Legitimizing Army Psychological

PADDOCKDuring 1945–1946, Army psychological warfare staffs and units dissipated withthe general demobilization of the militaryestablishment. A prototype detachment of2 officers and 20 enlisted men at Fort Riley,Kansas, was the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the Army whenthe North Koreans attacked South Koreain June 1950. Reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, it wassent to Korea in the fall of 1950 and servedas the Eighth Army’s tactical propagandaunit throughout the conflict. Tactical propaganda, sometimes called combat propaganda, was directed at specific audiences inthe forward battle areas. Mobile loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and aircraft becamea primary means of conducting tacticalpropaganda in Korea.To conduct full-scale strategic operations, General McClure—now chief of psychological warfare on the Department of ArmyStaff—directed the 1st Radio Broadcasting andLeaflet (RB&L) Group to deploy to Korea inJuly 1951. It conducted propaganda intendedto further long-term strategic aims. The grouphad the equipment and capability to producenewspapers and leaflets, and to augment orreplace other means of broadcasting radiopropaganda. It supervised a radio stationnetwork known as the Voice of the UnitedNations and often produced more than 200million leaflets a week, disseminated byaircraft or artillery shells. Some leaflets, forexample, offered inducements for enemysoldiers to surrender, while others bolsteredthe morale of Korean civilians by proclaimingUnited Nations support.Although the 1st RB&L Group wasa concept accelerated to meet the requirements of the Korean conflict, it and the 1stL&L Company performed functions similarto those used in psychological warfare inWorld War II. It bore a direct linkage to themobile radio broadcasting companies formedunder PWD/SHAEF to conduct operationsin North Africa and the European theater.Both the strategic concept embodied in theRB&L group and the tactical propaganda ideaexpressed by the L&L Company would appearin the capability formed as part of the newPsychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg,North Carolina, in mid-1952. Indeed, theywere forerunners to the activation of the 4thPsychological Operations Group in Vietnam.This Psychological Warfare Center wasthe brainchild of General McClure, who conndupres s.ndu.eduvinced the Army that psychological warfareand Special Forces units required such afacility and home base. The center consistedof a Psychological Warfare School for psywarand Special Forces instruction, the 6th RB&LGroup, the 10th Special Forces Group, anda psywar board to test materiel, doctrine,techniques, and tactics for psywar and SpecialForces.This home base, the name of which waschanged to the Special Warfare Center in1956, formed the nucleus for expansion intothe U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Centerand School after the death of President JohnF. Kennedy—and eventually, for establishment of the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand (USASOC) headquarters at FortBragg. (In 2001, the USASOC headquartersbuilding was named in honor of GeneralMcClure, “The Father of U.S. Army SpecialWarfare.”)Nevertheless, interest in special warfarebegan to dissipate after the Korean War,and the Army’s psychological operationscapability had eroded by the early 1960s. Inaddition, an important change in terminologyoccurred: psychological operations replacedpsychological warfare as the umbrella term.Psychological operations, or PSYOP, encompassed psychological warfare, but the latteroperated a 50,000-watt radio station and highspeed heavy printing presses, published amagazine for Vietnamese employees workingfor the U.S. Government and civilian agencies, and possessed a capability for developingpropaganda.PSYOP battalions employed lightprinting presses, a research and propagandadevelopment capability, and personnel towork with American Air Force Special Operations units for aerial leaflet and loudspeakermissions. Their loudspeaker and audiovisualteams operated with American divisions andbrigades or with province advisory teams. The7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa provided valuable backup support for printing and highaltitude leaflet dissemination.Four target audiences formed the basisof the 4th PSYOP Group’s overall programin support of the counterinsurgency effort.First was the civilian population of SouthVietnam—in essence, “selling” the government of South Vietnam to its people. Nextcame the Viet Cong guerrillas in the South,followed by the North Vietnamese regulararmy, and finally the North Vietnamese civilian population.The 4th and its battalions employedthe same media used in World War II andKorea—radio, loudspeakers, and leaflets—interest in special warfare began to dissipate after the KoreanWar, and the Army’s psychological operations capability haderoded by the early 