Nuclear Security Challenges –for The United States, And

Nuclear Security Challenges – for theUnited States, and OthersMatthew Bunn, Harvard Kennedy SchoolBelfer-Pakistan Dialogue, Istanbul, April 14-15 2017belfercenter.org/mtaNuclear theft and sabotage are real dangers2qMultiple terrorist groups have sought nuclear weapons— al Qaeda’s program progressed as far as carrying out explosivetests in the Afghan desert— Aum Shinrikyo had substantial effort before 1995 nerve gas attacks— Only hints of ISIS interest (extended monitoring of Belgian nuclearofficial) – but has more , people, control of territory, ability torecruit globally than the othersqqqMultiple government studies (in U.S. and elsewhere) haveconcluded that sophisticated terrorist groups could make acrude bomb if they got the material 20 cases of seizure of stolen nuclear bomb material inpublic recordAlso multiple cases of actual or planned nuclear sabotage— Most recent: Insider sabotage of Doel-4 turbine in 20141

A recent example: insider sabotage and acleared terrorist at Doel-43qAugust 2014: An insider at Doel-4reactor in Belgium drains lubricant,destroys reactor turbine— 100 million damage— Investigators unable to find culprit— Sabotage intended to cause economicdamage, not radiation releaseqInvestigation finds that long before,contractor Ilyass Boughalab hadaccess to vital area— Passed security clearance review in2009— In late 2012, left to fight for terroristsin Syria (reportedly killed later)— Later convicted as part of“Jihad4Belgium” terrorist groupSource: Kristof PietersFive key challenges for nuclear security in theUnited States (and elsewhere)4qq1.2.3.4.5.Like nuclear safety, nuclear security is never ”done” –requires focus on continuous improvementEffective nuclear security systems include many elements, butstrong efforts in five areas are key:Design requirements covering the full spectrum of plausibleadversary capabilities and tacticsComprehensive programs to protect against insider threatsTargeted programs to strengthen security cultureRealistic performance testing and vulnerability assessmentConsolidating material to the minimum number of locations2

Covering the full spectrum of plausibleadversary capabilities tactics5qChallenge: need to protect against plausible possibilitieswithout wasting money on unrealistic threats— But adversaries learn, evolve, adaptqU.S. experience— Drastically increased DOE DBT after 9/11 attacks – in two steps— Then, as costs/inconveniences became clear, DOE DBT shifteddownward again— NRC DBT different – increased after 9/11, then largely stable— Are they enough? What are the odds of adversaries having ALL thecapabilities envisioned in the DBT? What are the odds ofadversaries having more capability in some areas (e.g., multipleinsiders)? Can systems be designed to provide significant protectionbeyond the DBT? If the state is to handle beyond-DBT threats, howto prepare to fulfill that responsibility?Insider threats are the most dangerousnuclear security problem6qPeople don’t want to believe theirfriends and colleagues couldbetray the organization— Leads to serious lapses in protectionagainst insider threatsqqqqOften even obvious “red flags” gounreported, unaddressedU.S. continues to experience seriousinsider challengesNew Bunn-Sagan book includes“Worst Practices Guide” on hownot to handle the insider threat,detailed case studies, data onjihadist thinking on sider-threats3

Comprehensive protection frominsider threats7qChallenge: insiders are trusted by other staff, can use theirspecialized knowledge and authorized access to pose a threat— Source of most past nuclear theft and sabotage casesqComprehensive insider threat program should include:— Background checks before access, and ongoing monitoring after accessis granted— Material accounting and control sufficient to detect any theft, andidentify when and where it happened (and who had access then)— Monitors that would detect any unauthorized access to or removal ofnuclear material— Strong incentives for staff to report concerning behavior, potentialvulnerabilities— Constant surveillance of material, and of vital areas for sabotage— Effective program to address employee disgruntlement— Is it enough? How do we assess? What about multiple insiders?Programs to strengthen security culture8qChallenge: How to build organizational culture wherepeople are always vigilant, always on the look-out forvulnerabilities to be fixed, ways to improve security?— “Good security is 20% equipment and 80% culture”qEvery nuclear operating organization should have atargeted program in place to:— Assess its security culture— Strengthen security culture over timeqSome key elements:— Leadership focus on security— Broad understanding of the threat – and security’s importance— Structuring incentives to encourage staff to focus on security4

