Between State And Market: Protection Gap Entities And Catastrophic Risk
Between State and Market: ProtectionGap Entities and Catastrophic RiskProfessor Paula Jarzabkowski, Dr Konstantinos Chalkias,Dr Eugenia Cacciatori and Dr Rebecca Bednarek
2 Paula Jarzabkowski, 26th June 2018.No part of this report to be reproduced or referenced without appropriate citation to: Jarzabkowski,P., K. Chalkias, E. Cacciatori, R. Bednarek, (2018). Between State and Market: Protection Gap Entitiesand Catastrophic Risk. Cass Business School, City, University of London, 26th June 2018.We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of our sponsors, below, that enabled us to conductthe research for this report. Their sponsorship does not imply any endorsement of the resultsreported and any analysis, findings or errors are totally our own.
Between State and Market: ProtectionGap Entities and Catastrophic RiskExecutive summaryThe protection gap. The economic and social impact of disasters is increasing all around theworld. In 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria were so destructive as they swept through theCaribbean that they decimated many of these small island economies. Even in a wealthy countrylike the USA, the economic impact of these natural disasters was enormous. In recent years,earthquakes dealt a blow to Mexico, France saw the worst rains in 50 years with floods peaking inParis, typhoons and storms shook the Philippines and Hong Kong, and wildfires ravaged Californiaand Australia.Yet, the economic losses from such disasters are underinsured. In what is known as the protectiongap, some 70% of global losses from natural catastrophes are not insured, equating to 1.3trillion over the past 10 years. In 2017 alone, uninsured losses for weather-related disasterswere estimated to be around 180 billion. At the same time, other forms of large-scale risk, suchas terrorism, cyberattacks and pandemics are also increasing, with little financial protection toaddress the aftermath.The social and economic resilience of a country, and its political stability, are dependent on theability to recover from disasters. In the short-term, immediate post-crisis financial response iscritical. Failure to provide a rapid injection of capital in response to disaster puts lives at risk. InPuerto Rico, the death toll of Hurricane Maria rose above 4,000, with one-third of the deaths beingcaused by delayed or interrupted medical care. In the longer-term, reconstruction of housing,infrastructure and businesses after a disaster is essential for recovery. Bridging the protection gapprovides one way to underpin such financial recovery.Protection Gap Entities (PGEs): Marrying market solutions to social objectives. In theirquest to address some of their social objectives in protecting their citizens from disaster,governments are increasingly turning to market solutions, such as innovative means of insuringfor potential loss. They do so through the establishment of Protection Gap Entities (PGEs) thatoperate between state and market in developing novel solutions/schemes that mobilize global(re)insurance capital in addressing the aftermath of disaster.This report draws on a large-scale research study of different PGEs around the world, in bothdeveloped and developing economies, to explain their role, their effects and their limitations inmanaging risk and alleviating the financial consequences of disaster. While such governmentinterventions are growing, lessons need to be learnt about how to maximize their positive effectsand guard against potential unintended consequences that can exacerbate the protection gap.This report shows the strategic implications of different types of PGEs, what they may be best usedfor, and how they can evolve to better help society and government to protect against the growingthreats of natural and manmade disasters.Who should read this report? This report is useful for the different stakeholders involved inthe work of PGEs: from policy makers and governments, to NGOs, to those running PGEs orinsurance market organizations. These stakeholders often have very different interests and goals,which are reflected in the way they understand the purpose of PGEs and insurance. This reportprovides valuable insights into the common features of PGEs, and also examines some of theirkey differences, providing an opportunity for learning across stakeholders, PGEs, sectors andcountries.1