1960sindicated propaganda directed only againstenemy forces and populations for divisivepurposes. The new and broader term couldalso be used to describe propaganda employedtoward friendly and neutral audiences forcohesive purposes.As was the case after World War II,the Army severely reduced its psychologicaloperations capability after Korea. Consequently, an insufficient base of PSYOP-trainedofficers was available when the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion was activated inVietnam in 1965. By 1967, the Army’s PSYOPforces in Vietnam had been expanded to agroup (the 4th) with four battalions, one ineach of the four corps tactical zones.In addition to providing support to tactical field force commanders, the 4th PSYOPGroup assisted the South Vietnamese government in its communication effort down tothe hamlet level. The group headquarterswith the leaflets taking up 95 percent of itseffort. The group disseminated propagandavia television directed primarily at the civilians of South Vietnam. It also air-droppedthousands of small transistor radios—pretuned to its 50,000-watt radio station—overenemy troop locations.In targeting the enemy, one of themost effective efforts to which the 4th Groupprovided support was the Chieu Hoi, or OpenArms Program. Over the years, approximately 200,000 mostly lower level Viet Congdefected, or “rallied,” to the South Vietnamesegovernment. Some of these ralliers agreedto participate in propaganda campaigns byhaving their photos taken and composing asimple surrender appeal disseminated by leaflets among their former units.The 4th Psychological OperationsGroup returned to Fort Bragg in October1971 as part of the withdrawal of U.S. forcesissue 56, 1 s t quarter 2010 / JFQ     91

COMMENTARY Legitimizing Army PSYOPpopulation against the Jews, and the employment of propaganda to support U.S. forces inactions that result in the surrender of enemytroops, thus saving their lives and possibly thelives of our own Soldiers. The purposes arecompletely different. As Taylor states, “We needto redirect any moral criticism away from propaganda itself in the direction of the goals andintentions of those conducting it.” No matter.The term that had been a central part of ourdoctrine from World War I to the end of theCold War disappeared. It was not to be trusted.Totalitarian states used it. It represented lies.General McClure often told his psychological warfare staff and units to “[s]tick tothe truth, but don’t be ashamed to use thosetruths which are of most value to you.” Inother words, employ “selective truth,” muchlike the political propaganda employed bycandidates for office in the United States.A revelatory article that makes thispoint was Michael Dobbs’ December 2007piece in the Washington Post on December 30,2007, “The Fact Checker: Sorting Truth fromCampaign Fiction.” Citing specific statementsof Presidential candidates, Democrat andRepublican, Dobbs states many claims were“demonstrably false.” He argues that “the artof embellishment and downright fibbing isalive and well in Americanpolitics.” In fact, much of thistwisting of the facts is oftenpoor propaganda. In the age ofthe Internet, as Dobbs notes,the accuracy of a candidate’sstatements can be checked.Nevertheless, “electoralrewards from stretching thetruth or distorting a rival’srecord just as frequentlyoutweigh the fleeting politicalcosts.”Another example ofpropaganda used by our government appeared in RobertPear’s front-page article inPSYOP helicopter equipped with loudspeakers, circa 1964the October 1, 2005, NewYork Times, “Buying of Newsby Bush’s Aides is Ruled Illegal: Covert Propaganda Seen.” Essentially, the Bush admingroup in order to benefit the sponsor, eitheristration commissioned writers to preparedirectly or indirectly.”stories praising the Department of Education’sThat is about as neutral a definition asprograms and passed them to newspapers thatone could ask for. Yet those who criticize theprinted the stories without telling readers theterm propaganda allude to its being used onlyorigin of the material. Of this affair, the Govby our adversaries for evil means. But surely,ernment Accountability Office stated in itsfor example, there is a difference betweenSeptember 30, 2005, report: “The failure of anNazi Germany’s use of propaganda to turn itsU.S. Armyfrom Vietnam. Although officially a combatsupport organization, the 4th lost 13 of itsmembers to enemy action during the war, andseveral others were decorated for valor.From World War I to Vietnam, theterms propaganda, psychological warfare, andpsychological operations were employed intotal war, limited war, and counterinsurgency,respectively. They would continue to be useduntil near the end of the Cold War in the late1980s when propaganda and psychologicalwarfare were relegated to the glossaries ofPSYOP doctrine. Indeed, when I commandeda PSYOP battalion in the mid-1970s and agroup in the early 1980s, the PropagandaDevelopment Center was the focal point ofour operations. Under the new regime, thatentity became the Product DevelopmentCenter, but the “products” were, in fact, stillpropaganda. Nevertheless, the erosion of ourterminology had begun.Above, I quoted Philip Taylor’s statement that propaganda is a neutral term, anorganized process of persuasion, and a meansto an end. