China's World Issue 7 - WordPress
2019 Issue1 CHINA'S WORLDDavid ScottThe West should recognise thatChina is not an ordinary nationalstate. It is a civilizational state
CHINA'S WORLD2019 Issue1At the start of 2019, the Hong Kongbased South China Morning Post ran anarticle on 20 January titled “From tradewar to a clash of civilisations” writtenThere is an edge to talk of Chinese culture andChinese civilization that actually slides into Hansupremacismby Regina Ip. In it, she argued that “theWest should recognise that China is notan ordinary national state. It is a civiliza-relations being organized by the thinktheme, magni ed by his talk of a China-tional state” and that “if Samuel Hunting-tank New America. Skinner made strongIslam block working against the West.ton’s Clash of Civilisations prognosis iscomments on stage concerning civiliza-This was further elaborated in his 1996anything to go by, Sinic civilisation is nottion clash between the US and China,book entitled “The Clash of Civilizationsone which lends itself easily to Western-which quickly went viral and which ig-and the Remaking of World Order”. Thestyle democratisation”. Having set up thisnited immediate responses from Chinaquestion mark present in his 1993 articlecivilizational contrast, she neverthelessat the highest level. Second, barely twohad disappeared but was now coupled inimmediately went on to advocate that “itweeks later and Beijing hosted the Con-1996 with a sense of a changing worldis equally if not even more important inference on Dialogue of Asian Civiliza-order in which China was identi ed onthe long run, to avoid a clash of civilisa-tions (CDAC), complete with welcomingpage 83 as “the society most likely totions between China and the West”. Herspeech from Xi Jinping on 15 May. Bothchallenge the West for global in uence”.status as chairwoman of the pro-Beijingevents represent a quarter of a century ofIn Huntington’s book, China’s build-upNew People’s Party was on show laterheated debate over the role of civilizationof military capabilities were the dra-on in the year amid the dramatic anti-ex-in international politics, initiated withmatic scenario for a “civilizational war”tradition and pro-democracy demonstra-Samuel Huntington back in 1993, andbetween China and the US breaking out,tions that swept across Hong Kong dur-which continue to reverberate in China-in 2010, sparked by US interventioning spring and summer 2019. This wasUS relations.in the South China Seas in the wake of2the focus of Gary Schmitt’s piece at theAmerican Enterprise Institute (AEI) on13 June, entitled “Hong Kong: A clash ofcon ict between China and Vietnam. OfThe “Clash of Civilizations” andHuntingtoncivilizations”; though Beijing’s line wascourse 2010 has been and gone, but it isworth noting that by summer 2019 boththe US and China had established greaterto accuse US consulate sta , Julie EadehThe American scholar Samuel Hunting-military presence in the South China Seain particular, and the “West” in general ofton attracted widespread attention, lasting(mostly claimed by China), completeinterference.fame, and a degree of notoriety with hiswith rising China-US and China-VietnamForeign A airs article in Summer 1993maritime confrontations in these waters,By then, two “very di erent approachesentitled “The clash of civilizations?”;at a time of strengthening US-Vietnamto the world” from the United States (US)complete with question mark at the end,defence links.and China had been on show in April andand the famous prediction on page 25 thatMay 2019, which both re ected what Im-“the clash of civilizations will dominateHuntington’s analysis made a splash part-manuel Wallerstein had rst dubbed “ge-global politics. The fault lines betweenly because it contrasted with other inter-oculture as the underside of geopolitics”civilizations will be the battle lines ofpretations about the end of the Cold Warback in 1991. First, on 29 April 2019 Ki-the future”. Rising friction between Is-and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Inron Skinner, director of policy planning atlam and the West was most prominent1992, for instance, Francis Fukuyama inthe State Department, was interviewed atin his analysis, but civilizational frictionhis book “The End of History” argued thatthe Future Security Forum on US-Chinabetween China and the West was anotherthe West’s blend of liberal democracy and1
