Building Civilian Police Capacity Post Conflict Liberia 2003 2011

Jonathan Friedmantrained, standards for recruitment and vetting, andthe content of training. Based on U.N. standardsthat recommend 2.5 police officers per 1,000residents in peaceful countries, and an assessmentof what the Liberian government could supportfinancially in the long term, the committeeestablished a target to train 3,500 officers by 2007.That amounted to just under one officer perthousand residents, based on Liberia’s expectedpopulation of more than 3.6 million in 2007. Forcomparison, post-conflict Sierra Leone wastargeting a ratio of 1.69 officers per thousand in2009,1 Nigeria had a ratio of 2.46 (as of 2008)2and South Africa had a ratio of 3.06 (as of 2010).3Differences in geography, infrastructure, and theroles of other security services affect policepopulation ratios. Also using internationalpolicing guidelines, and at the insistence ofPresident Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the U.N. set atarget of 20% female officers for the new Liberianpolice by 2014. The U.N. also set a goal to drawdown its troops by 2010, though this deadline waslater pushed back. It was imperative thatUNMIL not only establish a domestic securityforce but also provide the mentoring and capacitybuilding to ensure that a vibrant domestic securitycapability existed upon its exit.Joseph Kekula, former deputy director foradministration and Massaquoi’s successor asinspector general from 2004 to 2006, promotedreforms to the ranking system as well. Kekula hadserved in the Liberian police for 20 years until1997, when he fled the country amid renewedhostilities. He returned in 2003. Because themilitary and the police had become intertwinedduring the war, the ranking system was confusingand overly militaristic. Kekula said military rankshad the potential to make Liberian officers feeland act like they were soldiers. Changing andstandardizing ranks “helped us demilitarize thepolice,” he said. In addition to eliminatingmilitary ranks such as colonel, Kekula sought tostandardize ranks with other West African policeInnovations for Successful Societiesservices. “We decided that in order to harmonizeour system with the entire region or thesubregion, it was better that we change thenomenclature.” There would no longer be adirector of the police, but rather, as in many otherAfrican countries, an inspector general.GETTING DOWN TO WORKAs UNPOL numbers increased to 518 by theend of the first quarter of 2004, the U.N. began toreclaim police stations throughout Monrovia,Liberia’s capital and largest city. Idris recalledmeeting beneath a tree outside the GermanEmbassy, which housed UNPOL’s first offices, tobrief officers leaving on patrols “just to show somepolice presence and try to bring some sense ofnormalcy back to the city.”In accordance with the peace agreement,Kroeker led the recruitment of 400 former policeto serve as an interim local policing presence. Inearly 2004, the United States governmentprovided US 500,000 to refurbish the NationalPolice Training Academy. Kroeker sent them tothe training academy for just a few weeks beforedeploying them to the Firestone rubber plantationand other key economic holdings to preventbusinesses from forming their own private securityforces. Others were sent to support UNPOL atstations throughout Monrovia.As the security presence in Monroviaexpanded and rebels from the rural countiesstreamed into demobilization camps—part of adisarmament program in which more than100,000 ex-combatants participated—interimpolice increasingly deployed outside Monrovia.U.N. forces drove ex-rebels from police stationsand began work on “quick impact” projects suchas reopening the facilities and building new ones.Idris recalled, “We were able to open up mostof the police stations that were closed for virtuallysome 10 to 15 years during these conflicts. Wesent our officers there. Then, gradually, some ofthese volunteer officers, some of the former, old 2011, Trustees of Princeton UniversityTerms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties.ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: iss@princeton.edu.4

