments, the assignment of taxation power and the design of inter-governmentaltransfer (subsidy) of fiscal resources coupled with provisions about the borrowingwindows to sub-national governments. These factors give rise to a third issue of therelative size of the public sector in the national economy. It is therefore the dynamics ofthese processes and public policy choices that ultimately shapes the performance of thefiscal sector and its impact on the national economy.2.1. Fiscal Function Assignment IssuesAn important aspect of the exercise of fiscal federalism is the assignment offiscal functions to the federal and the sub-national governments and the appropriatemeans of financing these responsibilities. The theory of fiscal federalism does notprovide a clear-cut separation of fiscal responsibilities that would promote economicefficiency and resource distribution. The broad thrust of normative theory is thatexpenditure responsibilities in areas of macroeconomic stabilization and redistributionfunctions should remain within the domain of the federal government whereasallocation functions should be assigned to lower levels of government (Oates, 1999;Shah, 1999; Musgrave, 1983). The argument is based on the reasoning that lower levels3
Abu G.M.: An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopiaof government have limited capacity and policy instruments to provide stabilization andredistribution functions. Due to the nature of the responsibilities, the federalgovernment usually assumes macroeconomic stabilization and income redistributionfunctions and make sure that regional governments would not take measures that are notcompatible with such functions. Moreover, there are functions such as national defenseand foreign affairs that have national public good character and hence usually assignedto the central government.Fiscal decentralization and the assignment of functions can generate economicefficiency of the public sector. If preferences are heterogeneous across jurisdictions,which is most likely the case, decentralized decision-making power as to the provisionof local public goods and services improves efficiency by tailoring services to thepreferences of the local population. The main argument is that local governments arecloser to the local population and can identify their choice and preferences better thanthe central government. Accordingly, when the decision to provide a bundle of publicgoods is made by local officials and these officials are directly accountable to the localvoters, there is an incentive for the local public officials to provide services that reflectthe preferences of the local population. Moreover, as long as there is close relationbetween the benefits from public services and taxes on the local taxpayers, there isadditional incentive to utilize resources efficiently and cost effectively. At least byimplication, the theory recognizes the need for local authorities to exercise choice in theprovision of public services that are of higher local demand instead of resorting to theunitary solution. The decentralization theorem suggests that, under such conditions,decentralization of fiscal decision-making can improve efficiency of the public sectorand the welfare of the local population.Once the allocation of expenditure responsibilities is conducted according tosuch broad principles, the fiscal system needs to address the issue of assigning taxingpower that broadly identifies who should tax, where and what (Musgrave, 1983). Theimposition of taxes, in the absence of lump-sum source of taxation, always involves acertain degree of economic inefficiency. In the context of fiscal federalism, theassignment process needs to identify the comparative efficiency and effectiveness ofproviding the fiscal instruments to the multi-tier decision-making centers so as tofinance public functions and activities in the most efficient manner possible.What kind of taxes should be assigned to the federal government and whichshould be assigned to the local governments? The theory and practice in the assignment4
Abu G.M.: An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopiaof taxation power identifies the following main criteria in assignment process: taxes onmobile tax bases, redistributive taxes, taxes that could easily be exported to otherjurisdictions, taxes on unevenly distributed tax bases, taxes that have large cyclicalfluctuations, and taxes that involve considerable economies of scale in taxadministration should be assigned to the national or federal government (Sobel, 1997;Musgrave, 1983; Tanzi and Zee, 2000, Oates, 1996). There are efficiency and equityconsiderations behind such principle of tax assignment.The assignment of taxing power between the federal and the regionalgovernments and the provision for concurrent power to share establishes the basic linkin which the behavior of one of the parties would influence the decision making powerof the other and its effective tax base. There is a possibility for vertical tax externalitythat might require additional policy instruments to correct their effect on other levels ofgovernment (Keen, 1998). When there are clear cases in which vertical tax externalitiesare prevalent, the tension between the federal and the state governments would arise.This in turn would require mechanisms for the assignment of taxing power and revenuebased on the nature and characteristics of the tax base.The assignment of taxing power is a thorny issue in fiscal policy and itsapplication is influenced by a number of considerations. First, despite the legislativeassignment of taxes, the actual potency of the tax network depends on the nature anddevelopment