Y-12 intrusion, 2012:A failure driven by weak security culture9q2012: 82-year-old nun and two otherprotestors enter Y-12 facility— Passed through 3 alarmed fences, settingoff multiple alarms – no one respondedfor extended period— New instrusion detection system setting off10x as many false alarms— Cameras to allow guards to see cause ofalarm had been broken for months— Major breakdown in security cultureqGraffiti from Y-12 Break-InEven today, few U.S. nuclearorganizations have targeted programsto strengthen security cultureRealistic performance testing and assessment10qChallenge: Many security systems that look effective can bebeaten by intelligent and creative adversaries— Adversaries find vulnerabilities we didn’t think ofqqIAEA recommendation: Quality assurance to ensureprotection system can protect against the design basisthreat; force-on-force exercises at least annuallySome key elements:— Create “red teams” with mission and incentives to find vulnerabilitiesand propose solutions— Conduct “tabletop” exercises and brainstorming workshops toidentify and assess tactics adversaries might use— Conduct realistic tests of ability of intelligent adversaries (insidersand outsiders) to find ways to defeat the overall security system –including realistic force-on-force exercises— Address weaknesses identified5

Challenges to realistic assessment, testing inthe United States11qCheating: January 2004: DOEInspector General finds thatWackenhut Corporation had beencheating on security exercisesqWeak incentives: Facilities wantvulnerability assessors to sayeverything is OK, not to findproblemsqSafety concerns limit the realism oftestingqHow to really test the performanceof insider threat protectionprograms?Consolidating material12qqqChallenge: Good security is expensive – and imperfect, soevery site with HEU or plutonium still represents some riskNuclear security summit commitment: minimize stocks andlocations with HEU and plutoniumElements of an effective consolidation effort:— Convert HEU fuels to LEU where practible— Assess each location with nuclear weapons, HEU, or separatedplutonium – do benefits still outweigh the risks? Could benefits stillbe achieved if material was removed and consolidated at anothersite?— Structure nuclear security regulations to give operators incentives toreduce costs by consolidating stocks of materialqU.S. experience:— Huge costs of post-9/11 security requirements created incentives formanagers to eliminate HEU, plutonium wherever possible6

Existing Pakistani good nuclear securitypractices13qqqqSubstantial investment in both physical security and humanreliability/counterintelligenceLarge armed guard forces, multiple types of barriers anddetectors, rapid response forcesCenter of Excellence provides high-quality, consistent trainingActive participant in nuclear security summits, key nuclearsecurity institutions— IAEA nuclear security programme (including training at COE)— CPPNM and its amendment— Global Initiative, Proliferation Security Initiative Opportunities for further nuclear securitycooperation14qqU.S.-Pakistan nuclear security cooperation has alreadyprovided major benefits to U.S. and Pakistani securityExchanges of approaches, best practices to meet each ofthe nuclear security challenges described here – and others– could build both security and confidence— Could establish Pakistan-U.S. expert working groups in each areaqqTransport security would be another fruitful area where bothcountries face challenges, have ideas to offerNear-term international opportunities:— INFCIRC/869, “Strengthening Nuclear Security Initiative”— World Institute for Nuclear Security— ICSANT7

Opportunities for cooperation (II)15qqqqExpanded regulator-to-regulator discussionsRadiological source securityPrevention and detection of illicit traffickingExploration of issues involved in Pakistan joiningINFCIRC/869, e.g.:— Approaches to preparing for international peer reviews of nuclearsecurity— Approaches to implementing key IAEA recommendationsqJoint development of initiatives to sustain nuclear securityprogress with the end of the summit process— Through the IAEA— Through the “Contact Group” of interested countries— Should the Global Initiative add a working group on nuclear securityand physical protection?For additional information 168

Principles for all states with HEU, plutonium,or major nuclear facilities17qqqqqqqProtect these items against the full spectrum of plausibleadversary threats and capabilitiesHave well-trained, well-equipped on-site armed guardforces sufficient to defeat the threatHave comprehensive programs to protect against insiderthreatsHave targeted programs to strengthen security culture,including regular security culture assessmentsConduct in-depth assessments and realistic tests to ensurethat nuclear security systems are meeting performance goalsHave nuclear material accounting and control systemssufficient to detect thefts and localize them in place and timeProvide effective cyber protectionFurther Reading and Background Material18qPreventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement orDangerous Decline? (2016) ingNuclearTerrorismWeb.pdfqThe U.S.-Russian Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear dfA Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons From eats.pdfqNuclear Security .org/qFull text of Managing the Atom publications:http://belfercenter.org/mta9

Nuclear safety and security support nuclearenergy growth19qNuclear energy important to U.S. and Pakistan’s energyfutures (and those of other countries)— Clean, expandable, non-intermittent powerqqPublic support requires public confidence that facilities willbe safe and secureFukushima accident had major effect on public, investorperceptions— Another major accident – or, worse, a terrorist attack – could doomprospects for nuclear growth on scale needed for major climatemitigation, pollution-reduction contributionqqResources for safety and security are essential investments inthe future of nuclear energySafety and security are inextricably intertwined – oftencontribute to each other, sometimes conflictSecurity culture matters:Propped-open security door20Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office10