CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGR· IM RELEASE AS SANITIZED .

Director ofCentralIntelligenceCIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGR· iMRELEASE AS SANITIZEDSoviet Space ProgramsNational InteUigence EstimateVolume 1-Key Judgmentsand Executive Summary .Top SecretNf 11-1-85/

'i.Tef3 BeretNIE ll-l-85JSOVIET SPACE PROGRAMSVOlUME I-KEY JUDGMENTSAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARYInformation available as of 5 December 1985was used in the preparation of this Estimate.which was approved bv the National ForeignIntelligence Board on that date.Tep Sserat

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE.THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of theEstimate:The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecurityAgency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.Also Participating:The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the ArmyThe Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the NavyThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air ForceThe Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

PREFACEThis Estimate is published in two volumes. Volume I includes theKey Judgments and Executive Summary. Volume II is a comprehensivediscussion of Soviet space programs.vTGS sggg Ba/ 'I ps;c,e'

Tap 6ee stFigure 1Soviet Space Expenditures, 1965-85Billion 1983 US S30Support01965707580ScctclVI .Top gGnllt85

TeF' 6ceactKEY JUDGMENTSA continuing trend toward the increasing use of space assets by Sovietmilitary forces is clearly foreshadowed by the large investments in spacesystems R&D of the past few years. We can expect to see the payoff bythe early 1990s in terms of expanded access to space for performance ofa variety of missions. In the long term, space systems would probably bean integral part of any advanced-technology strategic defense systemthe Soviets might develop and deploy, and we expect antisatellite(ASAT) capabilities-improved by then-to be a critical aspect of Sovietefforts to counter any space-based elements of a potential future USstrategic defense.Ultimately, it is the sheer size and breadth of the Soviets' space effort that gives them their greatest potential in the competition forleadership in space. The magnitude of the effort compensates for muchof the inefficiency and technological deficiency that characterizes manyindividual Soviet programs. Furthermore, we cannot clearly account for'all of the Soviet space support facilities in existence and underconstruction-design bureaus, production facilities, launchpads, andcontrol facilities-with known programs. Although some or even all ofthis additional capacity may be designated for relatively . benign"programs that we have not been able to detect, the possibility remainsthat developments of a more ominous nature await us, such as theeventual deployment of weapons in space. Another possibility is thatmore of the older facilities and launch vehicles will be phased out' thanwe have projected . Finally, it appears that the Soviets are providingthemselves with the necessary support structure to ensure that they willbe well positioned to make timely deployments of space systems basedon any major breakthrough in one or more areas in which we know theyare working-antisubmarine warfare (ASW}, ASA T, or ballistic missiledefense (BMD) technologies, for example.We estimate that in 1985 the costs of Soviet space programs areabout 26 billion. Between 1980 and 1983, space costs nearly doubled,largely because of the costs associated with the development of theheavy-lift launch vehicle. Since then, space programs have continued toexpand at a rate of nearly 10 percent annually (see figure 1). This levelof investment is equivalent to about 1.5 percent of the Soviet grossnational product. The costs of military space activities alone are aboutthe same as those for strategic offensive forces. Since 1980, mannedspace programs have accounted for the bulk of increased expendituresand now amount to about One-fourth of the total costs of Soviet spaceTGS &33(} 86/lTep &aerat

Tap Seerstefforts. The Soviets are making extensive use of man in space forperforming research on critical military problems[We expect the largest increases to be noted inmanned activities and communications programs over the next fiveyears.JThe Soviets currently have a dedicated antisatellite interceptor andseveral other potential means to conduct ASA T operations. The orbitalinterceptor system presents a significant threat to all low-altitude USintelligence and military support satellites but its effectiveness is limitedby operational considerations and reliability. The Soviets' overall ASATcapabilities are somewhat limited, especially against satellites at higheraltitudes. We expect the Soviets to make significant improvements intheir ASA T capabilities, particularly in the area of directed-energytechnologies.The Soviets use their space assets today principally to performtraditional military support missions of communications, targeting,reconnaissance and surveillance, navigation, meteorology, and geodesy;militarily, these functions will remain the most important space activities in the near term, and most of the future developments we projectare extensions of these basic military support missions. In addition, theSoviet space effort supports civilian-oriented functions, such as telecommunications, remote sensing for agricultural and resource development,and scientific research.The military importance of Soviet space assets has increasedgreatly in the past 10 years, and the Soviets increasingly value these assets for support of military operations in a crisis or conflict, especiallyfor reconnaissance and targeting, communications, and navigation. Wejudge that, although the USSR is not at present overly dependent onspace systems for the effective conduct of military operations, satellitesbecome more important to the Soviets as the level of conflict increases.In addition, as more near-real-time monitoring capabilities are introduced (including manneq platforms), we expect that Soviet spacesystems will become increasingly important in providing information onrapidly developing situations to both national-level decisionmakers andmilitary commanders.Soviet efforts to acquire space technology wi!I increase in the faceof intensified military-technological competition with the United States.The proliferation of commercial space capabilities among the Westernallies and the establishment of cooperative space programs will widenthe available targets for Soviet access. Thr()ugh such efforts, a vastamount of valuable space-related technology already has been andcontinues to be obtained directly from US sources and US allies inWestern Europe and Japan. Critically sought-after missile and spaceTG& &:l6Q 8&/ r2

