Tactical Electronic Warfare

FM 100-32 (TEST)CHAPTER 2LISTENING2-1. GeneralModern warfare requires extensive use of electronic equipment to maintain control over combat forces and surveillance over the battlefield.Since electronic equipment radiates both intentional and unintentional energy that can bedetected by other than the intended recipients,it is a valuable source of information. Listeningto the enemy’s electronic emissions may providethe tactical commander with an indication of themagnitude of the enemy force, his intentions,technical information for disrupting his electronic devices, and other information useful indeveloping order of battle. Information derivedfrom listening to the enemy’s electronic devicesis an indispensable input to the commander’sestimate and, when integrated with other intelligence, normally provides assistance in answering the questions: who, what, when, where andhow. All commanders can benefit from listening;however, the criteria prescribed by paragraph56(1) through (4), AR 105-87, must be met forauthorizing listening operations.2-2. What to Listen ForRarely, if ever, will a commander have enoughequipment resources and linguists to listen to allenemy electronic systems. Thus, priorities mustbe established for listening to the radios andradars that provide the most lucrative sources ofinformation. Normally these will include thoseenemy electronic signals associated with command and control, fire control, air-ground coordination, and intelligence systems. Listening toother electronic systems should be assigned alower priority unless the information being obtained dictates otherwise. The assignment of alower priority to other electronic systems doesnot mean that those systems will not be monitored, but rather that they will be listened towhen there is no activity on the systems assigned a higher priority.2-3. Factors That Affect ListeningThe enemy’s communication and surveillancedevices are quite similar to ours and requirebasically the same considerations for employment. Depending on the particular system, factors such as terrain, weather, distance, and security will determine the probability of detectingand listening to delectronic emissions.а. To listen to some tactical electronic systems,the listening receiver must have line-of-sightwith the target transmitter antenna. Locatingthe listening receivers on terrain or in airborneplatforms to attain liné-of-sight with the enemytransmitting antenna becomes a requirement.In addition, the location of listening receiversmust also be within the effective range of theenemy transmitters. Just as US C-E equipmentcan only transmit for a specific distance, enemyelectronic emitters are likewise limited. Therefore, depending on the type emitters being exploited, the listening receivers must be positioned as far forward as necessary to acquire thedesired enemy signal.б. There may be times when terrain and distance restrict efforts to listen to the enemyradios and radars from a ground site. Aircraftprovide the means to extend the radio horizon.However, hostile air defense systems and severeweather can restrict airborne electronic warfareoperations. Heavy overcast or precipitation mayrequire instrument flying for listening platformsand reliance on radar control for position verification. These limitations to airborne systems,therefore, require complementary ground-basedcapabilities.c. Just as emission control, good radio procedure, use of authorized codes and ciphers, andsecurity equipment will deny friendly information to the enemy, enemy use of the same procedures and devices will assist in denying information to friendly intelligence efforts.2—4. Listening CapabilitiesThere is an abundance of organic electronicequipment within the division that is capable oflistening to the enemy electronic systems. A USArmy Security Agency (ASA) division supportcompany will normally be attached to the divi2-1

IFM 100-32 (TEST)totoFM 100-32(TEST)US FORCES WE*ASADTOCSSE/EWE* Command.————Operational Control. SSE/EWE personnel from ASA support unit.Figure 2-1.Type ASA organization in support of tactical forces.