2019 Issue1 CHINA'S WORLDcapitalism seemed victorious. Huntington’s more pessimistic vision of the futurerejected that idea, re ecting the collapseby then of Yugoslavia along ethnic andreligious divides. Huntington’s analysisFaced with Huntington’s clash scenario, the People’sRepublic of China has stressed its opposite – theharmonious coexistence of civilizations, achievedthrough the dialogue of civilizationsof future structural challenges from China was also a challenge to assumptionsof American primacy outlined in 1990Even though Huntington’s analysis wasA close look at Huntington’s mapworkwith Krauthammer’s “unipolar moment”most immediately focused on civiliza-shows China straddling various civili-opening up for the US. It should be notedtional friction between the “West” andzational “fault lines”. Politics of coursethat most of the academic commentary“Islam”; most Chinese commentators,surrounds questions of culture and civi-was strongly negative to Huntington’so cial and semi-o cial, saw Hunting-lization within China. Beijing stressesanalysis of civilizational clashes, but itdon’s theory as also providing a threat inthe traditional civilizational picture ofshould also be noted that Huntington’sturn to China. Wang Jisi and Zou SichengChina based on the harmonious tripod ofbook became a bestseller. Moreover, indismissed Huntington’s analysis as dan-Confucianism and Daoism and Sinicizedthe aftermath of the 2001 al-Qaeda attackgerous politically-driven “China-Threat”“Chinese” Buddhism. However, there ison the New York, which took down thepolicy-shaping. They arguerstly thatan edge to talk of Chinese culture andTwin Towers and targeted the Pentagon,“in a sense Huntington’s thesis is moreChinese civilization that actually slidesHuntington’s perspective on civiliza-a political essay than an academic re-into Han supremacism. Han chauvinismtional frictions gained wider popularity,port, given that he has written it to advise(da hanzu zhuyi) was the warning givenpolitical pick-up, and perhaps credibility?the US government”; and secondly thatby Mao Zedong in 1953, and it remains aA similar process followed the rise of the“Huntington hopes his theory will line upquestion over sixty years later.Islamic State (ISIS) in the Middle East,the di erent fractions of American soci-North Africa and their blow-back attacksety, and even the whole West, to ght anDemography is of central importance inin Europe, where ISIS portrayed its ac-imaginary enemy”.the People’s Republic of China (PRC).tions in stark clash of civilization terms.3The PRC claims to be a multi-ethnicstate made up of Han alongside a rangeof other ethnic groups; but the Han makeup 91.5% of the population in the 2010national census, and it is from the Hanthat Chinese civilisation developed. Demographic movement of the Han hasbeen a deliberate PRC state policy. Already the Inner Mongolia AutonomousRegion has long been transformed into aHan-populated setting around 80%. Nowmovement of Han settlers, denounced bythe Dalai Lama as “demographic imperialism, increasingly threatens to make theTibetan (and their Tibetan Buddhism) andUighurs (and their Turkic Islam) a minority in their own supposedly nationalitiesbased Autonomous Regions of Tibet and
CHINA'S WORLD2019 Issue1of Xinjiang.4 Sini cation of these non-environment in China for continued re-inter-civilization dialogue, allowing cul-Han regions was on the base of this Hangime survival by the Chinese Commu-tures to complement one another throughChinese dominance, and presents an ele-nist Party (CCP). This is matched by thecompetition and comparison”; and withment of internal culture wars that werephrase “harmonious world” (hexie shijie),his call that “we should endeavor to pre-civilizational to some extent.and within that fostering of “harmoniousserve the diversity of civilizations in thecivilizations” (hexie wenming) to shape aspirit of equality and openness, make in-conducive external environment for Chi-ternational relations more democratic andna, that can also foster continued regimejointly build towards a harmonious worldsurvival by the CCP.where all civilizations coexist and accom-5Harmonious coexistence of civilisationsmodate each other”. Closer inspectionFaced with Huntington’s clash scenario, the People’s Republic of China hasHu Jintao’s speech at the United Nationsshows some tension between Hu Jintao’sstressed its opposite – the harmoniouson 15 September 2005 was suitably ow-call for civilizations to compete and forcoexistence of civilizations, achievedery