Short-termism In Business: Causes, Mechanisms And

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Short-termism in business:causes, mechanismsand consequencesEY Poland Report

Table of ContentsExecutive Summary11What is short-termism?52The causes of short-termism among public companies 112.1Factors contributing to the short-termist behaviour of investors132.2The instruments of investor pressure on the executives173.The consequences of short-termism213.1The channels of the impact of short-termism on a company’sperformance233.1.1 Shortened CEO tenure233.1.2 Neglect of investment activity243.1.3 Neglect of human capital253.227EY empirical analysis3.2.1 The companies’ performance variables (explained variables)283.2.2 The impact variables (explanatory variables)293.2.3 Statistical analysis353.2.4 Summary of the econometric results383.2.5 Summary of the empirical analysis434.45ConclusionsAbbreviations and definitionsSPIQStandard & Poor’s Capital IQGICSGlobal Industry Classification StandardLTIPLong-Term Incentive Plan

Executive SummaryExecutive Summary The right balance between a short- and long-term perspective iscrucial for the sustainability of a successful business. However, thereis a lot of evidence, not least the recent financial crisis, to showthat long-term objectives have often been neglected because of toomuch concentration on short-term goals. This is the short-termismphenomenon, which deteriorates firms’ competitiveness, increasessystemic risk, and reduces the long-term potential of the entireeconomy. This EY Poland Report contributes to the discussion on shorttermism through empirical research conducted for the 1024 largestcompanies listed on the European stock markets.Short-termist behaviour is particularly visible in the case of publiccompanies, which are often under pressure from their shareholdersto deliver short-term outcomes. Among the factors that contributedto this pressure are: new technologies, reduced trading times andtransaction costs, increased market volatility, media coverage, and theincreasing role of institutional investors.Shareholders have instruments to effectively execute their expectationsof short-term outcomes. These instruments include shaping theremuneration schemes of the executives based on their short-termperformance, as well as the ability to remove executives from officeif they do not meet investor expectations. Short-termism is oftenreinforced by companies’ market communication and financial reportingpractices, which largely focus on the short-term performance and, fromthe shareholders’ point of view, serve as an instrument for monitoringtheir short-term goals. Consequently, short-termism often results in“earnings management” rather than building the long-term value of thecompany.There are different channels through which short-termism may adverselyaffect companies and the economy as a whole. These are: shortenedCEO tenure, the neglect of investment activity and the neglect of humancapital. EY’s empirical analysis focuses on the former two.In light of a significant shortening of the executives’ contracts andperformance evaluation intervals, we show that addressing the issueof management stability should be of great importance. The resultsof our research indicate that an increased CEO tenure positivelyinfluences the company’s profitability and market capitalisation. Inparticular, an additional year of CEO tenure leads, in the long-run, to anaverage increase in the company’s annual profitability (ROE) by 0.3 p.p.Interestingly, we do not find any relation between the time-orientationShort-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequences1