Jonathan FriedmanLNP officers started to come in to render someassistance at the police stations. This is prior tothe time we started basic training.”Recruitment and vettingBefore general recruitment could begin inearly 2004, Kroeker and the Rule of LawImplementation Committee had to decidewhether to allow the thousands of former policeofficers to maintain their positions. Thecommittee decided to deactivate all former policeand invite them to apply to join the new policeservice, undergo a vetting process, give up theirformer ranks and go through basic training. Idrisexplained that the thinking was that most“genuine” police probably had fled their stationsduring the war, and that the ones who remainedlikely had ties to rebel groups. The U.N.’sRestructuring and Recruiting Section conductedthe vetting. Of the nearly 3,000 officers whoregistered, only 756—or about one of every four—qualified to participate in the new police service.People who were close to the process differedover the merit of the decision to deactivate formerofficers. Peter Zaizay, former deputy minister fornational security, said the mass deactivation wasunfair to experienced officers. “It means that allof your training, your first training you had towork with the organization and your experienceyou accumulated over the years, are given noconsideration,” Zaizay said. “So some of the guys,most of the experienced guys, felt that washumiliating or demeaning.” Assistant Minister ofJustice Asatu Bah-Kenneth, who was CommunityService Chair with the Liberian police at the timeof deactivation, thought the process posed “amajor challenge,” and she indicated that one resultof the decision was that “there was no institutionalmemory.” Cecil Griffiths, president of the LiberiaNational Law Enforcement Agency, a civil societyorganization that promotes professionalism in lawenforcement agencies, lamented the fact that someofficers with 30 or 40 years of service weredismissed without a retirement package orInnovations for Successful Societieshonoring ceremony, and he said the massdeactivation contributed to a lack of discipline andinsufficient respect for officials who previouslyhad held higher ranks. A 2009 study by theInternational Crisis Group found that someobservers were critical of the vetting process forbeing too lax and not weeding out enoughhuman-rights violators, while others criticized theprocess for eliminating too many officers withvaluable policing experience.After the Restructuring and RecruitingSection had vetted the former police, thecommittee set out to establish standards for newrecruits. Rather than imposing outside standards,he sought to build on Liberia’s police practicesfrom before the war. “I could see that there was aremnant of the golden age of policing in Liberiawhere they had standards, and there was once apolice academy and you had these ranks and therewas pride,” Kroeker said. “That pride didn’t goaway, the pride of being a professional police.”The standards the Rule of LawImplementation Committee set for new recruitswere similar to those used in other post-conflictcontexts. All recruits were required to have a highschool diploma, to have a good reputation in thecommunity, to be physically fit, and to have norecord of war crimes, though few records existedof war crimes in Liberia. Recruits had to pass awritten exam that tested basic arithmetic skills andscenario-based essay writing. For example, oneessay question asked recruits to assess theperformance of a senior policeman shot in the legafter intervening to defuse a riot. Recruits alsounderwent interviews during which they wereasked to describe why they wanted to join thepolice service, to list the basic duties of officers,and to identify facts about Liberia including thesignificance of the national seal and flag.Individuals under the age of 18 or over 55 wereineligible to apply, as were ex-combatants.To entice applicants, the Recruiting Sectionlaunched a marketing campaign aimed atovercoming concerns about the service’s poor 2011, Trustees of Princeton UniversityTerms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties.ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: iss@princeton.edu.5

Jonathan Friedmanreputation and meager initial wages. Helicoptersdropped leaflets stressing the importance of thepolice and encouraging individuals to sign up.Police representatives sponsored communityforums and went door-to-door and visitedschools. The U.N. showcased police vehicles suchas helicopters and motorcycles during theserecruitment campaigns.In vetting recruits, Recruiting Sectionofficials verified recruits’ personal information andtried to uncover any past disqualifying activities.Officials sent high school certificates to the WestAfrican Examinations Council to verify theirauthenticity. They published the names ofrecruits in newspapers for approximately a week,asking readers to come forward with informationthat might disqualify applicants. They analyzedwhat few criminal records remained from beforethe war and sent names of recruits to villageleaders in the recruits’ hometowns, to humanrights groups and to Liberia’s intelligenceagencies. Complaint boxes were set up for peopleto submit their concerns in writing.Although Idris considered the vetting processto be “aggressive,” when compared to the vettingprocess for Liberian military recruits carried outby U.S. contractor DynCorp International, theRecruiting Section appeared vastly undermannedand