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AD-A21 5 779THE INFLUENCE OF ELECTRONIC WARFAREON OPERATIONAL MANEUVERDTICELECT iA MonographbyMajor David M. RodriqttezInfantryDEC19 1989rc:BSchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasTerm 88-89ISecond Approvedfor Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited

UNCLASSIFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICAThON OF TIS PAGEPGForm ApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGElaREPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION2SECURI -"YOMBIo.0704-0188lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS"SfIATION AUTHORIT '3DISTRiBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORTApproved for public release;2b DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADINGSCHEDULEdistribution unlimited4 PERFORMING ORGANiZATiON REPORT NUMBER(S)S MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION7a. NAME OF MONITn-.,NSchool of Advanced MilitaryStudies, USACGSE6b. OFFICE SYMBOL(If applicable)I ATZL-SWV6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)Fort Leavenworth, Kansas66027-69008a. NAME OF FUNDING iSPONSORINGORGAN ZATIONBc.,ADDRESS (Cir,, eORGANIZATIONBb. OFFICE SYMBOL(If applicable)9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER,,O L .LOIe)10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERSPROGRAMPROJECTTASKWORK UNITELEMENT NO.NONO.ACCESSION NO.11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)The Influence of Electronic Warfare on Operational Maneuver (U)12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)ml qinT nnlyidNf RndV-'6--'13a. TYPE OF REPORTIT(QA3b. TIME COVEREDMonographIFROM14. DATE OF REPOPT (Year, Month, Oay)IS. PAGE COUNT89/5/22TOI416. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION17COSATI CODESFIELD18 SUBJECT TEFkMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)SUB-GROUPGROUPElectronic warfare'73 Mideast WarTechnologyOperational maneuver'82 Mideast WarElectromaznefir spectm19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)The challenge of adapting to emerging technologies is difficult and important to futuresiccess on the battlefield.One area in which recent technological advancements haveinfluenced military operations is electric warfare.This study examines the influenceof electronir warfare on opcrational maneuver.The purpose is to determine howexploitationof electronic warfare capabilities support operational maneuver by groundforces to attain operational effects.The monograph begins with an overview of operational maneuver and the link betweenoperational maneuver and electronic warfare.Next, a review of current electronicwarfare doctrine illustrates how we are integrating new electronic warfare technology.The '73 and '82 Mideast Wars are recent historical experiences analyzcd to show theimpact of electronic warfare on operational maneuver.These experiences indicateelectronic warfare significantly enhances the ability to execute operation al maneuver.In conclusion, the study offers three important points (continued on reverse side)20DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY(OUNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED22aOF ABSTRACTI- SAMENAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALMajor David M. Rodriguez-.,P.'EU6AS RPT[21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONr rTIC USERSIUNCLASST.FIED22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)(913) 684-2138P,-.,ous eititonsare obsolete,,CURITYi22c OFFICE SYMBOLi ATZL-SWVCLASSIFICATION OF THIS eutu"",UNCLASSIFIED

Item 19 Continued.for consideration during development of future operational concepts.Firvs ,thebattle for control of the electromagnetic spectrum must be won to effectivelyconduct operational maneuver.Second, military doctrine must keep pace withimproving technologies. Third, near real-tive intelligence provided by electrcnicwarfare assets drastically increases the speed of the commander's decision cycle.

THEINFLUENCE OF ELECTRONIC WARFAREON OPERATIONAL MANEUVERbyMajor DavidU.S.M. RodriguezArmySchool of Advanced Military StudiesU.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas22 itd:

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVALName of Student:David M. Rodriguez, MAJ, InfantryElectronic Warfare - The Gap In CreationTitle of Monograph:of an Operational Maneuver ForceApproved by: LTC William H. Jane.,x/Monograph DirectorIs Director,School ofAdvanced MilitaryStudiesCOL L. D. Holder, MADi rector, GraduateDegree ProgramPhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D.Accepted this/ day of/:1989

ABSTRACTTHE INFLUENCE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE ON OPERATIONALMANEUVER, by Major David M. Rodriguez, USA, 44 pages.The challenge of adapting to emerging technologies isdifficult and important to future success on thebattlefield.One area in which recent technologicaladvancements have influenced military operations iselectronic warfare.This study examines the influence ofelectronic warfare on operational maneuver.The purpose isto determine how exploitation of electronic warfarecapabilities support operational maneuver by ground forcesto attain operational effects.The monograph begins with an overview of operationalmaneuver and the link between operational maneuver andelectronic warfare.Next, a review of current electronicwarfare dcctrine illustrates how we are integrating newelectronic warfare technology.The '7Z and '82 MideastWars are recent historical experiences analyzed to show theimpact of electronic warfare on operational maneuver.These experiences indicate electronic warfare significantlyenhances the ability to execute operational maneuver.In conclusion, the study offers three important pointsfor consideration during development of future operationalconcepts.First, the battle for control of theelectromagnetic spectrum must be won to effectively conductoperational maneuver.Second, military doctrine must keeppace with improving technologies.Third, near real-timeintelligence provided by electronic warfare assetsdrastically increases the speed ,f the commander's decisioncyc 1 e.Accssilon For-NTIS. cGFA-&IDTIC TAIU11w9111ouncedj u:,ttitostionlYDIttrhbutioflfAveil ctud/orDlipoa