Executive Summaryof cultures and the average tenure of executives. This furtherstrengthens the view that, as far as listed companies are concerned,short-termism has become a global, culture-wide phenomenon.A reduction in investment expenditures is another important channelof the impact of short-termism on a company’s performance. Capitaloutlays are often made with the aim of improving the firm’s long-termcompetitiveness and capacity. EY’s analysis shows that a rise in capitalexpenditures to total assets ratio by 10 p.p. in the long-term leadsto an increase in the average ROE by 4.5 p.p., while a rise in capitalexpenditures to total revenue ratio by 10 p.p. leads, in the long-run(here 15 years), to an average increase in the growth of the company’smarket capitalisation by 7.1 p.p. However, in the short-term,investment outlays may lead to a deterioration in reported financialindicators, which in turn may result in a decline in the company’sshare price. We confirm that by showing that increasing the capitalexpenditures to total revenue ratio by 10 p.p. leads to a short-termdecrease in the company’s market capitalisation growth by 1.6-3.9 p.p.Therefore, while executives recognise the problem of excessive shorttermism, they may be reluctant to allocate capital to achieve longterm goals as they want to avoid missing the short-term consensusestimate and thus disappointing the company’s shareholders. Availablesurvey results confirm that executives would delay or sacrifice projectscreating long-term value in order not to miss short-term earningstargets.With respect to that, an important finding of the EY’s research is thatthe longer the CEO tenure, the higher (on average) are the company’sinvestment outlays. In particular, an additional year of CEO tenureleads, on average, to an increase in the firm’s capital expenditure tototal revenues ratio by 0.2 p.p.Our estimation results also point to a positive impact of appointing aninsider successor on the company’s profitability, both in the short- andlong-term. It may reflect an additional dimension of the CEO’s valuableexperience as that of the company’s insider. However, we do not findthis effect on the company’s long-term market value. Neither havewe identified any impact of an outsider or an insider successor on thecompany’s investment activity.In addition, the obtained results indicate that increasing the role ofLong-Term Incentive Plans (LTIP) in the CEO remuneration schemepositively influences the company’s ROE in the short-term. That effect,however, has not been identified for the market capitalisation or2Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequences

Executive Summaryinvestment activity of the company (long-term effects of the LTIP havenot been analysed).Short CEO tenure and neglect of investment outlays decrease acompany’s long-term value and profitability, as well as the ability toadapt to new market conditions and compete on a global scale. In thisway, if short-termism affects many firms, it translates into the reducedpotential of the entire economy. Consequently, tackling the problem ofthe shortened executives’ contracts may be one way of addressing theissue of short-termism.Reducing the problem of short-termism requires the involvement of allstakeholders. In particular, executives excessively focus on the shortterm performance in response to market expectations and pressurefrom investors. Engagement with the investor community shouldtherefore be an important part of the strategy to counter the problemof short-termism.One way of improving communication with stakeholders may berelated to changes in the reporting framework, in particular amendingthe structure of information towards more long-term, fundamentalguidance. This may help in shifting the focus of investors towardsthe long-term value and true drivers of business success, as well asattracting new, long-term investors.Another measure would be to incentivise executives to pay moreattention to long-term value creation. This may be achieved throughstructuring the remuneration schemes of executives so that asignificant portion of their compensation is based on the long-termperformance of the company.Yet another solution recommended in the literature is to provide taxand regulatory incentives for long-duration holdings of securities anddisincentives for short-duration holdings.Taking into account the costs that short-termism entails, not onlyfor public companies, but also for the whole economy, we stronglyrecommend considering a wide range of measures that may helpto address the excessive focus on short-term goals. If dealt witheffectively, it would improve the capacity and competitivenessof national businesses, encourage long-term value creation andcontribute to the welfare of society.Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequences3

01

Section 01What isshort-termism?‘Anybody can manage short. Anybody canmanage long. Balancing those two thingsis what management is’Jack Welch, General Electric CEO