under-resourced. In a 2008 study written forthe Strategic Studies Institute entitled “SecuritySector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results fromHumble Beginnings,” Mark Malan, a formerSouth African military officer and lecturer at theSouth African Military Academy, foundsignificant differences. Whereas DynCorpofficials were expected to vet one recruit per day,Recruiting Section officials were expected to vetfive. Additionally, DynCorp officials were giventhe time and resources to visit recruits’hometowns whereas Recruiting Section officialslacked means of transportation to do the same.Innovations for Successful SocietiesThe vetting process had other shortcomings.Aaron Weah, of the International Center forTransitional Justice, a nonprofit human-rightsorganization based in New York, remarked thatthe use of newspapers as a primary means ofvetting was shortsighted in a context in whichlarge segments of the population were illiterateand lacked access to printed news sources,particularly in rural areas. Further, there was nolarge-scale information dissemination about whatthe vetting process entailed. Many Liberians didnot understand it.Zaizay, the former deputy security minister,thought the requirement to provide proof of highschool completion was too stringent in light ofLiberia’s recent history. “Peoples’ homes wereburned, peoples’ documents were destroyed,” hesaid. “Now the insistence was that you mustproduce documents. Some of the schools thatpeople went to no longer existed. They had eitherbeen destroyed or in ruins. Now most institutionsdid not have records to trace, no records of thesestudents.”William Mulbah, deputy director for trainingand development at the National Police TrainingAcademy, thought the Recruiting Section’s lack ofany Liberian staff hurt its effectiveness. Manycitizens had assumed different names during thewar, and thousands had been displaced. Somerecruits might have given vetting officials false orincomplete information about their identities orhometowns to mislead officials and hideinformation about their pasts. Mulbah saidLiberians, better acquainted with Liberia’s historyof war and geographic and ethnic makeup, werebetter suited to assess the veracity of recruits’claims.TrainingThe first recruiting class began training at theacademy in July 2004. Trainers relied on a basic 2011, Trustees of Princeton UniversityTerms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties.ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: iss@princeton.edu.6

Jonathan Friedmancurriculum similar to those the U.N. had used inother post-conflict contexts. The trainingincluded nine weeks of academy training followedby 16 weeks of field training and a four-weekacademy capstone program.Dag Dahlen, a Norwegian police officer withmore than 30 years’ experience, including duty inLebanon, Kosovo and Afghanistan, arrived inLiberia in 2006 as UNPOL’s Training andDevelopment Coordinator. Among Dahlen’sinitial suggestions was to update the academy’scurriculum based on new revisions to U.N. policetraining protocol in post-conflict contexts,drawing from the training format used in Kosovoand later in East Timor. He felt that thecurriculum being used at the time emphasizedproducing officers quickly and was better suitedfor training interim police officers than training aviable long-term force, or, as in the case ofKosovo, where local police had a strong UNPOLpresence to support them in the field.Shortly after the first round of recruits begantheir official duties, public complaints emergedabout brutal and unfair tactics. Zaizay said thatimportant issues—ethics, discipline andspecialized training—were not adequately coveredduring early trainings. Dag Dahlen agreed. “Theproblem we see in peacekeeping missions fromprofessional police officers’ point of view is thatwe [were] putting quantity before quality,”Dahlen said. “It is important to deploy people assoon as possible to enforce security. But it onlycomes back to you later if you have poor policeofficer training.”In order to maintain continuity, UNPOLdecided that the academy would continue to useits original curriculum until it reached its goal oftraining 3,500 officers. However, the UNPOLcommissioner, Mohammed Alhassan, approvedDahlen’s proposal to develop a trainingcurriculum that would include six months ofacademy training and six months of field training.The revised curriculum would incorporate newnational legislation on democratic policing andInnovations for Successful Societiesreflect best practices in other West Africancountries such as Ghana and Nigeria. Overall,Dahlen said, the goal was to develop “an Africanstandard training program” that reflected theWest African context and that was in line withhow other West African countries conductedpolice training. The new curriculum