An Ultra-lightweight RFID Seeking Protocol For Low-cost Tags
Applied Mathematical Sciences, Vol. 8, 2014, no. 125, 6245 - 6255HIKARI Ltd, 4.48664An Ultra-lightweight RFID SeekingProtocol for Low-cost TagsIl-Soo JeonSchool of Electronic Engineering, Kumoh National Institute of Technology,77 Sanho-Ro, Yangho-Dong, Gumi, Kyungsangpuk-Do 730-701, KoreaEun-Jun Yoon*Department of Cyber Security, Kyungil University,33 Buho-Ri, Hayang-Ub, Kyungsan-Si, Kyungsangpuk-Do 712-701, KoreaCopyright 2014 Il-Soo Jeon and Eun-Jun Yoon. This is an open access article distributedunder the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, andreproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.AbstractRFID systems are widely used in various applications, and attaching RFID tagsto objects are increasing. Recently, Xie et al. defined RFID seeking concept whichis finding a lost tag in a blind spot or a specified tag among lots of similar onesand proposed a lightweight RFID seeking protocol. Their protocol providessecurity and privacy against most of common malicious attacks. However, sincethe protocol uses one-way hash functions to meet the requirement of the securityand privacy problems, it is hard to be implemented in the low-cost passive RFIDtags which have very constrained resources. Also, the protocol is vulnerable to thereader compromise attacks. Therefore, we propose an Ultra-lightweight RFIDseeking protocol that can resolve the flaws of Xie et al.βs protocol. The proposedprotocol uses Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) and XOR operations inthe tags. Since EPC C1G2 standard supports PRNG, the proposed protocol can beeasily implemented in the low-cost passive tags compliant with the standard.Keywords: RFID Seeking, Ultra-lightweight Seeking Protocol, Low-cost passiveRFID Tags*Corresponding author
6246Il-Soo Jeon and Eun-Jun Yoon1 IntroductionRadio Frequency Identification (RFID) enables objects to be identifiedautomatically by using radio signals. The applications of RFID technology areincreasing day by day such as inventory control, supply chain management,access control, smart labels, natural habitat monitoring, etc. RFID systems areusually consisted of three components: tags, readers, and a backend server.Identifying objects using RFID system is that tags having their unique IDs areattached to objects, and readers read the tag ID and identify it by using the storedinformation in the backend server. It is assumed that the communications betweenthe reader and the backend server are secure. However, since the communicationsbetween the reader and each tag performed through wireless channel, they arevulnerable to the various security attacks and privacy invasions. Therefore, wehave to cope with the security and privacy problems when developingapplications of RFID system.RFID tags are generally divided into three types: active tags, passive tags, andsemi-active tags [1,2]. Active tags have their own battery, but passive tags haveno battery in them and can get the power from the radio signal by the reader. Thecharacteristics of passive tags are to have very limited hardware resources, cheapprice, and to be applied to various applications. Semi-active tags have their ownbattery, but the battery is only used to operate their internal circuits not tocommunicate.Recently, Xie et al. defined RFID seeking concept which is finding a lost tag ina blind spot or a specified tag among lots of similar ones and proposed a seekingprotocol [3]. They showed that their protocol is safe from the common securityattacks. The protocol also supports server-less and privacy-friendly to both thereader and the tags. There are researches that are similar to the RFID seekingproblem such as RFID searching problem [4-10] and RFID monitoring problem[11-14]. RFID searching is to find a particular tag among a group of tags, andRFID Monitoring is to detect the missing of tagged items [3].Xie et al. insists that their protocol is lightweight. However, since hashfunctions are used in their protocol, it is difficult to be implemented for thelow-cost passive tags which have extremely constrained resources. Therefore, inthis paper, we propose an ultra-lightweight RFID seeking protocol that does notuse hash functions. The proposed protocol uses Pseudo Random NumberGenerator (PRNG) and XOR operations in the tags. Since EPC C1G2 standardincludes PRNG, the proposed protocol can be easily implemented in the low-costpassive tags compliant with the standard.The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, weintroduce related work and preliminaries. In section 3, we describe the presentedRFID seeking protocol, then the security and performance analysis of theproposed protocol is discussed in section 4. Finally, the conclusion is given insection 5.