2ContentsContentsSECTION 1.INTRODUCTIONSECTION 2.ORIGINATION AND OBJECTIVES OF PROTECTION GAP ENTITIES (PGES)6678910SECTION 3.IN THE PRESENCE OF A MATURE INSURANCE MARKET: MARKET DYNAMICS12121519SECTION 4.PROTECTION FOR SOVEREIGNS: INSURANCE AS A DISASTER LIQUIDITY PRODUCT202021222425SECTION 5.BRIDGING AND REDUCING THE PROTECTION GAP: PGES’ ROLE IN RESILIENCE2525262727SECTION 6.PROTECTION GAP ENTITIES OR STOPGAP ENTITIES?2930303031SECTION 7.CONCLUSION. LEARNING FROM PGE EXPERIENCES: A .42.5Protection Gap EntitiesThe protection gapStakeholders overviewSocial and market imperativesBridging and reducing the gapReport mapPGE origination: An ‘uneasy’ truce amongst stakeholdersObjective 1: Resolve disruption in (re)insurance supply in mature marketsObjective 2: Mitigate the threat of unaffordable insurance in mature marketsObjective 3: Increase the financial viability of sovereign states with fragile economiesBeyond markets: PGEs’ roles in framing the protection gap debate and in building expertise3.1 Protection Gap Strategic Response Framework: Types of market interventions3.2 Market effect: Strategic positions in the value chain3.3 ulating insurance as disaster liquidityPGEs in relation to social and market stakeholdersBenefits of disaster liquidity productsEnabling conditions for successSummaryPGEs’ role in risk identificationPGEs role in risk reduction and resilient reconstructionPGEs role in disaster preparednessSummaryMismatch 1: PGE remit does not match stakeholders’ expectationsMismatch 2: When addressing one problem creates anotherMismatch 3: PGE (ir)relevance in the face of an evolving ESTABLE AND FIGURES38Table 1.1Figure 3.1Figure 3.2Figure 3.3Figure 3.4Figure 3.5Figure 5.1Figure 6.1412161617182529The protection gap in developing economies, 2017Protection Gap Strategic Response FrameworkValue chain for risk transferStrategic position 1: Insurer PGEStrategic position 2: Reinsurer PGEStrategic position 3: Market Capture PGEPGE Resilience FrameworkPGE Evolution Framework
Between State and Market: ProtectionGap Entities and Catastrophic RiskSECTION 1.Introduction1.1 PROTECTION GAP ENTITIESThe challenges posed by the growing catastrophe insuranceprotection gap, particularly those of rebuilding in the aftermathof disaster, have prompted the generation of entities, which welabel Protection Gap Entities (PGEs). These PGEs bring togethermarket and non-market stakeholders in an effort to addressthe protection gap. They differ considerably in governance,political economies, points of origin, perils, and means offunding loss1,2,3(see Exhibit 1). Yet PGEs have the samebroad goal:To transform uninsured risk into insurance-based productsthat can be transferred into global financial markets to providecapital for recovery following a disaster.This report examines the nature, characteristics and activitiesof PGEs. It provides information for the diverse stakeholdersinvolved in some aspect of the work of PGEs, from policymakers to those running PGEs or depending upon them forfinancial products. These stakeholders often have very differentunderstandings about the insurance market and the remit oftheir own and other PGEs. The report will therefore provideinsights into the common features of these entities and someof their key differences, providing an opportunity for learningacross stakeholders, PGEs, sectors and countries.In this section we first define the protection gap, and thenprovide an overview of some key common elements across thePGEs examined in our research study: the multiple and diversestakeholders with whom they engage, the tension betweenthe pursuit of market and social objectives that characterisesthese stakeholders, and the tension PGEs face betweenpursuing their mission strictly by developing financial productsto ‘bridge’ the protection gap or expanding their remit toalso ‘reduce’ the gap through improved physical resilienceto disaster. This information provides the background for theanalysis presented in this report.Examples of PGEsCaribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), amulti-sovereign risk pool set up to provide its memberStates with access to rapid capital for responding to theaftermath of natural disasters as diverse as tropical cyclone,earthquake, and excess rainfall.California Earthquake Authority (CEA), a privately funded,publicly managed PGE set up to support the primaryinsurance market in providing earthquake insurance toCalifornian homeowners.Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation (ARPC), a terrorismreinsurance pool set up to provide reinsurance to insurancecompanies offering terrorism cover on commercialbusinesses in Australia.1.2 THE PROTECTION GAPThe term ‘insurance protection gap’ refers to the gap betweenthe insured and actual economic losses caused by large-scalecatastrophic events. Some 70% of global losses from naturalcatastrophes are uninsured, equating to 1.3 trillion overthe past 10 years.4 Indeed, uninsured natural disaster lossesfor weather-related risks are estimated to be around 180billion in 2017. Significant gaps in protection exist not only fornatural disasters but also for other large-scale threats such asterrorism, cybercrime and epidemics. This gap is a problem inboth developed and developing economies.Impact. Economic resources are crucial in allowing societies torecover from devastating disasters. In the absence of adequateinsurance, the burden of paying for losses falls largely oncitizens, governments or aid organizations, with significantimpact upon already straining government budgets, andeconomic and social hardship for those affected.5The growing exposure to disaster was shown in 2017; a veryactive year for natural catastrophes, with earthquakes, floodsand hurricanes inflicting devastation on communities aroundthe world. As Table 1.1 shows, the impact was particularlysevere in developing economies. In these countries, whereinsurance penetration is typically low and governmentsand citizens have few financial reserves, losses fromcatastrophic disasters can devastate the economy, rolling backdevelopment gains for the country and exacerbating globalinequality.6 Protecting the GDP is critical for such countries,which are more vulnerable, proportionally, to the losses fromlarge-scale events than developed economies.3
4Section 1Table 1.1The Protection Gap in developing and developed economies, 2017RegionEconomic lossesInsured lossesin USD bnin USD .712.050.6%11.749.4%Latin America & CaribbeanNorth AmericaEurope% of economiclosesProtection Gapin USD bn% of economiclosesAdapted from Swiss Re Institute 4,7Under-insurance is also a concern for developed economies.4,8While the insurance market is developed in these economies,the protection gap is also increasing.4 Such countries typicallyhave high-value assets and infrastructure that, when underinsured, contribute to a wide protection gap. For example,in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey only some 20% ofeligible domestic properties in Texas and Louisiana had floodinsurance.9 Hence, despite their relative economic strength,citizens, businesses and governments in such countiesalso suffer devastating losses that contribute to increasedinequality in the aftermath of a disaster, as shown in Table 1.1.Specifying the protection gap. While the protection gap isa global problem, affecting all countries, and referring to thewhole uninsured population, the uniform use of the term isproblematic. Typically, states and markets direct their effortsto address the protection gap at specific and local protectiongaps, rather than aiming to solve the overall problem of underinsurance. We will see examples in this report of such differentprotection gaps as: a lack of reinsurance capital available toinsurers who write terrorism cover for city-centre businessdistricts; insufficient emergency capital reserves in developingeconomies to maintain essential services after natural disaster;or unaffordable premiums for homeowners in highly exposedflood plains, or in earthquake-prone regions (even in matureinsurance markets).The protection gap as a generic term refers to all uninsuredrisk, but the initiatives attempting to address the protectiongap are specific to particular social, political or economicproblems caused by under-insurance in a region. In this report,therefore, we either specify “the global protection gap” or weuse the term “protection gap” in relation to specific social,political or economic problems in a region, which may beaddressed by insurance.1.3 STAKEHOLDERS OVERVIEWThe existence of a protection gap shows, by definition, thatmarket mechanisms alone are failing to protect againstthe specific peril involved. This prompts governments andinter-governmental organizations to intervene in the market,and generate some form of PGE. These PGEs draw togethergovernment, market and non-market stakeholders withdifferent expertise and interests relevant to the specificprotection gap problem. They may include:Insurance market stakeholders: In markets for risk, suchas flood and terrorism, insurers accept the responsibilityfor paying claims for post-disaster reconstruction in returnfor a premium. Some part of these insurer’s risk of payout istransferred to reinsurers and other capital providers througha range of financial products. Insurers pay a premium to thesecapital providers, who in exchange pay a share of the largescale claims incurred by the insurers following a disaster.Reinsurance capital therefore allows insurance companies toremain solvent after major claims events. This risk transfer isfacilitated by reinsurance brokers. As procuring agents, theysupport the transfer of both capital and