December 2010 Carl Forsberg AFGHANISTAN REPORT 7 CounterinsurgenCy In .

COUNTERINSURGENCYin K a nda h a rEvaluating the 2010 Hamkari CampaignBy Carl ForsbergIntroductionDuring the summer of 2010, the International Security and Assistance Force(ISAF) launched Hamkari, a comprehensive military and political effortto secure Kandahar Province.1 Hamkari, or “Cooperation” in Pashto and Dari,involved both a series of aggressive military operations to deny the Taliban controlof key terrain around the city and a civil-military effort to improve governance anddevelopment.Control of Kandahar is critical to the legitimacyof both the Taliban movement and the Karzaigovernment. Kandahar is the political keystoneof the Afghan South. It is the home of PresidentKarzai, the birthplace of the Taliban movement,the former de facto capital of the Talibangovernment, and since 2002, the chief objectiveof the Taliban insurgency. Despite Kandahar’smilitary and political importance, ISAF failedto prioritize the province from 2005 to 2009,allowing much of the population to fall underthe Taliban’s control or influence. After GeneralStanley McChrystal took command of ISAF in2009, the coalition reoriented its focus, andKandahar and neighboring Helmand wereidentified as the operational main effort in theISAF Joint Command’s campaign plan.Hamkari marks a critical shift in battlefieldmomentum in Kandahar. The Taliban hadlong used safe-havens and strongholds in keyterrain outside of Kandahar City to enable itsfighters and Improvised Explosive Device (IED)and intimidation cells to successfully control orinfluence the population of Kandahar and toattack ISAF and limit its freedom of movement.Beginning in late July 2010, a series of sequentialmutually reinforcing operations enabled by asurge of U.S. forces cleared and took key terrainthat the insurgents had long used to sustaintheir operations across Kandahar province anddestroyed critical enemy infrastructure. ISAFhas committed forces to holding the terrain itwww.Understandingwar.orghas seized and has implemented programs to winthe support of the local population and preventTaliban re-infiltration.As of November 2010, Afghan and ISAF forceshad neutralized the Taliban’s ability to conductoperations and control the population in centralKandahar province. The Taliban will likelyreconstitute in other provinces and in Pakistanand mount a counter-offensive in the springof 2011. The success of coalition forces willdepend on their ability to prevent insurgentre-infiltration, break the Taliban’s control andinfluence over the population, and addressthe fundamental drivers of instability in theprovince.2 If the coalition can prevent the Talibanfrom seriously contesting Kandahar in 2011, itwill likely damage the insurgents’ credibility as arival to the Afghan government.The Hamkari process is backed by a civilianstrategy with increased resources to addressgovernance and development challenges. Theinternational coalition’s governance efforts havefocused on building the Afghan government’sadministrative and service delivery capacity. It isunclear, however, it this approach is sufficient forrehabilitating the Afghan government’s legitimacy.Predatory and corrupt government and a cultureof impunity are more fundamental causes of thegovernment’s loss of legitimacy in Kandaharthan are its failure to provide services or fillmanning rosters. To turn operational progressinto strategic success, the Afghan government9

afghanistan report 7 COUNTERINSURGENCY in Kandahar C. forsberg DECEMBER 2010MAP 2 KANDAHAR PROVINCEwww.Understandingwar.org10