01What isshort-termism?The actions that we take in our everyday lifehave consequences. These consequences,however, may vary over time. Whereas someof our decisions result in immediate outcomes,for others it takes time, even years, to seethe effects. Decision-making becomes morecomplex if actions leading to long-termbenefits require short-term sacrifices, or ifachieving short-term goals comes at the costof long-term objectives.For instance, we have to make a choicebetween current consumption, which givesus some benefits straightaway, and savings,which are usually connected with someincreased, but delayed, gains. Therefore, if wewant to be rewarded with a higher cash-flow,and thus consumption in the future, we haveto sacrifice part of our today’s consumption,which – by definition – is not something thatwe are happy about. Another example ofsuch decision-making problem is whetherto continue the full-time education or starta professional career right away. Extendedfull-time education is usually related bothwith a direct cost (tuition fee) and alternativecosts (one could start a job earlier and earnwages instead of studying). Moreover, it oftenrequires a lot of effort to pass all the courses,so it entails personal costs as well. However,in the longer run, additional years spent ineducation are usually connected with a bettersalary, higher social status and/or prestige.Therefore, the decision whether to study (andhow much) or not, is actually an investmentdecision that takes time and effort before itpays off.Similar dilemmas are faced by businesses.When someone starts a new firm, the costsand sacrifices come first – only after time,sometimes many years, will the wholeinvestment reach the break-even point.And sometimes it never does. The trade-offsbetween long-term and short-term benefitsreiterate throughout the whole lifecycle of thecompany. For instance, the firm can distributeits profits in the form of dividends, resulting inshort-term rewards to the owners (individualor institutional shareholders), or it can usethese funds to finance investments in newproductive capacities or technologies. In fact,hardly any companies use all of their surpluscash either for dividends or for investment.On the one hand, if we neglect investmentactivity then the firm, even if initiallysuccessful, will gradually lose its competitiveadvantage. On the other hand, if we focustoo much on the long-run goals, the companymight fail to produce the outcomes necessaryto survive until the long-term benefitsmaterialise. In particular, the firm may loseliquidity if investors or banks do not acceptsuch a policy and cut off external financing.Or investors may simply lose their patienceand remove the CEO from office. The rightbalance between a short- and long-termperspective is crucial for the sustainability ofa successful business. Jack Welch, the authorof the opening quote, understood that perhapsbetter than anyone else during his 20 years inoffice as a CEO of General Electric. During histerm, the market capitalisation of the companyincreased by more than 2 800%.116Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequencesGE (2014), Past Leaders, John F. Welch, Jr., Chairman& CEO 1981 – 2001, n-f-welch-jr

What is short-termism?However, recent experience, not least thefinancial crisis, has shown that instead ofensuring a balance, long-term objectiveshave often been neglected because of toomuch concentration on short-term goals(see Frame 1). This results in the phenomenonof short-termism, which we define as theexcessive focus of decision-makers onshort-term goals at the expense of longerterm objectives. Short-termism resultsin insufficient attention being paid to thestrategy, fundamentals and the long-termvalue creation of a firm or an institution.It must be stressed that caring about shortterm goals should not be considered a problemper se, the problem of short-termism occurswhen decision-makers sacrifice long-termgoals, or even neglect to formulate them, andinstead excessively concentrate on short-termbenefits.A legitimate question is whether we shouldcare about the short-termism issue? One mightsay that it is the problem of certain companiesand we should let the market do its job.However, there are at least several argumentswhy we should care. First of all, shorttermism may apply not only to companies,but also to other institutions, including publicregulators. If short-termism dominates thepolicy of the latter, its consequences mightaffect all the market participants. If, forexample, government policy is determined bya short-term perspective, it may have adversemacroeconomic and social consequences,including an impact on economic growth,the unemployment rate or price dynamics.In particular, the government may be temptedto increase public expenditures beforeelections with the aim of winning more votes.Such a short-term oriented policy, however,might result in long-term costs, because anincrease in public debt due to the initial fiscalexpansion would have to be compensated forby the subsequent fiscal tightening, leading toan economic slowdown and increased volatilityof the business cycle. This would clearly affectall the households and companies in theeconomy.Secondly, an excessive focus on short-termgoals may result in a similar and simultaneousbehaviour of many other firms and institutions.In particular, this behaviour may take the formof excessive risk taking to maximize short-termearnings. For example, financial institutionsmay invest in assets with hidden risk or take onexcessive debt just to increase their short-termprofits.2 In such a setting, short-termism maylead to systemic risk, affecting the stability ofthe entire economic system. This has becomeevident especially in the case of large financialinstitutions issuing subprime mortgages, whichallowed them to make fast but unsustainableprofits. It led to the housing bubble, the burstof which resulted in the global economic crisis(see Frame 1). Therefore, short-termism maylead to macroeconomic imbalances followed bya sudden economic downturn.Finally, to the extent that short-termism leadsto the neglect of investment activity, it reducesfirms’ international competitiveness and theircapability to respond effectively to new marketchallenges. Short-termism thus results in thereduced potential of individual companies, butalso of the whole economy.Based on the above, there is little doubt thatalleviating the problem of short-termismwould contribute to building a better workingworld. On the one hand, there is an increasingamount of literature on the mechanismsunderlying the problem of short-termism2 Lynne L. Dallas (2012), Short-Termism, the FinancialCrisis, and Corporate Governance, Legal StudiesResearch Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12-078.Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequences7