information amongstthese parties, helping to make these high-value, highlycomplex deals work.Modellers: Catastrophe models are used to estimate thelikelihood and severity of financial loss from catastrophesbefore they occur. Modellers in academia, government andindustry provide analyses that inform the sophisticatedmathematical and computing models used to understand andprice the risks being transferred. Their work on the impact ofdisasters can also inform improved resilience to disaster.Government: Central government has political, social andeconomic reasons to protect its citizens. Its engagement asa stakeholder usually takes place through various entities,including its Financial Ministries, which aim to protect thegovernment balance sheet; and its Environmental andAgricultural departments, which promote disaster mitigationand resilience. Government is a key stakeholder in theprotection gap problem and usually initiates the developmentof a PGE. Often, government departments are gatekeepers offragmented, but crucial data for understanding disasters.Inter-governmental organizations: Given the global andinterconnected nature of the protection gap problem, intergovernmental organizations can promote mutual interestsacross countries in dealing with disasters. DevelopmentalBanks (e.g. World Bank) and International DevelopmentOrganizations (e.g. the UK’s Department for InternationalDevelopment – DFID) are key actors that bring togethercountries, particularly in the developing world, throughPGEs that develop market-based mechanisms to narrow theprotection gap.
Between State and Market: ProtectionGap Entities and Catastrophic RiskMany of these various stakeholders are to some extent alreadyinterdependent, in ways which will shape the activities of thePGE in which they participate – but the PGE’s activities will inturn modify those interdependencies.1.4 SOCIAL AND MARKET IMPERATIVESThese various stakeholders are characterised by a mix ofdiffering market and social objectives.Governments tend to have a socially-focused understandingof the problem, with an objective to protect their citizens andcommunities from disasters: Government’s role is to protectits citizens and its communities. We have a social responsibilitywith the local population. At the end this is our main mandate;to support them. (Government Stakeholder)“”The (re)insurance industry stakeholders have a market-focusedunderstanding of the problem, with market objectives that canoften clash with the social objectives. For example, insurerscharge premiums that reflect the risk they take and thus forhigh-risk areas they charge a market price that is often highenough to make insurance unaffordable:“Financially it doesn’t make sense [to provide low priceinsurance cover for high-risk areas]. I do get the social thingand there’s a responsibility and a concern for the industry.Affordability is always a concern for the industry but at thesame time, we’re publicly listed companies, we are not charities.We have shareholders, so we have to charge an appropriatepremium. (Market stakeholder)”PGEs are often formed through joint action between thegovernment and/or intergovernmental organizations onthe one side; and various market organizations on theother. Their mandate often requires them to pursue ‘social’objectives through market means. PGEs sit at the nexus of arange of stakeholders, often coordinating or combining thesemarket and social objectives. Therefore, the creation of PGEsintroduces a new type of actor, operating on a market basis butwith a clear social mission.1.5 BRIDGING AND REDUCING THE GAPWhen formed, a PGE’s primary mandate is to provide thecapital to support recovery following a disaster. Such initiativeshelp bridge the protection gap by providing financial solutions.However, if financial solutions lead purely to reconstructionof what was destroyed, they leave the underlying vulnerabilityunchanged. Therefore, PGEs social objectives often push themto attempt to reduce the gap by reducing vulnerability throughmore resilient forms of building and other initiatives. PGEs thusoften face a tension between these two ways of addressinga protection gap - by bridging it (finding insurance solutionswith greater reach than the existing ones) or by reducing it (riskreduction through either removing risk or bringing more riskwithin tradable range).1.6 REPORT MAPThe report is structured in 7 sections and an appendix.Section 1 is the introduction of this report (current section).Section 2 outlines PGE origination, in which multiplestakeholders must come together with their different interests.Three objectives of PGEs are introduced, alongside examplesof how PGEs pursue them. How PGEs