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (March2009) defines the word as “[a]ny form of communication in support of national objectivesdesigned to influence the opinions, emotions,attitudes, or behavior of any92     JFQ/ issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010agency to identify itself as the source of prepackaged news misleads the viewing public byencouraging the audience to believe that thebroadcasting news organization developed theinformation. The prepackaged news storiesare purposely designed to be indistinguishablefrom news broadcasts to the public. . . . Theessential fact of attribution is missing.”This is a classic illustration of blackpropaganda. This and milder forms of propaganda (white or grey) have been a regularfeature of American political life since thefounding of the Nation. Nevertheless, militarypsychological operations terms continue to bedeemed by some as too sensitive for interaction with commanders, other countries, andsome governmental agencies.With regard to the latter, my favoriteanecdote is a discussion I had with a seniorUnited States Information Agency officialwhile serving as the director for PSYOP in thelate 1980s. He was an old hand in the business,having been a member of the Joint U.S. PublicAffairs Office in Vietnam, which, incidentally,provided policy direction for military PSYOPin the country. We had a candid relationship.When I told him that his agency in realityconducted propaganda and psychologicaloperations abroad, he immediately responded,“You’re right, Al, but we can’t call it that.” Formilitary PSYOP, we should call it that.those who criticize the termpropaganda allude to its beingused only by our adversariesfor evil meansIt is truly ironic that a capability used toassist military commanders in accomplishing national security objectives abroad canbe considered un-American, when the sametechniques of propaganda are used by ourgovernment and political parties for domesticpurposes. In a fruitless search for legitimacy,a steady stream of euphemisms is trotted out,usually with the word information attached—an amorphous term that can mean anythingto anybody.In May 1994, in a letter to the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Special Operationsand Low Intensity Conflict, I wrote that“[a]nother difficulty with the term ‘information’ is its ever-widening definitional boundaries. In all of its permutations . . . it is becoming a morass which will cause even moren d upress.ndu.edu

PADDOCKconfusion if [the Department of Defense] usesit to describe what it does in PSYOP. Moreprofitable for the long run, in my view, wouldbe continued efforts to legitimize existingterms rather than apologizing for them orattempting to disguise them.”That was 15 years ago. Alas, the concerns I expressed have come to pass. A casein point is when the U.S. Special OperationsCommand renamed its Joint Psychological Operations Support Element the JointMilitary Information Support Command inNovember 2007. Despite this new name, themission of the organization—psychologicaloperations—remains unchanged.Now some want to eliminate altogetherthe name psychological operations—despitethe fact that psychological warfare and PSYOPorganizations served honorably in World WarI, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and in avariety of roles, to include conflicts, until thepresent—and despite the fact that our countryis now engaged in another ideological ColdWar, the very essence of which is psychological in nature. The question must be asked: Ifpropaganda, psychological warfare, and psychological operations were appropriate termsfor these earlier threats to our national security, why are they politically incorrect now?Related to this is the heritage issue. Iwonder, for example, how 4th PSYOP Groupveterans who served in Vietnam—and wholost 13 troops—would feel about changing thename of their unit. And now we have a PSYOPRegiment comprised of one Active-duty andtwo Reserve Component groups. All have personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Theregiment has as its purpose the developmentof pride in the heritage of a unit. Changing thePSYOP name will detract from that purpose.One can only imagine the hue and crythat would arise if a proposal were made tochange the name of the infantry, the artillery,or armor. These are combat arms units thatuse lethal means to accomplish their missions.Thus, it is particularly ironic that some wouldchange the name of PSYOP units that employnonlethal means to support these combatarms. Apparently, undermining the morale ofthe enemy is more politically