Tal' ee1 attechnologies include those related to development of space-based laserand other directed-energy weapons and antimissile defense systems.Open source publications, particularly NASA documents and NASAfunded contractor studies, constitute the largest and most importantsource of US space technology.The scope and direction of the Soviet space effort, the extensive efforts to acquire Western space technology, and the military nature ofSoviet manned space experiments are ultimately disquieting. Althoughwe judge that overall the Soviets remain at a significant technologicaldisadvantage relative to the United States in space, we are concernedabout the possibility that they may be heading toward a major militaryadvance. Our concern stems primarily from the considerable uncertainties we face in several key areas: the Soviet efforts in advanced weapontechnologies, the purpose of the Soviet use of man in space, and thegreat increase in the infrastructure the Soviets are providing. for spacesystem operations. Their efforts in these areas could lead to importantmilitary advantages.3Top Scu cl

Top 6ce:ratEXECUTIVE SUMMARY1. Over 70 percent of Soviet space launches are formilitary purposes at present and have been for someyears; most of the remainder serve both military andcivil purposes. The Soviets are increasing their spaceefforts in overall expenditures, R&D, booster size andpayload capabilities, and number and types of satellites in orbit. Much of the increase is due to thegrowing use of satellite systems to support militaryoperations. We have identified 15 Soviet space systemsthat are probably in development and are likely toundergo testing in the next 10 years (see figure 2).2. The Soviet approach to space differs from the USapproach. In general, the Soviets conduct their activities in space in much the same way they conduct alltheir military activities. Space assets are integratedinto the various elements of Soviet military forces andare not subordinated to a separate entity such as aspace command. In the Soviet view, any major conflicton Earth cannot be conducted without involvingspace. Soviet military precepts, such as the importanceof surprise, the necessity of confusing the enemy, andthe use of overwhelming force to ure mditaryobjectives, are also likely to apply to Soviet militaryoperations in space during a war. -· · .of a new ocean research satellite for naval support such as locating ice-free routes and facilitating Arctic submarine operations. The Sovietshave also increased the use and sophistication oftheir military comsat networks.-Improved Readiness Posture. These developments have improved the Soviet posture withregard to augmentation needs in a crisis. Whereas two years ago, about 40 additional satelliteswould have been needed to fill out existingpeacetime networks in order to support crisis orwartime needs, today's requirement probably hasbeen reduced to 20 to 30 because of the largernumber of satellites and upgraded systems nowon orbit. In addition, demonstration of a capability to store on orbit some communications, navigation, and reconnaissance satellites indicates Soviet intentions to reduce even further their needto launch additional spacecraft in a crisis.- Timeliness. The Soviets have taken preliminarysteps to improve the timeliness of their space---based reconnaissance.c· . .lBy the 1990s, theSoviets will be capable of rera'ying some satellitederived information to field commanders withinabout two hours of collection by reconnaissancesatellites, a capability essential for combat conditions in which mobility characterizes the forcesof both sides.A. Key Developments3. Key developments since the 1983 NIE on TheSoviet Space Program point to a continuing determined Soviet effort to acquire a mature and robust setof capabilities in space:- Expanded Satellite Network. The Soviets haveincreased the number of operational satellitestypically on orbit to over 140. This larger andmore sophisticated network is more capable ofsupporting Soviet military forces and operationsthan the 110-satellite network of just two yearsago.- Survivabilitu. We have noted some Soviet efforts to improve the survivability of Soviet spacecontrol facilities. Launch facilities and the maincontrol facilities are fixed, however, and remainvulnerable to attack.·- New Capabilities. The Soviets have furtherbroadened satellite support to military missions,including reconnaissance, communications, targeting, and other purposes. Notev:rorthy developments include the introduction of a prototypenear-real-time imaging system and development-Long-Duration Manned Spaceflight. Sovietcosmonauts set a world record of 237 continuousdays in space in a single flight, part of the longterm Soviet effort to establish a permanentmanned presence in space. The Soviets alsodemonstrated the capability to bring the damaged Salyut 7 spacecraft back into service, with5-TG& §33Q 8§/{Tep beeret