and extended on such inter-civiliza-them to cooperate. Re ecting the politicalthrough the dialogue of civilizations. Thistional dialogue. He started with the callimperatives of regime survival, Hu’s callties into other harmony formulations usedthat “we should do away with misgivingsfor the “democratization of internationalby the Chinese government, most nota-and estrangement existing between civili-relations” (guoji guanxi minzhuhua) wasbly “harmonious society” and “harmoni-zations and make humanity more harmo-not matched by calls for internal democ-ous world”. One should not forget thatnious and our world more colorful”. How-ratization. The “in line with national con-the political settings for the adoption ofever more double-edged comments wereditions” was a pointer towards Chinesethe phrase “harmonious society” (hexiepresent with his call that “in line withdistinctiveness, the “with Chinese charac-jiazhi) is to shape a conducive internalnational conditions, we should enhanceteristics” (juyou zhongguo tese) quali er
2019 Issue1 CHINA'S WORLDso often attached by Beijing to international normsits cultural in uence abroad, or ‘soft power’”. Tanglike human rights, democracy and suchlike.Yijie argued that “the deep-seated dream Huntington really cherishes is the renewal of the West toA series of Beijing Forums run during the 2000srecon rm its position as the leader whom otherpushed this Chinese message of civilizationalcivilizations follow and imitate”, and “the perfor-dialogue. The First Beijing Forum, held in 2004,mance of the Bush administration after ‘9.11’ in-was centered on the theme of “The Harmony andcident can be regarded from this standpoint as anProsperity of Civilizations”. Its keynote speakerattempt to recon rm American hegemonic leader-Qian Qichen, the PRC Vice Premier from 1998 toship on other civilizations”.2003, argued that “di erent civilizations should inthe rst place respect one another and coexist inThe link between a stress on “diversity of civili-harmony”, though in the longer term he judged thatzations” and foreign policy is not hidden. Jin Li-“only through the fusion of di erent cultures canangxiang has argued that “respecting the diversityinternational society and human civilizations makeof civilizations, as one characteristic of China’scontinuous progress”.foreign policy, is part of a strong Chinese tradi-6tion of inclusiveness, tolerance and harmony”,Around the government, Tang Yijie has been athat “this approach had served to maintain China’sstrong advocate of coexistence rather than clash.sound relations with countries of di erent cultural7Partly this was a matter of history; “from a generalperspective of history evolvement, assimilationand mixture form the mainstream of civilizationdevelopment in di erent states, nationalities andregions. In my opinion, civilization is not the rootcause of con icts between states, nationalities andregions, and di erent civilizations can co-exist andintermingle”. Partly it was a matter of policy; “Ibelieve that the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory ofSamuel P. Huntington is one-sided and serves USstrategy”, but that “it is the ‘coexistence of civilizations’ that points the way out for the human society,a goal that must be strived for”.Both Wang Jisi and Tang Yijie presented papers atthe Beijing Forum held in November 2008.8 Thiswas a high pro le event, on the theme of “TheHarmony of Civilizations and Prosperity for All—The Universal Value and the Development Trendof Civilization”. Wang Jisi argued there that “therole that China can and should play is to serve as abridge between di erent civilizations and culturesthat promotes harmony around the world”, but that“needless to say, while China is strengthening itscultural development at home, it wishes to enhance