incorrect thankilling them.Then there are practical considerations.A name change would require significantretooling of Service and joint doctrine. Additionally, the development of a PSYOP branchfor officers in the Army was a further important step toward legitimizing the name. I havendupres s.ndu.edunot heard any calls for renaming the SpecialForces branch.Calling PSYOP or propaganda something else will not deceive anyone. It certainlywon’t fool our adversaries or the media. As anexample of the latter, Pulitzer Prize winnerTom Ricks wrote a front-page article in theWashington Post on April 10, 2006, the leadsentence of which read: “The U.S. Militaryis conducting a propaganda campaign tomagnify the role of al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Justchanging the name is not going to camouflage what psychological operations does:persuasive communications to influenceattitudes and behavior of foreign target audiences in ways that support U.S. objectives. AsRichard Crossman, a brilliant propagandistwho worked for McClure in World War II,stated, “The art of propaganda is not tellinglies, but rather selecting the truths you requireand giving it mixed up with some truthsthe audience wants to hear.” The “truth” isthat psychological operations are based onmanipulation of facts. Using euphemisms willonly draw attention to our efforts to disguisethe real purpose of PSYOP.recommended the creation of an interagencypublic diplomacy committee to support counterterrorism efforts and a PSYOP workinggroup as part of the committee. These recommendations were implemented.During my tour as the Director forPsychological Operations in the Office of theSecretary of Defense, one of my top priorities,approved by the Under Secretary of Defensefor Policy, was institutionalizing PSYOP. Todo so, I continued briefing senior officialsthroughout the Department of Defense, andfor 2 years I lectured at the Service war colleges. When the Secretary of Defense recommended to the National Security Council thatan interagency PSYOP committee be formed,we insisted that “psychological operations” beincluded in its title. It was.A final personal anecdote. A few yearsago, I was invited to participate in a NationalPublic Radio panel to discuss psychological operations. As it turned out, the panelcomprised three journalists—and me. Themoderator was also a journalist. At the beginning, I sensed that they were all just waitingto pounce. So I began my comments withlittle instruction on psychological operations historically hasbeen included in the curricula of the Army’s professionalmilitary education for officersLet me address the argument thatchanging the name would make it easier forPSYOP to be accepted by supported commanders. Historically, the biggest challengefor PSYOP personnel has been convincingcommanders how PSYOP can help themaccomplish their mission. The PSYOP namerarely plays a part in this equation. Part of thatdifficulty stems from the fact that measuresfor effectiveness of PSYOP are often difficultto demonstrate. Another factor has been thatlittle instruction on psychological operationshistorically has been included in the curriculaof the Army’s professional military educationfor officers. Thus, PSYOP personnel continually have to reorient commanders and staff ontheir capabilities.As for selling PSYOP at “higher levels,”I should like to provide some personal experience. While serving as the military memberof the Secretary of State’s Policy PlanningStaff with a portfolio that included publicdiplomacy, PSYOP, and terrorism, I arrangedfor the 4th PSYOP Group to brief senior StateDepartment officials on its activities. I alsoa frank explanation of the military’s use ofPSYOP and propaganda. I also compared it tothe hypocrisy of U.S. domestic political propaganda, and cited a couple of examples. WhenI finished, it was as if all of the air had beenlet out of their collective balloons, and thediscussion proceeded on a much less adversarial basis. After the session, the moderatorthanked me for my candor.What I have described are examplesof aggressive institutionalizing that canand should be done by all PSYOP individuals (Active-duty, Reserve Component, andretired) to prevent a loss of identity for theircraft. PSYOP personnel should take pride intheir discipline and avoid apologizing for itsname. The use of euphemisms in an attemptto disguise PSYOP should cease. And seniorArmy officials must take into account therich legacy of this specialty, plus the practicallimitations of changing its name. In sum, theyshould resist political correctness and legitimize military psychological operations. JFQissue 56, 1 s t quarter 2010 / JFQ     93

Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in mid-1952. Indeed, they were forerunners to the activation of the 4th th Psychological Operations Group in Vietnam. This Psychological Warfare Center was the brainchild of General McClure, who con-vinced the Army that psych