of the national economy, the relative distribution of economic activitiesacross jurisdictions, and the administrative efficiency of the taxation system. Second,the practice of fiscal federalism, especially when citizens across regions with diverseeconomic and demographic situations are treated unequally, gives rise to the violationof one of the core principles of horizontal fiscal equity. Moreover, fiscaldecentralization might also potentially breach the principle of vertical fiscal equity bynot treating taxpayers with different capacity to pay differently. Third, despite themonopoly of taxing power resides at the disposal of the government, the reach of thetaxation network depends on the economic circumstances of the potential taxpayers.2.2. Fiscal Imbalances and Intergovernmental TransfersThe distribution of the tax base and the demand for public goods and servicesdoes not follow symmetrical pattern and this gives rise to the emergence of fiscalimbalances. A number of reasons, both economic and social, contribute to the mismatch5
Abu G.M.: An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopiabetween the expenditure responsibilities and the capacity of the lower levels ofgovernment to raise sufficient revenue to finance their expenditure. Vertical fiscalimbalances are the result of allocation of functions the cost of provision of which ishigher than the sources of revenue assigned to local governments. This indicates thecase in which the level of revenue source decentralization is lower than thedecentralization of expenditure responsibilities. Horizontal fiscal imbalance emergesusually as a result of concentration of tax bases due to uneven distribution of economicresources and economic activity across regions whereas expenditure requirements arespread more evenly.The problems of fiscal imbalances require measures that include the provisionof subsidies as well as policies that promote balanced growth of regional economies.The process of changing the taxation base of regional economies is slow and requiresconsistent policies that address the underlying sources of inequalities across regionaleconomies. Inter-governmental transfers or grant systems, however, might generatetheir own problems of the commons. When vertical fiscal imbalance is significant andlocal governments depend excessively on the federal fiscal grants, their fiscal autonomywould be compromised. Moreover, local government officials and the population wouldhave the incentive to maximize their federal grant receipts as long as they do notproportionately share the burden of taxation. Where local governments do not bear thecost of their spending decisions, there are incentives for local governments to expandtheir budget beyond their means and this behavior is prevalent when the benefits areconcentrated whereas the cost of financing such benefits is drawn from the commonpool.Inter-governmental fiscal transfers involve two main decisions even if mostfederal systems pursue different approaches. The federal government needs to decide onthe aggregate pool of federal grants and then the pool has to be distributed among therespective lower sub-national governments. The federal government can decide on thesize of the federal grant pool based on certain parameters or on some ad hocmechanisms. Once the pool of federal grants is decided, the distribution of such grantsacross regions or local levels of government follows a number of possibilities. Thefederal government may exercise discretionary decisions to distribute such resources.However, the risk of such discretionary exercise is that allocation might be influencedby political considerations instead of real need for assistance at the local levels. Themost conventional way is the use of some grant distribution formula that takes into6
Abu G.M.: An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopiaaccount indicators of needs and other factors at the sub-national government levels.2.3. Decentralization and the size of the governmentThe appropriate role and relative size of government in national economies arecontroversial political economy issues. The actual size of government in nationaleconomies is influenced by a number of economic, social, and political factors (Loweryand Berry, 1987; Rodrik, 1996). The normative argument about the proper size ofgovernment is also influenced by a wave of development thinking of the day.One distinctive feature of the issue, however, has been the phenomenal shift inpolicy thinking about the role of the government in economic development. In much ofthe first half of the 20th Century, government was considered the main force to bringabout economic development and transformation especially in the underdevelopedcountries. This line of thinking was confronted with criticism when government failurebecame pervasive. By the 1980s, the widely held view among global policy makers andacademics was that big government was the problem rather than the solution in theeffort of countries to bring about economic development. Accordingly, the 1980s and1990s witnessed policy prescriptions that attempted to reduce the size of thegovernment in national economies.In the current post-Washington-Consensus era, the pendulum of policythinking seems swinging with a more pragmatic tone. The prevailing argument is thatsmart and strong government and market forces can have a dynamically changingrelation in which developmental governments play a critical role in investment, humancapital formation, technology promotion, and institutional building without hamperingthe forces of the market in the system.Does fiscal decentralization have influence on the size of the government? Therelation between fiscal decentralization and the relative size of the public sector innational economies is not clearly established (Ehadie, 1994; Grossman, 1989). Thepublic finance theory identifies forces that shape the extent of government interventionin a national economy. These forces include market failure, imperfect information,incomplete market, externalities, public goods and significant unemployment ofresources. The extent to which these forces prevail in a system influences and shapesthe relative size of government intervention in the economy. The possible impact of the7