would bemore scenario-based and would incorporate morepractical exercises than the previous curriculum.The academy also aimed to increase thenumber of Liberian trainers. Initially, mosttrainers at the academy were international policeofficers, but since 2006 attempts had been madeto build a stronger indigenous training capacity.Problems hindered the effort. Deactivation hadeliminated some of the academy’s most senior andexperienced officers. New officers lacked thepractical experience to serve as effective trainersand relied on the assistance of their internationalcounterparts.The academy brought in several UNPOLtechnical advisers from West Africa to providementoring and monitoring support to Liberianofficers. Capacity building was a central aim.Typically, said Dahlen, UNPOL civic-matterexperts took the lead in developing curriculum,including in areas such as criminal investigationand community policing. UNPOL taught thefirst course. A designated Liberian officer assistedin teaching the second course and thereafter wasresponsible for teaching and sustaining courses.The academy inaugurated the new trainingcurriculum in January 2008 for a class of 123students. Every student received five new trainingmanuals, with topics including general policing,crime investigation, defensive tactics, nationallegislation and general administration. Manualscovered policies and procedures and emphasized agreater degree of report writing and statementtaking than previous curricula.After the classroom component, recruits weresent for in-service training with field officers atdifferent police posts around Monrovia. Theseofficers were assigned eight recruits apiece, on 2011, Trustees of Princeton UniversityTerms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties.ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: iss@princeton.edu.7

Jonathan Friedmanaverage—a relatively workable ratio of trainers torecruits. Recruits rotated through police stations,working on topics that included procedures,criminal investigations, community policing,traffic control and patrol duties. The trainingofficers reported recruits’ progress each Friday tothe academy. In order to pass the field training,recruits were required to pass three of five exitexaminations. Originally, questions had beenmultiple choice, and the exams did not testrecruits’ reading and writing skills. ThoughEnglish mastery and a high school education wererecruitment requirements, many recruits facedproblems meeting the new testing requirement.Citing report writing as a critical butunderdeveloped skill, the academy attempted tobring officers trained under the previouscurriculum up to speed. In March 2008, UNPOLsponsored in-service training for police academygraduates that included topics such as reportwriting, statement taking, and interviewtechniques, important skills in gathering evidenceand conducting police investigations. Althoughthe initial aim was to hold workshops throughoutthe country, problems with transportation, limitedtraining infrastructure, lack of accommodationsfor officers, and logistical considerations posedchallenges to broad implementation.Dahlen said that while management trainingfor middle- and senior-level officers requiredadditional attention and investment, Liberia had apromising model in place that involved nineweeks of senior management training. After fourweeks of training at the academy, thecommissioner or other senior manager workedwith a UNPOL technical adviser who providedcoaching and assisted with project work for theremaining five weeks. Rather than culminate in atraditional examination, the training finished witha service delivery project in which thecommissioner had to identify ways to deliver aspecified task and then justify his or herperformance. Some senior Liberian officers werealso sent for a 10-week command and controlInnovations for Successful Societiescourse in the U.K. and received training from theU.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation onintelligence gathering, human and drugtrafficking, and international terrorism.4SpecializationPlanners set up two specialized units tocounter high-risk threats. The EmergencyResponse Unit (ERU) was to take the lead incountering threats that did not warrant thedomestic use of the military but were beyond thecapabilities and mandate of the police. The ideacame from a 2007 RAND Corporation report5that highlighted the risk of renewed insurge

BUILDING CIVILIAN POLICE CAPACITY: POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA, 2003 - 2011 SYNOPSIS As Liberia began to emerge from civil war in 2003, the warring sides agreed to overhaul the discredited national police service. In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Ghana, the parties designated the United Nations as the lead body in rebuilding