afghanistan report 7 COUNTERINSURGENCY in Kandahar C. forsberg DECEMBER 2010and international coalition must ensure that theyidentify and addresses the underlying issues thathave undermined Kandahar’s long-term stability.strategically important Highway One in Zhari. Inrecent years the Taliban have used these districtsfor similar purposes.6This paper begins by summarizing the terrain andenemy system in Kandahar and briefly profiles theTaliban’s summer 2010 campaign. It then narratesthe progress of coalition military operations inArghandab, Zhari, and Panjwai districts. Thethird section considers the Taliban’s reaction tothe loss of safe-havens in central Kandahar andexamines the role Kandahar’s outlying districtsmay play in the future. The report concludesby outlining and evaluating the coalition’sgovernance strategy and analyzing Hamkari in itsbroader political context.Many of the Taliban’s senior leaders come fromZhari and Panjwai, and insurgents there benefitfrom tribal and family ties. These districts arepopulated by pockets of different tribes, includingsome – the Eshaqzai and Noorzai tribes of theDurrani confederation and smaller pockets ofnon-Durrani tribes – which are more connectedto the Taliban than to the Afghan government.7The tribes in which a higher proportion ofmembers benefit from Kandahar’s post-Talibanpolitical economy - including the Barakzai andPopalzai - are less common in Zhari and Panjwai,and more likely to be found in Kandahar City orDand and Daman districts.8 Arghandab districthas historically been the preserve of the Alokozaitribe, which saw its stake in the Kandahargovernment gradually decrease since 2002, butthere are also pockets of Sayeeds, Kakar, andGhilzai. These tribes are more receptive to theTaliban and helped the insurgents establish afoothold in the district.9 (For a fuller descriptionof Kandahar’s tribal makeup, see “Power andPolitics in Kandahar,” pgs 11-17).Terrain and Enemy SystemThe Taliban in Kandahar have configured theiractivities according to the human and physicalgeography of the province. The majority of thepopulation lives in central Kandahar, eitherin Kandahar City (the population of which isestimated at between 500,000 and 1,000,000)or in Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai, the denselycultivated districts that lie along the ArghandabRiver.3 Kandahar City itself has seen significantgrowth in the past five years, as displaced personsmoved to the city to escape conflict in outlyingdistricts.4Zhari, Arghandab, and Panjwai form theagricultural basin that sustains Kandahar City. Abelt of land in these districts, extending severalmiles north and south of the Arghandab River,has been intensely cultivated for centuries and isfamous for its almonds, grapes, pomegranates,and more recently, poppy. These districts havealso served as key terrain for insurgents, whohave taken advantage of the cover provided by thecanals that criss-cross the districts, small villageswith fortified compounds, thick orchards, andfields of four-foot high mounds of earth usedto grow grapes.5 During the anti-Soviet Jihadin the 1980s, the mujahideen used Zhari, Panjwai,and Arghandab as bases from which they wouldinfiltrate Kandahar City and launch attacks on thewww.Understandingwar.orgTo the north of Kandahar are the southernfoothills of the Hindu Kush. The valleys andbasins of Shah Wali Kot, Mian Neshin, Khakrez,and Ghorak districts are interspersed with smallvillages and a patchwork of tribes, includingPopalzai, Alizai, and Alokozai, along with pocketsof Ghilzai and Ishaqzai.10 The Taliban have longcontrolled and had freedom of movement acrossthese northern districts.11To the east of Kandahar City are Daman,Arghistan, and Spin Boldak districts, where thelandscape is flatter and marked by scrub andintermittent cultivation. While the Taliban havea presence in these areas, the terrain has madethem less permissive for insurgent operations,and the government has more connections to thePopalzai, Barakzai, and Achekzai tribes in thesedistricts.12 The southern half of the province isoccupied by the immense Registan Desert. Thedesert is traversable and has long been used by11