Ultra-lightweight RFID seeking protocol62472 Related Work and PreliminariesIn this section, we introduce Xie et al.βs seeking protocol [3] as a relatedresearch. They presented two application examples of RFID seeking scenario.One application scenario is to find a lost item in a blind spot like a secludedcorner. Suppose a lady lost an expensive necklace in her way home. The necklacehad been tagged with a tag-controlled indicator, which would generate sound/lightalarms once the tag was activated. The lady had a PDA embedded with an RFIDreader. She walked back along her track, holding the PDA to seek the necklace.When she was near the necklace, the tag was activated by the reader. And then,the tag-controlled indicator started an alarm via buzzing/flashing, guided the ladyto find the lost necklace in bushes. The other application scenario is to find aspecific tagged item among a mass of similar ones. Imagine that a postman wasdelivering lots of postal packages within a city. For each receiver, the postmanneeded to pick a specified package among similar others. If all packages had beentagged with tag-controlled indicators, the postman was able to seek a specificpackage by using his PDA embedded with an RFID reader i.e. after inputting areceiver's ID, the corresponding tag is activated, and the tag-controlled indicatorstarts buzzing/flashing, leading the postman to find the right package quickly [3].Table 1. Notations used in Xie et al.βs protocolNotationπ π , π β²ππ , ππ , π β²ππ , π1 , π1β² , π3ππ , π2 , οΏ½οΏ½πΆπ‘πππ»()ππ ππΊ() DescriptionIdentifiers of readersIdentifiers of tagsRandom number generated by a readerRandom number generated by a tagRandom number with bit length LSecret of the tag ππControlling state of ππAccess list downloaded by the reader π π from a certificate agencyCounter of ππHash functionPseudo Random Number GeneratorXOR operatorString concatenation operatorMessage transmissionAssume an RFID system that consist of a set of readers π {π 1 , π 2 , , π π }and a set of tags π {π1 , π2 , , ππ }. Each tag has a binary state value S whichcontrols a corresponding attached indicator. If the value of S is changed from 0 to1, the indicator will be activated to generate sound/light alarm viabuzzing/flashing. Each tag will also have its ID, a secret key. To describe protocoleasily in this paper, some notations are used and summarized in Table 1.
6248Il-Soo Jeon and Eun-Jun YoonXie et al.βs protocol is composed of two phases: initialization phase and seekingphase. Each phase is briefly described below and illustrated in Fig. 1.2.1 Initialization PhaseAn RFID reader π π downloads an Access List (AL) from a certificateauthority (CA). The mobile reader is a portable device such as a PDA or a smartphone, rather than a well-protected backend server. Therefore, if the reader isstolen, then all tag's secrets in it would be revealed. To prevent from the problem,the secret key of each tag is not stored directly, but stored as a transformed key.The secret key πΎπ of the tag ππ in the reader π π is stored as π»(π π πΎπ ) in theAL. Therefore, the AL of the reader π π is πΏπ {(π1 , π»(π 1 πΎ1 )), (π2 , π»(π 2 πΎ2 )), , (ππ , π»(π π πΎπ ))}. Each tag ππ has a controlling binary state value ππinitialized to be passive, i.e. ππ 0.2.2 Seeking Phase1. The reader π π broadcasts Ξ±, Ξ², ππ to seek a specified tag ππ , where πΌ π»(ππ ππ ) π π and π½ π»(π π ππ ) ππ .2. Each tag ππ computes π β² π»(ππ ππ ) πΌ and π β² π»(π β² ππ ) π½.If π β² ππ , it means ππ ππ , i.e. ππ is the tag sought by the reader, then ππcomputes π π»(π»(π β² πΎπ ) ππ ππ ). Otherwise, it means ππ ππ , i.e.ππ is not the tag sought by the reader, then ππ computes π π ππππΏ whereπ ππππΏ is random number with L bits. Each tag received the broadcastingmessage from the reader will generate π, ππ that are different from eachother. All the tags in the group respond to the reader with their own π, ππ .3. The reader π π computes π β² π»(π»(π π πΎπ ) ππ ππ ) using the valuesπ, ππ received from each tag. If π β² π, it means the seeking tag is found,then the reader computes π π»(ππ ππ π»(π π πΎπ )). Otherwise, theresponse is not from the seeking tag, then the reader computes π π ππππΏ .Then, the reader responds to each tag with a corresponding π.4. Each tag computes π β² π»(ππ ππ π»(π β² πΎπ )), which is compared withthe received value π. If π β² π, it means that ππ is the seeking tag by thereader, then ππ sets ππ 1. Then, the tag-controlled indicator starts analarm via buzzing/flashing. Therefore, the person holding the reader willfind the lost item or the specified item.
