SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing To President Kennedy

InternationalSecurity 26tion of some intelligenceinformation,as well as the strong disagreementson Soviet forcelevels among U.S. intelligenceagencies in 1961, which wasevidentin the range of intelligenceestimatesprovided to the President.Whatis clear, however, is that while Soviet nuclear forces capable of attackingEurope were large, Soviet intercontinentalforceswere far inferiorto thoseof the United States.The Soviet ICBM forces have received considerable attentionbecause ofthe missile gap controversy.U.S. fearsof an impendingmissile gap favoringthe Soviet Union, fears that JohnKennedy exploited during the 1960 Presidential campaign, were the product of U.S. intelligence shortfallsin thisperiod, inevitable uncertaintiesabout Soviet procurementplans, and Khrushchev's blusteringattemptsto gain politicaladvantage throughnuclearbluffand intimidation.10The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of December1958 had estimated that the Soviets could have 500 ICBMs in 1961, but suchestimates were repeatedly lowered in subsequent NIEs as improved intelligence became available.11By September 1961, however, it was clear to U.S.policymakersthat the missile gap actually favored the United States. OnSeptember 6, the CIA informedthe President that earlier estimates that 50to 100 Soviet missiles were operational were "probably too high," and theNIE published on September 21 placed the number of Soviet ICBMs onlaunchers as only 10 to 25 with no marked increase considered likelyduringthe immediatelysucceeding months.12It is criticalto remember,however, that ICBMs were only a small part ofthe Soviet strategicforceposture in 1961. The ICBM forcewas not as largeas had been previously estimated, the CIA reported on September 6; but"nevertheless, the present capabilities, along with those of bombers and10. The best sources on the missilegap are Lawrence C. McQuade, Memorandum forMr. Nitze,"But Where Did the Missile Gap Go?," 31 May 1963, National SecurityFiles, Box 298, MissileGap, 2/63-5/63,JFKL;JohnPrados, TheSovietEstimate:U. S. IntelligenceAnalysisand SovietStrategicForces(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1986), pp. 110-126; and Arnold L. Horelickand Myron Rush, StrategicPowerand SovietForeignPolicy(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,1966), pp. 35-102.11. NIE 11-4-58 (23 December 1958), as cited in McQuade memo, "But Where Did the MissileGap Go?," pp. 7-8. NIE 11-4-59 (9 February1960) estimated 140-200 ICBMs on launchers bymid-1961,and NIE 11-8-61 (7 June 1961) reportedthe intelligencecommunity'sconsensus thatthe Soviets "might already have fiftyto one hundred operational ICBM launchers," as cited inibid., pp. 9-10, 14.12. Central IntelligenceAgency Memorandum, "CurrentStatus of Soviet and SatelliteMilitaryForces and Indications of MilitaryIntentions,"6 September1961, President's OfficeFiles, Countries,Box 117, German Security8/61-12/61,p. 4, JFKL;NIE 11-8/1-61(21 September1961), citedin McQuade memo, "But Where Did the Missile Gap Go?," p. 15.