What is short-termism?and its destructive impact on companies.Many reports and articles confirm that thedecisions of CEOs bringing fast gains both toshareholders and to executives, often entaillong-term costs to the company. On the otherhand, there is little empirical research on thismatter, other than that based on surveys. ThisEY Poland report aims to reduce that gap.The goal of this report is to contribute to thediscussion on short-termism through empiricalresearch conducted for European companies,which – to our knowledge – have not been thesubject of many studies so far.The report is structured as follows. Section 2describes the causes of short-termism in thecontext of incentives faced by the decisionmakers in a company. In Section 3 we discussthe consequences of short-termism, witha particular focus on listed companies. Thispart of the report draws on the availableliterature, as well as on EY’s empiricalfindings for European companies. Details ofour methodological approach, including thetechnical description of data and econometricmodels, are included in the Appendix.338Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequencesThe Appendix to this report is available on the EYwebsite: www.ey.com/PL/short-termism

What is short-termism?Frame 1Short-termism and the financial crisis.Chart 1. The role of short-termism in the recent financial crashon the US real estate ns,sales of “bad”loansLargefinancialinstitutionsToxic assetsDevelopmentand burstof the financialasset bubbleCrisisFocus onshort term goalsSource: EY.Short-termism phenomenon played a keyrole in the chain of events that led to theeconomic meltdown beginning in 2007. Beforethe financial crisis outburst, large financialinstitutions were interested in selling as manyloans as possible, creating an “originate-todistribute” model. The idea was to charge feesfor giving credit, and then to use extremelycomplicated financial instruments in orderto disperse the risk throughout the financialmarkets. This made it possible for banks togrant mortgages even to creditors unable torepay them (NINJA loans – “no income, no joband no assets”), as the consequences weredisguised by the complexity of the financialinnovations. Moreover, those responsible forgranting loans were not so much interestedin the quality as in the quantity of newmortgages, for which they were rewarded withbonuses.In this way, an increasing number ofconsumers could afford a house financedthrough a mortgage, which led to skyrocketinghousing prices. In reaction to this ballooningdemand, the financial markets started toact as if real estate prices would rise forever,loosening the creditworthiness criteria evenfurther. And still, under the then-bindingsupervision standards, ever-rising housingprices made financial institutions’ balancesheets look more and more healthy, reinforcingthe above cycle.Finally, many financial institutions reacheda moment at which the consequences ofshort-termism became evident – the real estatebubble was about to burst. It became clearthat the situation in the housing market wasunsustainable and that “subprime mortgages”would likely inflict serious damage on thewhole US financial sector. Exotic financialinstruments, so far treated as an attractiveinnovation making housing loans a relativelysafe source of profit, suddenly becamerecognised as extremely risky and overvaluedassets. This left banks with a huge amountof “toxic assets”, raising the urgent need torepair their balance sheets, which requireda significant tightening of credit criteria.This in turn adversely affected non-financialcompanies as the across-the-board creditcrunch left many of them unable to financetheir activity. As a result, the economic slumpbecame more and more severe and wasspreading around the world.* The discussion in this frame is based partly on Dallas, op. cit. and Amiyatosh Purnanandam (2010),Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper.Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequences9