Ultra-lightweight RFID seeking protocolReaderπ π , πΏππΌ π»(ππ ππ ) π ππ½ π»(π π ππ ) ππ πΌ, π½, ππ 6249Tagππ , πΎπ , ππ 0π β² π»(ππ ππ ) πΌπ β² π»(π β² ππ ) π½if π β² ππ thenπ π»(π»(π β² πΎπ ) ππ ππ )elseπ π ππππΏπ,πππ β² π»(π»(π π πΎπ ) ππ ππ )if π β² π thenπ π»(ππ ππ π»(π π πΎπ ))elseπ π ππππΏππ β² π»(ππ ππ π»(π β² πΎπ ))if π β² π thenππ 1Fig. 1 Seeking Protocol of Xie et al.3 The proposed protocolIn this section, we point out the flaws of Xie et al.βs protocol and propose anultra-lightweight and more secure RFID seeking protocol. Xie et al.βs seekingprotocol is serverless, privacy-friendly to both RFID readers and tags, and issecure against common attacks such as manipulating, replaying, tracing, Denial ofService (DoS), etc. However, since their protocol uses hash functions, it isdifficult to be implemented in a low-cost passive tag which has very limitedresources, and their protocol is not secure from the compromise attack of a reader.Since the protocol is based on serverless and the mobile readers, a user possessingthe mobile reader can be stolen or lose it. If an attacker has the mobile reader,he/she can impersonate as a legal user. Therefore, we propose a more secure andlightweight RFID seeking protocol than Xie et el.βs protocol. The proposedprotocol has a login process to enhance security and uses PRNG and XORoperations instead of hash functions in the tags to be an ultra-lightweight protocolfor the low-cost passive tags.The proposed protocol is composed of three phases: registration phase,initialization phase, and login and seeking phase. We describe the detail procedureof each phase below and illustrate briefly in Fig. 2.
6250Il-Soo Jeon and Eun-Jun Yoon3.1 Registration PhaseA user holding a mobile reader submits a user ID (UID), a mobile ID (R), and apassword (Pwd) to a certificate authority (CA) via secure channel. Then, CAstores the userβs information in the database. The password is stored as a hashedvalue, i.e. π»(ππ€π) instead of PWD.3.2 Initialization PhaseThe initialization phase of the proposed protocol is similar to that of Xie et al.βsprotocol. A user holding a RFID reader π π downloads an Access List (AL) fromthe CA. The AL of the reader π π is πΏπ {(ππΌπ·, π»(ππ€π)), (π1 , ππ ππΊ(π π πΎ1 )), (π2 , ππ ππΊ(π π πΎ2 )), , (ππ , ππ ππΊ(π π πΎπ ))}. In the AL, the userβspassword, Pwd is stored as the form of π»(ππ€π), and the secret key πΎπ of the tagππ is stored as π»(π π πΎπ ). The tag ππ has a controlling binary state value ππinitialized to be passive, i.e. ππ 0. The tag ππ has a counter πΆπ‘ππ whose initialvalue is set to 0. The counter is used as a component of PRNG seed to generate apseudo random number in the tag.3.3 Login and Seeking Phase1. A user requests a login to the reader π π and inputs the user ID, UID and thepassword, PWD, then π π computes π»(ππ€π). If UID and π»(ππ€π) areequal to those of πΏπ , then proceeds next step. Otherwise, π π terminates thesession.2. The reader π π computes π΄ ππ ππΊ(ππ ) π π , π΅ ππ ππΊ(π π πΎπ ) π1 , and πΆ ππ ππΊ(π1 π π ) where π1 is a random number generatedby the reader. Then, the reader broadcast π΄, π΅, πΆ to seek a specified tag ππ .3. Each tag ππ computes π πβ² π΄ ππ ππΊ(ππ ), π1β² π΅ ππ ππΊ(π πβ² πΎπ ),and πΆ β² ππ ππΊ(π πβ² π1β² ). Then the tag compares the computed πΆ β² withthe