GAO-20-257T, NAVY MAINTENANCE: Persistent And Substantial Ship And .

Figure 2: Aircraft Carrier, Surface Ship, and Submarine Days of Maintenance Delay,Fiscal Years 2014 through 2019Note: Delayed maintenance days are allocated to the fiscal year in which they occurred. Delayedmaintenance days data for aircraft carriers for this analysis are limited to the Navy’s public shipyardsand do not include data from private shipyards. Data for submarines includes days of maintenancedelay from maintenance conducted at both public and private shipyards. Surface ship maintenance isconducted at private shipyards. Days of delayed maintenance data is as of November 2019.Furthermore, these delays have been growing longer and more frequent.In fiscal year 2014, about 20 percent of the Navy’s maintenance periodswere more than 90 days late. However, in fiscal year 2019, more than 57percent of its maintenance periods were similarly late (see figure 3).Page 5GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

Figure 3: Number of Navy Maintenance Periods That Ran Late by Length of Delay,Fiscal Years 2014 through 2019Note: Maintenance periods are allocated to the fiscal year in which they were completed.When maintenance is not completed on time, there are two primaryeffects. First, fewer ships are available to conduct training or operations,which can hinder readiness. For example, in fiscal year 2019,maintenance delays resulted in the Navy losing the equivalent of 19surface ships. Second, maintenance delays are costly. In November2018, we examined attack submarine maintenance delays and reportedthat the Navy incurred significant operating and support costs to crew andmaintain attack submarines that are delayed during maintenanceperiods. 6 We estimated that from 2008 to 2018, the Navy spent 1.5billion to support attack submarines that provided no operationalcapability—attack submarines sitting idle no longer certified to conductnormal operations—while waiting to enter the shipyards and thosedelayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. 7 Werecommended that the Navy analyze how it allocates its maintenance6GAO, Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facingthe Attack Submarine Fleet, GAO-19-229 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2018).7We calculated the costs in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars. While acknowledging themagnitude of these costs, Navy officials stated that there may be some benefits that couldbe realized from supporting these idle attack submarines since crews on idle attacksubmarines can conduct some limited training. GAO-19-229.Page 6GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

workload across public and private shipyards. DOD concurred with ourrecommendation, and in December 2018, the Navy analyzed its workloadallocation and moved two additional attack submarine maintenanceavailabilities to the private shipyards, with the possibility of movingadditional availabilities to the private sector over the next 5 years.Navy MaintenanceChallenges Stemfrom MultipleInterrelated FactorsThe Navy’s ability to successfully maintain its ships—completing allrequired maintenance on-time and within estimated cost—is affected bynumerous factors that occur throughout a ship’s lifecycle (see figure 4).Some of these factors involve decisions made during the acquisitionphase, years before a ship arrives at a shipyard for maintenance, whileothers manifest during operational use of the ship or during themaintenance process, as illustrated in figure 4.Page 7GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

Figure 4: Factors Affecting Maintenance PerformanceThese decisions can be interrelated; for example, decisions to increasedeployment lengths to meet the Navy’s operational demands can result indeclining ship conditions and material readiness. The declining conditionof the ships can increase the time that ships spend undergoingmaintenance at the shipyards. Increased maintenance time at shipyardscan lead to decisions to make further operational schedule changes toextend deployment lengths for other ships to compensate for shipsexperiencing maintenance delays.Acquisition DecisionsAffect MaintenanceTimelinessWhile our statement today focuses on factors occurring during operationsand the maintenance process, we have previously reported that long-termsustainment costs can be affected by decisions made early in theacquisition process. The decisions made during the acquisition phase of aPage 8GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

weapon system can affect maintenance strategies used throughout thelifecycle, as 80 percent of a program’s operating and support costs arefixed at the time a program’s requirements are set and the ship isdesigned. 8 For example, the littoral combat ship (LCS) program initiallyplanned to operate the ship with 40 sailors using contractors to completeall of the onboard maintenance tasks. After challenges with the first LCSdeployments, the Navy began revising the ships maintenance strategy,including adding more sailors onboard the ship. In addition, decisions toacquire or not acquire rights to technical data can have far-reachingimplications for DOD’s ability to sustain the systems and competitivelyprocure parts and services. 9 Furthermore, the Navy has shown awillingness to provide ships to the fleet that still have a number ofunresolved construction and quality deficiencies, which add to itsmaintenance burden. 10 For example, the Navy delivered the USSSomerset amphibious transport dock to the fleet with 52 significantdefects, including an electronic system crucial to the ship’s missioneffectiveness that the fleet had to replace shortly after it received the ship.We have ongoing work on the effect that acquisition decisions can haveon maintenance that we expect to issue in early 2020.Operational DecisionsAffect MaintenanceTimelinessSome causes of delays are created or exacerbated during an operationaldeployment. Our work has shown that to meet heavy operationaldemands over the past decade with a smaller fleet, the Navy hasincreased ship deployment lengths and has reduced or deferred shipmaintenance. Decisions to reduce crew sizes between 2003 and 2012also left crews overburdened and contributed to deferred maintenance.These decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions across thefleet and have increased the amount of time that ships require tocomplete maintenance in the shipyards. Increased maintenance periods,8GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for FutureInvestments, GAO-18-238SP (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2018); GAO, Navy Shipbuilding:Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality,GAO-17-418 (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2017); GAO, Navy Force Structure: ActionsNeeded to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews, GAO-17-413(Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2017); and GAO, Best Practices: Setting RequirementsDifferently Could Reduce Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2003).9GAO, Defense Acquisition: DOD Should Clarify Requirements for Assessing andDocumenting Technical-Data Needs, GAO-11-469 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).10GAO-17-418.Page 9GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