CHINA'S WORLD2019 Issue1China has pushed closer links with the MiddleEast under the umbrella of civilizational dialogueRoad going through the world’s biggest Muslimstate Indonesia and across to the Middle East.China has pushed closer links with Middle Eastbackgrounds, and particularly those in the Islamicunder the umbrella of civilizational dialogue. Thisworld”, and that “this should be solid foundationwas evident in the then Prime Minister Wen Jia-for China to push forward Belt and Road construc-bao’s clarion call speech “Respect diversity of civi-tion jointly with Islamic countries, particularly inlizations” delivered at the headquarters of the Arabsecurity cooperation”.9 Two signi cant aspects canLeague in Cairo on 7 November 2009. This wasbe pinpointed. First is the “particularly those in thefurthered in the launching of the China-Arab stra-Islamic world”, which brings to mind the China-tegic partnership in 2010. China-Arab cooperationIslam linkage earlier suggested by Huntington.has become multi-faceted; not only in strengthen-Second is that sense of civilizational dialogue be-ing political coordination and economic coopera-ing a “solid foundation” for China’s Belt and Roadtion, but also in the setting up of inter-civilizationproject. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is ofdialogues and cultural exchanges. The latter is re-course China’sagship foreign policy initiative,ected in the Conference on the Sino-Arabic Rela-the Eurasian overland route going through the Is-tions and the Dialogues of Civilizations betweenlamic states of Central Asia, and the Maritime SilkChina and the Arabic World set up under the frame-
2019 Issue1 CHINA'S WORLDXi Jinping has frequently brought in the clashof civilizations in his criticisms of the USof civilizations deserve our respect andmust be treasured”, and that “if all civilizations can uphold inclusiveness, the socalled ‘clash of civilizations’ will be outof the question and the harmony of civi-work of the China-Arab States Coopera-“advancing the Belt and Road Initiativelizations will become reality”. As alwaystion Forum (CASCF).for international cooperation, among oth-context is the key. One would not expecters, will play an important role to pro-other than advocacy of mutual enrich-mote civilizational dialogues”ment at the UNESCO setting, given thisA similar process of geo-cultural and geo-is UNESCO’s central mission. Typicallypolitical nuances of civilization dialoguecan be seen with the Athens DeclarationXi Jinping has frequently brought in theXi’s rhetoric was layered; Chinese civi-on the Establishment of the Ancient Civi-clash of civilizations in his criticismslization was unique, even though subjectlizations Forum on 24 April 2017 signedof the US. Back in 24 March 2014, theto exchanges and mutual learning. Theby the Chinese Foreign Minister Wangnewly established Chinese leader visitedcopying of other civilizations was to beYi with fellow ministers from Bolivia,the UNESCO headquarters in Paris andavoided, at least mechanically or blindly.Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Italy, and Peru.delivered a speech attacking the “clashInstead of the clash of civilizations, thereA swathe of modern positioning was con-of civilization” thesis. The speech wascould and should be a harmony of civili-tained with the Athens Declaration, whereinterspersed with traditional Chinesezations.“recognising civilisation and cultural di-analogies, such as “copying other civi-plomacy as a soft and smart power, and aslizations mechanically or blindly is likeFour years on, and at the Shanghai Co-a major component of international rela-cutting one’s toes just to t his shoes” andoperation Organization (SCO) on 10 Junetions”, they emphasised “the importance“radish or cabbage, each to his own de-2018 Xi Jinping in a speech there that “inof using the dialogue among civilisationslight”. His direct message was that “everythis global village of ours”, that “whileas a powerful tool of diplomacy” and thatcivilization is unique. All achievementswe keep hearing such rhetoric as the clash
CHINA'S WORLD2019 Issue1of civilizations or the superiority of onecivilization over another, it is the diversity of civilizations that sustains humanprogress”. The stress on diversity of civilisations is at one level a simple rebu toGlobalization has been adopted by the People’sRepublic of China in the economic sphere,yet globalization is as much a cultural as aneconomic processnotions of Western superiority. However,it is also another way of insulating Chinafrom universal norms, the “civilizationmodes of thinking and cultural pattern.Hence Liu Kang’s talk of how “globaliza-with Chinese characteristics” in e ectThis has illustrated Deng Xiaoping’stion constitutes a fundamental paradox inenabling the government to talk of “hu-well known summation of the openingthe sphere of culture”; on the one handman rights with Chinese characteristics”.up programme that “when you open win-“the trend toward cultural homogeniza-dow both ies and air come in”. A notice-tion through global cultural productionChinese scholars like