FM 100-32 (TEST)FM 100-32(TEST)Enemy Electronic SystemCommand and ControlFire DirectionAdministration and LogisticsAir-GroundArea CommunicationsOperation .and I ntelligenceRadars— Fire Control— Acquisition— CM/CB— SurveillanceFacsimileRadiosFMAM ' 'SSBRTTUHF (AM)Friendly Listening CapabilityASA CoOrganicAttachedASA Bnto Divto Divor GpXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXFigure 2-2. Friendly listening capability.sion to provide direct support. This unit has thecapability of listening to most types of electronicemissions from enemy electronic systems eitherfrom a ground mode or airborne platform. Ifsystems are .encountered beyond the capabilityof the attached ASA division support company,assistance can be obtained from the ASA battalion or group resources supporting the nexthigher tactical command echelon. Figure 2-1represents a type ASA organization in supportof tactical forces. The ASA organization will betailored to meet the specific electronic environment posed by an enemy force, thus the organization depicted may vary. Specific functions ofthe various organizations will not be discussedin this manual; however, each echelon is designed to provide support within the area ofinterest of the supported command. Detailedinformation on capabilities of the ASA organizations may be obtained from the supporting ASAunits.a. A summary of listening capabilities organicto the division and ASA resources is shown infigure 2-2.b. Although organic equipment compatiblewith some of the enemy electronic systems isauthorized within the division, such equipmentshould be considered as complementary to, butnot a subsitute for, ASA -support, since its primary purpose is for the communications-electronics support of the division. Listening requires proficiency in the enemy’s language, sometechnical skills, and coordination of the listeningeffort to preclude undésired duplication. Whenthe necessary skills and language capability areavailable in the tactical unit and the decision ismade to listen using organic resources, provisions must be made to expeditiously provide theinformation obtained to intelligence personnel toallow its integration with other information.Commanders must recognize that inèxperiencedpersonnel conducting listening operations aresusceptible to enemy deception operations; thus,integration of information obtained with allother available data is extremely important. Except in unusual situations the attached or nearest ASA unit should be consulted prior to engaging in listening operations. The SIGINT supportelement/electronic warfare element (SEE/EWE)will assist the command in developing and usingits organic listening capability to include provision of technical guidance and report formats.2-3

']FM 100-32 (TEST)Depend on supporting ASA units to fulfill mostlistening requirements. That’s what they arethere to do.2-5. Requirements for IntelligenceAs stated earlier, a commander will not have theresources to listen to all the communication andsurveillance devices of the opposing enemy force.Therefore, priorities must be established consist-ent with the total listening capability available.Normally this is accomplished after the identification of the essential elements of information(EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR)of the command and a decision by the commander on the concept of operation for the mission. Once the information requirements of thecommand are determined, priorities for listeningcan be established.i ;!It2-4

FM 100-32 (TEST)CHAPTER 3LOCATING3-1. GeneralThe location of enemy electronic emitters can beof significant value to the commander. The capability to locate electronic emitters exists in bothfriendly and enemy forces. The friendly capability to electronically locate enemy emitters isprovided by the US Army Security Agency. Thelocation of electronic emitters coordinated withfire is part of enemy doctrine, and commandersmust be alert to this threat. The enemy-locatingequipment is deployed to regimental level andtargeted against friendly emitters within 35 kilometers of the FEBA. Since current doctrine insome countries is to direct artillery fire on thebasis of electronic location information alone,commanders may expect to receive artillery firebased on location of their emitters within 10 to15 kilometers of the FEBA.3-2. Evaluation of Location InformationLocating information can provide locations,movement, dispositions, and targeting data. Thisinformation normally augments other intelligence held by the command; however, it is sometimes the most timely and accurate informationavailable. The integration of listening and locating capabilities, structured to support commandEE I and considered along with the traditionalintelligence assets of photography, infrared sensors, SLAR, PW interrogration, and agent reports, can provide the commander with accuratetactical intelligence.3-3. Location Information Characteristicsa.Emitterthe ground or air. Ideally, the technique involveslistening to the enemy emitter from at leastthree receivers deployed along a line and determing the location through intersection. Information received from locating enemy emitters isprocessed through the SIGINT support element/electronic warfare element (SSE/EWE).b. Location capabilities include the acquisitionof enemy radar as well as AM and FM emittersused by the enemy. The chart below generallydepicts enemy frequencies for both communication and noncommunication equipment. Location of most enemy emitters, used for tacticalpurposes, from the ground requires that theposition of location equipment provide line-ofsight to the enemy emitters. Aerial locatingplatforms complement the ground capability.These platforms normally operate behind theFEBA, are independent of terrain, extend lineof-sight, and can conduct surveillance over largeareas.c. Commanders should consider aerial locationplatforms as an extension of other aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets.3-4. Requirements for Intelligencea. Depending on the echelon, some emittersare listened to and heard more frequently andestablished. It may not be possible or desirableto obtain the location of every emitter heard.b. The commander, with the advice of his staff,must determine the priority for emitter location.This priority is stated in the EEL The commandlistening and locating operations are thusguided by and responsive to the command EELAssistance in the establishment of prioritiesmay be provided by the SSE/EWE.c. In this regard, the commander should belocationbe anaccomplishedfromawarecanthatemitter thatis being monitoredcan be located as quickly as the operating frequency is known and a triangulation conducted.The priorities established by the commander andhis staff are crucial to the proper use of available assets.