Table ofContentspageI.Introduction . 1II.Methodology . 2The Theory of OperationalIII.Maneuver and itsRelationship to Current Doctrine .Electronic Warfare Doctrine . 7IV.V.Lessons from theVI.VII.VIII.1973 Mideast War . iiLessons from the 1982 Mideast War . 21Conclusions . 1Implications . 76ENDNOTES . 7BBIBLIOGRAPHY . 42

I.INTRODUCTION.FM100-5,Operations,our war-fightingclaims to bedoctrine".rootedprinciples, yetinmostOnebeganintechnologicalisa field where technologyWarI with rudimentaryinterception.may beItnow, that andecisive.hasprogressed withargumentinit demonstrated"2on the modernbattlefield.technologicalcapability todynamic environmentinfluence oflevelsofthe firstprominently, butweaponry has become pivotalThe dramaticincreaseinfluence war createsofelectronicwar;thatemphasizes that".was notwarfare featuredhow electronicsuchcan be madeChris Bellamywarwhich electronicimprovesin the electromagnetic1982 Operation Peace for Galilee,threeemergingmilitary operationsthethedrastic changes.in which recentWarfareWorldfrom then toTheisimportant to future echnologywarfare.capabilitiesthe effectcontainingand adaptable to changingthese to seeandElectronic warfare isspeedThe doctrinr'-for adapting tois difficultadvancements havespectrumthe future.missions."'likely ofon the battlefield.electronicmanualtime tested theories andandThe challenge presentedtechnologiesforthe capstoneforward-lookingtechnologies, threats,currently theiselectronicwarfarestrategic,1inthewarfare.is feltoperational,throughoutand

tactical.This monographoperationallevelofwar,limits thespecifically,electronic warfare on operationalthe studyisto determine howwarfare capabilities supportforces to the operationalThe importance ofoperationaldepthinthein the1986 version.majorofoperationalto seeka decisive impactadvantage ofpositionachieve theaterII.an1982The puroose ofelectronicmaneuverby groundopposingforce.levelwarFMofofinour100-5 andOperationallevelmaneuverwar.the campaignto exploittacticalisaIts purpose isbygainingsuccess toMETHODOLOGY.begins withmaneuverand runderstanding ofcurrentT4-1ofanthewarfare.overview ofdoctrinalTerms relatingare explained tomanuals, FMfollows, includingthe rolewarfare technology.analyzed.100-5, FMintoprovide a commonAnoverview100-6, andFMour doctrine ofThis overview willillustrate where we areoperationallink between operationalthe concepts beingelectronic warfare.andofofobjectives. 3The monographofoninfluenceexploitation ofreaffirmedthethemaneuver.the operationaldoctrine was reintroducedpartanalysis to theprovide backgroundintegrating newelectronic

The SinaiCampaigninCampaign1982 aretoillustrate theonoperationalMiddle Eastin1973 and the Bekaa-ecent historicalimpactofmaneuver.experienceselectronic warfareelectronic warfareenhancesthe ability to execute operationalHowever,itoperationalhighdeepbecause ofAfterattackouristhe effect createdprotection,power,largeconceptsandwe tofto win controlthese conceptswillelectronicbewarfarethroughout the paperisby combiningto fight.maneuver,actionsto these fourstudy combatis theon the dynamics ofthe abilityagainstIt-ombatmeasuresfirepower,anaspects ofenemyincombatintelligence because oftheelectronic warfare.the paper theexamples we willThewarfare has"Combat luence electronicwar."'4ofinmaneuver.maneuver ficantlyability to execute deep maneuverThe e risksurvivability andthe electromagnetichave ononthatevaluating these historicalanalyze futureofevidentanalyzedThese recent experiencesindicate thatisValleyaboutthesuggestimplications andfuture direction of7electronic