Yu Xintian wereable Chinese “culture fever” (wenhua re)and distribution (media, popular culture,clear on the value of a stress on a distinc-has ensued over tradition vs. modernity,and entertainment industry)” and on thetive Chinese civilization; where “Chineseconservatism vs. radicalism, nationalismother hand “the opposite trend towarddiplomatic strategy and policy re ect,vs. globalism, and Sini cation vs. West-cultural diversi cation in terms of local,consciously or not, the in uence of Chi-ernization. The challenge for the PRC isethnic, and national cultural projects andnese culture”, able to use the sense thathow far Chinese culture will respond toagendas”.13 The opposite trend is in part“China is a country of ancient civilizationwider global patterns, and indeed how farthe process of “glocalization”, and inwidely recognized in the world” to gener-globalization re ects a tacit Westerniza-part more crudely cultural nationalism.ate soft power advantages for China, intion, and with it uncomfortable WesternThe national cultural agenda taken by thewhich “the kernel of soft power is cul-norms. To take one example, if greater in-PRC was one of reasserting Chinese cul-ture”.dividualism among Chinese youth is oneture, even while Western technology andconsequence of globalization, as arguedeconomic ways of operation were takenby Liu Changyuan and Wang Song, thenin. The political agenda was regime sur-this has potential economic and politicalvival, and the continuing leadership of theconsequences over time.Chinese Communist Party (CCP).10Globalization and civilization withregard to China’s riseThere has long been a divergent pull overwhat China should identify itself with,“to learn from the ancestors or to borrowfrom the foreigners” (shi cong xianbei yujie li wairan) as the traditional dichotomyhas put it for over a century. This ongoingchallenge is now entwined with the challenges ensuing from China’s embrace ofglobalization since the 1990s.Globalization has been adopted by thePeople’s Republic of China in the economic sphere, yet globalization is asmuch a cultural as an economic process. Since the 1980s, economics-basedglobalization has impacted on Chinese1112
2019 Issue1 CHINA'S WORLDGeo-cultural nationalism was at play in Zhang Xiabo and Song Qiang’s 1996 collection Zhongguokeyi shuo bu (i.e. “China Can Say No”); completewith contributions like “Burn down Hollywood”,“I won’t get on a Boeing 777” and “Prepare forwar”. Elsewhere, the editors explained bluntlythat “a generation of Chinese has totally and uncritically absorbed Western, particularly American,values”; but “lately however, the tide has begunto turn. More and more people in China are looking East instead of West to nd a future”, where“because of the growth of the Chinese economyand the legacy of China’s rich cultural traditions,many of us maintain that China should aspire totake its place as a world power, instead of lamelyemulating Western society”.14 Their attacks weremaintained in their Chinese sequel, later that yearin 1996, titled “China Can Still Say No”.Certainly there has been noticeable re-invocationof Chinese culture by the PRC. This was on showwith the opening ceremony for the Olympic Gameshosted by Beijing in 2008, and its panoramic portrayal of the glories of Chinese civilization. Thishas also been on show with the widespread deployment of Confucius Institutes throughout the world,The culture agenda has become highly chargedin the People’s Republic of China, as thegovernment seeks to maintain regime controland project Chinese soft power and prestigemore widelypushing Chinese culture in the softest of settings,and run from the Ministry of Education.the PRC, as the government seeks to maintain reChinese scholars were keen to push this civiliza-gime control and project Chinese soft power andtional tool. In 2012, Yang Jiemian’s call was forprestige more widely; “the concept of ‘civilization’China “to promote inter-civilization dialogue andhas long been a lens through which Chinese think-advocate the ideas of a harmonious world, on theers and PRC leaders make claims about China’sbasis of developing their own core values of civili-global status and aspirations in the past, present,zations”, in order “to provide the new internationaland future”. 16system and international order with the wisdomsof the East”.15 This national pride, and appropria-The CCP Central Committee Resolution concern-tion by the central government was encapsulated ining “Some important questions in strengtheningWang Yiwei’s article simply titled “Revival of Chi-socialist spiritual civilization construction” passedna’s civilization gives legitimacy to its rise” thaton 10 October 1996 at the 14th Party Congressappeared in the Global Times on 15 January 2013.warned about geo-cultural challenges facing China; in which “what we must face the mutual agita-The culture agenda has become highly charged intion of all sorts of ideologies and cultures at the