afghanistan report 7 COUNTERINSURGENCY in Kandahar C. forsberg DECEMBER 2010smugglers and, during the anti-Soviet Jihad andthe past decade, for insurgents moving from safehavens in Pakistan.13From 2003 to 2009, the Taliban conducteda series of offensives to take terrain aroundKandahar City. Control of this terrain hasenabled the Taliban to influence the populationand to attack coalition forces.14 ISAF operationsin 2010 revealed that the Taliban built asophisticated physical and human infrastructureof IED factories, weapons and supply caches, anddefensive positions in areas under their control.These facilitation networks supported andsustained Taliban operations across the province.As early as 2003, Taliban fighters moved intoZabul province and the hills of Shah Wali Kotdistrict north of Kandahar City.15 The insurgentsmade important gains in 2005 and 2006, when,in addition to seizing much of neighboringHelmand province, the Taliban moved into Zhariand Panjwai districts.16 These districts have sinceserved as key terrain for the insurgency, whichused the districts as bases from which to organizeand conduct attacks close to Kandahar City.17From 2006 to 2009, ISAF was never able todislodge or seriously threaten the Taliban’ssafe-haven in Zhari and Panjwai. A numberof military operations, rarely with more than abattalion’s worth of troops, took specific objectivesin these districts and sometimes briefly heldthem.18 Yet the Taliban continued to hold themajority of the “green zone,” an area of thickvegetation, orchards, vineyards and clusters ofvillages extending several miles north and southof the Arghandab River. The enemy used thisterrain to conduct a devastating IED campaignagainst coalition forces, which made it difficult forISAF to establish a more permanent presence.19From 2007 to early 2009, the Taliban usedtheir bases in Zhari and Panjwai to extend theirinfluence into several key areas which controlledmovement into and out of Kandahar City. In2008, the Taliban took Arghandab district.20Situated along the Arghandab River to thenorth of Kandahar City, Arghandab is criticalterrain. The canals, vegetation, and orchardswww.Understandingwar.orgare even more difficult to traverse than in Zharior Panjwai, and the district directly bordersKandahar City. The Taliban subordinated themajority Alokozai tribe in Arghandab followingan intense intimidation campaign that capitalizedon the death of the tribal leader and famousmujahideen fighter Mullah Naqib.21 Controlover parts of Arghandab was achieved by the endof 2008 and gave the Taliban safe-havens thatcontrolled the northern approach to the city.22In Zhari, the Taliban extended their controlto include the town of Senjaray, a key town thestraddles the strategically important HighwayOne.23 To the south of Kandahar City, theinsurgents expanded into Dand district and thesouthern suburbs of Kandahar City.24 ISAFrelied on a small and overtaxed Afghan forces, abattalion of Canadian troops, and Special Forcessupport to defend these critical districts until thesecond half of 2009, and was unable to contestthe Taliban’s advance.25The Taliban’s capture of key terrain aroundKandahar City allowed the insurgents to influenceand intimidate the population of the city itself.Sanctuaries in Zhari, Panjwai, and Arghandabsupported bomb-making and IED factories,allowed the basing of insurgent fighters and theorganization of complex attacks, and were usedfor shadow courts to which the Taliban wouldsummon Kandahar City residents.26 Withinthe city, the Taliban conducted dramatic attackson Afghan government targets and undertookan assassination and intimidation campaign todissuade the population of Kandahar City fromsupporting or assisting the Afghan government.27By the summer of 2009, the enemy system inKandahar was thus deeply entrenched. It wasresilient enough to withstand ISAF and coalitioncounter-terrorism operations designed tocapture and kill its leadership. ISAF disruptionoperations similarly were unable to have seriousor lasting effects on the enemy system, as thecoalition could rarely hold ground and oftenavoided the areas of greatest importance tothe Taliban. ISAF was also diverted from keyenemy strongholds by the need to focus on12

afghanistan report 7 COUNTERINSURGENCY in Kandahar C. forsberg DECEMBER 2010force protection and secure its own lines ofcommunication (LOCs) against IED attacks.Disruption operations continued to characterizeISAF’s activity into early 2010. The 5th StrykerBrigade Combat Team (BCT) provided the firstsignificant reinforcements for ISAF’s presencein Kandahar when it deployed in August2009; however, its efforts were not linked to abroader plan to dismantle the enemy system inKandahar.28 The 5th Stryker BCT devoted muchof its efforts to disruption operations, routesecurity, and civil affairs, missions that would helpsupport the surge of U.S. forces into Kandaharin mid-2010, but which did not represent afundamental departure from ISAF’s previousstrategy.29Only in Dand did a shift in approach occur bymid-2009. Enabled to consolidate their forcesby U.S. reinforcements, Canadian forces adopteda population-centric approach designed tosecure and hold operationally important villagesin Dand. The effort improved security in thedistrict and thwarted Taliban attempts to makeinroads in Dand. The Canadians were aided bylocal Popalzai and Barakzai leadership, which hadcloser ties to the ruling elite in Kandahar Cityand was emboldened to resist the Taliban by theCanadian presence.30Enabled by a surge in U.S. force levels, Hamkarirepresents a fundamental and consistent shiftin the ISAF approach to Kandahar, as ISAF hasboth directly targeted Taliban sanctuaries in thedistricts which gave sustenance to their networkand prepared itself to hold the ground it seizes.The Lead-up to Hamkari:Deployment, Shaping Operations,and the Taliban’s Summer 2010OffensiveIn December 2009, U.S. President BarackObama committed 30,000 additional U.S.troops to Afghanistan. ISAF committed a portionof the new forces to Kandahar, including the2nd BCT of the 101st Airborne Division, the 525Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, and a militarywww.Understandingwar.orgpolice (MP) battalion. ISAF also transferredseveral U.S. army battalions to Kandahar fromelsewhere in Afghanistan.31 Regional Command(RC) South, a divisional headquarters under thecommand of British Major General Nick Carter,took primary responsibility for planning how theadditional troops were used.In April 2010, ISAF emphasized that Hamkariwould be a comprehensive civil-military processto improve governance and increase securityrather than only a military operation.32 In earlyJune 2010, ISAF commander General StanleyMcChrystal announced that security operationsin Kandahar City would unfold more slowly thaninitially expected.33 General McChrystal statedthat additional Afghan forces had not yet deployedto Kandahar, and that more time was requiredfor political engagement, so that conditions couldbe “shaped politically with the local leaders, withthe people.”34 The delay was driven partly by thedeployment timelines for the additional U.S. andAfghan troops sent to Kandahar. Building theinfrastructure to base and supply thousands ofnew American troops, as well as an unprecedentedsurge in Afghan National Army (ANA) forces toKandahar Province, posed a significant logisticschallenge and appears to have taken longer thanexpected.35 The last of the new U.S. combatbattalions assigned to Zhari finally moved intoposition with its partnered Afghan units in lateAugust 2010, and major operations commencedshortly thereafter.36The media attention given to the then upcomingoperation in Kandahar throughout the springof 2010 created a disconnect between publicexpectations and the actual timeline followed bythe operation. Afghan and Western media outletsdrew significant attention to pending operationin Kandahar in March and April 2010, afterISAF conducted clearing operations in Marjah.37When operations did not commence in June2010, as had been widely expected, it promptedsignificant speculation, and some commentatorsquestioned whether operations in Kandaharwould materialize at all.3813