0210

Section 02The causesof short-termismamong publiccompanies11

mainKey findingsheaderThe causesof short-termismamong publiccompanies Public companies are often under pressure of investors who expectshort-term outcomes Factors contributing to the short-termist behaviour of investorsinclude: new technologies, globalisation of financial markets,reduced trading times and transaction costs, market volatility,constant media scrutiny of market conditions with an emphasison the short-term performance indicators, and the increasing roleof institutional investors Shareholders may execute their pressure on the companyby shortening the tenure of executives or influencing theirremuneration schemes Public companies’ communication and reporting practices oftenamplify the short-termism problem. Issuing earnings guidanceand frequent financial reporting obligations make executivesexcessively focus on meeting the market short-term expectations,notwithstanding the long-term value of the companyThere are many sources of short-termismin the behaviour of firms, but in the caseof public companies one factor deservesparticular attention. This is the marketpressure exerted by shareholders on theexecutives, and in particular on the CEO12of a company to deliver financial results ina short time span. It is a major reason for theshift in focus of firms and their managementtowards short-term goals at the cost of longterm strategy.Short-termismShort-termism inin business:business: causes,causes, mechanisms,mechanisms, consequencesconsequences 01 August 2014

The causes of short-termism among public companies2.1Factors contributing to theshort-termist behaviour of investorsAmong the factors that contributed to theshort-termist behaviour of shareholders arenew technologies, reduced trading timesand transaction costs, market volatility,media coverage, and the increasing role ofinstitutional investors – all adding to short-termperformance pressure. There are now fewerbarriers to short-termism.In recent decades, globalisation andtechnological progress have led to a substantialreduction in transaction costs, making itmuch easier for investors both to allocate andreallocate their funds. For instance, nowadayspeople do not have to call or visit a broker tobuy securities – they can make transactionsvia the Internet at any time and with littleor no commission fee. This makes it possiblefor investors to easily move their capital fromone company to another, or even to switchto completely different markets, such as thecorporate debt market, the sovereign debtmarket or the derivatives market. They canalso easily move their capital between themarkets of different countries. Having so manyinvestment opportunities makes it much easierfor investors to allocate their funds accordingto their own risk profile and preferencestowards returns.In addition, the rapid development of newtechnologies has resulted in spreading newinformation around the world within minutes,anytime, day or night, making it possible forinvestors to respond almost immediately tochanges in the market situation. This hascreated new possibilities for investors topursue short-term profits and hasstrengthened the tendency in the modernsociety of expecting immediate returns.Moreover, constant media scrutiny of marketconditions with an emphasis put on shortterm performance indicators may exacerbateinvestors’ concentration on the currentsituation, while neglecting a broader pictureof companies’ condition.4Such an abundance of high-frequencyinformation translates into a likely informationoverload and makes it hard for individualinvestors to process all the data in a timelymanner. Their natural response is often to passthe funds to a specialised investment entitywith the ability to process and use the massiveamounts of information in order to find thebest investment opportunities – to institutionalinvestor (see Chart 2). This is a legal entitythat can carry out transactions using fundsfrom many various sources – individuals orother institutional investors. Examples includebanks, pension funds, investment funds, hedgefunds and private equity funds, whose rolehas substantially increased in equity marketsover the last half a century. For instance, in themid-1960s, institutional investors held around16% of all publicly listed stocks in the USA,and 46% in the United Kingdom, whereas inthe 2010s these numbers have increased toaround 60% and 89%, respectively.545Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequencesLouise Pocock (2013), Curbing Excessive ShortTermism. A Guide for Boards of Public Companies,Thought Leadership Paper, Australian Institute ofCompany Directors, ught-leadership-paperÇelik, S. and M. Isaksson (2013), Institutional Investorsas Owners: Who Are They and What Do They Do?,OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No.11, OECD Publishing, %20as%20owners.pdf13