received πΆ. If πΆ πΆ β² , it means ππ is the tag sought by the reader, ππincrement the counter πΆπ‘ππ and computes π2 ππ ππΊ(πΆπ‘ππ πΎπ ), π· π1β² π2 , and E ππ ππΊ(π2 ππ ) where π2 is a pseudo random numbergenerated by the tag. Otherwise, it means ππ is not the tag sought by thereader, then ππ computes π· π1β² πΆ β² and πΈ ππ ππΊ(π1β² ππ ). Eachtag that received the broadcasting message from the reader will generateπ·, πΈ that are different from each other. All the tags within the reading rangeof the reader respond to the reader with their own π·, πΈ.4. The reader π π computes π2β² π· π1 and πΈ β² ππ ππΊ(π2β² ππ ) usingthe values π·, πΈ received from each tag. If πΈ β² πΈ, it means the seeking tagis found, then the reader computes πΉ ππ ππΊ(π1 π2β² π π ππ ) .Otherwise, the response is not from the seeking tag, and the reader com-
Ultra-lightweight RFID seeking protocol6251putes πΉ π3 where π3 is a random number generated by the reader.Then, the reader π π responds to each tag with a corresponding πΉ.5. Each tag computes πΉ β² ππ ππΊ(π1β² π2 π πβ² ππ ), and πΉ β² is comparedwith the received value πΉ. If πΉ β² πΉ, it means that the tag ππ is theseeking tag by the reader, then the tag ππ sets ππ 1 . Then, thetag-controlled indicator starts an alarm via buzzing/flashing. Therefore, theperson holding the reader will find the lost item or the specified item easily.In the proposed protocol, we used a counter πΆπ‘ππ in the tag ππ , which was notin Xie et al.βs protocol. To generate a pseudo random number of the tag ππ in theproposed protocol, the counter πΆπ‘ππ contributed as a part of the seed of PRNG.Readerπ π , πΏππ π receives user ID, UID and password, Pwdπ π computes π»(ππ€π)If UID and π»(ππ€π) those of πΏπthen Exitelseπ΄ ππ ππΊ(ππ ) π ππ΅ ππ ππΊ(π π πΎπ ) π1 //π1 : NonceπΆ ππ ππΊ(π1 π π )π΄, π΅, πΆπ2β² π· π1πΈ β² ππ ππΊ(π2β² ππ )if πΈ πΈ β² thenπΉ ππ ππΊ(π1 π2β² π π ππ )elseπΉ π3 //π3 : Random No.FTagππ , πΎπ , ππ 0, πΆπ‘ππ 0π πβ² π΄ ππ ππΊ(ππ )π1β² π΅ ππ ππΊ(π πβ² πΎπ )πΆ β² ππ ππΊ(π πβ² π1β² )if πΆ πΆ β² thenπΆπ‘ππ πΆπ‘ππ 1π2 ππ ππΊ(πΆπ‘ππ πΎπ )π· π1β² π2E ππ ππΊ(π2 ππ )elseπ· π1β² πΆ β²πΈ ππ ππΊ(π1β² ππ )D,EπΉ β² ππ ππΊ(π1β² π2 π πβ² ππ )if πΉ πΉ β² thenππ 1Fig. 2 Proposed Seeking Protocol4 Security Analysis and Performance EvaluationIn this section, we analyze the security and privacy of the proposed protocoland evaluate its performance
6252Il-Soo Jeon and Eun-Jun Yoon4.1 Security Analysis Resistance to replay attackThe reader and the tag can generate random (or pseudo random) numbers anduse them in their communication messages. Since the random numbers arechanged each session, communication messages can keep freshness. Therefore,the replay messages cannot be authenticated by either the reader or the tag. Thus,the proposed protocol can resist the replay attacks. Resistance to DoS attackThe proposed protocol does not need synchronization between the reader andthe tag. Even though an attacker does de-synchronization attacks by blockingsome communication messages in a session, there is no problem to beauthenticated in another session between the reader and the tag. Therefore, theproposed protocol is safe from the DoS attacks. Resistance to message modificationMost of the communication messages were created by PRNG. If an attackermake modified messages