SIOP-62 Briefing127submarines,pose a greatthreatto U.S. urban areas, but a more limitedthreatduringthe monthsimmediatelyahead to our nuclear strikingforces."1'3Whatwere U.S. estimates of the other two legs of the Soviet triad?In 1961, the bulk of the Soviet Union's strategicnuclear weapons residedon its long-range bomber force. Declassified material prepared for specialhigh-levelwar games held during the Berlin crisis in early September 1961estimatedthat"the Soviets could put about 200 bombersover NorthAmerica"in an initial firststrike,an estimate that is consistentwith SecretaryMcNamara's testimonyin executive sessions of the Committeeon Foreign Relations in Februaryand September1962.14This estimateincluded BISON andBEAR heavy bombers as well as BADGER and BLINDER medium-rangebombers but excluded combat attritionfromU.S. air defenses, which wouldhave existed since, as SecretaryMcNamara testifiedin February1962, "suchan attack could not be launched without our receivingwarning more thanadequate to alert our strategicforceand air defenses."'15Turningto U.S. estimates of Soviet submarine-launchednuclear missiles,the September 1961 Berlin crisis war game material stated that there wereapproximatelytwenty-eightSoviet red,seven nuclear-powered) capable of launching "about seventy-eight"nuclear missiles against United States coastal targets.16 In Feb13. CIA memo, "CurrentStatus of Soviet and SatelliteMilitaryForces," p. 5.14. MaterialsPrepared forNATO Planning Conference,9 September1961, Red StrategicForces,OSD-FOI; Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations CommitteeTogether with JointSessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee(HistoricalSeries), Vol. 14, 87th Congress,2nd session, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1986), pp. 145, 694.McNamara testifiedon September 5, 1962 that the Soviets have about 165 long-rangebombersand tankers,and about 950 medium-rangebombers and tankers,and "out of that totalbombertanker force of something on the order of 1,100 or 1,200 aircraft,they could put about 200bombers,we believe, over North America today." Ibid., p. 694.15. NATO Planning ConferenceMaterials, Red StrategicForces; and Executive Sessions of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee, Vol. 14, p. 145. No officialestimates of the expectedeffectivenessof the NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) air defense against sucha Soviet attack are available, but NORAD exercises in the early 1960s revealed that U.S. airdefenseswere farfromperfectin defendingagainst a concertedSoviet attack.See HQ NORAD,Sky Shield III, "Conclusions and/orRecommendations,"December 6, 1962. CCS 3150 JointandCombined Exercises, 20 December 1961, Sec. 2, Box 66, JCS 1961.16. NATO Planning Conference Material, Red StrategicForces. This materialappears to havebeen based upon officialU.S. estimatesof the rapidlygrowingSoviet submarineforce.NIE 118-62 (July6, 1962) stated thatin mid-1962the Soviets had ten H-class nuclear submarines(threeballisticmissiles each), fourE-class nuclear submarines (six cruise missiles each), seven Z-class(diesel-electric)submarines (two ballisticmissiles each), 25 G-Class (diesel-electric)submarines(threeballisticmissiles each), and six convertedW-class (diesel-electric)submarines(threecruisemissiles each). The total was therefore155 nuclear missiles on 52 submarines. Figures in Ray-

InternationalSecurity 28ruary 1962, McNamara testifiedthat thirtySoviet submarines could deliverapproximatelyninety nuclear missiles.17 This submarine force was an extremelyprimitiveone, however, equipped with short-rangeSS-N-3 cruisemissiles and SS-N-4 ballisticmissiles, both of which required the submarineto approach within150-350 nautical miles of the U.S. coast and surfacepriorto launching an attack.18 If one collects these estimates, the resultingestimated total Soviet strategicnuclear forceat the time of the SIOP-62 briefingis given in Table 4.When one examines the relative alert levels of U.S. and Soviet strategicnuclear forcesin 1961, the imbalance appears even more pronounced. In late1961, approximatelyhalf of the StrategicAir Command (SAC) bomber forcewas kept on fifteenminute ground-runwayalert with a small number of B52s on airbornealert at all times throughthe continuous airbornealerttraining program. Two of the AtlanticCommand's five Polaris submarines (eachwith sixteen missiles on board) and about one-thirdof SAC's ICBM force(twenty-fourout of seventy-eightmissiles) were also routinelykept on alert.In September 1961, the Chairman reportedthatexecutionof the alert optionTable 4. EstimatedSoviet rine-launchedmissiles(ballisticand cruisemissiles)BombersNumber10-25about 78200mond L. Garthoff,IntelligenceA DecisionPointin theKennedyAdminAssessmentand Policymaking:istration(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1984), p. 55.17. ExecutiveSessions of the Senate Foreign Relations CommitteeTogetherwith JointSessionswith the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), Vol. 14, 87th Congress, 2ndSession, 1962 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1986), p. 145.18. For a discussion of Soviet submarine missile launching capabilitiesin the early 1960s, seeK.J.Moore, Mark Flanigan, and RobertD. Helsel, "Developments in SubmarineSystems,19561976," in Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, eds., SovietNaval Influence:DomesticandForeignDimensions(New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 154-162; and Robert G. Weinland, "TheEvolution of Soviet Requirementsfor Naval Forces: Solving the Problems of the Early 1960s,"Survival,Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan./Feb.1984), pp. 16-25. The Soviet navy may have also includedtorpedo-firingsubmarinesin theirstrategicdeliveryforces.See Michael MccGwire,"Soviet NavalProcurement,"in The Soviet Union in Europeand the Near East: Her Capabilitiesand Intentions(London: Royal United Services Institute,1970), pp. 79-81. U.S. intelligenceestimatesafter1962dropped cruise missile submarines fromthe strategic-attackforceestimateson the grounds thatthey were likely to be used for anti-carrieroperations, not land attack missions. Garthoff,IntelligenceAssessmentand Policymaking,p. 22.