evolve in relation tothese objectives, and the key challenges which commonlyarise in pursuit of them is then discussed.Section 3 is about PGEs in developed economies with matureinsurance markets. It presents a Protection Gap StrategicResponse Framework that can be used to differentiate PGEsaccording to the way they intervene in the market for risk.We identify the pros and cons of three different types of PGEstrategic positions in the value chain for risk transfer, providinga practical model for PGE design.Section 4 is about PGEs triggered by a desire to protectsovereign states, with fragile economies that are highlyexposed to natural catastrophe, and where there is lowinsurance penetration. We explain how the particulardemands of such economies for immediate capital to copewith crisis post-disaster has led to innovations in protectiongap products.Section 5 discusses PGE contributions to disaster resilience.The PGE Resilience Framework is introduced to examinehow PGEs can support key aspects of resilience. Areas andchallenges that are beyond the direct control or influence ofPGEs are discussed.Section 6 introduces the PGE Evolution Framework to identifykey mismatches between different stakeholder interests, theevolving protection gap, and the remit of the PGE. Ways ofresolving these mismatches are suggested.Section 7 issues a call to arms to learn from and makebetter use of these already established PGEs to betterunderstand and address the growing threat of natural andman-made disasters.The Appendix presents the methodology of the research studyand a glossary with key terms used in this report.5
6Section 2SECTION 2.Origination and Objectivesof Protection Gap Entities(PGEs)Despite the great variety of local circumstances,7,8 and thehighly variable design and remit of the resulting PGEs, ourresearch study has found that PGEs typically originate at theinstigation of government in consultation with market players.They come about at their outset to fulfil objectives that fall intothree categories.Objective 1: Resolve disruption in (re)insurance supply inmature markets;Objective 2: Mitigate the threat of unaffordable insurancein mature markets;Objective 3: Increase the financial viability of sovereignstates with fragile economies.We find that these objectives not only shape the remit andstrategies of the PGEs at their point of origin. They also actas anchors for the evolution of PGEs. While PGEs are typicallyestablished with a relatively narrow mandate to act on aspecific local gap, some PGEs have evolved over time to tacklechanges in the nature of their protection gap.2.1 PGE ORIGINATION: AN ‘UNEASY’ TRUCE AMONGSTSTAKEHOLDERSGovernment has a socio-political and often an economicinterest in protecting its citizens and communities. Whenpart of the society is not protected by the existing marketmechanisms, it has the legislative power to bring aboutchange. One course of action may be to set up a PGE to fulfilthese public interests through the implementation of a marketsolution – finding a way to provide insurance.Establishing a PGE is inevitably a complex and sometimesprotracted process, as can be seen in our case study of theformation of Flood Re in the UK. It requires negotiationsbetween multiple stakeholders that have different world views,different technical understanding of risk, and crucially, differentobjectives – social and/or commercial.It can take many iterations to engineer what can be an ‘uneasy’truce between these stakeholders into the founding remit of aPGE. However, only once it begins to operate will the differentstakeholders really see how their interests are served by thePGE and its remit. As a result, the remit of the PGE may have toevolve; a recurrent theme in this report.The origin of Flood Re: A ‘truce’ between state andmarket stakeholdersThe autumn of 2000 was one of the wettest ever recordedin the United Kingdom and prompted a dialogue betweenthe Government and the insurance industry about howto manage growing flood losses. Working through theirprofessional body, the Association of British Insurers (ABI)the industry drew up a Statement of Principles (SoP) withGovernment to stabilize flood insurance provision. Underthis agreement, existing insurer members of the ABIpromised to continue insuring properties at high risk offlooding and the Government on its side would continue toinvest in flood defences.The SoP was renewed in June 2008 to last until July 2013.After a Flood Summit in September 2010, three workinggroups comprising representatives from Government, theEnvironment Agency, the insurance industry and relatedorganizations met regularly to try to agree key principlesfor a shared approach to managing flood