CHINA'S WORLD2019 Issue1global level”, since “opening up to the outsidenese strength to provide a source of cultural andworld may also bring dangers; capitalist decadencemoral guidance for our people”, and that externallymay seize the opportunity to come in” and where“China’s cultural soft power and the international“the pressure from developed capitalist countries’in uence of Chinese culture have increased signi -upper hand in science and technology and the in l-cantly”.tration of western ideology will remain for a longtime”.A clash of civilizations and Kiron SkinnerHu Jintao’s Report to the 17th National Congress,As already noted at the start, on 29 April 2019,on 25 October 2007, was a rea rmation of eco-Kiron Skinner, director of policy planning at thenomic reform but also of cultural retrenchment. HuState Department, was interviewed on stage atpledged to “promote Chinese culture and build thethe Future Security Forum held by the think tankcommon spiritual home for the Chinese nation”,New America. Her comments were reported by thewelcomed how “Chinese culture has been an un-Washington Examiner on 30 April as “State De-failing driving force for the Chinese nation to keeppartment preparing for clash of civilizations withits unity” and vowed to “enhance the in uence ofChina”. Skinner did not mince her words on stage.Chinese culture worldwide”.Noteworthy was her pinpointing of civilizationalfactors in which she argued that “this is a ght withXi Jinping’s Report to the 19th National Congress,a really di erent civilization, and a di erent ideol-on 18 October 2017 was two-pronged in pledg-ogy, and the United States hasn’t had that before”.ing economic reform but also cultural strength.This was entwined with particularly forceful com-He argued that internally “we should do more toments that “in China, we have an economic com-foster a Chinese spirit, Chinese values, and Chi-petitor, we have an ideological competitor, one that
2019 Issue1 CHINA'S WORLDthis is a ght with a really di erent civilization,and a di erent ideologyStates. It’s going to be a long-term competition”in which “we are at a di erence with China, thatwe defend our interests and our values. And I dounderscore values”.really does seek a kind of global reach that manyChina’s rebuttal to Skinner was immediate. On 5of us didn’t expect a couple of decades ago”, andMay the Global Times opinion piece, entitled “US“I think it’s also striking that it’s the rst time that‘clash of civilizations’ leads nowhere” pointedwe will have a great power competitor that is notout the policy implications, that “it seems that theCaucasian”. The use of the term “Caucasian” wasUS Department of State led by Mike Pompeo isquickly picked up, and denounced by some as Yel-inciting hostility toward China as well as the Chi-low Peril racism. The irony on this is that Skinnernese civilization”, and that “the plan mentionedis a prominent Afro-American.by Skinner is clearly centred on Western civilization and discriminates against Chinese civiliza-US o cials at the State Department were quizzedtion”.17 The following day, the Foreign Ministryabout her speech, and certainly did not disown it.Spokesperson Geng Shuang told correspondents atCiting Skinner’s comments; at a Special Brie nghis regular Press Conference on 6 May that “it ison 3 May, David Hale the Under Secretary forsimply absurd and utterly unacceptable to look atPolitical A airs at the US State Department wasChina-U.S. relations from a clash-of-civilizationsasked “does the State Department view the currentor even racist perspective, which deserves everycon ict with China as a clash of civilizations in theharsh rebuke and resolute opposition”. The Chi-Samuel Huntington sense?”. His response was thatnese state media remained strong in its criticisms“I see China as a strategic competitor of the Unitedduring May, for example with articles like Zhong