that can pass the mutual authentication, he/she has toknow the seed value of PRNG such as tagβs secret key, tagβs ID, readerβs ID,and/or the counter value. However, since the attacker cannot extract theinformation from the communication messages, the proposed protocol hasresistance to the message modification. Resistance to trackingIn the propose protocol, an attacker is unable to extract the ID of a reader or theID of a tag by eavesdropping the readerβs broadcasting messages or the responsemessages of the tags, because those IDs are not exposed directly but fused in themessages by PRNG and XOR operations. In addition, since the reader and thetags use random (or pseudo random) number for the message freshness, themessages generated by the same tag are different from each other in every session.Therefore, the proposed protocol provides anonymity and resistance to trackingfor both the reader and the tags. Resistance to impersonation attackAssume a reader was lost or stolen, and an attacker has the reader. Since theattacker does not know the password, he/she cannot success a login. Therefore,the attacker cannot impersonate as a legal user of the reader. Even though theattacker knows the contents of the AL in the reader, he/she cannot acquire any
Ultra-lightweight RFID seeking protocol6253secret keys of the tags. Therefore, the attacker cannot impersonate as a legal tag.Thus, proposed protocol is safe from the impersonation attacks for both the readerand the tags.4.2 Performance EvaluationThe performance of the proposed protocol is compared to the Xie et al.βsprotocol in Table 2. The target of performance evaluation is only the performanceof tag side, because we can assume that the reader has powerful hardware andsoftware to run the protocols. The comparison factors are composed of security,operation types, and communication costs in tag side. In Table 2, L denotes thelength of each item in the communication messages.As we can see in Table 2, the proposed protocol is more secure than Xie et al.βsprotocol. The length of the communication messages is shorter than Xie et al.βsprotocol. In our protocol, the computation costs and implementation space will bereduced considerably by using PRNG operations instead of hash functions.Therefore, we can say that our protocol will be a good option for variousapplications of RFID systems which use the low-cost passive tags.Table 2. Comparisons of PerformanceProtocolComparison factorResistance to replay attackResistance to DoS attackResistance to message modificationResistance to trackingResistance to impersonation attackCommunication message lengthOperation typesXie et al.βs protocol [3]Proposed protocolYesYesYesYesNo6LYesYesYesYesYes5Lπ»(), ππ ππΊ(), 5 ConclusionIn this paper, we proposed a secure and ultra-lightweight RFID seekingprotocol for the low-cost passive tags. The proposed protocol does not use hashfunctions but use PRNG and XOR operations in the tags. Those operations aregood enough at the aspect of both computation costs and implementation space.Since the proposed protocol can meet the requirements of EPC C1G2 standard, itcan be easily implemented in the low-cost passive tags compliant with thestandard. Therefore, it will be a good solution for the RFID application systemsusing low-cost passive RFID tags.