risk, despiteconsiderable scepticism about each other’s motivations.In the move to austerity, government spending on flooddefences had been reduced; a move that was not wellreceived by insurers. At the same time, a two-tier insurancemarket had been created by the SoP, as new insurancecompanies entering the market did not have to insureproperties in high risk flood areas, and so could adoptdifferent strategies about which consumers to target. TheSoP conditions were affecting the competitive state of themarket.Over the following two years there were heated negotiationsabout the different government and industry objectives.Insurers preferred a free market where they could decidewhich risks made sense to trade commercially, and at whatprice. Government did not want high prices to be a deterrent,as they wanted to make sure that high-risk areas werecovered by insurance. Yet they did not want to take any extraliability on the public purse.For insurers, there was the real threat that Government couldlegislate an obligation to provide flood insurance, while forGovernment, the threat of a free market could leave high-riskproperties uninsured. Leaving a swathe of such propertiesuninsured was not good for the reputation of the insuranceindustry either, as an insurance stakeholder argued: “theincentive for us was reputational; we knew there was a
Between State and Market: ProtectionGap Entities and Catastrophic Riskproblem, the market wasn’t servicing these very high floodrisk homes, so how could we deal with that, rather than justsaying it’s too high a risk, we’re not going to insure you”. Asolution had to be found.The insurance industry drew on modelling and data frominsurers to understand the extent of the problem: howmany homes were at high risk of flood? They also examinedmodels for the setting up of a PGE, such as the CaliforniaEarthquake Authority (CEA), National Flood InsuranceProgram (NFIP), and the UK terrorism pool. The Governmentproposed different options, not wanting to leave that taskcompletely to the industry. After much push back from bothsides, the compromise Flood Re model was agreed in 2014.Flood Re would be run by the insurance industry, supportedby government legislation to levy all policyholders to fundthe pool, and the Government would increase spending onflood defences.More working groups brought together the ABI, representingthe industry, the Department for Environment, Food andRural Affairs (DEFRA) for the legislation, and other insurancemarket parties such as modellers, brokers and reinsurers.The often messy elements of the emerging solution werepresented to a committee of MPs, progressively establishingthe legislation that would be passed as a Bill in UKparliament on 2015 – a full fifteen years after the start ofdiscussions. Flood Re was born, and now had to executeits remit.2.2 OBJECTIVE 1: RESOLVE DISRUPTION IN (RE)INSURANCESUPPLY IN MATURE MARKETSExtreme events which cause unexpectedly high losses canresult in sudden large-scale disruption, or even failure, in thesupply of (re)insurance for a specific peril. This is because:a) unexpected large losses can jeopardize (re)insurers’capital reserves and thus the ability to pay claims; andb) industry participants may lose confidence in their abilityto quantify and manage exposure to such events.In such situations, insurers may stop offering policies so thatcitizens and/or business cannot get insurance cover. Thisdisruption may be compounded when reinsurers stop offeringcapital to insurers to cover catastrophic losses; the result isinsurers not being able to remain solvent to cover the risk ofa large-scale loss themselves. For example, Pool Re in theUK was formed following the terrorist bombing of the BalticExchange in London, which disrupted the supply of insuranceand reinsurance capital to cover terrorist attack on high-valuecommercial properties.Supply disruption in either the primary or secondary markettranslates into short-term disruption in the ability to transferrisk, and longer-term loss of trust in the market as a means torespond to disasters. Such disruption creates a socioeconomiccrisis that may spur the establishment of a PGE whoseobjective is to restore supply as quickly as possible, as shownin the CEA case study (below).The case of CEA: Solving the problem of supplyThe 1994 Northridge 6.7 magnitude earthquake in southernCalifornia caused insured losses of 12.5 billion USD. Thisreportedly equated to more than 80 years of premiums forearthquake in California: a clear message to the market thatexisting earthquake pricing had not reflected the actual risk.Residential insurers in California were concerned about theirability to price correctly for earthquake risk, for