in turn, have compressed the time during which ships are available fortraining and operations. Specifically, the Navy: Decreased crew levels. We reported in 2017 that the Navy’s effort toreduce crew sizes between 2003 through 2012 corresponded withincreases in maintenance costs that outweighed the savings achievedthrough reduced personnel costs. 11 Navy officials told us that shifts inmaintenance workload from the organizational- and intermediatelevels to depot-level maintenance increased overall maintenancecosts. This change occurred in part because reduced crew sizesresulted in minor maintenance being deferred, which developed intomore costly issues that had to be addressed later at the depot level. Extended deployments. We have previously reported that Navydecisions to extend deployments can lead to maintenance challenges,as these decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions acrossthe fleet, and have increased the amount of time that ships require tocomplete maintenance in the shipyards. 12 Deferred maintenance. We reported in 2015, 2016, and 2017 thatmaintenance deferred while a ship is deployed can develop into morecostly issues that must be addressed later, often during depot-levelmaintenance. 13 Deferred maintenance can lead to new work at theshipyards, as the degraded ship conditions result in the need foradditional maintenance. For example, maintenance officials told usthat the focus for ships homeported overseas is on mission readiness,so overseas-homeported ships place priority on the maintenance ofcombat systems. This means that systems with the potential to reduceship service life—such as fuel and ballast tanks that require extendedin-port periods to properly maintain—can be subject to maintenancedeferrals in order to allow the ship to sustain a high operationaltempo.11GAO, Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition ofShip Crews, GAO-17-413 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2017.)12GAO-16-466R.13GAO-17-413, GAO-16-466R, and GAO, Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan andComprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned toOverseas Homeports, GAO-15-329 (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015).Page 10GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

Challenges during theMaintenance ProcessAffect TimelinessIn our prior work, we identified numerous challenges that occur during theNavy’s planning and execution of a ship’s maintenance period thatcontribute to delays. For example: Difficulties in adhering to the maintenance planning process. Wereported in 2016 that the Navy must accurately define the work foreach ship’s maintenance period. 14 To do this, the Navy’s maintenanceplanning process specifies planning milestones intended to ascertainthe ship’s condition, identify the work needed, and plan for itsexecution. Missing or meeting planning milestones late can contributeto maintenance delays. However, the Navy does not always adhere toits own maintenance planning process due to high operational tempo,scheduling difficulties, or personnel shortages, among other factors,resulting in shipyards discovering the need for additional repairs aftermaintenance has begun and adding time to the schedule for planning,contracting, or waiting for parts. Navy shipyards have shortages of skilled personnel. The Navyhas reported a variety of workforce challenges at the four publicshipyards such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providingpersonnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in criticalskills. 15 The Navy has noted that some occupations require years oftraining before workers become proficient. According to Navy officials,a large portion of its workforce is inexperienced. For example, wereported in December 2018 that 45 percent of the Puget Sound and30 percent of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyards’ skilled workforce hadfewer than 5 years of experience. 16 According to DOD officials,workforce shortages and inexperience contribute to maintenancedelays. For example, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard in 2014 and2015, two submarines were delayed approximately 20 months each,in part because of shortages in ship fitters and welders, among otherskilled personnel. Most of DOD’s depots, which include the navalshipyards, have taken actions to maintain critical skills throughretention incentives, bonuses, and awards. However, we found thatneither the depots, their higher-level service component commands,nor the services have conducted an assessment to determine theeffectiveness of these actions.14GAO-16-466R.15GAO, DOD Depot Workforce: Services Need to Assess the Effectiveness of TheirInitiatives to Maintain Critical Skills, GAO-19-51 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2018.)16GAO-19-51.Page 11GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