SIOP-62 Briefing129in SIOP-62 would launch 1,004 deliverysystemswith 1,685 nuclear weaponsagainst the Sino-Soviet bloc.19In stark contrast,none of the Soviet ICBMs were kept on routine highstates of alert in 1961: nuclear warheads were controlledby the KGB andkept physicallyseparated fromthe rocketforces;the missiles' non-storableliquid propellant was unstable; and the September 1961 war game materialsuggested that it might take one to three hours to warm up the electricalequipment and fuel the early Soviet ICBMs.20As a special interdepartmentalintelligencereport for President Kennedy stated in August 1962: "presentSoviet procedures forfiringinitialand subsequent salvos are relativelyslowand complicated, and design limitationsof their currentmissile systemsappear to preclude attainmentof readiness conditionsapproaching those ofU.S. systems."'21The Soviet bomberforces'alertstatuswas similar:no bombers were ever on routine day-to-dayrunway alert and no Soviet airbornealertprogramexisted.22Finally,no precise estimateon the day-to-dayreadiness of the Soviet nuclear-armed submarine force appears to have beenavailable in 1961, and the 1962 special intelligencereportcould only statethat the Soviet submarine fleetwas "forthe most part" kept in port duringpeacetime and that"virtuallynone would be in position to launch immediatelyagainst the United States under day-to-dayalert conditions."23Preemptionand WarningGiven the size of the Soviet strategicnuclear forceby 1961, it is understandable that U.S. officialsbelieved that the effectsof a Soviet firststrikewould19. Briefingto the President,SIOP-62, p. 14; IS, p. 48.20. Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," in Ashton B. Carter,JohnD. Steinbruner,and Charles A. Zraket, eds., ManagingNuclearOperations(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1987), p. 487; Robert P. Berman and JohnC. Baker, SovietStrategicForces:Requirementsand Responses(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1982), p. 49; and NATO PlanningConferenceMaterials, Red StrategicForces. Fred Kaplan has reported that U.S. intelligenceestimatedin 1961 that it would take at least six hours to load warheads on Soviet ICBMs. FredM. Kaplan, The WizardsofArmageddon(New York: Simon and Schuster,1983), p. 295.21. "Report of the Special Inter-DepartmentalCommitteeon Implicationsof NIE 11-8-62 andAssessmentandRelated Intelligence Assessment and Policy Making," in Garthoff,IntelligencePolicymaking,p. 49.22. Meyer,"Soviet Nuclear Operations," p. 488. The NATO PlanningConferenceMaterialstates,in contrast,that 10 percent of the Soviet bomber forcewas on ground alert,but according toThomas Schelling, the coordinatorof'the games, this estimatemay have been an artificeof thegaming exercise. Interview,11/6/86.Assessment23. "Report of the Special Inter-DepartmentalCommittee,"in Garthoff,Intelligenceand Policymaking,p. 47 (emphasis added).