two reasons: They could not simply stop offering it because, since1986, it was (and remains) mandatory by California lawto offer earthquake cover with all residential-propertyinsurance policies. However, offerees are free to declinethe offer, and lenders do not require earthquake cover as acondition of mortgage issuance. California in 1988 enacted a new, strict, insurance-rateregulation law that dramatically restricted insurers’ abilityto implement rates for personal lines insurance, such ashome insurance.The effect of Northridge in 1994 on the primary homeinsurance market was rapid and severe: insurers simplywithdrew, or severely restricted the availability of, new homeinsurance policies for any peril, not just earthquake. Thismarket constriction eventually extended to almost 95% ofthe California home-insurance market. Californians requiringa new home-insurance policy were threatened with inabilityto insure new homes.A local protection gap for home insurance in California wascreated. While supply was disrupted, there was still strongdemand, as homeowners could not get a mortgage withouta home insurance policy in place. Although mortgageesdid not, and do not, require mortgagors to buy earthquakeinsurance, they still required insurance on a range of perilsbeyond earthquake.Faced with a severe crisis, the State of California, ledby the insurance commissioner, worked with insurancemarkets and the state Legislature to find a solution. Thisled to the creation of the California Earthquake Authority(CEA), a privately funded, pub
Table 1.1 The Protection Gap in developing and developed economies, 2017 Under-insurance is also a concern for developed economies.4,8 Insurance market stakeholders: While the insurance market is developed in these economies, the protection gap is also increasing.4 Such countries typically have high-value assets and infrastructure that, when under-
Fundamentals of Protection Protection System – A complete arrangement of equipment that fulfills the protection requirements Protection Equipment – A collection of devices excluding CT, CB etc Protection Scheme – A collection of protection equipment providing a defined function. 34! Zones of Protection
El Salvador Market entry: 2005 Units: 89 Costa Rica Market entry: 2005 Units: 217 Nicaragua Market entry: 2005 Units: 86 Honduras Market entry: 2005 Units: 81 India Market entry: 2009 Units: 20 Africa Market entry: 2011 Chile Units: 396 Market entry: 2009 Units: 404 Brazil Market entry: 1995 Units: 557 Argentina Market entry: 1995 Units: 105 As .
Minimum standards for child protection in humanitarian action Standards to mainstream child protection in other humanitarian sectors 163 Standard 19 Economic recovery and child protection DGH Standard 20 Education and child protection DHE Standard 21 Health and child protection DIL Standard 22 Nutrition and child protection DIG Standard 23 Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)
Protection and Control of EHV Capacitor Banks Standard 2.1.1 699B protection relay The 699B protection relay shall consist of: (a) phase overcurrent protection and earth fault protection sensitive to the fundamental frequency current; (b) phase harmonic overload protection –where the phase current is proportional to the voltage across the .
Motor Protection system. 365. Motor Protection. Protection and Control. The 239 is a digital motor protection system designed for three phase AC motors and associated mechanical equipment. Advanced protection features include: thermal overload. This function calculates the thermal capacity used by the motor during different stages of the motor .
1910.28 - Duty to Have Fall Protection and Falling Object Protection. Work on low-slope roofs Fall protection for (less than 6 ft.) from the edge. Fall protection for (6 ft. to less than 15 ft.) from the edge. Fall protection for (15 ft. or more) from the edge. Designated Area -Warning line, being used in a Fall Protection Plan
Power System Protection 7 Ex: Differential protection, frame leakage protection The systems in which selectivity is relative are non-unit systems. Ex: current time graded protection, distance protection. 1.7 Basic Principle of Operation of Protective relay Each relay in a protection scheme performs a certain function and responds in a given
Contents Product Selection 1 Overview/Applications 2 Operating Programs 3 Communication 4 Overcurrent Protection 5 Distance Protection 6 Line Differential Protection 7 Transformer Differential Protection 8 Busbar Differential Protection 9 Relays for Various Protection Applications 10 Generator Protection 11 Substation Automation 12 Relay Communication Equipment 13 Test Equipment and Accessories 14