The causes of short-termism among public companiesChart 2. Sources of pressure exerted on managers by investors.New technologiesGlobalisationMore developed financialintermediation services24/7 mediacoverageGrowth of financialmarkets andinternational capitalflows, reduced transactioncostsMore investmentopportunities andpotential for short-termreturnsRapid flows ofinformationIncrease in marketvolatilityChanges in the shareholdingstructure: the growing role ofinstitutional investors witha short term investment horizonPRESSURE EXERTED ON MANAGERS BY INVESTORSFocus on the short-run and quick earningsSource: EY.Institutional investors are assessed with regardto the overall return from their portfolios, andcompared with the results achieved by theircompetitors. Moreover, the technologicalchanges have allowed clients of institutionalinvestors to track their performance ona continuous basis, which has reinforced theirfocus on short-term returns. In such a setting,the longer-term perspective is often lost, asclients of investment funds are unwilling towait that long and can shift their money fromone investment fund to another with a singleclick (usually at a negligible transaction cost).As a result, institutional investors may feelan incentive to focus on short-term results inorder to retain their clients.In the pursuit of the required short-term returnon the managed assets, institutional investorsusually carry out frequent adjustments of theirportfolio structure, without much attentionbeing paid to the fundamentals of theindividual companies. This, in turn, results indisregarding the long-term strategyand fundamental value of the firms ownedby a particular institutional investor. Whatgains importance is the performance ofa given company in the short run. If it is notsatisfactory, shares held in that companymight be replaced with other securities withinseconds. This tendency has been reinforcedby the fact that fund managers are usuallyassessed on the basis of their short-termperformance. They may be graded and fired onthe basis of short-term outcomes even whenthe purpose of the investment is to providefor retirement benefits in many years.6 Insuch a setting, even if fund managers believethat a company is a promising long-terminvestment, they may not purchase its stocksjust because of what the price might do in theshort-term.7Shortening of financial institutions’ investmenthorizon has been reflected in the averageholding period for stocks in professionallymanaged funds that has dropped from aboutseven years in the 1960s to less than one6714Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequencesDavid Gonski (2012), A Competitive Country PicksWinners, The Australian Financial ReviewPocock, op. cit.

The causes of short-termism among public companiesyear today.8 Although individual investors’horizon has also been shortened, it is longerthan that of institutional investors.9 10 Givenan increased role of institutional investors infinancial markets, this may indicate that thereis an increasing pressure on the managementof companies to deliver short-term results inorder to avoid the sale of their shares andthe decline of their company’s marketcapitalisation. Indeed, there is a literatureproviding evidence that short-term tradingby transient institutional investors leadsto “earnings management” and thatshort-termism is pervasive in the businesscommunity, causing long-term damage to bothfinancial and nonfinancial firms.11Chart 3. S &P 500 daily price return index over the last 40 years, closevalue, and the 100 days moving standard deviation [index points]200200016016001201200808004040000Jan 74Jan 79Jan 84Jan 89Jan 94Jan 99100 days moving standard deviation [left axis]Jan 04Jan 09Jan 14S&P Index [right axis]Source: EY calculations based on Reuters EcoWin data.8910Alfred Rappaport (2006), Ten Ways to CreateShareholder Value, September Harvard BusinessReview: OnPoint 1, 2-3 tenways.pdf .Limei Che, (2011), Investors’ performance andtrading behaviour on the Norwegian stock market,A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian BusinessSchool for the degree of Ph.D., Series of Dissertations5/2011, BI Norwegian Business School.OECD (2011), The Role of Institutional Investors inPromoting Good Corporate Governance, CorporateGovernance, OECD Publishing.Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms, consequences11See, for example, Dallas, op. cit.15

The causes of short-termism among public companiesThe development of the global financialmarkets, together with the increasing role ofinstitutional investors, has been accompaniednot only by a surge in the volume of trade inshares, but also by stronger fluctuations inshare prices (see Chart 3). Increased financialmarket volatility makes it more difficult forthe individual investors to analyse the data.This strengthens their propensity to outsourcethe management of their funds to financialintermediaries – institutional investors.Moreover, when markets are volatile, it is moredifficult for investors to assess the long-termpotential of a company, which increases theirfocus on short-term indicators and furtherdiscourage long-term investors. Financialmarkets volatility thus amplifies the problemof short-termism.The fact that short-termism is pervasiveand entrenched in companies’ m

2 The causes of short-termism among public companies 11 2.1 Factors contributing to the short-termist behaviour of investors 13 2.2 The instruments of investor pressure on the executives 17 3. The consequences of short-termism 21 3.1 The channels of the impact of short-termism on

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