FM 100-32 (TEST)FM uencyRadar.4201020.FrequencyFigure 3-1. Enemy frequency usage.3-2J-rmaoGHZ

F/y l 00-32 (TEST)CHAPTER 4DISRUPTING4-1. GeneralThe enemy relies heavily on electronic systemsto pass orders and information as well as tocollect data. Regardless of the function of theenemy electronic system, the commander mustcontend with these enemy systems during allphases of the tactical operation. This chapter isan overview of electronic disruption on the battlefield. It is designed to provide basic data fromwhich the commander and staff may begin amore detailed exploration into the possibilities ofusing the electronic environment to gain tacticaladvantage.4—2. Disrupt OptionsThere are five options to be considered:а. Destruction. From the standpoint of noncommunication emitters (e.g., radars), destruction is usually the best option available to thecommander. Communication emitters (e.g., radios) should be destroyed when disruption of theenemy’s command and control is more importantthan using an emitter as a source of intelligence.б. Jamming. This option degrades receipt ofthe desired signal at the receiving station andapplies to both communication and noncommunication systems. Some jamming signals are difficult to identify; thus radio or radar operatorsmay believe they are experiencing equipmentdifficulty rather than jamming activity.c. Imitative Deception. The input of false information into the enemy communication systemusing enemy radio procedure may be attemptedin an effort to cause the enemy to react in adesired manner.d. Manipulative Deception. The use of friendlycommunication and noncommunication systemsto provide false information to enemy signalintelligence units is manipulation. Successfulemployment of this option causes the enemy toinput false data into his intelligence analysisprocess.e. No Action. This final option may be theproper solution when friendly listening effortsare gaining information of significant value tofriendly operations from the enemy electronicsystem. A decision to disrupt such an enemysystem might result in loss of the information.In these cases, the value of the informationmust be compared with the tactical advantage tobe gained through disruption to determinewhich option is bétter. This is a commander’sdecision.4-3. ApplicationIn general, disruption options can be applied toany enemy system that receives an electronicsignal. Some of the more vulnerable systems are:.a. Forward Air Controller Communications.Disruption of these communications seriouslyinhibits enemy tactical air reliability. When target information cannot be supplied, these aircraft generally must expend ordnance againsttargets that can be acquired visually. Imitation,as well as jamming, should be considered for usein this situation.b. Enemy Navigational Aids and Radar Bombing Systems. Destruction of these systems is theobvious choice. However, if location data is inadequate or other factors preclude destruction ofthese systems, the use of jamming and employment of false navigational aids should be considered.c. Surveillance or Weapon Drones. Jammingand deception can be employed against theircontrol systems as well as the drone sensorsystem.d. Enemy Communication Nets. Disruption ofenemy communications may be achievedthrough destruction, jamming, or imitation.e. Missile Systems. Enemy tactical missile systems are subject to effective disruption to theextent that they depend on communications andelectromagnetic data links for performance oftheir functions./. Electronic Surveillance Systems. Groundbased devices consist primarily of radars, infrared detectors, and light-amplification andthermal-imaging devices. These devices may bejammed or deceived by friendly equipment having appropriate radiating characteristics.4-1