InternationalSecurity130be horrendous. What bears special attentionis General Lemnitzer's discussion of U.S. preemption. It should by no means be surprising that theChairman of the JointChiefs discussed nuclear preemptionwith PresidentKennedy in 1961: the existenceof such capabilitiesand options was commonknowledge in the late 1950s and early1960s, and seniorU.S. officialspubliclydiscussed such a possibility.24Indeed, what mightbe surprising,given theimbalance of forces outlined above and the extraordinarilylow readinessstates of Soviet forces, is General Lemnitzer's warning that "under anycircumstances-even preemptive attack by the U.S.-it would be expectedthat some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear force would striketheUnited States."25Why was this the case? The briefingdoes not present the JointChiefs'calculations,but a number of possibilitiescan be examined. First,one mustconsider the scenario under discussion. At no point in the SIOP-62 briefingdoes General Lemnitzerappear to be discussing a U.S. "bolt out of the blue"surprise attack against the Soviet Union.26 Instead, what the preemptiveoption appears to referto is the possibilitythat the United States mightpreempt, i.e., launch an offensivestrike,upon receivingwarning that theSoviet Union was about to launch an attack.27Yet, militaryactivitiesthat24. For example, Air Force Chief of StaffGeneral Thomas White discussed the United Statestaking the "initiative"in a nuclear war in the event of "tacticalor strategicwarning" in openCongressional testimonyin 1959. PresidentKennedy also told StewartAlsop in March 1961 that"in some circumstances we might have to take the 'initiative"' in nuclear war, apparentlyreferringto a Soviet conventionalattackon NATO. DepartmentofDefenseAppropriationsfor1960,Hearings before the Subcommitteeof the Committeeon Appropriations,House of Representatives,86th Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, pp. 928-929; and StewartAlsop, "Kennedy's GrandStrategy,"SaturdayEveiningPost, March 31, 1962. Also see "First Strike?,"Newsweek,April 9,1962, p. 26.25. Briefingto the President,SIOP-62, p. 18; IS, p. 50.26. There appears to have been some discussion of a surprisecounterforceoption, not utilizinginflexibleSIOP structures,among civilian planners during the Berlincrisis,but the incident isstill shrouded in mystery.Kaplan states that U.S. fatalitiesin a successful firststrike wereestimatedby Pentagon civilians at two to fifteenmillion(the scenario used is unclear), but alsonotes the greatoperationaluncertaintiesinvolved and the expectationthatEuropean allies wouldsufferfargreaterdamage due to the large number of Soviet theaternuclear forces.See Kaplan,Wizardsof Armageddon,pp. 294-301; and Gregg Herken, Counselsof War (New York: Knopf,1985), pp. 159-162.27. A portionof the draft1959JointStrategicObjectives Plan has been declassifiedand confirmsthis view: "U.S. national policy precludes the concept of preventivewar or acts intended toprovoke war. However, in recognitionof the clear differentiationbetween preventivewar andthe exercise of the initiative,U.S. forcesmay be required to take the initiativeif so directedbythe Presidentin response to knowledge that a Soviet attackagainst the United States is imminent." CCS 3130, JSOP, 25 November 1959, Box 14, JCS 1959. As earlyas April1950,forexample,the U.S. government rejected the possibilityof preventive war. As NSC-68 put it, "it goes

SIOP-62 Briefing 31would constitutestrategicwarning that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent-such as matchingwarheads to the ICBMs, fuelingthe missiles,loadingand dispersingbombers, or sending bombers to Arcticstagingbases28-wereprecisely the Soviet actions that would reduce the effectivenessof a U.S.preemptivestrike.Moreover,if the United States alerted its missile forcesorplaced SAC or European Command bombers on higher states of alert inorder to increase coverage and effectivenessof SIOP-62, such actions wouldconstitutestrategicwarning for the Soviets and increase the likelihood ofcorresponding Soviet alert measures.29Indeed, McNamara expressed precisely such