Abu G.M.: An Economic Analysis of Fiscal Federalism in Ethiopiaprocess of fiscal decentralization on the overall size of the public sector is moderatedthrough a number of factors such as the political institutions, the extent to which thecost of providing public services is internalized at local levels, ideological position ofthe government in power, and the autonomy of local governments.As we argued earlier, the process of fiscal decentralization can potentiallyimprove efficiency in the provision of public goods by identifying the preferences oflocal population and internalize the cost within the same jurisdiction. When politicalinstitutions enforce accountability and local officials are responsible to the localconstituency, there is incentive for decision makers to achieve goals that are in line withthe preferences of the local population. The internalization of the cost of public serviceprovision would provide extra incentive to discipline fiscal decisions and operate withinhard budget constraint. If the expenditure choice of local governments is linked totaxation on the local population, there would be strong reason to maintain fiscaldiscipline and operate towards a smaller and efficient government size. However, aslong as the benefits from provision of local public services accrue to those who are notpaying for the cost of such provisions, there is a tendency for excessive demand andincrease in the size of the government. This might lead to the expansion of the publicsector without a correspondingly positive effect on the performance of the nationaleconomy.3. Features of the Ethiopian Fiscal SystemThe f
the practice of fiscal federalism, especially when citizens across regions with diverse economic and demographic situations are treated unequally, gives rise to the violation of one of the core principles of horizontal fiscal equity. Moreover, fiscal .
Chapter 15: Fiscal Policy The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Real GDP and the Price Level Expansionary and Contractionary Fiscal Policy Figure 15-5. Fiscal Policy. Explain how fiscal policy affects aggregate demand and how the government can use fiscal policy to stabilize the economy. In
3.0 SUMMARY OF FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS As noted in Section 1.0, this analysis summarizes the existing conditions and the fiscal and economic impacts that are associated with the construction and annual operations of the 411,000 SF industrial development at Spagnoli Road. Fiscal impacts include the generation of
1.8-1.9 Is the library now reporting on a different fiscal year than it reported on in the previous Annual Report? – If the library's fiscal year has changed please answer this question accordingly and contact your library system. 1.11-1.12 Beginning Local Fiscal Year and Ending Local Fiscal Year-Beginning Local Fiscal Year (operating year) and Ending Local Fiscal Year (operating year) –
Economic Impact Analysis offers an overview of the statewide economic impact analysis process and the spending associated with NJHMFA’s project investments, and presents the results of HR&A’s economic impact analysis. Section IV. Fiscal Impact Analysis identifies the different State and local taxes examined by this study and presents
Fiscal Policy: Economic Effects. Fiscal policy describes changes to government spending and revenue behavior in an effort to influence the economy. By adjusting its level of spending and tax revenue, the government can affect economic outcomes by either increasing or decreasing economic activity. For example, when the government runs a budget .
Traditional, Command, Market 3. The former Soviet Union was an example of what kind of economic system? Command 4. Which economic system allows for the most individual freedom? Market 5. In which economic system does the government have the most control? Command 6. In which economic system do individuals do things based on customs & beliefs .File Size: 3MBPage Count: 55Explore furthertypes of economic systems worksheet answer key pdflaspalmasbr.comTypes Of Economic Systems Worksheet Pdf - worksheetnovenalunasolitaria.blogspot.c Types of Economic Systems Worksheet PDF Economic .www.scribd.comCommand, traditional, and market economiesdsfepf2015.weebly.comTypes of Economic Systems Worksheet.pdf - Name: Date .www.coursehero.comRecommended to you b
Fiscal Year (operating year) and Ending Local Fiscal Year (operating year) – Enter the beginning and ending dates of the library's local fiscal year, even if they are the same as the fiscal reporting year indicated in Questions 1.6 and 1.7. (For example, a school district library's local fiscal year may be July 1 – June 30, but the library .
Waves API 550 User Manual - 3 - 1.2 Product Overview . The Waves API 550 consists of the API 550A, a 3-Band parametric equalizer with 5 fixed cutoff points per band and the API 550B, a 4-Band parametric equalizer with 7 fixed cutoff points per band. Modeled on the late 1960’s legend, the API 550A EQ delivers a sound that has been a hallmark of high end studios for decades. It provides .