afghanistan report 7 COUNTERINSURGENCY in Kandahar C. forsberg DECEMBER 2010Enemy Situation: The Taliban’s Summer 2010CampaignWhile ISAF was preparing for Hamkari, theTaliban launched a violent summer campaign inKandahar. The Taliban took seriously ISAF’sannouncement of an impending operation anddevoted resources to maintaining their influence.In the spring and summer of 2010, the Talibansurged fighters into the province and attemptedtheir own offensive. Insurgent attacks over thesummer of 2010 reached an intensity unmatchedin previous years.39 This Taliban surge failed tohave a marked effect on ISAF operations, thoughits effects on the Afghan population are harder tojudge.Propaganda by the Taliban’s Pakistan-basedleadership in 2010 demonstrates the priority theinsurgents placed on countering the pendingISAF campaign. Throughout the summerand fall, Taliban propaganda claimed that theinsurgents were “dominant in Helmand andKandahar Provinces as they have always been,”and boasted that they would maintain controlover Kandahar City and the surroundingcountryside.40 Taliban rhetoric and operationssuggest that the insurgents believed needed todemonstrate a continued capacity to conductoperations in order to retain influence over thepopulation.The Taliban’s summer campaign had twoelements. The first was escalated direct fireassaults on U.S. forces, combined with IEDattacks, both designed to defend Taliban freedomof movement and to place ISAF on the defensiveand prevent the coalition from attacking insurgentsafe-havens and facilitation zones. The secondwas an intense intimidation campaign to maintaincontrol over the population.Taliban attacks on coalition forces were greatestin Zhari, Panjwai, and Arghandab districts. Theparticular dynamics of these districts are describedin greater detail in subsequent sections, butthere were some common elements to Talibanoperations in central Kandahar. The Talibanattempted to use escalated small arms and mortarwww.Understandingwar.orgattacks in conjunction with sophisticated IED beltsto pin ISAF in a defensive posture and to limit thecoalition’s freedom of movement. 41 By placingISAF on the defensive, the Taliban could defendthe key LOCs, IED making facilities, and fortifiedstrongholds which the insurgents used to supporttheir attacks across the province. Until 2010,these insurgent tactics were effective, causingISAF to focus on securing its own LOCs and on

AFGHANISTAN REPORT 7 Carl Forsberg. December 2010. CounterinsurgenCy in Kandahar. Cover Photograph: Canadian soldiers of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, along with Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, took part in a partnered dismounted . patrol around the Panjwai'i District in Kandahar province, Oct. 7, 2010.