The condition of facilities and equipment at Navy shipyards isgenerally poor. We reported in September 2017 that poor conditionof facilities and equipment at the shipyards contributed tomaintenance delays for aircraft carriers and submarines, hindering theshipyards’ ability to support the Navy. 17 Specifically, we found that theaverage condition of shipyard facilities was poor and that shipyardequipment was generally past its expected service life. For example,four of the five dry docks at Norfolk Naval Shipyard face floodingthreats from extreme high tides and storm swells and average onemajor flooding event per year. In 2009 a dry dock at Norfolk NavalShipyard required emergency repairs to prevent flooding while theUSS Tennessee (SSBN-734) was undergoing maintenance.According to the Navy’s report on the incident, several days of hightides and winds, coupled with multiple leaks in the dry dock’s graniteblock joints, resulted in the dry dock flooding at an estimated rate of3,000 gallons per minute before workers could repair it. In addition, atPuget Sound Naval Shipyard—located in an area identified by the U.S. Geological Survey as a “High Seismic Hazard Zone”—a 7.0magnitude or greater earthquake could damage or ruin the only drydock on the west coast that is capable of performing maintenance onaircraft carriers. We have also previously reported that the Navyshipyards do not track when facility problems leads to maintenancedelays. 18 Furthermore, the average age of equipment at the shipyards isbeyond its average expected service life (see table 1). Equipment thatis past its expected service life can pose an increased risk formaintenance delays or higher maintenance costs, affecting thedepots’ ability to conduct work. As we have previously reported, agingequipment can present a number of challenges, such as morefrequent breakdowns, less effective or efficient operation, and safetyhazards. 1917GAO, Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that AffectOperations, GAO-17-548 Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2017). Facilities are defined as anybuilding, structure, or linear structure (such as a fence or railway). Equipment includes allnonexpendable items needed to outfit or equip an organization; for the depots, thatincludes items used by depot personnel to conduct depot-level maintenance, such astools, test equipment, machining equipment, and test stands.18GAO, Military Depots: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions of Facilities andEquipment that Affect Maintenance Timeliness and Efficiency, GAO-19-242 (Washington,D.C.: Apr. 29, 2019).19GAO-19-242.Page 12GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

Table 1: Average Age of Equipment at the Navy’s Public ShipyardsYearsShipyardAverageequipment ageTime past averageservice lifeNorfolk Naval Shipyard2915.3Portsmouth Naval Shipyard193.5Puget Sound Naval Shipyard225.2Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard150.8Source: GAO-20-64. GAO-20-257T The Navy shipyards lack the capacity to conduct requiredmaintenance in the future. We also reported in 2019 that the navalshipyards cannot support 68 of the 218—almost a third—of themaintenance periods that aircraft carriers and submarines will requirethrough 2040, due to a lack of dry dock capacity. 20 Specifically,several of the Navy’s 17 dry docks will become obsolete after the LosAngeles-class submarines are retired because they will be too smallor lack the appropriate shore-side support for newer classes ofsubmarines. For example, only 14 dry docks can support the earlyflight Virginia-class submarines and only 11 dry docks can support theVirginia-class submarines outfitted with the longer Virginia PayloadModule. 21 In addition, no dry docks can currently support repairs tothe Ford class aircraft carrier, even though the Navy accepted deliveryof the first ship of that class in 2017. Private shipyards have told theNavy that they could have some additional capacity to conductmaintenance, but are hesitant to invest in creating this capacitywithout more certainty from the Navy.20GAO, Naval Shipyards: Key Actions Remain to Improve Infrastructure to Better SupportNavy Operations, GAO-20-64. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 2019).21The Virginia Payload Module is an additional mid-body section, approximately 84 feet inlength, which contains vertical launch tubes that would be used to store and fire additionalTomahawk cruise missiles and other payloads. The Navy plans to include this module inall of the Virginia-class boats procured in fiscal year 2020 and subsequent years.Page 13GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

The Navy Has TakenSome Steps toAddress MaintenanceDelays, butCorrective ActionsWill Take Years toImplementThe Navy Developed aShipyard InfrastructureOptimization Plan, but ItWill Require SignificantTime and Resources toImplementThe Navy has begun to implement a major effort—the ShipyardInfrastructure Optimization Plan—that is intended to significantly improvethe condition of shipyard facilities and equipment, but it will requiresignificant time and resources to implement. This plan is designed toaddress the bulk of the Navy’s dry-dock capacity issues as well as identifythe optimal placement of facilities and major equipment at each publicshipyard. The Navy estimates these changes can ultimately increase itsmaintenance efficiency by reducing the distance that workers andmaterial will have to travel around the shipyards during the maintenanceperiod. According to the Navy, this equates to recovering about 328,000labor days per year—an amount roughly equal to that of an additionalsubmarine maintenance period annually. In addition, the Navy hascreated a program office to oversee its shipyard improvement effort,which we believe demonstrates leadership attention and commitment tothe effort. However, the Navy estimated that the replacement of thefacilities will take 20 years (see figure 5). Further, the Navy estimates thatit will take 30 years to bring the average age of its equipment to withinindustry standards.Page 14GAO-20-257T Navy Maintenance

Figure 5: Navy’s Timeline for Optimizing Facilities under the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization PlanNote: The Navy’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan is designed to identify the optimalplacement of facilities and major equipment at each public shipyard, which the Navy estimates canultimately increase its maintenance efficiency by reducing personnel and materiel travel.The Navy estimated in 2018 that this effort will require 21 billion over 20years to implement. However, this 21 billion estimate does not includeinflation and other significant costs, such as those for utilities, roads, orenvironmental remediation. Our analysis of the Navy’s preliminaryestima

the maintenance periods conducted during fiscal years 2014 through 2019, with more than half of the delays in fiscal year 2019 exceeding 90 days. When maintenance is not completed on time, fewer ships are available for training or operations, which can hinder readiness. Navy's Days of Maintenance Delay, Fiscal Years 2014 through 2019