warfare toenhance operationalmaneuver.recommendations include changestrainingThe theory andtracedtypesofto theimportancedecisive points,leadareobjectivepoints offurtherwhichsupportstatesgeographicalby thethe enemybe attainedThebyothermaneuver.compelto makeoperationallines ofdefined as:a river,adefense orterrain whi:h,the enemypeace is".mayfront ofgoodJominiifpossessedto make peace. 7one effectthat canmaneuver.is the objective point"Objective points ofderive theirattained,maneuver."enterprises."'isobjective pointcontradistinctionifoffensive action theobjective pointwillisline ofulteriorthat- duringattacker,CompellingforHe defines twoObjective points ofpointaffords goodcanobjective points andBoth points,theRELATION TOmaneuverJomini.geographicalresults.important fortress,operationsorganization,ITSoperationalthe basis for operationalThe geographicbe anofmaneuver.to operationalmaneuverMANEUVER ANDmilitary theorist,objective points ofcanin equipment,tactics.andIII. THE THEORY OF OPERATIONALCURRENT DOCTRINE.beThemaneuver,to geographicalimportance from, and4pointsofinofmaneuver,their positions depend

upon,on5i tuattheto ethis arethe enemyarmy.andlosspeace duepositionachieveofmaneuvertwo methodsa pieceofofdestructionthe enemyattemptsresults"results.''examplethe antageillustrate100-5 states:to gainontheadvantage o4The decisivesuccesses toimpactandd.scussioneffects.the operationalofofto a given100-5 willequate with Jomini'sto operationalanaarmy.doctrine.Itor hatin terms ofto positionalitsasofterrainseeks a decisive impacta campaign.operationalAnothereffectmajor operationsbefore battle and to exp'oit tacticaloperationalrelatingtheJomini's concepts to FAinfluence on currentconductarmy.therefore corresponda major portion"OperationalisJomini,relative toorhisas pointsis also anonto make peace andforce him to makeTracingimpac':seizure oftooftrThe resultslocationmaneuvereffects can therefore be definedAccordingattaininggoesIominlmaneuver.have a decisivecampaign."Nthe enemythe enemy armyby operationalthatofdestruction ofThe operationalthosemASt.the objective pointsrelate to theattainedthQ hostiIeenemy.new problemseffect ofmaneuverFffective manuverforthe enemy,renders

his reactiondefeat.""'producingTheineffective, andThis technique alsoan operationalability tomodern battlefieldeffort.eventuallyleads to hisillustratesa means ofeffect.conduct operationaldemands tremendous"Leaders combine maneuver,maneuversituations become more arly statedofin FMsituation."'ofandcountless2Asdue to the rapidlychangingthe commander's ability tooperation maneuverThe importancethecoordinationprotection capabilities available to them incombinations appropriate to theonis critical.firepowerto operationalmaneuveris100-5.Firepower supports friendly operationalmaneuver by damaging key enemy forces orfacilities, creating delays in enemymovement, complicating the enemy's commandand control, and degrading his artillery, airdefense, and air support.At the operationallevel, firepower can also disrupt themovement, fire support, command and control,and sustainment of enemy forces."Offensive electronicwarfare enhancesby disrupting movement,andsustainmentusedtoofin conjunctionfire support,enemyforces.' 4withfirepowerthe tremendous effectssupporting operationalallthe firepowercommand andElectronicis6control,warfarea large contributorfirepower canmaneuver.effectElectronichave whilewarfare

support tothe firepowerimportance on ingmodern battlefieldand willincontinue tofut,'re.1isanother dynamictn operationalmaneuver.ofcombatFMpowerthatis100-5 explains:They (operational commanders) protectthe force from operational levelmaneuver and concentrated air support.Air superiority operations, theater wideair defense systems and protection ofair bases are important activitiesassociated with maximizingcombat power.1 6Electronicareas.warfare isTheincreasingdefense rolescontrolofa major playerthe electromagneticsystems makewhoforframeworkIV.inforsupport ofPM100-5clearlyThe rapidlyofimportantoperat onalofthe maneuvertechnology anorole electronicmaneuver willbe thethe paper.DOCTRINE.specifies the purposewarfare:. electronic wartare uses theelectronic spectrum to deceive the7airelectronic warfareprotectionThethe remainderELECTRONIC WARFAREspectrum.inbattle forpossesses the latestcan effectively employ it.thesebased missilescapabilities ofthis battlequestion ofwarfare hasgroundeach ofis becoming a technologicalchanging technologicalforce arole ofinofelectronic