FM 100-32 (TEST)4-4. PlanningEach of the commander’s options discussed inparagraph 4-2 assumes that the enemy receiveror emitter can impact on friendly combat operations. The working definitions and the partiallist of applications above will assist the commander in determining how best to degrade theenemy electronic capability. The three electronicoptions available (jam, imitate, manipulate) arediscussed in more depth below to insure understanding.a. Electronic Jamming. Technical planning forjamming operations includes consideration ofnumerous factors. Some important areas are:(1) Required data. Data on the identification,technical characteristics, locations, and use ofemitters and their associated receiver systemsare continually updated and assembled into apriority listing in accordance with the currenttactical situation by the SSE/EWE.(2) Variables. The major variables to be considered include availability of jamming equipment, environmental factors, radiating powerrequirements, tactical environment, and possibleenemy reaction.(3) Controls. Frequencies to be jammed mustbe compared with the current restricted frequency list held by the SSE/EWE. This list contains specific frequencies that, if jammed, wouldinterfere with friendly operations and/or affectthe safety aspects of friendly nuclear or conventional weapons that employ electronic commandor guidance systems. Should a restricted frequency be considered for jamming operations,permission must be obtained from the commandthat restricted the frequency before the jamming operations may commence. The commandconducting jamming operations must have aneffective ON/OFF control procedure that allowsimmediate starting and stopping of jammingactivities. The command’s ability to exercise thistype of control must be assured prior to startingany disruption operations.b. Imitation. Imitative operations are mostlikely to succeed when enemy signal securitymeasures are poor and operators are undisciplined. Imitation is generally more successful atlower levels of command, due primarily to increasingly sophisticated communication systemsand security procedures at the higher echelons.4-2Captured enemy equipment should be usedwhen available. Friendly linguists must be convincing, sound authentic, and be competent inthe use of enemy terminology. The level of tactical activity impacts heavily on the success ofimitation operations. Obviously, enemy operators are less likely to question a transmission inthe “heat of battle” than in preparation for theattack. Commanders are authorized to conductimitative operations provided the Army component commander has given prior approval. SeeFM 32-20 for detailed authorizations.c.forms: alteration of emissions from existingunits to limit the amount of information presented, and/or simulation of emissions from notional units to deceive the enemy. A successfulmanipulation operation requires that friendlyelectronic data be intercepted by enemy signalintelligence units and that the enemy believethe intercepted transmission. This type of operation is designed to influence the enemy estimateof the situation and must be consistent withterrain, disposition of troops, and the tacticalsituation. The information presented must beplausible to the enemy. The information must becalculated to cause the enemy to react in adefinite manner; however, the outcome of thetactical operation must not depend entirely onthe enemy reacting as anticipated. The commander may conduct manipulative operationsany time on circuits that are wholly within hiscontrol. This action should be fully integratedwith the commander’s overall deception plan.4-5. Planning DataThe success or failure of disruption operationsrests on the immediate availability of pertinentelectronic data on enemy units. Detailed technical data is generally available within the analytical sections of the division intelligence or ASAunits; however, basic planning data should beavailable either in the all-source intelligencecenter of the G2 or the SSE/EWE in the TOC.This data should be posted on a map or overlayand accompanied with a data chart such asfigure 4-1. This data is sufficient for the commander to begin consideration of the availabledisruption options.

As ofCrossreferencenumberUnit/designatorDisruption possibilitiesFriendly capability191st Tk RegtOperations net controlJam, imitate—comm procedures good; most vulwhen unit moving.ASA DSU can jam—imitation possible during enemy off opns.2QVR-11 Radar (Norm assoc with 159mm gun)Jam:—radar usually turned on 3 minutes beforearty fire for warmup.Destroy, jam—friendly jamming would most probably result in delay of or prevention of arty fire forassoc gun.3211st SIGINT CoManipulate—unit moves frequently thereby losingcontinuity on friendly units.Organic equipment and personnel to establish falsepresence of friendly bn.42d CAA Log NetJam—must be abn opn due to distance and line-ofsight frequencies used.Asst from higher headquarters required.Noie. Fictitious data utilized on this sheet.Figure 4-1. Example of enemy electronic vulnerability sheet.FM 100-32 (TEST)t(today)

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FM 100-32 (TEST)CHAPTER 5COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION5-1. GeneralResponsibility for employing EW is a function ofcommand. EW functions are assigned to the staffto enable the commander to discharge his responsibilities for planning and conducting EWoperations. Formal EW mission planning normally does not originate below division level(except in the case of separate brigades); implementation of EW plans can extend to the lowestechelon having requisite resources. Whether ornot a TOC is established by the commander, thefunctions of planning and executing EW operations are exercised as delineated in subsequentparagraphs.5-2. Coordinationa. The use of EW requires close coordinationbetween operations, intelligence, and C-E staffelements. Generally, a decision must be madeconcerning the relative value of the intelligencebeing derived from an enemy emitter versus thetactical value that could accrue from denyinghim use of the emitter through electronic orother action. This conflict of interest directlyinvolves the G2 and G3, since a close relationshipexists between EW and acquisition of intelligence from enemy electronic emissions. Thorough and continuous coordination between theG3 and the communications-electronics (C-E) officer is necessary to insure that EW, which isemployed against an enemy threat, will not unacceptably degrade friendly C-E systems. Figure5-1 depicts the flow of requirements and information within the staff elements having primaryEW functions.b. In the case of adjacent commands that aresubordinate to the same immediate headquarters, little difficulty should be en

electronic warfare operations on friendly elec- tronic systems. (4) Electronic warfare considerations for de- ception planning. (5) Generalized data concerning friendly and enemy electronic warfare capabilities. (6) Command and staff responsibilities for control, planning, coordination, and execution of electronic warfare operations. 1-3.