6254Il-Soo Jeon and Eun-Jun YoonAcknowledgements: Il-Soo Jeon was supported by Research Fund, KumohNational Institute of Technology. Eun-Jun Yoon was supported by Basic ScienceResearch Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF)funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology(No.2010-0010106).References[1] M. Moessner and G. N. Khan, Secure authentication scheme for passiveC1G2 RFID tags, Computer Networks, 56(1) (2012), 273β286.[2] C. Lee, S. Park, K. Lee, and D. Won, An attack on an RFID authenticationprotocol conforming to EPC class 1 generation 2 standard, ICHIT, (2011),448β495.[3] W. Xie, L. Xie, C. Zhang, Q. Wang, J. Xu, Q. Zhang, and C. Tang, RFIDseeking: finding a lost tag rather than only detecting its missing, Journal ofNetwork and Computer applications, 42 (2014), 135-142.[4] C.C. Tan, B. Sheng, and Q. Li, Secure and serverless RFID authenticationand search protocols, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 7(4)(2008), 1400-1407.[5] C.C. Tan, B. Sheng, and Q. Li, Serverless search and authenticationprotocols for RFID, Proceedings of the 5th annual IEEE internationalconference on pervasive computing and communications, (2007) WhitePlains,NY, United States, 3β12.[6] T.Y. Won, J.Y. Chun, and D.H. Lee, Strong authentication protocol forsecure RFID tag search without the help of central database, IEEE/IFIPInternational Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, (2008),153β158.[7] Z. Kim, J. Kim, K. Kim, I. Choi, and T. Shon, Untraceable and serverlessRFID authentication and search protocols, 2011 IEEE 9th InternationalSymposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with ApplicationsWorkshops, (2011), 278β283.[8] C.F Lee, H.Y Chien, and C.S Laih, Server-less RFID authentication andsearching protocol with enhanced security, International Journal ofCommunication Systems, 25 (2012), 376-385.[9] J.Y. Chun, J.Y. Hwang, and D.H. Lee, RFID tag search protocol preservingprivacy of mobile reader holders, IEICE Electron Express, 8 (2011), 50β56.[10] E.J. Yoon, Cryptanalysis of an RFID Tag Search Protocol Preserving Privacyof Mobile Reader, International Federation for Information Processing,(2012), 575β580.[11] C.C. Tan, B. Sheng, and Q. Li, Efficient techniques for monitoring missingRFID tags, IEEE Trans. On Wireless Communication, 9 (2010), 1882β1889.
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The necklace had been tagged with a tag-controlled indicator, which would generate sound/light alarms once the tag was activated. The lady had a PDA embedded with an RFID reader. She walked back along her track, holding the PDA to seek the necklace. When she was near the necklace, the tag was activated by the reader. And then,
RFID technology, RFID detection, RFID applications, RFID in management, RFID components. 1. Introduction . RFID, which stands for Radio Frequency Identification, is an automatic identification technology used for retrieving from or storing data on to RFID Tags without any physical contact [1]. An RFID system primarily comprises of RFID Tags .
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RFID technology and detail RFID reader unreliability. 2. RFID BACKGROUND RFID Technology Primer. RFID is an electronic tag-ging and tracking technology designed to provide non-line-of-sight identiο¬cation. For the purposes of this paper, a typi-cal RFID installation consists of three c
RFID technology this year, with 8% in full deployment The average annual RFID budget is estimated at 550,000, reaching 770,000 by 2007 23% of companies polled are piloting RFID technology, while 38% plan to evaluate RFID technology in the next two years By 2015, 1.3 million people are estimated to be working in the RFID industry
Spec2000 RFID chapter usable - A350 initiative - RFID apps/tools developed - Delta implemented RFID across fleets - RFID applications sold on open market - A&D format approved by EPC - Airlines start to engage - Airbus compatibility testing lab - Delta RFID baggage deployment. Brief History of Aviation RFID. 2002. 2004. 2006 .
in the RFID field on the THU screen that matches the RFID Tag put on the THU. Q: Is RFID part specific? Does each part or P/N need an RFID label? A: No. RFID is shipment specific. Labels are attached to the THU exterior packaging. Q: What is t
3.3 Radio Frequency Identification 54 3.3.1 RFID Historic Background 54 3.3.2 RFID System Overview 54 3.3.3 Principles of RFID Operation 58 3.3.4 The Electronic Product Code System 63 3.3.5 RFID and Biometrics 65 3.3.6 Challenges of RFID Implementation 67 3.4 Wireless Senso
Progress of RFID research RFID background and basics Evolving coreness of control points The future of RFID β IP Hourglass analogy 26. Outline RFID Case Study. 27. Progress of RFID Research June-September