concerns in late 1962 in a draftmemorandumforthe President:I am convinced that we would not be able to achieve tacticalsurprise, especially in the kinds of crisis circumstancesin which a first-strikecapabilitymightbe relevant. Thus, the Soviets would be able to launch some of theirretaliatoryforcesbeforewe had destroyedtheirbases.30withoutsaying that the idea of 'preventive'war-in the sense of a militaryattacknot provokedby a militaryattackupon us or our allies-is generallyunacceptable to Americans." Moral andpoliticalconsiderations"rule out an attackunless it is demonstrablyin the nature of a counterattackto a blow which is on its way or about to be delivered." NSC-68 in Thomas H. Etzold1945-1950Documentson AmericanPolicyand Strategy,and JohnLewis Gaddis, eds., Containment:(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1978), pp. 431-432. In 1957, three members of theGaitherCommitteeadvocated a reconsiderationof the preventivewar option, but Eisenhowerapparentlydid not follow that advice at thattime. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," p. 47.28. SecretaryMcNamara testifiedin 1963 that "to mount such an attack, the Soviets wouldeitherfirsthave to deploy theirbomber forceto theirArcticbases or stage them throughthesebases in successive waves. Such action would greatlyjeopardize theirchance of surprisingusand, equally important,theirbombers would become vulnerable to our missile attack duringtheir staging operation." Statement of Secretaryof Defense Robert S. McNamara Before theHouse Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations,The Fiscal Year 1964-1968Defense Programand the 1964 Defense Budget, Feb. 6, 1963, p. 50, National SecurityArchives,Washington,D.C. In congressional testimonyin January1959, Chairman of the JointChiefsNathan Twining noted that "large scale movement" of long and medium-rangeSoviet bombersto Arctic staging bases "might provide us with very valuable strategicwarning." ExecutiveSessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee(HistoricalSeries), Vol. 11, 86th Congress,1st session, 1959 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1982), p. 23.29. In addition, as Richard K. Betts has argued, if the Soviet Union launched a conventionalattackagainst NATO, it would in all likelihoodalertits strategicnuclear forcesin orderto protectagainst a U.S. nuclear response. RichardK. Betts,"A Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance BeforeParity,"InternationalSecurity,Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter1986-87), p. 22. Stephen Meyer has arguedthat the Soviets probably had militarybase watchers (KGB and GRU agents) scatteredaroundEurope and the United States to provide strategicwarning of a bomber attack. Meyer, "SovietNuclear Operations," p. 488.30. DraftMemorandum forthe President,November 21, 1962. Subject: Recommended FY 19641968StrategicRetaliatoryForces, OSD-FOI (hereinafterDPM-62), p. 8. On Soviet crisisreactions,see, however, Marc Trachtenberg,"The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban MissileCrisis," InternationalSecurity,Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 156-161.

InternationalSecurity132General Lemnitzer's statementmay well reflectsimilarconsiderations,sinceit clearlysuggests thatthe JointChiefs believed thateven ifwarning of suchSoviet activities was unequivocal and prompt, and even if the Presidentauthorized nuclear attackunder such conditions (and theremust have beenconsiderable uncertaintyon both counts),31the United States could not beconfidentthat a preemptive attack could destroy all Soviet bombers andmissiles on the ground beforetheywere launched.A second factorcontributingto cautionarymilitaryassessments concerningpreemptioncan be seen in the measurementsof militaryeffectiv

Soviet bloc" that would be attacked, and the mechanics of the execution of the SIOP. His conclusion was simple and chilling: execution of SIOP-62 . TAB G, National Security Files, Agency Files, Box 11-12, Department of Defense, 11-63, Vol. 1, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. The total megatonnage was 1,798 for the alert force and .