CHINA'S WORLD2019 Issue1Sheng’s “‘Clash of civilizations’ theory will comesets”. On 16 July, John Bolton, the National Se-to no good end” run in the People’s Daily on 26curity Adviser spoke at the National ConservatismMay 2019, and Li Zheng’s “‘Clash of civilizations’Conference in Washington, DC. Bolton argued thatnarrative dangerous” run in the China Daily on 27the growing rivalry between America and ChinaMay 2019. Skinner was denounced in Yu Jincui’s“has elements of Samuel Huntington’s Clash ofpiece entitled “Radical Western extremists threat-Civilizations” thesis. The Chinese media immedi-en global security”, run in the Global Times on 8ately denounced both statements as re ecting thatAugust 2019, but with the rebuttal that the Westfor the US “this is all about racial supremacy”.19“should learn to face up to and adapt to the rise ofnon-Western civilizations”The Conference on Dialogue of Asian CivilizationsCriticism in the US of Skinner was also noticeable,including from liberal critics of China. Minxin PeiIn the immediate aftermath of Skinner’s com-argued that since “the latest failure to reach a tradements, Beijing held a high pro le Conference ondeal suggests that the US-China cold war is esca-Dialogue of Asian Civilizations in mid-May. In thelating to the next stage”, sooner or later “the Trumpo ng for several months, its timing enabled Chinaadministration will realize that it actually needsto make an immediate counter-narrative to Skinner.the support of its allies to prevail against the Chi-The Conference also came just weeks after the Beltnese”, and “when that day comes, it would do welland Road Forum (BRF) held in Beijing and daysto abandon talk of civilizational con ict and racialafter an escalation in the 10-month trade war be-rivalry, and instead o er a morally justi able casetween China and the United States. Throughout thefor confronting China”. However, in Hong Kong,Conference there was frequent reference to China’sunder identity threat from ever closer embraceBelt and Road Initiative (BRI) fostering economicfrom Beijing, Chi Wang penned an article at theand cultural cooperation across Eurasia and theSouth China Morning Post on 11 May titled “Cul-Indo-Paci c.18ture and race can’t be ignored in US-China rivalry– American o cial Kiron Skinner is right”. His po-The Conference was welcomed by Xi Jinping,sition as a former head of the Chinese section of thewhose speech on 15 May was suitably entitledUS Library of Congress, and currently president of“Deepening exchanges and mutual learning amongthe US-China Policy Foundation, give his endorse-civilizations for an Asian community with a sharedment of Skinner’s analysis an extra edge.future”. Xi set the context as “greater multi-polarity, economic globalization and cultural diver-US o cials maintained a robust position on “val-sity” and extolled Chinese foreign policy in whichues” at stake between China and the US. On 12 Julythe Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) across EurasiaSecretary of State Mike Pompeo alluded to widerand the Indo-Paci c “has greatly expanded inter-friction between the two countries in an interviewcivilizational exchanges and mutual learning”. Inwith Sebastian Gorka of America First. Pompeomany ways this represented a Chinese appeal topinpointed friction as threefold, ran
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WEI Yi-min, China XU Ming-gang, China YANG Jian-chang, China ZHAO Chun-jiang, China ZHAO Ming, China Members Associate Executive Editor-in-Chief LU Wen-ru, China Michael T. Clegg, USA BAI You-lu, China BI Yang, China BIAN Xin-min, China CAI Hui-yi, China CAI Xue-peng, China CAI Zu-cong,
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Air China (Beijing), China Eastern (Shanghai), China Northwest (Xi'an), China Northern (Shenyang), China Southwest (Chengdu) and China Southern (Guangzhou). CAAC was the nominal owner of these airlines, in the name of the state. Accompanying these reforms was growth in the number of regional airlines, which were usually established by local
Cold War 2001: China joins the World Trade Organization 2010: China overtakes Japan as world’s 2nd largest economy 2013: Belt and Road Initiative* announced 2015: Made in China (MIC) 2025 program** announced 2018: Seminal U.S. vice-presidential speech on China 2005: First U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue Key historical events in the U.S.-China strategic rivalry * Belt and Road Initiative (BRI .
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