enemy, locate his units and facilities,intercept his communications, anddisrupts his command, control, andtarget acquisition systems at critical7moments.1FM100-6 goes somewhatfurther byelectromagnetic spectrum,military action tohostile use ofThe stafrwarfareestablishing".electronicdetermine, exploit,the electromagneticwarfarespectrum. "11ofto the operations officercommunications officer.FMisreduce, or preventresponsibility for the conductis assignedtheelectronicand the100-5 declares:The G-3 or S-3 has the overallresponsibility for electronic warfare,but focuses his primary effort onoffensive electronic warfare.The G-2or S-2 develops targets forinterception jamming or destruction.The communications electronics officermanages defensive electronicwarfare. "This methodologydivides responsibility betweenand defensive missions amongElectronicconceptofwarfare directlythe operation.warfare assetsshould behis conceptoperation.ofdifferent staffFMsupports thesections.commander's100-5 states electronicintegratedFMby the commander100-5 emphasizes:. commanders should treat electronicwarfare assets much as he treatsartillery assets.Electronic warfareconducted concurrently at both theoperational and tactical levels, and8offensiveisinto

these efforts must be synchronized witheach other and with other activitiesmaneuver, fire, and air support toobtain maximum benefit. 2 0Thus ourdoctrine places a heavy emphasis onwarfare as one ofthe elements ofThe defensive applicationofcombat power.electronicwarfareincludes electronic counter-countermeasureselectronic warfare countermeasuresmeasures to protecttransmit(ECM).command, control,(C3) systems againstintelligence systemsjammingorjam(ECCM) andECCM are passiveand communicationsenemy activities.through enemyelectronicECM can be usedtoenemy signalto screen and preventenemyintercept. 2The offensive components ofelectronic ion,combat forces.provides information foris a nonlethal"Carefulwith visual,sonic,the tronicand olfactory actionsa deceptionofthe enemy'simportant playerintegrationprojection(MED) orattackemploymentand communication systems.Electronic warfare is anactivities:warfare are(ESM) and active electronictargeting and tacticalECMcommand, control,ESMelectronicin deceptiondeceptionis criticaltostory."22uses either manipulative electronicimitative electronic9deception.MEDis

the passingenemyofsignalfalse dataamongfriendly forces tointelligence capabilities.electronic deceptionisthedeceiveImitativeimitation ofthe enemy'sownelectromagnetic radiation to deceive or confuse them. 2 4Electronic warfare possesses the capability totremendous uncertainty in the OPFOR's mind.theorist,Generalir'yanproposeselectronic reconnaissance, whichseewhat happens" mentality.whathappens,achieved.toomajorBythe timelate to reactwhenactualmassed andcontacteffectively.Thereliance onin a"wait andwaits to seesurpriseoccurs, itwilluncertainty thatblindedThe reliability and trustthus becomes aresultWhile the enemyelectronic reconnaissance isindeed.A Soviet"blinding" the enemy'swillforces can becreateinisbeoccursvery greatelectronic systemstechnology that can be verycostly. 2UDue to theresources anddistinctive mission,training problems, anelectronic warfare employmentFM100-5 puts electronicperspective:ofintegratedis difficult towarfare concepts".plans shouldreflectelectronic warfare weapons, theirtransient nature ofnature ofanscarce equipmenttheireffects mayintegratedconcept.orbe10in the currentthe relative scarcityand theThis transienttrue when consideredThe transientinto permanent effects when combinedimplement.limitations,2effects. 'a&may notconcept foreffects canbewith maneuver,inturned

firepower,protection,andelectromagnetic spectrumarelike anyassimilatingis a newchanges;itofart ofittheThe servicescomes toso the changes come slowly.resources makethe difficultControlmission.large organization whenscarce equipmentlearnintelligence.difficultTheto trainandcoordinating the effects ofelectronic warfare systems.The discussion ofoperationalhave onrecentmaneuverfuture employmentoperationalV.war.The defeatSinaibyIsraeltoDuringto find aneffects electronicillustrated.Nowlet usofwarfare canturn to twoexamples that providekey lessons forofinTHEThe origins ofprepareddevelopmentelectronicwarfaresupport ofmaneuver.LESSONS FROMforce.and theit have beenhistoricalthe theoreticalof1973 MIDEASTthe1973EgyptWAR.war can be tracedandto thesubsequent occupationwere unacceptable to the Egyptians.regain thelost territory as soonthe time betweenanswer to thethe'67 andsuperiority ofContrastingly, theIsraelis believedtheEgyptEgypt hadIsraelithat:Having learned the lessons of the 1967war, the Egyptians would not embark upona new war until they felt capable ofstriking at Israeli airfields andneutralizing the Israeli air force." 2 '11ofas possible.'77 wars,the1967air

However,ofassistance came from the Sovietmodernizedequipment.equipment beganairsuperiority.superiorityin1970Modernization ofto offsettheThe new equipmentaircraftand,missiles ard electronicUnionintheformEgyptianIsraeliAir Force'sincluded more airmore

warfare doctrine illustrates how we are integrating new electronic warfare technology. The '73 and '82 Mideast Wars are recent historical experiences analyzcd to show the impact of electronic warfare on operational maneuver. These experiences indicate electronic warfare significantly enhances the ability to execute operation al maneuver.